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CHICKAMAUGA. 


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NOTED  BATTLES  FOR  THE  UNION 


DURING  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

In  the  United  States  of  America,  1S61-5. 


CHICKAMAUGA 


BY 


^■7 


JOHN  B.  TURCHIN, 

Late  Brigadier-General  United-States  Volunteers; 
Formerly  Colonel  of  the  General  Staff 
(Etat-Major)  in  the  Imperial 
Guards  of  Russia. 


Illustrated  with  Eight  Maps. 


CHICAGO: 


FERGUS  PRINTING  COMPANY. 


1888. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1888,  by 
Fergus  Printing  Company, 

In  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Nov.  14,  1888. 
Fergus  Printing  Company,  Chicago, 

Dear  Sirs: — The  officers,*  invited  by  Capt.  S.  C.  Kellogg, 
U.S.A.,  to  meet  at  Chattanooga  on  Nov.  10,  1888,  and  to  assist 
him  in  locating  the  positions  of  our  troops  on  the  old  battle¬ 
field  of  Chickamauga,  with  a  view  of  correcting  the  official 
War-Department  maps  of  that  battle,  have  finished  their  work. 
During  our  visits  to  the  battlefield  on  Nov.  11,  12,  and  13,  there 
were  found  slight  discrepancies  between  the  positions  as  located 
by  the  gentlemen  present  and  the  corresponding  positions  as 
designated  on  our  maps,  accompanying  the  narrative  of  the 
“Battle  of  Chickamauga.”  They  are  as  follows: 

(1)  Gen.  Wilder,  who  commanded  our  mounted-infantry  bri¬ 
gade  (1st  brig.,  4th  div.,  14th  A.C.)  in  that  battle,  asserted  that 
after  his  withdrawal  from  Alexander’s  bridge,  where  his  bri¬ 
gade  was  posted  during  Sept.  18,  1863,  he  took  position  on  the 
heights  east  of  Vineyard’s  farm,  where  he  remained  until  next 
morning.  Toward  evening  of  the  same  day,  the  confederate 
troops  of  B.  R.  Johnson’s  division,  with  one  brigade  of  Hood’s 
division,  after  crossing  Chickamauga  River  on  Reed’s  bridge, 
advanced  toward  the  same  Vineyard’s  farm,  and  went  into 
bivouac  several  hundred  yards  from  the  field  of  that  farm,  lying 
on  the  east  side  of  the  main  Chattanooga-and-Lafayette  road; 
so  that  apparently  the  troops  of  Wilder  were  facing  the  above- 
mentioned  confederate  troops  during  the  night  of  Sept.  18-19. 

On  our  map  No.  5  we  have  placed  Wilder’s  brigade  east  and 
a  little  north  of  Widow  Glenn’s  house,  as  Gen.  Thomas,  in  his 
report,  mentions  that  while  advancing  with  two  of  his  divisions 

*  Those  present  at  Chattanooga  were:  Capt.  S.  C.  Kellogg,  U.S.A.,  in  charge 
of  the  correction  of  the  official  maps;  Gen.  Absalom  Baird,  who  commanded  ist 
division,  14th  A.  C. ;  Gen.  Ferdinand  Vanderveer,  who  commanded  3d  brigade,  3d 
division,  14th  A.  C. ;  Gen.  H.  V.  Boynton,  who  commanded  35th  Ohio  Inf.;  Gen. 
John  B.  Turchin,  who  commanded  3d  brigade,  4th  division,  14th  A.C. ;  Gen.  J.  S. 
Fullerton  and  Capt.  J.  D.  Taylor  were  on  the  staff  of  Gen.  Granger,  commanding 
reserve  corps;  Gen.  John  T.  Wilder,  who  commanded  the  mounted-infantry  brigade; 
Lieut. -Col.  Chesley  D.  Bailey  of  the  9th  Kentucky  Inf.,  of  VanCleve’s  division;  and 
Col.  S.  B.  Moe,  adjutant -general  of  Steedman’s  division. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


toward  Kelley’s  house,  early  in  the  morning  of  Sept.  19,  Col. 
Wilder  reported  to  him  that  his  brigade  was  in  position  on  the 
heights  east  of  Widow  Glenn’s  house. 

Gen.  Wilder  thus  explains:  that  as  Glenn’s  and  Vineyard’s 
houses  are  on  an  almost  due  east-and-west  line,  consequently 
his  report  to  Gen.  Thomas  of  his  position  was  correct.* 

In  our  description  of  the  action  of  our  troops  around  and  on 
Vineyard’s  farm  on  Sept.  19,  we  locate  Wilder’s  brigade  form¬ 
ing  on  the  left  of  Davis’  division.  Its  position  on  our  map 
No.  6  is  shown  at  the  time  when  Davis’  troops  were  driven  by 
the  enemy  across  the  field,  and  when  Col.  Wilder’s  command 
checked  the  enemy’s  pursuit. 

The  discrepancy  thus  exists  only  in  the  location  of  the 
bivouac  of  Wilder’s  brigade  on  the  night  of  Sept.  18  and  19, 
and  as  there  was  no  action  at  the  time,  it  is  unimportant. 

(2)  Gen.  Vanderveer  was  colonel  commanding  third  brigade 
of  Brannan’s  division,  and  Gen.  Boynton,  as  lieutenant-colonel, 
commanded  the  35th  Ohio  Infantry,  under  Vanderveer,  during 
the  Chickamauga  battle.  They  have  located  the  position 
occupied  by  their  brigade  in  the  forenoon  of  Sept.  20,  in  which 
they  met  and  checked  the  enemy  advancing  in  the  rear  of  our 
left  wing,  and  then  by  a  charge  drove  him  beyond  our  extreme 
Left.  This  position  is  located  by  them  on  the  east  side  of  and 
close  to  the  main  Chattanooga-and-Lafayette  road,  in  Kelley’s 
field,  while  on  our  map  No.  7  it  is  designated  on  the  west  side 
of  that  road;  a  discrepancy  which  does  not  invalidate  the 
general  features  of  the  actions  in  the  rear  of  our  left  wing 
during  the  forenoon  of  September  20,  1863,  as  designated  on 
our  map. 

The  above  are  the  only  discrepancies  noticed  between  the 
positions  of  our  troops  as  located  by  the  parties  investigating 
the  battlefield  and  the  positions  designated  for  those  troops 
on  our  maps. 

Yours  truly, 

John  B.  Turchin. 


*  We  have  erased,  with  a  cross,  Wilder’s  position  near  Glenn’s  house,  in  map 
No.  5,  and  inserted  his  bivouac  position  on  Sept.  18-19,  as  claimed  by  him,  in 
front  of  the  rebel  troops  under  Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson, — Pubs. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Portrait  of  Author,  in  1867, 


Frontispiece 


Map  1. — Vicinity  of  Chattanooga,  showing  the  preliminary  dis¬ 
positions  and  movements  of  the  contending  forces.  Com¬ 
piled  from  the  War  -  Department  Map  of  the  Atalanta 


Campaign  and  the  U.-S.  Coast- Survey  Map, 


24 


Map  2. — Vicinity  of  Battlefield,  showing  the  movements  of  the 

enemy  to  defeat  in  detail  the  army  corps  of  Gen.  Thomas,  32 

Map  3. — Vicinity  of  Battlefield,  showing  the  movements  of  the 

enemy  to  defeat  in  detail  the  army  corps  of  Gen.  Crittenden,  42 

Map  4. — Vicinity  of  Battlefield,  showing  the  location  of  oppos¬ 
ing  armies  on  the  night  of  Sept.  17,  1863,  -  -  52 

Map  5. — Battlefield  of  Chickamauga,  reduced  from  War-Depart¬ 
ment  Map,  showing  action  of  combatants  during  the  fore¬ 
noon  and  until  1  p.m.  on  Sept.  19,  1863,  -  In  pocket 

Map  6. — Battlefield  of  Chickamauga,  reduced  from  War-Depart¬ 
ment  Map,  showing  action  of  combatants  during  the  after¬ 
noon  of  Sept.  19,  1863;  also  showing  position  occupied  by 
Union  forces  at  Rossville,  Sept.  21,  1863,  -  In  pocket 

Map  7. — Battlefield  of  Chickamauga,  enlarged  from  War-Depart¬ 
ment  Map,  showing  action  of  combatants  during  the  fore¬ 
noon  of  Sept.  20,  1863,  -  -  -  In  pocket 

Map  8. — Battlefield  of  Chickamauga,  enlarged  from  War-Depart¬ 
ment  Map,  showing  action  of  combatants  during  the  after¬ 
noon  and  evening  of  Sept.  20,  1863,  -  -  In  pocket 


CONTENTS. 


Dedication,  ^ 

Publisher's  Preface,  -  ^ 

Preface,  ^ 

Part  First.— The  Campaign. 

CHAPTER  I. — Preliminary,  ^ 

CHAPTER  II. — The  Movements,  -  -  -  21 

CHAPTER  III. — The  Isolation  of  our  Army  Corps  and  Bragg's 

Attempts  to  Defeat  Them,  -  -  -  -  32 

CHAPTER  IV. — Halleck — Concentration  of  our  Army — The 

Enemy’s  Orders,  -----  48 

CHAPTER  V. — Topography — Positions — Enemy’s  Movements 

and  our  Counter-Movements,  -  -  -  56 

Part  Second. — Battle  of  Sept.  19,  1863. 

CHAPTER  VI. — During  the  Day,  -  -  -  71 

CHAPTER  VII. — During  the  Evening — Results,  -  -  91 

Part  Third. — Battle  of  Sept.  20,  1863. 

CHAPTER  VIII. — Our  Position — The  Assault  on  our  Left,  97 

CHAPTER  IX. — The  Attack  on  our  Right  and  its  Rout,  no 

CHAPTER  X. — Between  the  Acts,  -  -  -  -  122 

CHAPTER  XI. — The  Assaults  on  Horseshoe  Ridge — Steed- 

man’s  Advance,  -  -  -  -  133 

CHAPTER  XII. — The  Second  Assault  on  our  Left — Turchin’s 

Charge  to  the  Rear — Capture  of  Three  Regiments,  145 

CHAPTER  XIII. — Was  it  a  Rebel  Victory  or  Defeat? — Our 

Commander-in-Chief  and  his  Lieutenant — The  Soldier,  156 


V 


CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 


CHAPTER  XIV.— Particular  Lessons  of  the  Campaign  and 

Battle  and  some  of  the  General  Lessons  of  the  Late  War,  167 


185 

185 


APPENDIX,  3d  Brig.,  4th  Div.,  14th  Corps,  A.  of  C., 
Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Turchin, 

Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  J.  J.  Reynolds,  - 


Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  John  M.  Palmer,  -  -  -  -  196 

Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  ...  198 

Extract  from  the  Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  Wm.  S.  Rosecrans,  201 

Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  James  B.  Steedman,  -  -  201 

Anent  the  Capture  of  Three  Regiments: — Twenty-first  and 

Eighty-ninth  Ohio  and  Twenty-second  Michigan,  203 

Letter  from  Col.  Caleb  H.  Carlton,  89th  Ohio,  -  203 

Letter  from  Lieut.-Col.  W.  H.  Glenn,  89th  Ohio,  204 

Letter  from  Rev.  E.  S.  Scott,  89th  Ohio,  -  -  205 

Letter  from  Gen.  John  C.  Smith,  96th  Illinois,  -  208 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Organization  of,  during  the  Battle 

of  Chickamauga,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20,  1863,  -  215 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Organization  of,  at  the  Battle  of 

Chickamauga,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20,  1863,  -  -  224 

Return  of  Casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  com¬ 
manded  by  Maj.-Gen.  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  at  the  Battle 
of  Chickamauga,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20,  1863,  -  233 

Detail  aggregate  Strength  and  Loss  of  the  various  Corps 

of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  -  -  -  239 

Aggregate  Strength  and  Loss  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber¬ 
land,  Recapitulation,  ------  239 


Aggregate  Strength  and  Loss  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  240 
INDEX, 


241 


TO  THE 

Brave  and  Patriotic  Soldiers 

of  THE 

Eleventh,  Thirty-sixth,  Eighty-ninth,  and  Ninety-second  Ohio 

AND  THE 

Eighteenth  Kentucky  Regiments  of  Infantry, 
who  formed,  during  the 
Campaign  and  Battle  of  Chickamauga, 

THE  THIRD  BRIGADE 

OF  THE 

Fourth  Division  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps, 

OF  THE 

Army  of  the  Cumberland, 

This  simple  Narrative  is  Dedicated 
By  their  old  Comrade  and  Brigade  Commander, 

John  B.  Turchin. 


i  iif 


♦> 


"  '  :  r>j 


\ 


PREFACE. 


THE  ground  work  for  a  description  of  campaigns  and  battles 
are  the  official  reports  of  the  various  commanders  of  the 
contending  armies,  made  directly  after  the  action  in  the  field. 
These  unerring  landmarks  enable  the  narrator  to  discern  the 
plans  of  the  commanders-in-chief  and  their  methods  of  carry¬ 
ing  them  out.  When  diligently  sifted  and  brightened  by  the 
critical  considerations,  founded  on  the  acknowledged  principles 
of  the  art  of  war,  they  become  military  history.  Personal 
reminiscences  of  military  men,  who  have  participated  in  the 
operations  narrated,  may  enhance  the  general  interest  of  the 
events  or  explain  some  details  of  the  transactions,  but,  how¬ 
ever  plausible  or  interesting,  they  can  not  shake  the  official 
records.  This  narrative  is  founded  principally  on  the  official 
records  of  the  officers  of  both  the  United- States  and  rebel 
forces,  interspersed  with  some  details  not  found  in  the  records 
from  the  reminiscences  of  veracious  persons  and  from  personal 
observations  of  the  writer.  For  copies  of  the  official  records 
the  writer  feels  under  obligations  to  the  late  Col.  Robert  N. 
Scott,  who  was  so  long  at  the  head  of  the  office  of  military 
records  and  proved  to  be  so  efficient  in  mastering  and  sys¬ 
tematizing  for  publication  an  immense  mass  of  both  Union 
and  rebel  documents,  a  laborious  and  important  task,  requir¬ 
ing  particular  talent  and  adaptability  which  he  fully  possessed. 
That  this  narrative  may  prove  instructive  to  the  students  of 
military  art  as  well  as  interesting  to  the  general  public  is  the 
sincere  wish  of 


July  30,  1887. 


John  B.  Turchin. 


. .  j  or..:  .  .  * 
1  #  ■ 


V-  t 


' 

4, 


I 


PUBLISHER’S  PREFACE. 


OHN  BASIL  LURCH  IN — Ivan  Vasilevitch  Turchininoff \ 


J  the  author  of  this  narrative,  was  born  January  30,  1822, 
in  the  Province  of  Don,  Russia;  after  receiving  a  collegiate 
education,  entered  the  cadet-school  at  St.  Petersburg,  gradua¬ 
ting  into  the  horse-artillery  service,  and  when  lieutenant  entered 
the  military  academy  for  the  general  staff;  graduating  with 
high  honors,  was  admitted  into  the  staff-service  of  the  Imperial 
Guards  as  sub-captain,  and  was  promoted  successively  captain 
and  colonel;  made  the  campaigns  with  the  Imperial  Guards 
during  the  Hungarian  war  in  1848-9,  and  of  the  Crimean 
war  of  1854-6. 

In  this  country  the  record  of  Gen.  Turchin  is  one  of  the 
most  remarkable.  His  regiment,  the  19th  Illinois  Infantry, 
was  acknowledged  to  be  the  best-drilled  regiment  in  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland;  the  brigades  he  commanded  always  dis¬ 
tinguished  themselves  conspicuously  in  those  battles  in  which 
they  were  led  by  their  intrepid  commander.  The  capture  of 
Huntsville,  Ala.,  early  in  1862;  the  last  charge  of  Turchin’s 
brigade  at  Chickamauga;  the  scaling  of  Missionary  Ridge,  at 
the  extreme  left  of  the  storming  line  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  when  nine  guns  were  captured  and  the  enemy 
driven  north  before  help  came  from  other  brigades  of  the 
same  division,  are  deeds  worthy  of  a  hero. 

His  method  of  treating  rebel  property,  including  slaves,  at 
the  commencement  of  his  military  career  in  this  country  was 


5 


; 


6 


CHICK  AMAUGA. 


that  of  an  experienced  soldier,  and  was  the  people’s  key-note 
for  a  more  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  for  which  he  was 
court-martialed  by  the  pro-slavery  Gen.  Don  Carlos  Buell,  and 
relieved  of  his  command.  President  Lincoln,  instead  of  approv¬ 
ing  the  sentence,  promoted  him  to  a  brigadier-general. 

These  facts  are  stated  to  show  that  Gen.  Turchin  is  one  of 
the  most  thoroughly-educated  soldiers  in  our  country,  and  that 
his  description  of  one  of  the  most  remarkable  and  important 
battles  of  our  late  war  should  command  the  attention  of  not 
only  military  students  but  of  all  enlightened  men. 


CHICKAM  AUGA. 


PART  ONE. 

THE  CAMPAIGN. 


CHAPTER  I. 


PRELIMINARY. 


HE  year  1863  may  be  considered  as  a  turning-point  in  the 


X  struggle  between  the  North  and  the  South.  The  left 
wing  of  the  Union  forces,  represented  by  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  after  suffering  a  defeat  in  the  beginning  of  May  in 
the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  was  soon  obliged  to  fall  back 
beyond  even  Washington,  as  the  enemy’s  Army  of  Virginia, 
under  Gen.  Lee,  was  gradually  moving  north,  and,  crossing  the 
Potomac,  had  invaded  Pennsylvania. 

The  object  of  the  invasion  having  been  more  political  than 
military,  it  had  the  virtue  of  stimulating  our  government  to 
exert  its  utmost  efforts,  resulting  in  the  bloody  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  where  the  rebel  forces  were  stopped  and  beaten 
back.  The  array  of  military  forces  at  Gettysburg,  by  both 
contestants,  was  unsurpassed  either  before  or  afterward,  and 
the  determination  and  stubbornness  of  the  fighting  on  both 
sides  was  unexampled.  Our  efforts  at  Gettysburg  on  July  2 
and  3  showed  clearly  to  the  enemy  that  their  attempts  to 
invade  the  North  were  futile;  and  that  the  losses  and  exhaus¬ 
tion,  which  they  suffered  in  this  campaign  and  battle,  if  repeated, 
would  end  the  Rebellion. 

While  our  left  wing  was  thus  occupied,  our  right  wing,  repre¬ 
sented  by  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  penetrated  by  the  Missis¬ 
sippi  River  far  into  the  enemy’s  country,  having  vainly  endeav¬ 
ored  during  the  winter  and  early  spring,  in  the  bayous  and 
swamps,  to  change  the  current  of  that  mighty  river  and  thus 
pass  the  ramparts  of  Vicksburg  with  the  fleet.  In  the  mean¬ 
time,  the  army  moved  along  the  western  shore  of  the  river,  the 


2 


9 


IO 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


fleet  successfully  ran  the  gauntlet  of  the  enemy’s  stronghold, 
and,  after  crossing  the  Mississippi  and  manoeuvring  east  of 
Black  River,  captured  Jackson,  the  capital  of  the  State  of  Missis¬ 
sippi,  and,  defeating  the  enemy’s  army  under  Pemberton,  com¬ 
pelled  it  to  retreat  to  Vicksburg.  It  then  invested  that  fort, 
which  was — on  July  4,  the  next  day  after  the  end  of  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg — surrendered  to  the  Union  army. 

The  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg  victories  thus  almost  simul¬ 
taneously  achieved,  was  a  stunning  blow  to  the  Rebellion,  from 
the  effect  of  which  the  rebels  never  recovered.  They  reduced 
the  enemy’s  army  by  over  5°>000  men,  and  destroyed  an 
immense  amount  of  property  and  material  at  Vicksburg,  in¬ 
cluding  almost  the  whole  of  their  Mississippi  fleet. 

No,t  less  important  were  our  operations  during  the  same 
time  in  our  centre,  represented  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumber¬ 
land,  and  conducted  on  our  central  theatre  of  war  through 
Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Northern  Georgia  and  Alabama.  Our 
army  under  Gen.  Rosecrans  started,  June  24,  from  Murfreesboro, 
Tenn.,  and,  by  a  series  of  skilful  movements  in  a  nine-day  cam¬ 
paign,  obliged  the  enemy’s  army  under  Gen.  Bragg  to  evacuate 
its  fortified  positions  at  Shelby ville  and  Tullahooma,  and  to 
move  south  to  the  Tennessee  River,  and,  successively,  beyond  it 
to  Chattanooga.  So  that  at  that  time  all  the  country  between 
the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  rivers,  which  during  the  preceding  sum¬ 
mer  and  fall  had  been  evacuated  by  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
under  Gen.  Buell,  was  again  triumphantly  reoccupied  by  the 
same  army,  now  called  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  Thus, 
while  the  guns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  mowed  down  the 
enemy  at  Gettysburg,  and  the  cannon  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten¬ 
nessee  battered  down  the  rebel  works  at  Vicksburg,  the  guns 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  were  reverberating  through 
the  canons  of  the  Cumberland  mountains,  and  the  Union  flao-s 
were  triumphantly  waving  on  their  peaks  and  along  the  beauti¬ 
ful  Tennessee  River.  This  territory  reoccupied  by  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  was  considered  by  them  Union  ground, 
as,  for  nearly  two  years  previous,  it  had  been  marched  over 
in  its  length  and  breadth  by  the  Union  armies,  and  was  never 
afterward  retaken  by  the  enemy. 

I  he  year  1863  was  also  remarkable  for  the  radical  change 


PRELIMINARY. 


1 1 


of  policy  in  prosecuting  the  war.  In  1861-2,  the  so-called 
“  guarding-potato-patches  ”  policy  was  prominently  used,  par¬ 
ticularly  in  the  West;  the  greatest  military  absurdity  that  was 
ever  practised  in  the  prosecution  of  war.  The  idea  sprang 
from  that  epoch  of  humiliating  compromises  which  so  degraded 
our  political  leaders  and  mainly  led  to  the  Rebellion.  Their 
tendency  to  compromise  with  the  South,  and  to  coax  the  rebels 
to  remain  in  the  Union  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  culminated 
in  the  “guarding-potato-patches”  policy,  which  consisted  in 
gently  fighting  the  rebels  in  the  field,  and  at  the  same  time 
preserving  their  property  from  the  uses  of  the  army.  In  other 
words,  it  compelled  our  armies  to  subsist  on  our  own  supplies, 
and  to  guard  the  patches  of  truck  and  grain,  orchards,  smoke¬ 
houses,  corn-cribs,  and  even  the  water-wells  of  the  rebel  citizens 
from  the  use  of,  or  spoliation  by  our  soldiers.  No  Southern 
beef  or  pork  should  be  tasted  by  the  Northern  soldiers. 

Only  entire  ignorance  of  the  history  of  wars  and  the  want 
of  common-sense  could  create  such  a  policy  in  the  brains  of  our 
leaders;  and  not  until  after  many  courts-martial  of  our  officers, 
the  continued  sufferings  of  the  rank  and  file,  and  the  humiliating 
reverses  in  the  field,  did  the  people  of  the  country  realize  its 
absurdity,  and  through  their  President  put  an  end  to  it. 
Marauding  and  plunder  should  not  be  allowed;  there  should  be 
always  enough  of  our  own  rations  on  hand  for  an  emergency; 
but  the  legitimate  foraging  and  cantonment  on  the  citizens 
of  the  enemy’s  country  are  the  first  requisites  for  moving  armies 
through  an  invaded  territory;  otherwise,  with  the  lengthen¬ 
ing  of  distance  from  our  basis  of  supplies,  the  army  would  be 
tied  up  to  its  trains,  and  boldness  and  rapidity  would  be  impos¬ 
sible.  Gen.  Buell  was  one  of  the  strongest  and  most  persistent 
representatives  of  that  famous  policy,  and  to  his  cost  realized 
its  absurdity,  when  he  was  compelled  to  run  a  race  with  Gen. 
Bragg,  in  1862,  from  Huntsville,  Ala.,  back  to  Louisville,  Ky. 

Another  measure  that  was  an  additional  blow  to  the  Rebel¬ 
lion,  in  1863,  was  the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  issued  Jan.  1, 
by  President  Lincoln;  and,  as  if  in  defiance  of  that  proclama¬ 
tion,  and  with  the  hope  that  such  a  measure  would  cause  a 
revolt  of  all  the  Southern  sympathizers  throughout  the  North, 
the  rebels  strained  themselves  to  their  utmost,  while  their 


12 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


aggressive  movements  in  the  East  were  baffled  by  oui  brave 
and  determined  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
their  losses  at  Vicksburg  were  immense.  The  emancipation  of 
the  blacks  led  to  the  formation  of  negro  regiments  and  to  the 
general  demoralization  and  stampede  of  the  slaves  through  the 
enemy’s  country.  Toward  the  end  of  the  war,  nearly  150,000 
negro  troops  were  fighting  under  the  Union  flag,  and,  having 
learned  to  shoot  as  well  as  the  white  soldiers,  in  some  battles 
displayed  wonderful  pluck  and  bravery. 

These  last  two  measures  materially  assisted  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  in  wrestling  with  the  enemy.  Its  principal  basis 
of  supplies  was  at  Louisville,  and  the  secondary  basis  at  Nash¬ 
ville;  but  after  Bragg  was  compelled  to  retreat  with  his  army 
to  Chattanooga,  the  line  of  operations  was  extended  down  to 
the  Tennessee  River,  on  which,  at  Stevenson,  our  depot  of  sup¬ 
plies  had  to  be  established  in  case  our  army  should  cross  the 
river;  and  as  the  next  campaign  was  to  be  made  for  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  Chattanooga,  the  repairing  of  the  Nashville-and-Chatta- 
nooga  Railroad,  and  the  establishment  of  the  depot  at  Steven¬ 
son,  became  of  paramount  importance  and  a  matter  of  urgent 
necessity. 

Gen.  Rosecrans,  after  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  at  Tulla- 
homa,  halted  his  army  in  order  to  put  his  long  communications 
in  shape  and  to  establish  new  depots  of  supplies;  and  during 
that  time,  in  order  to  accumulate  the  supplies  as  quickly  as  pos¬ 
sible  at  the  points  chosen,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and 
particularly  the  cavalry,  was  drawing  supplies  to  a  great  extent 
from  the  country  occupied.  The  cavalry  was  ordered  to  scatter 
along  the  wide  track  extending  north  of  the  Tennessee  River 
for  no  other  purpose  than  to  clean  out  that  country  of  all  ser¬ 
viceable  horses  and  mules  and  able-bodied  negroes,  a  measure 
which,  a  year  before,  would  have  horrified  Gen.  Buell  and  his 
confreres,  while  he  was  court-martialing  a  number  of  brigade 
and  regimental  commanders  of  Gen.  Mitchell’s  division,  pre¬ 
sumptively  for  disorders  committed  by  their  troops,  but  really 
for  the  great  offence,  as  it  was  then  considered,  of  feeding  some 
of  those  troops  upon  the  resources  of  the  enemy’s  country. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  consisted  of  three  army  corps: 
the  14th,  of  four  divisions,  under  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas;  the 


/ 


"  V,  •:  ;  '•  IV  • 


p 


PRELIMINARY.  1 3 

20th,  of  three  divisions,  under  Gen.  Alexander  McDowell 
, McCook;  and  the  21st,  of  three  divisions,  under  Gen.  T.  L. 
Crittenden.  The  first  two  corps  were  concentrated  around 
Winchester,  Tenn.,  with  one  division  advanced  to  Stevenson; 
and  Crittenden’s  corps  was  stationed  around  McMinnville.  The 
reserve  troops,  under  command  of  Gen.  Gordon  Granger,  were 
scattered  at  different  points  along  the  communications  of  the 
army,  and  a  portion  of  them,  consisting  of  two  brigades  of 
Steedman’s  and  one  brigade  of  Morgan’s  divisions,  was  chosen 
to  follow  the  army  when  ordered.  The  cavalry  consisted  of 
two  divisions,  under  Gen.  D.  S.  Stanley,  but  on  account  of  his 
absence,  was  commanded  by  Gen.  R.  B.  Mitchell.  Altogether 
about  56,000  men  and  200  guns  were  available  for  the  cam¬ 
paign. 

Let  us  look  at  the  situation.  Gen.  Henry  W.  Halleck,  after 
his  Siege  of  Corinth  the  year  previous,  had  been  elevated,  for 
that  wretched  campaign,  to  the  position  of  the  chief  commander 
of  all  the  armies,  and  made  a  sort  of  a  military  adviser  to 
President  Lincoln.  Gen.  McClellan  at  that  time  was  flounder¬ 
ing  in  the  swamps  of  the  Chickahominy,  a  region  utterly  unfit 
for  the  manoeuvring  of  a  great  army,  and,  by  his  undecisive  and 
vacillating  operations,  ruining  his  reputation  as  a  military  chief¬ 
tain.  There  was  no  prominent  general  at  that  time  on  whom 
the  hopes  of  the  Nation  and  of  the  government  could  concen¬ 
trate,  and  who  could  supersede  McClellan  as  commander-in¬ 
chief  of  our  armies,  except  Halleck;  so  on  Halleck  fell  the 
mantle  of  the  highest  military  authority  in  the  country.  And 
never  before  in  the  history  of  wars  has  such  military  medioc¬ 
rity,  with  only  a  semblance  of  success,  but  without  one  redeem¬ 
ing  feature  of  distinction,  been  elevated  to  the  supreme  com¬ 
mand  of  the  great  armies  of  a  great  country.  The  government 
had  to  select  some  one  for  the  place;  circumstances  favored 
Halleck,  and  he  was  appointed.  Apparently  he  had  some 
claim  to  a  military  reputation;  he  passed  West-Point  Academy 
with  honor;  studied  the  French  strategist,  Gen.  Jomini,  and 
translated,  or  rather  compiled,  some  of  his  works;  and  stood  high 
as  a  military  scientist  among  the  regular-army  officers.  The  war 
came  upon  the  country  unexpectedly;  the  magnitude  of  the 
operations  required  a  corresponding  amount  of  military  forces; 


14 


CHICK  AM  AUGA. 


and  as  the  number  of  the  army  officers  was  rather  limited,  the 
government  had  no  choice  but  to  select  at  random  army  com¬ 
manders  from  those  who  before  commanded  only  companies 
and  battalions. 

Halleck  was  chosen  for  the  place,  because  from  those  officers 
of  high  rank,  or  who  had  distinguished  themselves  already  at  the 
time,  no  man  as  yet  was  successful  enough  to  give  confidence  to 
the  government.  McClellan  did  not  realize  the  governments 

o 

expectations,  and  his  unpopularity  reflected  unfavorably  even 
on  the  bravest  of  his  subordinates;  Fremont  was  under  a  cloud; 
Grant  had  not  yet  recovered  from  his  defeat  at  Shiloh;  Pope 
was  yet  an  unknown  quantity;  while  Halleck  had  apparent 
success  at  Corinth,  where  he  commanded  as  great  an  army  as 
that  which  was  under  McClellan  on  the  peninsula.  No  one 
dared  to  criticise  or  inquire  whether  the  campaign  of  Halleck 
was  deserving  the  name  of  a  great  achievement;  there  was  an 
appearance  of  success,  Corinth  was  abandoned  and  the  enemy 
retreated  south,  which  was  sufficient  to  make  his  reputation,  and 
he  became  the  commander  of  our  armies. 

Before  his  elevation,  Halleck  was  arbitrary  enough  in  his 
behavior  toward  the  officers  of  rank,  but  after  his  elevation  he 
became  intolerable.  He  pretended  to  be  a  genius,  yet  his 
actions  belied  his  pretensions.  That  the  country  should  be 
strategically  subdivided  into  several  departments  was  a  matter 
of  necessity;  but  to  make  those  departments  independent  of 
each  other  in  a  military  point  of  view — as  if  they  were  so  many 
foreign  countries,  in  which  the  commander  of  one  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  commander  of  another — unless  ordered  by 
Halleck,  was  the  essence  of  military  absurdity.  Yet  it  was 
done.  Grant  on  the  Mississippi  had  nothing  to  do  with  Rose- 
crans  in  Middle  Tennessee,  and  Burnside  in  East  Tennessee 
had  nothing  to  do  with  either  Rosecrans  or  Grant;  while  Mid¬ 
dle  Tennessee  and  East  Tennessee  lay  in  the  same  theatre  of 
war.  To  perceive  this  does  not  require  any  particular  knowledge, 
for,  by  looking  at  the  map,  any  one  may  see  that  the  armies 
operating  against  Chattanooga  and  Knoxville  should  cooperate 
with  each  other  and  should  be  under  the  command  of  one  man. 
Yet,  because  it  pleased  Halleck  to  establish  a  department  in 
East  Tennessee,  he  made  Burnside  independent  of  Rosecrans. 


PRELIMINARY. 


15 


No  wonder  then  that  the  department  commanders  acted  “like 
a  balky  team,”  as  Gen.  Grant  expressed  himself  in  one  of  his 
reports. 

The  objective  point  for  the  coming  campaign  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  was  the  possession  of  Chattanooga,  the 
gate  by  which  the  army,  retaining  possession  of  the  railroad, 
could  enter  Georgia.  Once  Chattanooga  was  in  our  possession, 
it  would  have  been  fortified  and  made  a  new  basis  of  operations 
for  the  next  campaign  to  Atlanta.  But  it  would  extend  our 
communications,  and  the  distribution  of  the. army  over  several 
wild,  precipitous  mountains,  separating  Northern  Georgia  and 
Alabama  from  the  Middle  Tennessee,  would  necessitate,  in  order 
to  insure  success,  the  reenforcement  of  the  army,  particularly  our 
cavalry,  which  in  numbers  was  far  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy. 
On  this  subject,  Gen.  Rosecrans  made  several  reasonable  repre¬ 
sentations  and  requests  to  Gen.  Halleck,  all  of  which  were 
treated  cavalierly,  showing  that  Halleck  knew  better  what 
forces  were  needed  to  go  through  the  coming  campaign  suc¬ 
cessfully  than  Rosecrans,  although  Halleck  was  a  thousand 
miles  from  the  theatre  of  operations.  Finally,  on  August  5, 
Gen.  Rosecrans  received  the  following  despatch:  “The  orders 
for  the  advance  of  your  army,  and  that  its  progress  be  reported 
daily,  are  peremptory.  H.  W.  Halleck.” 

This  reminds  one  rather  of  a  brutal  teacher  lifting  his  rod 
over  a  school-boy  than  gf  a  high  military  dignitary  addressing 
a  distinguished  commander  of  a  great  army.  And  after  all, 
was  he  right  under  the  circumstances?  Was  it  because  suc¬ 
cesses  had  been  obtained  at  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg  that  the 
successes  would  necessarily  follow  beyond  the  Tennessee  River? 
And  would  not  those  successes  have  been  obtained  more  surely 
and  easily  if  Rosecrans  had  been  made  stronger  than  he  was? 
And  could  not  Halleck  at  that  time  strengthen  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  beyond  ,  any  possibility  of  defeat,  by  largely 
increasing  its  numbers  ? 

At  the  time  of  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg,  Gen.  Grant’s 
army  was  80,000  strong;  the  job  had  been  thoroughly  done, 
and  30,000  men  could  have  been  spared  from  it  without  any 
detriment  to  the  service,  because  there  remained  but  a  handful 
of  the  enemy  to  be  taken  care  of,  under  Gen.  Johnston,  in  the 


1 6 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


neighborhood  of  Jackson,  Miss.  It  seems  strange  that  such  a 
scientist  as  Halleck  could  not  have  seen  the  propriety,  immedi¬ 
ately  after  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg,  of  ordering  a  strong 
army  corps  to  be  transferred  by  boats  and  cars  to  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  and  then  to  order  Rosecrans,  thus  reen¬ 
forced,  to  go  ahead.  Halleck  not  only  neglected  that  splendid 
opportunity  to  insure  success  to  the  Union  arms  in  Tennessee, 
but  did  still  worse.  Gen.  Burnside,  with  a  force  of  20,000, 
organized  at  Camp  Nelson,  was  ready  to  start  on  his  expedition 
to  East  Tennessee  at  the  time  Rosecrans  was  urged  to  move 
on  Chattanooga.  By  simply  looking  at  the  map  any  body 
could  see  that  the  two  armies,  one  of  which  was  to  operate 
against  Chattanooga  and  the  other  against  Knoxville,  ought 
to  have  been  under  one  commander;  and  that  if  the  enemy’s 
forces  occupying  East  Tennessee  should,  on  the  invasion  of 
Burnside,  retreat  toward  Chattanooga  to  unite  with  their  forces 
concentrated  *there,  the  forces  of  Burnside  should  join  and 
cooperate  with  the  forces  of  Rosecrans.  Not  so  with  Halleck, 
he  gave  carte-blcinche  to  Burnside  to  act  in  the  East  Tennessee 
as  he  pleased,  without  caring  what  became  of  Rosecrans. 

Gen.  Burnside  with  his  command,  the  principal  part  of  which 
was  mounted,  and  with  the  most  necessary  portion  of  their 
munitions  and  stores  packed  on  mules,  after  concentrating  at 
Crab  Orchard,  Ky.,  pushed  vigorously  through  to  Mount  Ver¬ 
non,  London,  and  Williamsburg,  then,  resting  for  two  days  at 
the  foot  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  made  a  two-day’s  march 
over  the  mountains,  reaching  Montgomery  or  Morgan  Court- 
House,  and  thence  on,  arriving  at  Kingston,  at  the  junction  of 
Clinch  and  Tennessee  rivers,  on  Sept.  I,  where  his  pickets  com¬ 
municated  with  the  cavalry  pickets  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum¬ 
berland,  in  the  valley  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River. 
Thence,  he  moved  rapidly  to  Loudon,  in  a  vain  effort  to  be  in 
time  to  save  the  railroad  bridge  at  that  place;  and  then  moved 
to  Knoxville,  where,  on  Sept.  3,  he  was  received  with  open  arms 
by  the  intensely  loyal  population,  who  for  two  long  years  had 
been  terribly  persecuted  by  the  rebels,  and  who  now  thought 
that  the  day  of  their  deliverance  had  finally  arrived,  and  that 
Burnside  and  his  army  had  come  to  stay  and  protect  them 
from  their  heartless  oppressors. 


PRELIMINARY. 


1/ 


There  were  many  touching  and  deeply-affecting  scenes  that 
would  have  melted  even  a  stouter  heart  than  that  of  Gen. 
Burnside,  yet,  as  a  commander  of  an  army,  he  should  have 
looked  into  the  state  of  affairs  more  carefully  than  he  did. 
When  he  saw  that  the  enemy  withdrew  at  his  approach,  with¬ 
out  firing  a  single  shot,  he  should  have  known,  at  least  approxi¬ 
mately,  that  their  strength  amounted  to  a  corps  of  two  divisions. 
He  knew  that  they  were  retreating  toward  Chattanooga,  and 
it  did  not  need  great  genius  to  know  that  their  purpose  was  to 
reenforce  the  army  of  Gen.  Bragg,  there  concentrated.  Another 
general  would  have  subordinated  his  tender  affection  for  the 
unfortunate  people  of  that  loyal  region  to  the  dictates  of  his 
military  duty  toward  the  whole  country.  Burnside  was  general 
enough  to  know,  that  his  easy  possession  of  the  East  Tennessee, 
without  the  success  of  Rosecrans,  was  but  ephemeral;  that 
should  Rosecrans  be  defeated  and  obliged  to  recross  the  river, 
the  enemy  would  return  to  East  Tennessee  and  drive  him 
and  his  forces  beyond  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  and  make 
the  condition  of  the  people,  temporarily  alleviated,  ten-fold  more 
miserable.  His  business  was  to  look  to  the  future,  and  to  show 
his  generalship  and  sagacity  by  proposing  to  Rosecrans  to 
cooperate  with  him,  and  after  joining  him  with  at  least  one- 
half  of  his  force,  leave  the  other  half,  which  at  that  time  would 
have  been  sufficient,  to  take  care  of  East  Tennessee. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Burnside  did  not  exhibit  at  this 
juncture  either  intelligent  patriotism  or  military  talent.  While 
he  was  receiving  ovations  at  Knoxville,  Rosecrans  was  anxiously 
hurrying  his  army  across  the  Tennessee  River,  obeying  the 
peremptory  orders  of  an  obdurate  and  untalented  chief,  giving 
up  all  hope  of  receiving  succor  from  Burnside  or  from  any 
other  source.  For  the  successive  sufferings  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  Halleck  should  be  justly  held  to  condemna¬ 
tion  as  the  principal,  and  Burnside  as  his  accessory,  and  no 
documents  can  be  dug  out  of  the  archives  to  palliate  the  mis¬ 
chief  occasioned  by  their  omission  and  commission. 

The  prospective  campaign  of  September,  1863,  that  was  to 
be  consummated  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  a  diffi¬ 
cult  task,  even  if  it  were  not  aggravated  by  the  strategical  and 
tactical  faults  which,  as  it  afterward  transpired,  were  committed 


1 8 


CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 


on  our  side.  It  presents  many  features,  the  study  of  which,  .to 
a  military  man,  is  highly  interesting  and  instructive.  It  was 
one  of  the  most  diversified  and  complicated  campaigns  known. 
There  was  a  large  river  to  be  crossed  in  the  face  of  the  enemy; 
there  were  several  lofty  ranges  of  mountains,  2000  feet  in 
height,  to  be  crossed  on  roads  as  rugged  and  precipitous  as 
can  be  imagined,  principally  through  an  exceedingly  wild  and 
sparsely  populated  country,  deficient  in  forage  and  water;  there 
was  a  demonstration  on  a  large  scale  to  be  made,  which  would 
be  sufficiently  threatening  upon  the  enemy’s  communications 
to  compel  his  army  to  evacuate  Chattanooga;  there  was  an 
unavoidable  scattering  of  our  forces  and  an  imminent  danger 
of  their  being  destroyed  in  detail,  without  any  possibility  of 
their  supporting  each  other  if  attacked;  there  was  an  anxious 
moment,  even  after  the  final  concentration  of  the  army,  when 
an  effort  was  made  to  extricate  it  from  the  false  position  in 
which  it  was  placed  during  its  concentration ;  there  was  a  fierce 
attack  made  by  the  enemy  before  it  could  be  formed  in  a 
proper  position;  there  was  an  unpremeditated  battle,  which 
continued  for  almost  a  whole  day,  in  which  the  army,  not  being 
in  position,  was  obliged  to  fight  by  piecemeal — without  any 
prearranged  plan — but  simply  for  its  existence;  there  was 
another  battle  fought  during  the  next  day,  when  the  army 
was  in  a  faulty  position,  that  gave  great  advantage  to  the 
enemy’s  attacks;  there  was  a  complete  rout  of  the  entire  half 
of  that  army,  resulting  in  broken  and  shapeless  lines  and  tre¬ 
mendous  losses;  and,  finally,  there  was  a  wonderful  courage  and 
unsurpassed  heroism  displayed  by  the  rank  and  file,  which  stood 
all  that  bloody  ordeal  and  returned  all  the  blows  of  the  enemy 
with  fearful  interest,  then  deliberately  withdrew  from  the  field 
of  slaughter  three  miles  to  the  rear,  as  if  only  to  pick  up  its 
stragglers,  and  in  the  morning  again  presented  a  defiant  front 
to  the  enemy,  who  dared  not  then  or  afterward  attack  it. 

It  is  only  the  lack  of  analysis  and  proper  presentation  of 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga  before  the  public  that  has  prevented 
our  people  from  justly  appreciating  that  gigantic  struggle,  in 
which,  notwithstanding  the  most  fearful  odds  that  were  against 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  its  soldiers,  as  the  fighting  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  people  of  the  North,  developed  in  the  highest 


1 


PRELIMINARY. 


19 


degree  those  staying  qualities  of  character  which  dangers  can 
not  quail  nor  reverses  subdue.  In  that  battle,  the  Northern 
soldier  showed  conspicuously  what  a  heroic  defender  of  the  in¬ 
stitutions  and  freedom  of  this  Republic  the  people  had  in  him. 
He  proved  on  that  battlefield,  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt, 
that  in  a  dark  hour  the  country  could  implicitly  rely  on  him. 

Since  we  have  all  the  records  before  us,  we  will  endeavor  to 
decipher  the  campaign  and  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  being 
confident  that  our  own  participation  in  them  will,  to  a  great 
extent,  assist  us  in  the  explanation  of  its  various  phases  in  the 
light  of  military  science. 

From  a  perusal  of  contemporaneous  reports  of  eye-witnesses 
and  of  successive  accounts  made  by  various  members  of  the 
armies  engaged,  who  detail  their  reminiscences,  one  may  glean 
some  interesting  incidents  connected  with  a  campaign,  engage¬ 
ment,  or  battle;  but  they  utterly  fail  to  furnish  any  data  where¬ 
by  the  military  skill  of  the  commanding  generals  can  be  ade¬ 
quately  estimated.  As  a  criterion  of  that  quality  we  consult 
the  official  reports  and  despatches  made  by  the  highest,  as  well 
as  by  the  subordinate,  commanders  of  both  contending  forces. 
Only  from  such  reports,  written  immediately  after  the  cam¬ 
paign,  can  a  discriminating  narrator  glean  the  plans  and  their 
execution;  ascertain  the  correct  or  incorrect  estimates  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy;  or  can  perceive  that  intuitive,  almost 
instinctive,  sense  of  a  talented  general  which  enables  him  to 
execute  those  sudden  and  decisive  strokes  which  terminate  in 
brilliant  successes,  but  which  are  inconceivable  to  a  mediocre 
commander.  These  reports  are  unerring  guides  to  obtain  the 
truth,  and  are  surer  than  any  other  source  of  information. 
Occasionally  in  the  reports  of  the  defeated  contestant  there 
may  be  vagueness,  or  cloudiness  for  a  purpose;  but  to  the 
initiated  there  is  no  difficuity  in  deciphering  the  proper  sense 
between  the  lines  and  explaining  its  meaning.  On  these  reports 
and  despatches  we  base  our  narrative. 

Macauley,  in  his  essay  on  “History,”  in  one  place  says:  “No 
past  event  has  any  intrinsic  importance.  The  knowledge  of  it 
is  valuable  only  as  it  leads  us  to  form  just  calculations  with 
respect  to  the  future.”  And  again:  “Facts  are  the  mere  dross 
of  history.  It  is  from  the  abstract  truth  which  interpenetrates 


20 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


them,  and  lies  latent  among  them,  like  gold  in  the  ore,  that  the 
mass  derives  its  whole  value;  and  the  precious  particles  are 
generally  combined  with  the  baser  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
separation  is  a  task  of  the  utmost  difficulty.” 

As  the  above  is  true  in  general  history,  so  is  it  true  in  mili¬ 
tary  history.  That  there  has  been  a  difficult  campaign  and  a 
bloody  battle  is  not  in  itself  so  important,  unless  from  the  mass 
of  evidence  the  real  and  actual  features  are  extracted,  critically 
considered  and  so  perspicuously  arranged  that  the  present  and 
future  generations  of  military  students  may  extract  from  them 
instructive  lessons  for  operations  in  future  wars,  according  to 
the  immutable  principles  of  the  art  of  war. 


¥ 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  MOVEMENTS. 


HE  general  course  of  the  Tennessee  River  from  Kingston, 


X  Tenn.,  down  to  Guntersville,  opposite  and  north  of  War- 
renton,  Ala.,  is  very  nearly  from  northeast  to  southwest,  except¬ 
ing  several  sharp  coils  that  the  river  makes  just  below  Chatta¬ 
nooga,  endeavoring  to  force  its  waters  between  the  high  and 
precipitous  mountains  that  compress  it  on  both  sides.  Com¬ 
mencing  in  the  vicinity  of  Huntsville,  Ala.,  the  Cumberland 
Mountain  range  stretches  along  the  western  shore  of  the  Ten¬ 
nessee  to  a  gap,  where,  at  Cowan,  the  Nashville-and-Chatta- 
nooga  Railroad  passes  through  a  tunnel.  Thence  the  range 
rises  to  a  lofty  height  varying  from  1000  to  2000  feet  and  grad¬ 
ually  widens  at  its  summit,  forming  a  large  undulating  plateau, 
chiefly  covered  with  timber,  having  light  soil,  on  which  short, 
sparse  grass  grows,  fit  only  for  pasture.  About  eight  miles 
above  Bridgeport,  where  the  railroad  crosses  the  Tennessee 
River  on  a  bridge,  is  the  mouth  of  the  Sequatchie  River.  That 
river,  starting  on  the  plateau  of  the  Cumberland,  traverses  that 
mass  of  rocks  through  a  narrow  and  precipitous  valley  in  an 
almost  parallel  direction  to  the  Tennessee  River,  and  forms 
Walden’s  Ridge.  This  is  a  narrow,  rough,  and  rocky  ridge  with 
very  precipitous  sides  toward  the  river,  and  extending  north  as 
far  as,  and  beyond,  Kingston;  its  lower  points,  above  the  mouth 
of  the  Sequatchie,  abut  against  the  Tennessee  River,  narrowing 
its  valley  toward  Chattanooga  to  a  few  hundred  steps,  and  then 
recedes  from  the  river  for  several  miles  above  Chattanooga, 
filling  the  valley  with  innumerable  foot-hills. 

On  the  east  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  parallel  thereto, 
is  Sand  Mountain,  similar  in  formation  to  the  Cumberland 
Range,  but  lacking  the  width  of  the  latter;  it  closely  fringes  the 
river  and  abuts  against  it  immediately  opposite  the  points  of 
Walden’s  Ridge.  This  abutment  narrows  the  valley  to  incon¬ 
siderable  dimensions  and  fills  it  with  a  detached  rocky  mass 
called  Racoon  Mountain.  East  of  this  range,  comprehending 


21 


22 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Sand  and  Racoon  mountains,  and  separated  therefrom  by  a 
narrow  valley  drained  by  Lookout  Creek,  Lookout  Mountain 
rises  abruptly  like  an  immense  wall;  its  northern  point,  2400 
feet  above  the  sea,  stands  lofty  and  severe,  rocky  and  precipi¬ 
tous,  immediately  on  the  Tennessee  River,  leaving  barely  suffi¬ 
cient  space  for  the  railroad  to  pass  between  its  perpendicular 
base-cliff,  60  feet  in  height,  and  the  precipitous  bank  of  the 
river,  two  miles  below  Chattanooga. 

The  summit  of  Lookout,  at  its  northern  part,  is  narrow,  but 
farther  south  it  widens  to  from  two  to  five  miles;  its  sides,  how¬ 
ever,  are  very  steep  and  abrupt.  About  45  miles  south  of 
Chattanooga,  on  its  east  side,  Lookout  throws  out  a  spur  con¬ 
sisting  of  a  low  range  of  hills  called  Pigeon  Mountains,  which 
extend  northeast,  but  in  a  diverging  line  from  Lookout,  forming 
with  it  a  valley  called  McLamore’s  Cove.  This  cove  is  drained 
by  the  west  branch  of  the  Chickamauga  River,  which,  after  its 
junction  with  the  middle  and  east  branches,  form  the  Chicka¬ 
mauga  River  emptying  into  the  Tennessee,  four  and  a-half 
miles  above  Chattanooga.  Farther  east  of  Pigeon  Mountain, 
and  running  parallel  to  it,  is  Taylor’s  Ridge,  through  the  gaps 
of  which,  formed  by  the  east  branch  of  the  Chickamauga,  passes 
the  Chattanooga- and -Atlanta  Railroad  at  Ringgold. 

In  McLamore’s  Cove  starts  another  range  of  hills,  which, 
farther  north,  forms  a  continuous  ridge  called  Missionary  Ridge, 
and  which,  opposite  Chattanooga,  rises  in  places  to  an  elevation 
of  350  and  400  feet,  and  abuts  against  the  Chickamauga  River 
about  one  mile  and  a-half  from  its  mouth.  It  forms,  with  the 
Lookout  Range,  the  Chattanooga  Valley,  drained  by  Chatta¬ 
nooga  Creek,  which  empties  into  the  Tennessee  between  Chat¬ 
tanooga  and  the  nose  of  Lookout  Mountain. 

From  the  above  topographical  description  it  is  evident  that, 
on  account  of  our  base  of  supplies  being  located  at  Stevenson, 
—on  the  Memphis-  and  -  Charleston  Railroad,  ten  miles  west  of 
Bridgeport,  and  three  miles  from  the  Tennessee  River— the 
crossing  of  the  army  had  to  be  made  below  Chattanooga. 
The  gorge  formed  by  the  mountain  ranges  between  Bridgeport 
and  Chattanooga,  through  which  the  river  flows,  is  about  twenty- 
eight  miles  long  and  narrows  itself  gradually  toward  its  eastern 
end  until  it  is  closed  by  Lookout  Mountain  on  the  south  side  of 


THE  MOVEMENTS. 


23 


the  river  and  along  the  railroad;  while  the  town  of  Chattanooga, 
fortified  at  that  time,  was  situated  two  miles  beyond  that  point. 
The  country  south  and  southeast  of  Chattanooga,  although  in¬ 
tersected  by  low  ridges,  becomes  more  open  and  fit  for  military 
operations.  Hence  Chattanooga  might  have  been  properly 
considered  as  the  gate  for  us  to  enter  into  Georgia,  or  as  the 
gate  for  the  enemy  to  enter  Middle  Tennessee,  or  to  draw 
supplies  therefrom.  It  was  out  of  the  question  for  us  to  operate 
against  Chattanoaga  through  that  gorge,  because,  if  at  its  end 
there  were  but  two  divisions  and  several  batteries  of  the  enemy 
properly  posted  on  the  nose  of  Lookout,  they  could  defy  an 
army  of  60,000.  But,  however  strong  the  position  at  Chatta¬ 
nooga  was,  in  case  an  army  might  try  to  operate  against  it 
through  that  gorge  along  the  river,  it  became  untenable  and  fell 
to  the  ground  as  soon  as  that  army  crossed  the  river  and  the 
ranges  of  the  Sand  and  Lookout  Mountains  below  it,  or  crossed 
the  river  above  it.  In  either  case  the  enemy’s  army  occupying 
Chattanooga  would  have  to  evacuate  the  town  and  take  a  posi¬ 
tion  outside,  for  fear  of  losing  its  communication  with  the 
South,  and,  finally,  of  being  shut  up  and  beleaguered  in  Chat¬ 
tanooga.  It  would  be  possible  for  us,  if  blockaded  in  Chatta¬ 
nooga,  to  retain  possession  of  it,  having  the  gorge  and  the 
communications  behind  us,  as  it  was  afterward  proven;  but 
for  the  enemy  to  be  shut  up  in  Chattanooga  would  have 
amounted  to  the  loss  of  his  army. 

As  before  mentioned, Che  base  of  our  supplies  being  at  Stev¬ 
enson,  that  fact  determined  where  our  crossing  must  be.  To 
attempt  to  cross  the  river  above  Chattanooga  would  have  been 
undesirable,  as  the  region  on  the  Cumberland  Range  east  of  the 
N ashville-and-Chattanooga  Railroad  and  the  country  contiguous 
to  it,  being  wild  and  little  settled,  would  of  itself  be  very  dis¬ 
advantageous  for  an  army  to  enter  before  reaching  the  Tennessee 
River  above  Chattanooga;  again,  a  great  distance  would  separate 
the  army  from  its  line  of  supplies,  and  that  distance  filled  up 
with  rough  mountains  and  roads  that  were  hardly  passable  for 
heavy  teams,  even  in  the  best  season  of  the  year.  But  to  make 
such  a  demonstration  above  Chattanooga  as  would  show  to  the 
enemy  that  we  possibly  could  cross  the  river  there,  was  perfectly 
proper,  as  it  might  distract  his  attention  and  thereby  facilitate 
our  crossing  below  the  city. 


24 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


At  the  time  of  starting  the  army,  it  was  known  that  Gen. 
Bragg,  commanding  the  rebel  army,  had  two  army  corps  under 
Gens.  Polk  and  D.  H.Hill  at  Chattanooga,  and  that  an  infantry 
corps  of  two  divisions  and  a  division  of  cavalry  under  Gen. 
Buckner,  were  occupying  East  Tennessee;  and  as  Gen.  Burnside 
with  a  Union  force  was  soon  going  to  enter  East  Tennessee,  it 
was  expected  that  Buckner  would  have  to  fight  Burnside  and 
be  unable  to  join  Bragg  at  Chattanooga,  at  least  for  some  time. 

Col.  Inness,  with  his  regiment  of  Michigan  Engineers,  was 
busy  in  repairing  the  Nashville-and-Chattanooga  Railroad  be¬ 
tween  Murfreesboro  and  Bridgeport,  which,  on  July  13,  was 
ready  for  use  to  the  Elk-River  bridge,  and  this  bridge  and  the 
railroad  between  it  and  Bridgeport  were  put  in  order  by  July  25. 
But  there  was  a  short  branch  from  Cowan  Station  leading  east 
to  Tracy  City,  which  it  was  desirable  to  repair  also,  so  that 
some  supplies  could  be  collected  at  Tracy  City,  and  that  occu¬ 
pied  until  August  13,  by  which  time  the  corn  commences  to 
ripen  in  that  country  and  would  afford  forage  for  the  animals. 

On  August  16,  the  army  moved.  The  left,  consisting  of 
Crittenden’s  corps  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Col.  Minty, 
moved  in  the  following  manner:  Wood’s  division  from  Hills¬ 
boro,  by  Pelham,  to  Thurman,  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley; 
Palmer’s  division,  from  Manchester  to  Dunlap;  VanCleve’s 
division,  leaving  a  brigade  at  McMinnville,  to  Pikeville  at  the 
head  of  the  Sequatchie  Valley;  Minty’s  cavalry  by  Sparta  to 
drive  a  rebel  cavalry  force  from  there  toward  Kingston,  and  to 
cover  the  left  of  Crittenden. 

The  divisions  of  I  homas’  corps,  constituting  the  centre, 
moved  thus:  Reynolds’,  from  the  University  Place,  across  the 
Cumberland  into  Steven’s  Cove,  and  by  way  of  Battle  Creek  to 
Jasper;  Brannan’s  to  follow  it;  Negley’s,  by  Tantalon,  to  halt 
on  Crow  Creek  between  Anderson  and  Stevenson;  Baird’s  to 
follow  and  halt  at  Anderson. 

Ihe  divisions  of  McCook’s  corps  thus:  Johnson’s,  by  Salem 
and  Larkin’s  to  Bellefont;  Davis’  by  Mount  Top  and  Crow 
Creek  to  near  Stevenson;  Sheridan’s  to  remain  at  Stevenson 
and  Bridgeport.  Three  brigades  of  cavalry,  under  Gen.  Mitchel, 
by  Fayetteville  and  Athens,  covering  the  right  of  the  army. 
Gen.  Crittenden  was  ordered  to  send  a  brigade  to  reconnoitre 


I 


25 


THE  MOVEMENTS. 


\ 


the  Tennessee  River  above  Chattanooga,  near  Harrison’s  Land¬ 
ing,  and  take  post  at  Poe’s  Cross-roads.  Minty  to  reconnoitre 
from  Washington  down  and  take  post  at  Smith’s  Cross-roads; 
and  Wilder  with  his  mounted-infantry  brigade,  supported  by*  a 
brigade  of  infantry  to  reconnoitre  from  Harrison’s  Landing  to 
opposite  Chattanooga. 

All  these  movements  were  completed  by  August  20,  and 
preparations  commenced  for  the  crossing  of  the  river  by  the 
army.  Hazen’s  brigade  was  detached  by  Gen.  Crittenden  to 
Poe’s  Cross-roads  on  that  reconnoitring  expedition.  Gen. 
Hazen,  being  the  senior  officer,  assumed  command  of  the  whole 
force  in  the  valley  opposite  to  and  above  Chattanooga,  consist¬ 
ing  of  his  own  brigade,  Minty’s  cavalry,  Wilder’s  mounted 
infantry,  and  Gen.  Wagner’s  brigade,  in  all  between  6000  and 
7000  men.  He  was  to  manage  the  demonstration  to  cross 
the  Tennessee  above  Chattanooga.  His  instructions  were:  to 
watch  all  the  movements  of  the  enemy  at  all  crossings  of  the 
river;  make  such  dispositions  as  would  lead  the  enemy  to 
believe  the  valley  was  occupied  by  a  large  force;  and  to  show 
that  we  wanted  to  cross  the  river  with  the  intention  of  occupy¬ 
ing  Chattanooga.  Hazen  made  such  arangements  as  answered 
the  purpose,  and  ordered  the  construction  of  pontoons  on  North 
Chickamauga  Creek,  which  empties  into  the  Tennessee  about 
two  miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga  River,  as  if  we 
wanted  those  pontoons  when  ready,  to  float  down  and  use  them 
for  a  bridge  across  the  Tennessee,  near  the  mouth  of  that 
creek.  Troops  were  made  to  appear  at  three  or  four  different 
crossings  at  one  time,  and  by  ingeniously  arranging  their  camp¬ 
fires  and  beating  their  calls,  also  by  the  dexterous  use  of  the 
artillery,  the  rebels  were  made  to  believe  that  there  were 
divisions  where  there  were  only  companies.  Two  regiments  of 
infantry  with  a  battery  of  artillery  were  placed  opposite  Chatta¬ 
nooga  to  annoy  the  enemy. 

All  this  activity  of  Gen.  Hazen  was  not. without  desirable 
results.  Gen.  Bragg,  who  commanded  the  rebel  army,  in  his 
detailed  report  of  the  operations  before  and  during  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  dated  at  Warm  Springs,  Ga.,  December  28,  1863, 
says:  “Immediately  after  crossing  the  mountains  to  the  Ten¬ 
nessee  the  enemy  threw  a  corps  by  way  of  Sequatchie  Valley 

3 


26 


CHICICAMAUGA. 


to  strike  the  rear  of  Gen.  Buckner’s  command,  while  Burnside 
occupied  him  in  front.  One  division  already  ordered  to  his 
assistance  proving  insufficient  to  meet  the  force  concentrating 
on  him,  Buckner  was  directed  to  withdraw  to  the  Hiwassee 
with  his  infantry,  artillery,  and  supplies,  and  to  hold  his  cavalry 
in  front  to  check  the  enemy’s  advance.  As  soon  as  this  change 
was  made  the  corps  threatening  his  rear  was  withdrawn,  and 
the  enemy  commenced  a  movement  in  force  against  our  left 
and  rear.”  This  shows  that,  although  Bragg  did  not  believe  in 
the  crossing  above  Chattanooga  of  our  whole  army,  but  know¬ 
ing  that  Crittenden’s  corps  was  in  the  upper  part  of  the 
Sequatchie  Valley,  and  hearing  of  the  demonstrations  of  Hazen 
at  various  crossings  of  the  river,  he  evidently  thought  that  it 
might  be  possible  that  Crittenden  would  cross  the  Tennessee 
somewhere  above  the  mouth  of  the  Hiwassee  River  and  strike 
at  Buckner’s  flank  or  rear.  Cleburne’s  division  of  D.  H.  Hill’s 
corps  was  distributed  at  various  fords  and  crossings  between 
the  mouths  of  Chickamauga  and  Hiwassee,  putting  up  some 
intrenchments,  and  Stovall’s  brigade  of  Breckenridge’s  division 
was  posted  at  Sivley’s  Ford.  These  troops  were  afterward 
reenforced  by  Hindman’s  division.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  our 
demonstration  busied  many  of  the  rebel  troops,  and  hence  its 
object  was  fully  attained. 

In  the  meantime  our  army  was  busy  in  preparing  the  means 
for  crossing.  Reynolds  captured  some  boats  at  Shellmount, 
Brannan  was  building  several  rafts,  Sheridan  commenced  to 
construct  trestles  to  repair  the  railroad  bridge  at  Bridgeport, 
partially  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  Davis  was  building  pontoons 
for  the  bridge  to  be  thrown  over  at  Caperton’s  Ferry  opposite 
Stevenson.  The  orders  were  for  Thomas  to  cross  Negley’s 
division  by  Caperton’s  bridge;  Baird’s  by  Bridgeport  bridge; 
Brannan  on  rafts  at  Battle  Creek;  Reynolds  on  boats  at  Shell- 
mount,  then  to  climb  by  several  rough  roads  Sand  Mountain 
and  go  over  into  the  Lookout  Valley  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Trenton,  from  which  to  send  an  advance  force  to  seize  Cooper’s 
and  Steven’s  gaps,  leading  into  McLamore’s  Cove  from  Look¬ 
out,  toward  Lafayette.  For  McCook:  to  cross  Johnson’s  and 
Davis’  divisions  by  Caperton’s  bridge,  then  cro§s  Sand  Mountain 
into  Lookout  Valley,  concentrating  near  Valley  Head,  and  send 


THE  MOVEMENTS. 


2  7 


an  advance  for  seizing  Winston’s  Gap,  leading  into  Broomtown 
Valley  from  Lookout  toward  Alpine.  For  Crittenden:  to  fol¬ 
low  Thomas  by  Shellmount,  Battle  Creek,  and  Bridgeport,  take 
the  Valley  road  to  Chattanooga,  take  post  before  reaching  the 
Lookout  Valley  on  the  Murphy’s- Hollow  road,  and  push  one 
brigade  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy  at  the  base  of  Lookout,  tak¬ 
ing  post  at  Wauhatchie.  For  three  brigades  of  cavalry  to 
cross  at  Caperton  and  by  a  ford  near  Island  Creek,  go  over 
Sand  Mountain  to  Rawlingsville,  in  the  Lookout  or  Will’s  Val¬ 
ley,  and  to  reconnoitre  boldly  toward  Alpine  and  Rome. 

The  crossing  of  the  army  commenced  on  August  29,  the  last 
detachments  and  trains  being  over  the  river  on  September  4. 
Thomas’  and  McCook’s  corps  crossed  over  the  mountains  and 
were  in  the  neighborhood  of  Trenton  and  Valley  Head  in  the 
Lookout  Valley  on  September  6.  Now  it  was  found  that  the 
enemy  was  holding  firmly  the  point  of  Lookout,  while  it  was 
reported  from  over  the  river  that  the  rebel  forces  of  Buck¬ 
ner  were  moving  from  East  Tennessee  to  Chattanooga.  On 
the  6th,  Negley’s  division,  of  Thomas’  corps,  reached  Johnson’s 
Crook,  where  the  road  from  Trenton  to  Lafayette  leads  up 
Lookout  Mountain.  Gen.  Beatty  sent  one  regiment  half-way 
up  the  mountain  which  met  the  enemy’s  pickets  and  drove 
them  some  distance,  but  night  prevented  further  action.  The 
next  day — the  7th — Negley’s  whole  division  climbed  the  moun¬ 
tain.  On  the  8th  it  took  possession  of  the  forks  of  the  road, 
the  right  branch  leading  to  Stevens’  and  the  left  to  Cooper’s 
Gap,  through  which  these  roads  descend  into  McLamore’s 
Cove,  and  after  crossing  it,  pass  over  Pigeon  Mountain,  the 
first  through  Dug  Gap  and  the  second  through  Catlett’s  Gap, 
both  leading  direct  to  Lafayette.  Baird’s  division  reached 
Johnson’s  Crook,  while  Brannan’s  and  Reynolds’  remained  in 
camp  near  Trenton.  After  reaching  the  fork  of  the  roads,  Neg- 
ley  sent  one  regiment  to  Stevens’  Gap  and  two  regiments  to 
Cooper’s  Gap  to  occupy  both.  Stevens’  Gap  was  found  heavily 
obstructed  with  fallen  trees. 

During  the  time  that  Thomas  was  securing  the  passes  of 
Lookout  Mountain  on  the  roads  leading  to  Lafayette,  McCook 
was  pushing  the  advance  of  his  corps  and  cavalry  toward 
Alpine.  Davis’  division,  on  September  4,  seized  Winston’s 


28 


CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 


Pass,  at  the  foot  of  Lookout,  forty- two  miles  distant  from 
Chattanooga.  On  the  5th,  his  other  divisions  were  marching 
toward  the  same  gap.  On  the  6th,  Sheridan  was  twelve  miles 
from  Winston.  On  September  8,  Johnson  marched  to  Long’s 
Spring,  on  the  Trenton  road,  and  two  brigades  of  Davis’  de¬ 
scended  into  Broomtown  Valley  to  support  the  cavany.  Such 
was  the  situation  on  September  8,  when,  during  the  night  ol 
the  9th,  Gen.  Rosecrans  at  Trenton,  received  a  dispatch  from 
Gen.  Wagner,  who  was  with  his  brigade  opposite  Chattanooga 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  stating  that  Chattanooga  was 
evacuated  by  the  rebels,  and  that  he  would  occupy  it  in  the 
morning. 

Now  came  one  of  those  weighty  moments  when  the  decision 
taken  by  the  general  commanding  the  army  determines  the 
fate  of  the  campaign.  When  the  decision  is  correct  the  issue  of 
the  campaign  will  be  successful,  at  least  not  disastrous;  when 
the  decision  is  wrong,  the  campaign  will  be  stormy  and  difficult, 
if  not  altogether  ruinous.  Gen.  Rosecrans  in  his  report,  says: 
“the  weight  of  evidence  gathered  from  all  sources,  was  that 
Bragg  was  moving  on  Rome!'  It  is  apparent  that,  debating 
the  question  in  his  own  mind,  Rosecrans  could  not  clearly  see 
the  purpose  of  this  movement;  he  could  not  divine  what  that 
purpose  could  have  been,  and,  notwithstanding  the  information 
that  Bragg  was  moving  on  Rome,  he  could  hardly  credit  it. 
The  proper  line  of  retreat  for  Bragg  was  by  Ringgold  and 
Dalton;  to  move  the  bulk  of  his  army  by  Lafayette  to  Rome 
would  be  to  give  up  the  railroad  and  the  strong  position  in 
front  of  Dalton  at  Buzzard’s  Roost,  almost  without  a  shot. 
He  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  bulk  of  the  rebel  army 
certainly  retreated  along  the  railroad,  and  only  a  part  of  it 
went  by  Lafayette  toward  Rome. 

Once  becoming  satisfied  as  to  the  route  taken  by  the  retreat¬ 
ing  enemy,  he  promptly  issued  orders  to  pursue  him,  and  these 
orders  clearly  show  that  he  located  the  bulk  of  the  enemy’s 
army  as  retreating  along  the  Chattanooga-and-Atlanta  Rail¬ 
road,  and  only  a  part  of  it  as  retreating  by  Layfayette.  In  his 
report  he  says:  “Gen.  Crittenden  was  therefore  directed  to  hold 
Chattanooga  with  one  brigade,  calling  all  the  forces  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Tennessee  across,  and  to  follow  the  enemy’s 


THE  MOVEMENTS. 


29 


retreat  vigorously,  anticipating  that  the  main  body  had  retired 
by  Ringgold  and  Dalton .”  In  the  communication  to  Gen. 
Thomas  written  at  Trenton  on  September  9,  the  day  of  the 
receipt  of  the  communication  giving  information  of  the  evacua¬ 
tion  of  Chattanooga  by  the  enemy,  dated  10  a.m.  and  signed 
by  Gen.  Garfield,  is  said:  “The  general  commanding  directs 
you  to  move  your  command  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Lafayette 
and  make  every  exertion  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank ,  and  if  pos¬ 
sible  cut  off  his  escape .”  If  Rosecrans  did  not  mean  that  Thomas 
in  Lafayette,  would  find  only  a  part  of  the  rebel  army,  he  never 
would  have  issued  such  an  order.  McCook,  in  his  report,  says 
that  on  September  9,  at  6.45  p.m.,  he  “received  information  that 
Chattanooga  is  evacuated,  and  the  enemy  retreating  southward, 
and  the  order  to  move  rapidly  on  Alpine  and  Summerville,  Ga., 
in  pursuit,  or  to  intercept  his  line  of  retreat  and  attack  him  in 
flank.”  It  certainly  could  not  mean  to  intercept  the  whole 
rebel  army,  but  meant  some  portion  of  it. 

Strange  to  say,  all  this  was  a  grievous  mistake,  and  yet  the 
movement  of  the  rebel  army  was  the  simplest  and  the  plainest 
in  the  world,  provided  the  hypothesis  to  reason  about  it  were 
correct,  and  the  premises  should  have  been  these:  that,  suppos¬ 
ing  the  enemy  never  thought  of  retreating  before  our  army, 
what  would  his  movement  then  be  ?  Once  admitting  that,  and 
knowing  that  our  army  was  lying  in  the  Lookout  Valley  and 
actually  beginning  to  cross  Lookout,  it  would  be  easily  seen 
that  Bragg  had  to  evacuate  Chattanooga  if  he  cared  to  preserve 
his  communications.  On  the  other  hand,  by  leaving  Chatta¬ 
nooga  and  proposing  to  fight  his  enemy,  there  was  but  one 
sensible  thing  for  him  to  do,  and  that,  to  take  his  army  toward 
Lafayette  and  concentrate  it  before  the  center  of  our  fron 
which  he  actually  did. 

In  his  complete  report,  dated  at  Warm  Springs,  Ga.,  Decem¬ 
ber  28,  1863,  Gen.  Bragg  says:  “Closely  watched  bv  our  cavalry 
which  had  been  brought  forward,  it  was  soon  ascertained  that 
the  enemy’s  general  movement  was  toward  our  left  and  rear, 
in  the  direction  of  Dalton  and  Rome,  keeping  Lookout  Moun¬ 
tain  between  us.  The  nature  of  the  country  and  the  want  of 
supplies  in  it,  with  the  pressure  of  Burnside’s  force  on  our  right, 
rendered  a  movement  on  the  enemy’s  rear  with  our  inferior 


) 


20  CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 

force  extremely  hazardous,  if  not  impracticable.  It  was  there¬ 
fore  determined  to  meet  him  in  front  whenever  he  should 
emerge  from  the  mountain  gorges.  To  do  this  and  hold  Chat¬ 
tanooga  was  impossible  without  such  a  division  of  our  small 
force  as  to  endanger  both  parts.  Accordingly,  our  troops  were 
put  in  motion  on  September  7  and  8,  and  took  position  from 
Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  to  Lafayette,  on  the  road  leading  south 
from  Chattanooga  and  fronting  the  east  slope  of  Lookout 
Mountain.”  And  further:  “Thrown  off  his  guard  by  our  rapid 
movement,  apparently  in  retreat,  when  in  reality  we  had  con¬ 
centrated  opposite  his  center,  and  deceived  by  the  information 
from  deserters  and  others  sent  into  his  lines,  the  enemy  pressed 
on  his  columns  to  intercept  us  and  thus  exposed  himself  in 

detail.” 

Gen.  Rosecrans,  speaking  in  his  report  of  the  time  when  his 
army  got  into  Lookout  Valley  and  the  reconnoissance  made 
against  the  nose  of  Lookout  developed  the  enemy  in  strong 
force  there,  says:  “To  dislodge  him  from  that  place  (meaning 
Chattanooga)  it  was  necessary  to  carry  Lookout  Mountain,  or 
so  to  move  as  to  compel  him  to  quit  his  position  by  endanger¬ 
ing-  his  line  of  communication.  The  latter  plan  was  chosen.” 

o 

It  was  perfectly  correct,  and  the  plan  of  which  he  speaks  was 
virtually  carried  out  when  the  advancing  forces  of  McCook’s 
and  Thomas’  corps  climbed  over  Lookout  and  occupied  the 
only  gaps  on  its  eastern  slope  through  which  the  roads  lead 
into  the  open  country  and  upon  the  enemy’s  communications. 
The  plan  also,  was  eminently  successful,  because  the  object  of 
compelling  the  enemy  to  quit  Chattanooga  was,  September  8, 
attained.  Bragg,  with  his  army,  withdrew,  and  a  part  of  our 
forces  took  possession  of  Chattanooga  early  on  the  9th.  Hence 
the  campaign  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga  was  virtually 
over. 

To  the  bold  plan,  then,  of  the  demonstrations  upon  the  com¬ 
munications  of  the  enemy,  should  have  succeeded  a  plan  of 
concentration.  The  army  front  was  then  attenuated  over,  forty- 
two  miles.  After  boldness  should  have  come  prudence.  Then 
the  advanced  forces  from  the  eastern  gaps  of  Lookout  might 
have  been  withdrawn,  and  Thomas  and  McCook  might  have 
marched  to  Chattanooga,  screened  from  the  enemy  by  Lookout 


THE  MOVEMENTS. 


31 


Mountain.  One  corps  could  have  been  thrown  out  to  guard 
against  the  enemy,  Chattanooga  fortified,  the  exact  strength 
and  plans  of  the  enemy  discovered,  and  the  decision  reached 
what  was  best  to  do  next.  Unfortunately,  not  knowing  what 
reenforcements  Bragg  received,  and  how  much  more  he  ex¬ 
pected,  laboring  under  a  misconception  of  the  enemy’s  purposes 
and  being  apparently  convinced  that  it  was  Bragg’s  intention 
to  evade  the  battle,  Gen.  Rosecrans,  on  September  9,  issued 
orders  to  Crittenden  to  pursue  the  enemy  by  Ringgold  toward 
Dalton,  to  Thomas  to  move  as  fast  as  possible  to  Lafayette, 
and  to  McCook  to  move  to  Alpine  and  Summerville,  throwing 
his  cavalry  toward  Resaca,  with  the  object  of  breaking  the 
railroad  between  that  point  and  Dalton,  thus  lengthening  the 
front  of  the  army  to  a  dangerous  degree,  and  entirely  isolating 
its  several  army  corps  from  each  other. 

The  roads  over  Sand  Mountain  were  rough,  rocky,  and  pre¬ 
cipitous,  frequently  requiring  large  details  to  bring  them  into 
passable  condition  by  dint  of  hard  work,  and  often  needing  the 
teams  of  artillery  and  wagons  to  be  doubled  up  in  order  to 
ascend  its  steep  slopes.  The  work  of  climbing  Lookout  Moun¬ 
tain  with  artillery  and  trains  was  exhausting.  In  Thomas’  corps 
two  full  days  were  required  by  each  division  to  get  its  artillery 
and  trains  over  the  mountain,  and  this  was  achieved  at  the 
expense  of  the  unremitting  manual  labor  of  the  troops.  It 
may  justly  be  considered  a  feat  of  itself:  the  crossing  of  those 
rugged  and  inaccessible  ranges  of  Sand  and  Lookout  moun- 
tains,  so  expeditiously  and  so  successfully  by  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  with  its  artillery  and  trains. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  ISOLATION  OF  THE  ARMY  CORPS,  AND  BRAGG’S 
ATTEMPTS  TO  DEFEAT  THEM. 


PURSUANT  to  orders,  on  September  9,  Gen.  Negley  with 
his  division,  descended  through  Stevens’  Gap  into  Mc- 
Lamore’s  Cove,  and  took  position  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain. 
He  then  made  a  reconnoissance  and  drove  the  rebel  cavalry 
three  and  one-half  miles,  capturing  a  few  of  them.  On  the 
10th,  he  moved  in  the  direction  of  Lafayette,  sending  out 
skirmishing  parties  from  Bailey’s  Cross-roads.  Pie  kept  up  the 
march  until  the  gorge  leading  to  Dug  Gap  was  reached,  and 
there  the  troops  were  halted  until  the  position  of  the  enemy  in 
the  gap  could  be  ascertained.  There  Negley  learned,  from  a 
Union  cititizen,  that  a  large  infantry  and  artillery  force  of  the 
enemy — presumably  Buckner’s  corps — was  moving  toward  his 
left  from  the  direction  of  Catlett’s  Gap,  whither  a  regiment  was 
sent  to  reconnoitre.  At  sundown,  a  strong  demonstration  was 
made  by  our  forces,  whereby  the  enemy’s  skirmishers  were 
driven  back  on  their  reserves,  after  which  a  position  was  selected 
and  occupied  for  the  night.  From  the  enemy’s  movements, 
and  from  information  gained  from  scouts,  Negley  felt  confident 
that  the  enemy  proposed  to  attack  him  with  a  superior  force  in 
the  morning.  He  also  learned  from  a  prisoner,  and  from  Union 
citizens,  that  he  was  confronted  by  Hill’s  corps,  comprising 
twelve  brigades;  that  Buckner’s  corps — eight  brigades — and  a 
division  of  cavalry  were  three  miles  to  his  left,  and  that  Polk’s 
and  Breckenridge’s  commands  were  within  supporting  distance. 
He  sent  a  communication  to  Gen.  Baird  asking  him  to  move 
forward  and  support  him  in  the  morning,  and  who,  toward 
evening  of  that  day,  with  his  division,  arrived  at  the  foot  of 
Stevens’  Gap. 

About  8  o’clock  on  the  nth,  Baird,  with  Starkweather’s — 
three  regiments — and  Scribner’s — four  regiments — brigades  and 
the  First  Michigan  battery  of  artillery,  joined  Negley  at  Davis’ 
Cross-roads.  Our  position,  forming  a  curve,  intersected  the  Dug- 

32 


CAMPAIGN  FOR  CHATTANOOGA,  1863. 

The  moves  of  the  enemy  to  defeat  the  army  corps  of 
Gen.  Thomas  in  detail. 


st OcCk 


a 

b 

c 

d 

a 

b 

c 


Negley  and  Baird. 

Turchin  of  Reynolds^ 

Brannan. 

King  of  Reynolds’. 

Hindman  and  Buckner  (3  divisions). 
Walker  and  Cleburne  (3  divisions). 
Cheatham. 


3  s  •  ,  „ 

V  2  3  4-  5  M  1I6S 

GOPYMGHTE  O,  /ear.  _  ffffGOS  PRINTING  CO.  CTticctjo. 


THE  ISOLATION  OF  TIIE  ARMY  CORPS. 


33 


Gap  road  on  the  right  and  the  Chattanooga  road  on  the  left. 
Our  skirmishers  in  front  of  our  right  in  the  woods,  were  at-  . 
tacked  by  the  rebels  and  driven  back,  taking  shelter  behind  a 
fence.  The  enemy  then  appeared  in  heavy  force  on  the  right, 
and  a  battery  opened  on  the  left.  Negley  decided  to  withdraw. 
Baird  relieved  Negley’s  troops,  which  withdrew  with  some  loss 
beyond  Chickamauga  Creek.  During  this  engagement  the 
Nineteenth  Illinois,  of  Stanley’s  division,  posted  behind  a  stone 
wall,  severely  punished  the  enemy  pressing  our  right,  and 
helped  Negley’s  artillery  to  withdraw.  Trains  were  started 
and  Beatty’s  and  Scribner’s  brigades  were  ordered  to  protect 
them  against  rebel  cavalry  on  the  road  to  and  at  Bailey’s 
Cross-roads,  when  arrived  there.  Starkweather’s  brigade  was 
withdrawn  beyond  Chickamauga  Creek,  and,  checking  the 
advancing  rebels,  relieved  Stanley’s  brigade  from  pressure,  and 
then  the  forces  withdrew  to  Bailey’s  Cross-roads  without  being 
pursued  by  the  enemy  beyond  Chickamauga  Creek,  where  they 
took  a  strong  position  on  the  ridge,  near  and  in  front  of 
Stevens’  Gap. 

Although  but  little  was  known  of  the  design  of  the  enemy  in 
attacking  Negley,  and  as  the  seasonable  and  prudent  with¬ 
drawal  of  our  troops  toward  the  monntain  did  not  give  the 
rebels  time  enough  to  display  their  forces  and  intention  in  full, 
yet  it  was  a  strong  reminder  to  us  to  be  careful.  Gen.  Thomas 
received  a  dispatch  from  Gen.  McCook  dated;  Headquarteis 
20th  A.  C.,  at  foot  of  mountain,  Sept.  II,  8.30  p.m.  “General, 
my  corps  is  concentrated  here.  I  have  heard  nothing  from  you. 

I  sent  Col.  Harrison  to  open  communication  with  you.  [Sup¬ 
posing  Thomas  to  be  at  that  time  at  Lafayette.]  He  met  the 
enemy’s  cavalry  between  here  and  Lafayette  and  drove  them 
to  a  point  within  nine  miles  of  this  place.  A  prisoner  from  the 
army  and  citizens  report  that  none  of  your  troops  are  there,  but 
that  the  place  is  occupied  by  the  enemy  with  cavalry  and 

infantry.” 

The  encounter  of  Negley  with  the  enemy  at  Dug  Gap,  and 
the  information  gathered  from  the  prisoners  and  civilians 
pointed  strongly  to  a  large  rebel  force  concentrated  around 
Lafayette,  and  the  despatch  of  McCook  confirming  the  same 
added  that  no  rebel  forces  were  south  of  Lafayette  except  some 


34 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


cavalry.  Notwithstanding  all  the  evidence,  Gen.  Rosecrans 
could  hardly  believe  that  the  whole  rebel  army  was  concen¬ 
trated  at  Lafayette,  because,  after  receiving  the  information,  in 
his  despatch  to  Gen.  Thomas  from  Chattanooga  on  September 
12,  ii. 15  a.m.,  and  signed  by  C.  Goddard,  A.  A.  G.,  he  said: 
“Your  despatches  of  10.30  last  night  and  II  this  morning  have 
been  received.  After  maturely  weighing  the  notes,  the  general 
commanding  is  induced  to  think  that  Gen.  Negley  withdrew 
more  through  prudence  than  compulsion.  He  trusts  that  our  loss 
is  not  serious  and  that  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  holding  the 
gap.”  He  evidently  had  commenced  to  think  that  his  original 
decision  in  regard  to  the  movements  of  Bragg  might  have  been 
erroneous.  Further,  in  the  same  despatch,  is  said:  “He  [the 
general  commanding]  despatched  you  last  night  to  communicate 
with  Gen.  McCook,  and  call  him  up  if  you  thought  necessary. 
He  trusts  this  has  been  done;  if  not ,  no  time  should  be  lost 
Here,  then,  was  a  positive  order  to  Gen.  Thomas  to  call  up 
McCook  at  once. 

Seldom,  in  the  annals  of  warfare,  has  such  a  magnificent 
opportunity  been  presented  to  completely  defeat  the  opposing 
force  in  detail  as  that  which  was  now  offered  to  the  rebel 
general  Bragg.  In  his  report,  Bragg  says,  that  at  this  juncture 
his  effective  force,  including  reenforcements  from  Mississippi, 
and  without  counting  his  cavalry,  consisted  of  35,000  men,  all 
concentrated  north  and  northeast  of  Lafayette;  while  of  our 
army,  Thomas’  stood  opposite  him,  McCook’s  was  twenty-five 
miles  to  the  right  of  Thomas  in  a  bee  line,  but  by  the  roads 
which  he  had  to  take  to  join  Thomas  the  distance  amounted 
to  over  forty  miles,  with  a  very  wild  tract  of  country  stretched 
between  them,  and  Crittenden  was  at  Ringgold,  twenty-five 
miles  to  the  left  of  Thomas.  Gen.  Bragg  appreciated  the  situa¬ 
tion,  and  tried  to  profit  by  it. 

As  soon  as  Negley  debouched  with  his  division  into  Mc- 
Lamore’s  Cove,  on  the  evening  of  the  9th,  Bragg — at  11.45  p-ni. 
that  evening — issued  an  order  to  Gen.  Hindman,  stationed  with 
his  division  near  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  where  the  Lafayette- 
and-Chattanooga  road  crosses  Chickamauga  Creek,  to  move 
immediately  to  Davis’  Cross-roads  in  McLamore’s  Cove,  and 
there  join  the  column  of  Gen.  Hill,  also  ordered  to  move  there, 


THE  ISOLATION  OF  THE  ARMY  CORPS.  ^5 

and  “if  in  command,  you  will  move  upon  the  enemy,  reported 
to  be  4000  or  5000  strong,  encamped  at  the  foot  of  Lookout 
Mountain  at  Stevens’  Gap.”  At  the  same  time,  enclosing  his 
order  to  Gen.  Hindman,  Bragg  also  sent  an  order  to  Gen.  Hill 
to  send  or  take  Cleburne’s  division  to  Davis’  Cross-roads  next 
morning,  to  unite  with  Hindman.  That  the  column  must  be 
accompanied  with  a  cavalry  force,  to  open  communication  with 
Hindman  before  the  junction  is  made,  and  to  move  upon  the 
enemy  encamped  at  the  foot  of  Stevens’  Gap.  These  orders 
were  sent  by  Bragg  from  his  headquarters  near  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill. 

Hill,  who  was  at  Lafayette,  received  his  order  about  daylight 
the  next  morning  and  immediately  replied,  informing  Bragg  of 
the  late  hour  the  order  had  been  received,  that  Gen.  Cleburne 
was  sick  abed  the  whole  day,  and  that  two  regiments  of 
Cleburne  had  not  yet  returned  from  above  Harrison  Landing 
on  the  Tennessee,  that  one  brigade  of  his  division  was  picketing 
the  gaps,  that  the  gaps  were  heavily  obstructed  by  the  cavalry, 
that  some  hours  would  be  required  to  clear  them  up,  and  as 
Cleburne  had  nearly,  if  not  quite,  as  long  a  march  as  Hindman. 
Hill  believed  the  intended  junction  was  impossible,  and  no  sur¬ 
prise  could  be  effected.  Whereupon  Bragg  issued  orders,  on 
the  10th,  at  8  a.m.,  to  Gen.  Buckner,  then  at  Anderson’s,  four 
miles  south  of  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  inclosing  his  orders  to 
Hindman  and  Hill,  informing  him  that  “Gen.  Hill  has  found 
it  impossible  to  carry  out  the  part  assigned  Cleburne’s  division, 
and  that  he  desires  that  he  (Buckner)  would  execute  without 
delay  the  orders  issued  to  Gen.  Hill. 

According  to  these  orders,  Hindman,  between  1  and  2  a.m.  on 
the  10th,  moved  his  division  by  Anderson  s  house  and  through 
Worthens’  Gap  of  Pigeon  Mountain  toward  Davis’  Cross-roads, 
and,  hearing  nothing  from  Hill,  halted  for  water  at  Morgan  s, 
within  five  miles  of  Davis,  shortly  after  suniise.  He  then 
threw  out  pickets  and  sent  out  scouting  parties,  afterward  he 
moved  one  mile  farther  to  Conley’s  house  near  Catlett’s  Gap, 
where  there  was  a  good  spring  of  water,  and  beyond  which,  until 
Davis’  was  reached,  no  water  could  be  obtained.  Late  in  the 
afternoon,  Hindman  received  from  army  headquarters  a  copy 
of  a  communication  from  Gen.  Wood  of  Hills  corps,  dated. 


36 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Dug  Gap,  12.20  p.m.,  stating  that  the  enemy  with  infantry, 
artillery,  and  cavalry,  was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  his  front 
advancing.  With  this  was  a  copy  of  a  note  horn  Gen.  Hill, 
dated,  1.30  p.m.,  stating  that  he  had  ordered  Cleburne  s  division 
to  Dug  Gap ,  and  that  if  the  enemy  was  attacking  there  it  would 
be  a  good  time  for  Hindman  to  attack  in  rear.  At  4.45  p.m., 
Buckner’s  corps  joined  Hindman.  A  dispatch  from  army  head¬ 
quarters  dated  6  p.m.,  received  after  8  p.m.,  informed  him  that 
Crittenden’s  corps  of  the  Union  army  had  marched  southward 
from  Chattanooga  that  morning,  and  that  it  was  highly  import¬ 
ant  to  finish  the  operations  in  the  cove  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

By  this  time,  Hindman  had  received  all  the  orders  and  infor¬ 
mation  he  needed,  and  it  was  his  duty  to  move  early  next 
morning  and  attack  the  Union  force  at  Davis’  Cross-roads, 
knowing  that  Cleburne’s  division  would  be  there  to  cooperate 
with  him.  Instead  of  that,  he  called  a  council  of  general  officers 
to  determine  what  was  best  to  be  done,  which  came  to  a  very 
absurd  conclusion,  which,  as  Hindman  states  in  his  own  report, 
was  that  “they  ought  not  to  advance  without  more  definite 
information  as  to  the  Union  force  at  Stevens’  Gap,  nor  until 
assured  that  Gen,  Hill  could  move  through  Dug  Gap  and  force 
a  junction  with  their  forces  at  Davis’  Cross-roads;  and  if  Gen. 
Hill  could  not  do  this,  or  if  the  enemy  at  our  flank  proved  to 
be  so  strong  that  an  advance  would  be  hazardous,  our  best 
course  would  be  to  turn  upon  Crittenden,  Cheatham  cooperat¬ 
ing,  and  Hill  if  possible,  and  thus  crush  tha4  corps  of  the 
enemy.” 

Here  the  subordinate  officers  decide  to  virtually  disobey  the 
orders  already  given  by  their  commanding  general,  and  submit 
to  him  a  new  plan  of  action,  and  Hindman  sends  a  communica¬ 
tion  to  that  effect  to  Bragg  with  Maj.  J.  W.  Nocquet  of  Gen. 
Buckner’s  staff.  Gen.  Bragg’s  answer  in  words  if  not  in  writ¬ 
ing  to  Nocquet  amounted  to  this:  that  Gen.  Hindman’s  infor¬ 
mation  (in  regard  to  Crittenden)  amounted  to  nothing,  and  he 
should  carry  out  the  order  given  to  him.  Until  now,  Bragg 
acted  correctly;  but  soon  he  astonished  Hindman  and  the 
members  of  his  council  of  war  by  the  following  extraordinary 
communication,  received  at  4.20  a.m.  on  the  nth: 

“Lafayette,  Sept.  10,  1863,  12  p.m.,  General:  Headquarters 


THE  ISOLATION  OF  THE  ARMY  CORPS. 


37 


are  here,  and  following  is  the  information:  Crittenden  is 
advancing  on  us  from  Chattanooga;  a  large  force  from  the 
south  has  advanced  within  seven  miles  of  this.  Polk  is  left  at 
Anderson’s  to  cover  your  rear.  Gen.  Bragg  orders  you  to 
attack  and  force  your  zvay  through  the  enemy  to  this  point  at  the 
earliest  hour  that  you  can  see  him  in  the  morning.  Cleburne  will 
attack  in  front  the  moment  your  guns  are  heard.  I  am,  etc., 
Geo.  W.  Brent,  A.  A.  G.” 

Hindman  construed  this  despatch  in  this  way:  that  Bragg 
considered  his  position  perilous,  that  he  did  not  expect  him  to 
capture  the  enemy,  but  wanted  him  to  prevent  his  own  capture, 

.  by  forcing  his  way  through  to  Lafayette,  and  thus  save  his 
command  and  enabling  Bragg  to  resist  the  forces  that  seemed 
about  to  envelope  him.  He  delayed  the  order  to  march,  and 
sent  more  scouts  toward  the  enemy,  but  Maj.  Nocquet,  upon 
his  arrival,  reported  to  Hindman  that  Gen.  Hill  expected  him 
to  make  an  attack  and  would  cooperate.  After  this  report 
at  7  a.m.,  the  movement  finally  commenced.  The  whole  dis¬ 
tance  to  pass  was  only  four  miles,  yet  at  ii.io  a.m.  the  column 
was  only  half-way  from  Davis’  house.  Union  skirmishers  were 
met  and  driven  in.  Buckner’s  two  divisions  deployed  with 
the  left  to  the  spurs  of  Pigeon  Mountain,  Gen.  Anderson,  now 
commanding  Hindman’s  division,  deployed  behind  the  right 
of  Buckner,  and  the  whole  line  advanced,  when  a  new  surprise 
came  from  the  headquarters  at  Dug  Gap  in  the  following  des¬ 
patch:  “Gen.  Hindman:  the  enemy,  estimated  12,000  or  15,000, 
is  forming  line  in  front.  Nothing  heard,  etc.,  W.  W.  Mackall, 
Chief  of  Staff.” 

This  information  staggered  Hindman.  He  now  thought  that 
this  was  an  additional  force  to  that  which  was  already  at  Davis’ 
Cross-roads.  He  stopped  the  forward  movement,  ordered  a 
more  careful  reconnoisance  than  had  yet  been  made,  and,  call- 
in0-  up  Buckner  and  Anderson,  had  a  consultation  with'  them. 
They  concurred  with  Hindman  that  it  would  be  imprudent  to 
advance  further.  Finally  the  order  was  given  to  retire  through 
Catlett’s  Gap,  but  before  the  movement  commenced  the  reports 
of  scouts  satisfied  Hindman  that  the  enemy  was  retiring  toward 
Stevens’  Gap.  Then  he  ordered  his  lines  to  advance  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  with  Anderson’s  division  on  the  right  of  Buckner  s 
and  make  every  effort  to  intercept  the  retreating  column. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


38 

Gen.  Hill,  in  his  report,  says:  “On  the  morning  of  the  nth, 
Cleburne’s  division,  followed  by  Walker’s  [reserve  corps  of  two 
divisions],  marched  to  Dug  Gap.  It  was  understood  that  Hind¬ 
man  and  Buckner  would  attack  at  daylight,  and  these  other 
divisions  were  to  cooperate  with  them.  The  attack,  however, 
did  not  begin  at  the  hour  designated,  and  so  imperfect  was  the 
communication  with  Hindman  that  it  \vas  noon  before  he  could 
be  heard  from.  I  was  then  directed  to  move  with  the  divisions 
of  Cleburne  and  Walker  and  make  a  front  attack  upon  the 
Yankees.  The  sharpshooters  of  Wood’s  brigade,  under  the 
gallant  Maj.  [A.  T.]  Hawkins,  advanced  in  handsome  style, 
driving  in  the  Yankee  pickets  and  skirmishers,  and  Cleburne’s 
whole  force  was  advancing  on  their  line  of  battle,  when  I  was 
halted  by  an  order  from  Gen.  Bragg.  The  object  was,  as  sup¬ 
posed,  to  wait  until  Hindman  got  in  the  Yankees’  rear.  About 
an  hour  before  sundown,  I  was  ordered  once  more  to  advance; 
but  the  Yankees  now  rapidly  retired.  Their  rear  was  gallantly 
attacked  by  a  company  of  our  cavalry,  but  made  a  stand  on 
the  other  side  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  under  cover  of  a  battery 
of  artillery.  Semple’s  magnificent  battery  was  ordered  up,  and 
in  a  short  time  silenced  the  Yankee  fire  with  heavy  loss,  and 
the  Yankee  rout  was  complete.  I  had  in  the  meantime  com¬ 
municated  with  Gen.  Buckner  in  person,  and  by  an  aide  with 
Gen.  Hindman,  and  had  arranged  to  connect  my  line  of  skir¬ 
mishers  and  battle  with  theirs,  so  as  to  sweep  everything  before 
us.  The  prompt  flight  of  the  Yankees  and  the  approaching 
darkness  saved  them  from  destruction.  This  force  proved  to 
be  the  advance  of  Thomas’  corps,  the  main  body  being  oppo¬ 
site  Stevens’  Gap,  in  Lookout  Mountain.” 

That  skilfully-managed  retreat  of  Geiis.  Negley  and  Baird, 
which  Hill  calls  complete  rout,  has  been  before  described.  It 
was  only  because  of  the  industrious  collection  of  information 
by  Gen.  Negley  of  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and 
his  judicious  withdrawal,  that  our  two  divisions  succeeded  so 
well  in  slipping  out  of  that  nest  of  rebel  hornets,  and  escaping 
destruction. 

The  incident  of  the  concentration  of  the  enemy’s  forces 
against  Gen.  Thomas,  with  the  object  of  destroying  us,  is 
instructive;  showing  that  it  is  one  thing  to  conceive  plans, 


the  isolation  of  the  army  corps.  39 

and  another  thing  to  successfully  carry  them  out.  In  his  early 

mpaigns  in  Italy,  Napoleon  twice  defeated  the  Austrian  army 
by  throwing  the  bulk  of  his  force  against  isolated  columns  of 
his  enemy,  and  defeating  them  in  detail.  Gen.  Bragg  had  the 
best  possible  chances  to  imitate  Napoleon  in  this  case,  but  he 
lacked  his  strategical  skill  and  ability  to  handle  troops;  his 
almost  dogged  determination,  after  once  conceiving  a  plan,  to 
carry  it  out  to  the  farthest  limits;  and  his  deliberate  and 
mathematical  coolness  that  no  alarming  reports  could  disturb 
while  he  was  absorbed  in  solving  a  problem. 

Bragg  wished  to  destroy  Thomas’  corps,  and  yet  at  the  first 
appearance  of  only  one  of  its  divisions  in  McLamore’s  Cove, 
he  was  hurriedly  issuing  orders,  late  in  the  evening,  to  two  of 
his  divisions,  located  at  the  opposite  flanks  of  his  front,  to  unite 
in  front  of  a  gap,  which  was  entirely  blockaded,  and  from  there 
to  move  to  Stevens’  Gap  and  attack  our  division.  Even  if  suc¬ 
cessful,  such  an  expedition  could  not  seriously  damage  Thomas’ 
corps.  After  he  saw  that  his  first  order  could  not  be  executed, 
he  increased  the  force  of  his  detail,  and  entrusted  the  leadership 
of  the  principal  attack  upon  the  enemy,  then  at  Davis’  Cross¬ 
roads,  to  a  man  who,  he  should  have  known,  was  totally  unfit 
for  a  bold,  independent  action  of  that  sort.  Then  again,  instead 
of  giving  only  positive  orders  to  Hindman  to  attack,  he  was 
sending  him  communication  after  communication  of  such  an 
alarming  character  that  Hindman  finally  gave  orders  to  his 
three  divisions  to  withdraw  through  Catlett’s  Gap;  and  if  it 
were  not  for  his  able  scouts,  who  succeeded  in  persuading 
him  of  the  retreat  of  the  Union  forces,  Hindman  never  would 
have  reached  Davis’  Cross-roads. 

During  the  pursuit,  Bragg  knew  that  there  were  two  divisions 
of  the  Union  army  in  front  of  him;  at  sunset,  he  stopped  his 
forces  on  Chickamauga  Creek.  At  Davis’  Cross-roads,  the 
Union  force,  being  in  a  hurry  to  get  away,  could  not  certainly 
learn  about  the  number  of  his  troops,  as  they  did  not  see 
but  a  small  portion  of  them.  He  had  six  divisions  with  him. 
Why  not  go  into  bivouac  on  Chickamauga  Creek,  and  in  the 
morning  at  daylight  attack  the  Union  forces?  To  help  those 
two  divisions  out,  the  balance  of  Thomas  coips  would  neces- 
ly  have  descended  from  the  mountain,  and  tneic  Biagg 


sari 


40 


CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 

would  have  a  chance  to  destroy  the  whole  corps.  And  there 
were  no  troops  to  help  that  corps  on  the  morning  of  September 
12,  as  at  that  time,  two  divisions  of  Crittenden’s  were  still  at 
Ringgold,  twenty-five  miles  away  from  Stevens’  Gap,  and  Mc¬ 
Cook’s  corps  was  near  Alpine,  forty  miles  away. 

To  us,  it  is  very  gratifying  to  know  that  the  rebels  failed  in 
their  attempt;  but  looking  at  the  matter  from  a  military  stand¬ 
point,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  it  was  a  wretched  fiasco, 
in  which  Hindman  bore  the  most  prominent  part.  It  showed 
also,  that  it  was  not  enough  to  originate  a  plan;  it  required- 
the  capacity  to  execute  it,  and  of  that  there  was  a  lamentable 
deficiency. 

At  this  phase  of  the  war-like  panorama,  the  rebel  troops  were 
withdrawn  behind  Pigeon  Mountain,  and  Bragg  was  preparing  to 
strike  Crittenden.  On  Sept.  9,  Gen.  Crittenden  moved  his  corps, 
with  its  artillery  and  train,  over  the  nose  of  Lookout  to  Chatta¬ 
nooga.  Wood’s  division  was  retained  in  Chattanooga,  while 
Palmers  and  VanCleve’s  passed  on  to  Rossville.  During  the 
day,  Crittenden  received  orders  that,  after  leaving  one  brigade 
at  Chattanooga,  he  should  pursue  the  enemy  with  the  utmost 
vigor  by  Ringgold  and  toward  Dalton.  On  September  10,  the 
two  divisions  moved  toward  Ringgold,  and  halted  on  Pea-Vine 
Creek,  five  miles  from  Ringgold,  waiting  for  provisions.  Gen. 
Wood,  leaving  Wagner’s  brigade  in  Chattanooga,  moved  with 
his  other  brigades  following  those  divisions. 

The  advance  guard  of  Palmer  was  continuously  skirmishing 
with  rebel  cavalry,  which  appeared  to  be  numerous,  and  once 
in  a  dash  upon  four  companies  of  the  First  Kentucky  made  by 
the  Sixth  Georgia  rebel  cavalry,  two  officers  and  fifty-six  men 
were  captured.  Much  information  was  gleaned,  showing  that 
the  rebel  army  was  concentrated  north  of  Lafayette.  After 
passing  Rossville,  Gen.  Wood  reported  to  his  corps-commander 
that  he  was  informed  that  a  considerable  rebel  force  was  on  his 
right,  and  toward  evening,  meeting  some  negro  teamsters  on 
the  road,  was  told  by  them  that  they  were  doing  some  hauling 
for  the  rebels  and  that  Massa  Bragg  was  just  below  the  Lee- 
and-Gordon’s  mill  with  his  army.  Wood,  deeming  the  infor¬ 
mation  important,  reported  it  to  Gen.  Rosecrans,  who  ordered 
him  to  at  once  despatch  a  brigade  to  the  mill. 


41 


the  isolation  of  the  army  corps. 

it  T!)e  f  rdKer.  Waf  received  early  on  the  morning  of  the  I  ith,  and 

aikers  brigade  was  appointed  for  that  duty.  While  it  was 
going  out,  Gen.  Crittenden  came  to  Wood’s  camp  and  ordered 
him  to  move  two  miles  further  and  wait  for  orders.  Soon  Gen 
Wood  received  an  order  direct  from  Gen.  Rosecrans  to  move 
by  the  shortest  route  with  his  other  brigade  to  the  mill  and 
support  Harker,  which  was  accomplished  by  8.30  p.m.  Col 
Marker  had  heavy  skirmishing  between  Rossville  and  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill  with  the  last  squads  of  the  rear  guard  of  the  rebel 
army.  Meantime  during  the  day,  Col.  Wilder,  with  his  brigade 
of  mounted  infantry,  supported  by  VanCleve’s  division  ran  the 
rebel  cavalry  out  of  Ringgold,  Wilder  pursuing  it  farther  toward 
Tunnel  Hill,  while  VanCleve  and  Palmer  stopped  at  Ringgold. 
There  Crittenden  received  instructions  to  move  to  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill. 

In  his  report,  Gen.  Rosecrans  says:  “ Additional  information 
on  the  10th  [September]  rendered  certain  that  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  retired  by  the  Lafayette  road.”  But  the  idea 
that  Bragg  would  make  a  stand,  or  assume  the  offensive, 
seemed  to  be  untenable  to  him  at  that  time,  as  he  further 
says.  But  uncertain  whether  he  had  gone  far.”  It  was  only 
on  the  next  day,  the  nth,  that  Rosecrans  first  began  to  feel 
sure  that  Bragg  was  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  between  Lee- 
and-Gordon’s  mill  and  Lafayette,  east  of  Pigeon  Mountain; 
and  consequently  issued  his  (Rosecrans’)  orders  for  the  concen¬ 
tration  of  the  army:  to  Crittenden,  to  move  from  Ringgold  to 
Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  and  to  Thomas,  to  call  up  McCook  to 
join  him. 

On  September  12,  Gen.  Crittenden  called  up  Col.  Wilder, 
from  the  vicinity  of  Tunnel  Hill,  and  ordered  him  to  protect 
his  left  on  the  march  to  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill.  Palmer  and 
VanCleve  moved  by  way  of  Judge  Gilbert’s  house,  on  the 
Graysville-and-Lafayette  road,  beyond  which  they  found  the 
bridge  over  Pea-Vine  Creek  cut  down,  and  the  ford  blockaded 
by  the  rebel  cavalry,  which  retreated  before  them  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  Lafayette.  Beyond  Pea-Vine  Creek,  at  the  junction  of 
the  Lafayette  road  and  the  road  to  the  mill,  Gen.  Palmer  halted 
his  division,  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Pea-Vine  Valley  lower 
down  by  VanCleve,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  trains.  But  few 

4 


42 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


of  the  enemy’s  troops  were  then  watching  their  movements. 
At  io  a.m.,  some  firing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  the  mill, 
and  Hazen’s  brigade  received  orders  from  Palmer  to  move 
there.  At  2  p.m.,  two  regiments  and  a  section  of  artillery  were 
sent  toward  Pea-Vine  church  to  clear  the  flank  of  the  enemy, 
which  was  done.  About  dark,  both  divisions  bivouacked  at 
Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill. 

But  the  movement  of  Wilder’s  mounted  infantry  was  not  so 
easily  accomplished.  He  was  marching  from  Ringgold  by  the 

old  Alabama  road,  and  in  the  direction  of  Leet’s  tan-yard.  On 

» 

the  previous  day,  while  on  the  way  to  Tunnel  Hill,  he  had  had 
a  fight  with  the  rebel  cavalry  under  Scott;  and  on  this  day  he 
had  quite  a  tussle  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry  under  Gen. 
Pegram  at  Leet’s  tan-yard,  killing  and  wounding  fifty  of  the 
enemy,  and  losing  thirty  of  his  own  men. 

The  next  day,  September  13,  Gen.  Crittenden,  after  placing 
his  divisions  in  position,  ordered  Gen.  VanCleve,  with  Dick’s 
brigade  supported  by  Sam  Beatty’s,  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
beyond  the  mill  on  the  Lafayette  road;  while  Col.  Wilder  with 
his  mounted  infantry,  supported  by  Cruft’s  brigade  of  Palmer’s 
division,  received  orders  to  reconnoitre  to  the  left,  through  Pea- 
Vine  Valley.  At  that  time,  the  Fourth  U.-S.  Cavalry,  650 
strong,  came  down  from  Chattanooga,  and  reported  for  duty  to 
Crittenden,  and  he  sent  them  to  reconnoitre  the  road  leading 
up  McLamore’s  Cove.  VanCleve  moved  out  and  skirmished 
with  some  rebel  cavalry  which,  as  it  appeared  to  him,  had  some 
artillery,  He  advanced  almost  three  miles,  then  halted,  and, 
after  resting  his  troops,  returned.  He  never  imagined  that  one 
mile  south  of  where  he  rested  his  force,  the  greater  part  of  the 
enemy’s  army  was  in  position.  Likewise  were  both  Wilder  and 
Cruft  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  one  mile  beyond  the  Pea-Vine 
church,  which  they  reached,  they  would  have  struck  the  right 
wing  of  that  army.  Yet  it  was  the  case. 

After  the  failure  at  Dug  Gap,  Bragg  withdrew  his  forces  to 
Lafayette,  but  immediately  moved  Hindman’s  division  and 
Walker’s  corps  in  the  direction  of  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill.  On 
September  12,  forenoon,  Bragg  ordered  Gen.  Polk  to  proceed 
at  once  with  Cheatham’s  division  and  take  position  at  Rock 
Spring,  and  to  forward  the  rest  of  his  corps  as  soon  as  practi- 


CAMPAIGN  FOR  CHATTANOOGA,  1863. 

The  moves  of  the  enemy  to  defeat  the  army  corps  of 
Gen.  Crittenden  in  detail. 


A 

B 


B 

C 


Thomas. 

Crittenden. 

Confederate  line  of  Walker,  Hindman^^^^^ 
and  Cheatham. 

Buckner  on  the  march  to  join  them. 

Cleburne. 


j  2  3  5  Miles 

COPYRIGHTED'  / Q87.  _  flRGOS  PRINTING  CO.  Cfiicctjo. 


. 


. 

- 


'  ■- 

-• 


J 


•  / 


' 


* 


THE  ISOLATION  OF  THE  ARMY  CORPS. 


43 


cable.  The  same  day,  Bragg  sent  to  Polk  the  following  com¬ 
munication: 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Tennessee,  Lafayette,  Ga.,  Sept.  12 
[ 1 863],  6  p.m.  Lieut.- Gen.  Polk. — General:  I  enclose  you  a 
despatch  from  Gen.  Pegram.  This  presents  you  a  fine  oppor¬ 
tunity  of  striking  Crittenden  in  detail,  and  I  hope  you  will  avail 
yourself  of  it  at  daylight  tomorrow.  This  division  crushed,  and 
the  others  are  yours.  [Gen.  Pegram  apparently  informed  Bragg 
that  from  Ringgold  only  one  Union  division  was  coming  down]. 
We  can  then  turn  again  on  the  force  in  the  cove.  Wheeler’s 
cavalry  will  move  on  Wilder  so  as  to  cover  your  right.  I  shall 
be  delighted  to  hear  of  your  success.  Very  truly  yours,  Braxton 
Bragg.” 

Cheatham  took  position  before  noon,  Walker  came  in  in  the 
evening,  and  Hindman  before  daylight  on  the  13th.  The' line 
was  formed,  with  Cheatham  resting  near  Dr.  Anderson’s,  Hind¬ 
man  on  the  right  of  Cheatham,  Walker  on  the  right  of  Hindman 
the  line  covering  three  roads:  the  Chattanooga-and-Lafayette, 
Graysville-and-Lafayette,  and  the  Ringgold-and-Lafayette. 

On  the  evening  of  the  12th,  at  8  p.m.,  Polk  informed  Bragg 
that  he  found  that  the  whole  of  Crittenden’s  corps  and  Wilder’s 
cavalry  brigade  was  immediately  before  him;  that  VanCleve 
was  on  the  Gordon’s- mill  road,  with  his  advance  encamping 
one  and  one-half  miles  in  his  front;  Palmer  on  the  Pea-Vine  or 
Graysville  road,  with  his  advance  about  the  same  distance,  and 
Wood  on  the  Lafayette-and-Ringgold  road,  with  his  advance 
on  a  line  with  the  other  tw’o.  “It  will  thus  be  perceived,”  Polk 
says,  “I  have  the  whole  of  Crittenden’s  corps  with  Wilder’s 
cavalry  brigade  confronting  me  and  moving  in  line  of  battle. 
How  much  more  of  the  enemy’s  force  is  behind  this  line  as  a 
reserve,  there  is  no  means  of  determining;  but  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  he  has  received  a  considerable  accession  of  force 
at  Chattanooga,  and  it  is  not  to  be  believed  that  he  will  omit 
to  send  them  forward.  I  am  therefore  clearly  of  the  opinion 
that  you  should  send  to  me  additional  force,  so  as  to  make 
failure  impossible,  and  great  success  here  would  be  of  incalculable 
benefit  to  our  cause.  I  think  I  should  have,  so  as  to  make  suc¬ 
cess  sure,  the  force  under  Gen.  S.  B.  Buckner.  That  will  leave 
Gen.  Hill’s  corps  intact  for  any  contingency  in  your  quarter. 


44 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


In  this  opinion  I  find  all  the  general  officers  with  me  agree,  and 
I  am  myself  so  profoundly  convinced  of  this  that  I  beg  leave 
most  respectfully  and  urgently  to  press  this  upon  your  atten¬ 
tion.  It  would  not  only  insure  success  if  there  were  no  other 
troops  present  with  the  enemy  as  a  reserve,  but  prevent  failure 
if  there  should  be.  The  enemy  is  moving  with  steady  step  upon 
my  position — it  is  a  strong  one — and  will  no  doubt  attack  early 
in  the  morning.  My  troops  I  can  not 'get  into  position  in  time 
to  attack  myself  at  so  eariy  an  hour  as  day-dawn.  If  I  find  he 
is  not  going  to  attack  me,  I  will  attack  him  without  delay.  I 
send  you  a  map  of  the  situation.  I  send  this  by  a  staff-officer. 
Respectfully,  General,  your  obedient  servant,  L.  Polk,  Lieut.- 
Gen.,  Commanding.” 

Notwithstanding  the  weighty  circumstances  under  which  the 
correspondence  between  Gens.  Bragg  and  Polk  was  conducted, 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  preserve  one’s  seriousness.  When  Bragg 
made  such  a  gallant  proposition  to  crown  with  laurels  the  brow 
of  Leonidas  Polk,  how  flat  and  unsoldierly  a  response  was  sent 
by  the  latter.  Where  he  tries  to  be  pathetic  he  is  tame,  and 
where  his  imagination  runs  with  him  he  is  ludicrous.  The 
movement  “with  steady  step”  on  his  position  appeared  to  have 
been  made  early  in  the  day,  but  when  he  was  writing  his 
despatch,  that  steady  step,  as  we  have  before  seen,  was  turned 
east  from  all  those  roads,  and  resolved  itself  into  rest  in  the 
bivouacs  opposite  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill.  Still  Gen.  Bragg 
tried  to  humor  the  former  bishop,  and  answered  him  thus: 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Tennessee,  Lafayette,  Ga.,  Sept.  12, 
1863,  12  o’clock  at  night.  General:  I  have  your  despatch  giv¬ 
ing  me  your  position  and  the  disposition  of  the  enemy  oppposite 
to  you.  Your  position  seems  to  be  a  strong  one  for  defence, 
but  I  hope  will  not  be  held  unless  the  enemy  attacks  early. 
We  must  force  him  to  fight  at  the  earliest  moment,  and  before 
his  combinations  can  be  carried  out.  Your  generals  who  advise 
the  concentration  of  the  larger  portion  of  the  army  with  you, 
only  know  of  Crittenden’s  corps  being  opposed  to  you,  and  did 
not  know  of  the  advance  again  of  a  heavy  infantry  force  in  the 
cove  upon  this  place,  and  of  another  from  the  south,  preceeded 
by  a  very  large  cavalry  force.  However,  to  avoid  all  danger,  I 
shall  put  Buckner  in  motion  in  the  morning  and  run  the  risk 


45 


THE  ISOLATION  OF  THE  ARMY  CORPS. 

here.  You  must  not  delay  attack  for  his  arrival,  or  another 
golden  opportunity  may  be  lost  by  the  withdrawal  of  our  game. 
Had  you  and  the  generals  with  you  had  the  information  in  my 
possession  at  the  date  of  your  last  despatch,  your  conclusions 
might  have  varied.  But  I  trust  that  the  cavalry  sent  south 
may  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  you  finish  the  job  intrusted 
to  you.  Action,  prompt  and  decided,  is  all  that  can  save  us. 
The  troops  are  leady  to  respond.  I  am,  etc.,  Braxton  Bragg.” 

In  his  report,  Biagg  says:  “Early  on  the  13th,  I  proceeded 
to  the  front,  ahead  of  Buckners  command,  to  find  that  no 
advance  had  been  made  on  the  enemy,  and  that  his  forces  had 
formed  a  junction  and  recrossed  the  Chickamauga.  Again  dis- 
appointed,  immediate  measures  were  taken,  etc.”  As  there 
are  no  official  documents  to  show  how  the  whole  affair  termin¬ 
ated,  except  the  diary  of  Lieut.  W.  B.  Richmond,  aide-de-camp 
to  Lieut. -Gen.  Polk,  we  will  make  extracts  from  that  diary  in 
regard  to  it. 

“Sunday,  September  13,  [1863].  Clear  and  very  warm.  By 
3  a.m.,  Gen.  Walker  was  ordered  to  take  position  to  right  of 
Cheatham.  At  4.30,  Hindman  reported  in  person  at  head¬ 
quarters,  at  Mrs.  Susan  Parks,’  near  Rock- Spring  church,  on 
Pea-Vine  road.  At  6  a.m.,  Hindman  was  ordered  to  take  posi¬ 
tion  between  Cheatham  and  Walker.  The  new  line  thus  formed 
left  Cheatham  with  three  brigades  in  front  and  one  in  reserve; 
Hindman,  two  in  front  and  one  in  reserve,  and  Walker,  three  in 
front  and  one  in  reserve.  Orders  issued  at  9  a.m.,  before  the 
line  was  formed,  to  division  commanders  to  inform  corps  head¬ 
quarters  when  they  were  in  line,  as  the  order  was  for  the  whole 
line  to  advance.  About  this  time  information  came  from 
Pegram  that  there  was  no  enemy  on  the  Ringgold  road,  and 
there  was  a  movement  of  the  enemy  from  that  road  toward  the 
Gordon’s- mill  road.  The  enemy  were  only  about  one  and 
one-half  miles  out  on  that  road  and  Strahl  [commander  of  a 
brigade  in  Cheatham’s  division]  was  sent  out  to  develop  them. 
The  first  guns  were  fired  about  12.30,  and  Strahl  retired  with 
the  intention  of  drawing  the  enemy  after  him  on  Cheatham. 
After  some  artillery  practice  the  firing  ceased. 

“Gen.  Bragg  and  staff  arrived  at  Gen.  Polk’s  quarters  about 
9  a.m.  Buckner  was  ordered  partly  out  and  then  ordered  back. 


46 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


At  2  p.m.,  Walker  was  ordered  to  swing  from  right  toward  left, 
in  order  to  strike  the  enemy,  said  to  be  at  Pea-Vine  church  in 
force.  Before,  however,  the  order  was  executed,  it  was  dis¬ 
covered  that,  leaving  only  his  skirmishers  to  deceive,  he  had 
gone  with  his  whole  force  toward  Chattanooga.  At  5  p.m., 
Gen.  Bragg  and  staff  returned  to  Lafayette.  Monday,  Septem¬ 
ber  14.  Clear  and  warm.  At  9  a.m.  all  the  troops  started  for 
Lafayette.  General  returned  by  6  p.m.”  etc. 

The  inactivity  of  Gen.  Bragg  at  this  juncture  is  still  more 
inconprehensible  than  it  was  at  Dug  Gap.  Four  miles  south  of 
Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  he  concentrated  six  divisions — including 
Buckner’s  which  was  on  the  way  there — just  double  the  force 
Crittenden  had  at  the  mill.  Knowing  how  little  capacity 
Gen.  Polk  possessed  for  the  management  of  such  an  expedition, 
why  did  not  Gen.  Bragg  come  upon  the  ground  early  and  direct 
the  movement  himself?  Gen.  Polk  was  uneducated  in  the  art 
of  war,  was  tardy  and  timorous,  and,  as  circumstances  demon¬ 
strated,  was  afraid  to  attack  Crittenden’s  three  divisions  with 
his  four,  but  wanted  Buckner’s  two  divisions  in  addition. 

His  communication  of  the  previous  day  shows  that  he  was 
fearful  that  the  enemy  was  surely  moving  on  him  with  “steady 
step,”  and  after  once  posting  his  troops  in  a  strong  position  he 
would  have  stuck  to  it  forever,  waiting  for  the  enemy,  who  had 
no  idea  of  attacking  him.  On  the  contrary,  that  day  Crittenden 
received  orders  to  immediately  move  his  two  divisions  to  a 
position  on  Missionary  Ridge,  covering  the  Chattanooga  Valley, 
leaving  Wood  alone  at  the  mill,  with  instructions  to  Wood  to 
hold  that  position  as  stubbornly  as  posssible,  and,  if  finally 
compelled  to  give  way,  to  fight  and  slowly  retreat  toward 
Chattanooga;  then  to  take  position  with  one  brigade  in  front 
of  Chattanooga,  and  to  place  the  other  on  the  nose  of  Lookout, 
and  there  fight  to  the  last;  of  course,  with  the  supposition  that 
the  other  troops  that  were  in  Chattanooga  would  support  him. 
Hence,  supposing  that  under  a  misapprehension,  Bragg  lost  the 
opportunities  of  September  13  by  inactivity,  there  is  nothing 
to  show  why  he  should  not  have  attacked  Crittenden  on  the 
14th.  Crittenden  was  covering  Chattanooga;  if  he  was  attacked 
and  compelled  to  give  way  he  would  have  to  retreat  toward 
that  city,  and  Thomas,  who  was  still  at  Stevens’  Gap,  almost 
eighteen  miles  away,  could  not  help  Crittenden. 


THE  ISOLATION  OF  THE  ARMY  CORPS. 


47 


It  is  impossible  to  ascribe  this  frittering-away  of  the  oppor¬ 
tunity  that  chance  at  that  time  presented  to  Bragg  to  anything 
else  than  his  individual  indecision  of  character  and  the  lack 
of  that  indomitable  energy  and  cool  daring  which,  allied  with 
accurate  planning,  makes  perfect  generalship.  Those  three 
memorable  days  of  September,  1863,  which  would  have  made 
a  talented  general  famous,  manifested  Bragg’s  mediocrity  and 
low-grade  generalship,  above  which  he  never  arose  subsequently. 

Bragg  then  relinquished  the  idea  of  trying  to  defeat  Rose- 
crans’  army  in  detail;  but,  in  anticipation  of  shortly  receiving 
some  additional  reenforcements,  busied  himself  in  plans  for  the 
destruction  of  that  army  at  one  stroke. 


HALLECK. 


CHAPTERS  V. 

CONCENTRATION  OF*  OUR  ARMY. 
ENEMY’S  ORDERS. 


HE  following  despatches  of  Gen.  H.  W.  Halleck,  sent  to 


1  Gen.  Rosecrans,  are  worthy  of  notice.  His  despatch  of 
September  6,  1863,  says:  “You  give  no  information  of  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  Bragg  and  Buckner;  if  they  have  united  it  is  important 
that  you  and  Burnside  unite  as  quickly  as  possible,  so  that  the 
enemy  may  not  attack  you  separately.”  Could  not  he  see  the 
importance  of  it  before?  At  the  time  of  the  despatch,  Buckner 
was  on  his  way  to  Chattanooga,  and  Burnside  was  scattering 
his  forces  through  the  whole  of  East  Tennessee. 

Again,  in  a  despatch  of  the  same  date,  Halleck  says:  “I  have 
heard  nothing  from  Burnside  since  his  despatch  of  August  31, 
[that  was  the  time  Burnside  was  on  the  point  of  crossing  the 
Cumberland  Mountains]  the  substance  of  which  was  sent  you. 
His  instructions  were  to  advise  you  of  his  movements ,  and  con¬ 
nect  as  soon  as  possible  with  your  left.  There  is  no  reason 
now  to  suppose  that  'any  of  Lee’s  troops  have  been  detached, 
except  perhaps  a  small  force  from  Charleston.”  From  this  it 
is  clear  that  until  that  time,  Halleck  never  contemplated  order¬ 
ing  Burnside  to  actively  cooperate  with  Rosecrans  in  the  cam¬ 
paign  against  Chattanooga. 

After  receiving  information  that  Chattanooga  was  evacuated, 
that  Bragg  was  in  retreat,  and  that  2000  rebels  surrendered  to 
Burnside  at  Cumberland  Gap,  Halleck  again  mounted  his 
strategic  stilts  and  sent  to  Rosecrans,  on  September  11,  the 
following  despatch:  “Burnside  telegraphs  from  Cumberland 
Gap  that  he  holds  all  East  Tennessee  above  Loudon,  and  also 
the  gap  of  the  North-Carolina  Mountains.  A  cavalry  force  is 
moving  toward  Athens,  to  connect  with  you.  After  holding 
the  mountain  passes  on  the  west,  and  Dalton  or  some  other 
point  on  the  railroad,  to  prevent  the  return  of  Bragg's  army ,  it 
vuill  be  decided  whether  your  army  shall  move  further  into 
Georgia  and  Alabama.  It  is  reported  by  deserters  that  a  portion 


48 


HALLECK. 


49 


of  Bragg's  army  is  reenforcing  Lee.  It  is  important  that  the 
truth  of  this  should  be  ascertained  as  early  as  possible/' 

This  despatch  shows  such  a  contemplative  placidity  by  the 
great  strategist  that  one  would  think  Halleck  wrote  it  right 
after  one  of  his  luxurious  dinners,  washed  down  with  genuine 
Madeira  and  Tokay.  His  strategy  in  this  despatch  reveals 
itself  so  magnificently,  and  his  future  decision,  whether  Rose- 
crans  shall  move  farther  into  Georgia  and  Alabama  or  not, 
looks  so  important  that  one  would  instinctively  deem  that  he, 
Halleck,  was  the  sole  arbiter  of  the  military  destinies  of  the 
Nation.  Then  he  condescends  to  notice  those  ragged  rebel 
deserters  (who  by  the  way,  were  sent  to  him  purposely)  and 
their  report  that  Bragg’s  troops  were  reenforcing  Lee,  and  then 
authoritively  remarks,  in  fact  orders,  that  its  verity  or  falsity 
should  be  ascertained  as  early  as  possible.  And  this  was 
written  on  the  day  when  Negley  and  Baird  were  trying  their 
best  in  McLamore’s  Cove,  to  escape  the  deadly  grasp  of  the 
enemy. 

But  Halleck  himself  soon  had  an  opportunity  of  ascertaining 
the  truth  of  the  reports  of  those  deserters.  The  next  day  he 
found  out  that  Longstreet,  with  his  corps,  disappeared  from  the 
army  of  Lee,  and  was  sent  by  rail  west  to  Atlanta  and  thence 
to  Bragg.  He  also  received  a  despatch  from  Gen.  Hurlbut  at 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  informing  him  that  the  bulk  of  Johnston’s 
Army  of  the  Mississippi  was  sent  to  Bragg,  and  that  he  con¬ 
sidered  the  news  reliable.  Then  Halleck  abandoned  his  gas¬ 
conades,  and  from  a  great  man  he  became  a  small  one.  He 
saw  that  his  incapacity  conjured  up  a  portent,  and  the  phantom 
of  the  responsibility  before  the  Nation  in  case  Rosecrans’  army 
was  destroyed,  was  threateningly  rising  before  him ;  and  to 
evade  that  responsibility,  he  became  cringing.  He  telegraphed 
to  Burnside  at  Knoxville,  to  Hurlbut  at  Memphis,  and  to 
Grant  at  Vicksburg,  to  immediately  send  troops  to  Rosecrans. 
Grant  being  at  New  Orleans,  he  reiterated  his  orders;  he  tel- 
graphed  to  Sherman  at  Vicksburg  again,  to  Schofield  in 
St.  Louis,  and  even  to  Pope  in  the  Northwest,  to  send  troops  to 
Rosecrans,  as  if  those  troops  could  fly  and  reach  their  contem¬ 
plated  destination  in  a  couple  of  days,  while  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  facing  the  enemy,  preparing  to  fight.  But  it 


50 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


is  of  no  use  to  continue  our  remarks  on  Halleck.  We  have 
only  to  say  that  nothing  could  be  produced  by  that  excessive 
telegraphing  before  the  great  battle  was  fought  except  the 
demonstration  that  Halleck  was  fearful  and  appreciative  of  his 
own  incompetency.  . 

Speaking  in  his  report  of  the  time  Crittenden’s  corps  was 
located  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  Gen.  Rosecrans  says:  “Thus 
it  was  ascertained  that  the  enemy  was  concentrating  all  his 
forces,  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  behind  Pigeon  Mountain,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Lafayette,  while  the  corps  of  this  army  were  at 
Gordon’s  mill,  Bailey’s  Cross-roads,  at  the  foot  of  Stevens’  Gap, 
and  at  Alpine,  a  distance  of  forty  miles  from  flank  to  flank,  by 
the  nearest  practical  roads,  and  fifty-sevei)  miles  by  the  route 
subsequently  taken  by  the  Twentieth  army  corps.  It  had 
already  been  ascertained  that  the  main  body  of  Johnston’s  army 
had  joined  Bragg,  and  an  accumulation  of  evidence  showed 
that  the  troops  from  Virginia  had  reached  Atlanta  on  the  first 
of  the  month,  and  that  reenforcements  were  expected  soon  to 
arrive  from  that  quarter.”  Then  added:  “It  was  now  a  matter 
of  life  and  death  to  effect  the  concentration  of  the  army.” 

We  have  mentioned  the  instructions  given  to  Gen.  Crittenden 
on  the  13th  to  take  a  position  on  Missionary  Ridge  with  his 
two  divisions,  and  cover  the  Chattanooga  Valley,  which  was 
done;  but  in  the  evening  a  new  order  came  to  move  his  divis¬ 
ions  down  to  Chickamauga  Creek,  placing  VanCleve’s  at 
Crawfish  Spring,  connecting  with  Wood’s  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s 
mill,  and  Palmer  further  up  the  river  at  Gowen’s  Ford.  At 
Bailey’s  Cross-roads,  Gen.  Thomas  on  the  12th  posted  Brannan’s 
division  on  the  left  of  Baird,  and  Reynolds’  second  brigade  to 
the  left  of  Brannan,  while  Turchin’s  brigade  of  Reynolds’ 
division,  which  on  the  previous  day  while  at  the  fork  of  the 
roads  on  the  mountain,  was  directed  to  seize  Cooper’s  Gap,  re¬ 
mained  before  that  gap.  The  same  day  Gens.  Brannan  and 
Baird  went  with  parts  of  their  commands  on  a  reconnoissance 
to  Davis’  Cross-roads,  and  two  miles  beyond,  but  found  no 
enemy  other  than  a  few  mounted  men.  Next  day,  the  13th, 
Reynolds’  division  concentrated  on  the  road  leading  from 
Cooper’s  Gap  to  Catlett’s  Gap,  and  on  the  14th  took  position 
at  Pond  Spring  near  Chickamauga  Creek  on  the  same  road, 


CONCENTRATION  OF  OUR  ARMY. 


51 


where  Wilder’s  mounted  infantry  brigade  joined  him.  Gen. 
McCook  received  orders  to  join  Thomas  on  the  12th  at  mid¬ 
night,  and  commenced  the  movement  on  the  13th  up  the 
mountain,  and  on  the  14th,  encamped  in  Lookout  Valley. 

Let  us  consider  a  moment  the  subject  of  the  concentration  of 
our  army.  Our  objective  point  was  Chattanooga;  it  was  a 
matter  of  necessity  to  make  a  strong  demonstration  with  the 
largest  part  of  our  army  on  the  communications  of  the  enemy. 
The  configuration  of  the  mountain  ranges  and  scarcity  of  passes 
to  cross  or  climb  Lookout  was  the  cause  of  such  an  extraor¬ 
dinary  lengthening  of  our  front.  The  enemy  abandoned  Chat¬ 
tanooga  and  moved  south  to  Lafayette.  The  idea  that  he  was 
evading  the  fight  occasioned  the  descent  of  our  troops  into 
Broomtown  Valley  on  the  extreme  right,  into  McLamore’s 
Cove  in  the  centre,  and  the  move  toward  Chickamauga  River 
on  the  road  to  Lafayette  on  our  left.  On  that  road  between 
Chickamauga  River  and  Lafayette,  the  enemy’s  army  was 
found  to  be  concentrated  and  screened  by  Pigeon  Mountain. 

On  September  13,  enough  was  ascertained  to  believe  that  the 
enemy  was  largely  reenforced,  and  was  sure  of  receiving  addi¬ 
tional  troops.  Making  a  stand  at  Lafayette,  he  threw  us  on 
the  defensive,  and  being  so  widely  scattered,  we  dared  not 
attack  him.  If,  right  after  the  success  of  our  demonstration 
and  the  evacuation  of  Chattanooga,  instead  of  crossing  Lookout 
we  had  withdrawn  the  corps  of  Thomas  and  McCook  by  the 
Lookout  Valley  to  Chattanooga,  we  could  have  rectified  our 
front  and  have  met  the  enemy  squarely,  should  he  attack  us  in 
front  of,  or  beyond  Chattanooga,  covering  the  approaches  to  it 
perfectly,  and  facing  south  or  southeast  according  to  the  direc¬ 
tion  in  which  the  enemy  would  be  approaching.  The  proba¬ 
bility  was  that  in  such  a  case  the  enemy  would  not  remain  at 
Lafayette,  but  would  have  shifted  his  position  to  Ringgold  or 
Dalton,  and  approach  us  from  that  direction.  Now,  as  we 
stood  facing  east,  our  objective  point,  Chattanooga,  was  lying 
north  of  our  left  flank  at  a  distance  of  twelve  miles,  and  from 
our  center  at  about  twenty-seven  miles. 

In  order  to  cover  Chattanooga  well,  the  front  of  our  position, 
should  it  have  been  selected  on  the  spurs  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
would  have  to  be  so  taken  as  to  intersect  the  main  Lafayette- 


52 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


and-Chattanooga  road  at  right  angles.  To  reach  such  a  position 
our  army  would  have  to  make  a  flank  movement  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy’s  army,  a  very  delicate  and  dangerous  operation.  To 
risk  being  attacked  on  the  march  while  performing  such  a  flank 
movement  in  the  daytime,  was  to  put  our  army"  in  jeopardy. 
Still  we  would  have  to  make  a  flank  movement  in  some  way 
in  order  to  get  the  army  out  of  its  false  position. 

When  Gen.  Rosecrans  decided  to  concentrate  his  army,  there 
were  two  ways  to  do  it.  On  the  night  of  September  14,  Mc¬ 
Cook’s  corps  and  Col.  McCook’s  division  of  cavalry  were 
bivouacking  in  Lookout  Valley,  Crook’s  division  of  cavalry  be¬ 
ing  left  to  watch  the  gaps  of  Lookout  opposite  Alpine.  On 
the  same  day,  Granger’s  three  brigades  of  the  reserve  corps 
arrived  at  Rossville,  four  miles  south  of  Chattanooga.  From 
Rossville  to  Lee-and- Gordon’s  mill  is  about  eight  miles.  „  If 
McCook’s  cavalry  was  ordered,  on  the  14th,  to  join  Thomas  by 
forced  marches,  it  could  have  descended  through  Stevens’  Gap 
into  McLamore’s  Cove  on  the  night  of  the  15th,  and  relieved 
infantry  at  the  fords  and  gaps.  Granger’s  three  brigades  might 
have  advanced  to  within  supporting  distance  of  Crittenden,  and 
Thomas’  corps  on  the  night  of  the  15th  or  16th,  might  have 
been  ordered  to  make  a  night- march,  passing  to  the  rear  of 
Crittenden’s  corps.  On  the  17th,  both  corps  might  have  fallen 
back  to  a  position  selected  on  the  spurs  of  Missionary  Ridge 
somewhere  in  front  of  Rossville,  by  which  time  McCook’s  corps 
if  directed  to  march  to  Chattanooga  by  the  Lookout  Valley, 
would  have  joined  them. 

The  other  way  to  concentrate  the  army  was,  to  direct  Mc¬ 
Cook  to  join  Thomas  in  McLamore’s  Cove,  then  to  shift 
Thomas  to  the  left  to  give  room  to  McCook,  and  finally,  by 
making  a  night-march,  to  pass  Thomas  and  McCook  to  the 
rear  of  and  beyond  Crittenden.  This  last  plan  was  adopted  by 
Gen.  Rosecrans. 

While  waiting  for  McCook’s  corps,  after  Wilder’s  mounted- 
infantry  brigade  joined  Reynolds,  Gen.  Turchin  of  Reynolds’ 
division,  started  with  the  Ninety-second  Illinois  of  that  brigade 
on  a  reconnoitering  expedition  to  the  gorge  of  Catlett’s  Gap, 
skirmishing  with  the  mounted  pickets  of  the  enemy  from  the 
Chickamauga  Creek  out  to  the  mouth  of  the  gap,  where  the 


CAMPAIGN  FOR  CHATTANOOGA,  1863. 
Location  of  the  armies  on  the  night  of  September  17. 


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Thomas’  Corps: 
a  Brannan.  b  Baird. 
c  Turchin.  d  King  of  Reyn< 
e  Negley. 

Crittenden’s  Corps: 

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Palmer’s,  h  Beatty  and  Dick,  anh^x^f 
i  Wood  and  Barnes  of  VanCleve’s. 
k  McCook’s  Corps. 

a  Hindman  (1  division),  b  Buckner  (2  divisions) 
c  Cheatham  (1  division),  d  Walker  (2  division 
«  and  /  Breckinridge  and  Cleburne. 


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CONCENTRATION  OF  OUR  ARMY. 


53 


enemy’s  reserves  were  found  drawn  up  and  a  strong  line  of 
skirmishers  posted  to  the  right  of  the  road,  resisting  the  ad¬ 
vance.  Having  received  instructions  to  avoid  bringing  on  an 
engagement,  Turchin  retired  with  the  Ninety-second  regiment 
to  the  camp.  The  same  day,  September  14,  there  was  a  recon- 
noissance  made  by  another  part  of  Wilder’s  brigade  to  the  Blue¬ 
bird  Gap,  south  of  Dug  Gap,  but  it  did  not  meet  any  of  the 
enemy.  On  the  same  day  Gen.  Brannan  advanced  one  brigade 
to  Chickamauga  Creek,  to  the  right  and  south  of  Reynolds. 
On  September  16,  Gen.  Turchin,  with  his  own  brigade,  again 
made  a  reconnoissance  to  Catlett’s  Gap.  The  enemy  fell 
back  as  he  advanced  until  he  came  upon  a  force  strongly 
posted  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  roads.  He  made  a 
second  reconnoissance  on  the  afternoon  of  that  day,  with  but 
little  result,  as  he  could  advance  but  a  short  distance  farther, 
the  enemy  being  in  force  in  his  front.  Leaving  a  strong  force 
in  the  gorge  to  watch  the  enemy,  the  brigade  withdrew  to 
camp  in  the  vicinity  of  the  gap.* 

On  the  17th,  the  following  movements  were  made:  Palmer’s 
division,  stationed  opposite  Gowen’s  and  Owen’s  fords,  trans¬ 
ferred  Grose’s  brigade  from  Gowen’s  to  Glenn’s  Ford;  Thomas’ 
corps  moved  into  position  down  the  creek;  Brannan,  to  the  left 
of  Reynolds,  extending  to  Gowen’s  Ford;  Baird  from  there 
down  to  Bird’s  mill,  and  Negley  to  between  that  and  Owen’s 
Ford.  King’s  brigade  of  Reynolds’  remained  at  Pond  Spring, 
and  Turchin’s  at  Catlett’s  Gap.  Barnes’  brigade  of  VanCleve’s 
division,  stationed  at  Glenn’s  Ford,  was  sent  to  reenforce 
Gen.  Wood  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill.  McCook’s  corps  de¬ 
scended  into  McLamore’s  Cove  and  took  positions  vacated  by 
Thomas’  corps,  his  left  connecting  with  Reynolds.  Thus  the 
shifting  of  our  army  to  the  left  commenced.  After  Gen.  Mc¬ 
Cook  received  orders  at  midnight  on  the  12th,  to  join  Thomas, 
it  took  him  just  five  days  to  accomplish  it;  five  anxious  days, 
during  which,  with  a  more  active  and  daring  enemy  the  ruin  of 
two  of  our  corps  might  have  been  accomplished. 

After  his  fiasco  on  September  13,  in  regard  to  the  assault  on 

*  The  rebel  Gen.  Hill  in  his  report  says  that  a  strong  Yankee  force  appeared  at 
Catlett’s  Gap  on  the  16th,  and  that  he  reenforced  Deshler’s  brigade,  occupying 
that  gap,  with  Breckenridge’s  division. 


54 


CHICICAMAUGA. 


Crittenden’s  corps,  Gen.  Bragg,  rightly  guessing  that  we  were 
waiting  for  the  junction  of  McCook’s  corps,  busied  himself  in 
preparing  a  stroke  whereby  our  left  would  be  out-flanked  and 
his  army  placed  between  ours  and  Chattanooga  before  we  were 
able  to  shift  our  army  to  a  better  position.  In  his  report  he 
says:  “Again  disappointed  [meaning  on  the  13th],  immediate 
measures  were  taken  to  place  our  trains  and  limited  supplies  in 
safe  positions,  when  all  our  forces  were  concentrated  along  the 
Chickamauga,  threatening  the  enemy  in  front.  Maj.-Gen. 
Wheeler,  with  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  occupied  the  positions 
on  the  extreme  left,  vacated  by  Hill’s  corps,  and  was  directed 
to  press  the  enemy  in  McLamore’s  Cove  to  divert  his  attention 
from  our  real  movement.  Brig.-Gen.  Forrest,  with  his  own  and 
Pegram’s  divisions  of  cavalry  covered  the  movement  on  our 
front  and  right.  Brig.-Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  whose  brigade  had 
been  at  Ringgold  holding  the  railroad,  was  moved  toward 
Reed’s  bridge,  which  brought  him  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
line.  Walker’s  corps  formed  on  his  left  opposite  Alexander’s 
bridge;  Buckner’s  next,  near  Tedford’s  Ford;  P^k’s  opposite 
Lee- and -Gordon’s  mill,  and  Hill’s  on  the  extreme  left.  With 
Johnson  moved  two  brigades,  just  arrived  from  Mississippi  and 
three  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  all  without  artillery  and  transpor¬ 
tation. 

“The  following  orders  were  issued  on  the  night  of  the  17th 
for  the  forces  to  cross  the  Chickamauga,  commencing  the  move¬ 
ment  at  6  a.m.  on  the  18th  by  the  extreme  right  at  Reed’s 
bridge: 

“Headquarters  Army  of  Tennessee, 
[Circular.]  In  the  field,  Leet’s  Tan-yard,  Sept.  18,  1863. 

1.  Johnson’s  column  (Hood’s)  on  crossing  at  or  near  Reed’s 
bridge,  will  turn  to  the  left  by  the  most  practicable  route  and 
sweep  up  the  Chickamauga  toward  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill. 

2.  Walker,  at  Alexander’s  bridge,  will  unite  in  this  move, 
and  push  vigorously  on  the  enemy’s  flank  and  rear  in  the  same 
direction. 

3.  Buckner,  crossing  at  Tedford’s  Ford,  will  join  in  the 
movement  to  the  left  and  press  the  enemy  up  the  stream  from 
Polk’s  front  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill. 

4.  Polk  will  press  his  forces  to  the  front  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s 


enemy’s  orders. 


55 


mill,  and  if  met  by  too  much  resistance  to  cross,  will  bear  to 
the  right  and  cross  at  Dalton’s  Ford,  or  at  Tedford’s,  as  may  be 
necessary,  and  join  in  the  attack  wherever  the  enemy  may  be. 

5.  Hill  will  cover  our  left  flank  from  an  advance  of  the 
enemy  from  the  cove,  and  by  pressing  the  cavalry  in  his  front 
ascertain  if  the  enemy  is  reenforcing  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill, 
in  which  event  he  will  attack  them  in  flank. 

6.  Wheeler’s  cavalry  will  hold  the  gaps  in  Pigeon  Mountain, 
and  cover  our  rear  and  left  and  bring  up  stragglers. 

7.  All  teams,  etc.,  not  with  troops,  should  go  toward  Ring- 
gold  and  Dalton,  beyond  Taylor’s  Ridge.  All  cooking  should 
be  done  at  the  trains.  Rations  when  cooked,  will  be  forwarded 
to  the  troops. 

8.  The  above  movements  will  be  executed  with  the  utmost 
promptness,  vigor,  and  persistence. 

By  command  of  Gen.  Bragg.  G.  W.  Brent, 

Asst.  Adjutant-General.” 


CHAPTER  V. 

TOPOGRAPHY.  POSITIONS.  ENEMY’S  MOVEMENTS 
AND  OUR  COUNTER-MOVEMENTS. 


BEFORE  proceeding  further,  let  us  look  upon  the  configu¬ 
ration  of  the  country  where  the  contending  armies  were 
about  to  meet. 

West-Chickamauga  River  has  its  source  in  the  upper  part  of 
McLamore’s  Cove;  its  general  course,  from  its  source  as  far  as 
the  north  point  of  Pigeon  Mountain,  being  from  southwest 
to  northeast,  but  beyond  Pigeon  Mountain,  pressed  by  the 
foot-hills  of  Missionary  Ridge,  it  makes  a  general  curve  east¬ 
ward,  and  afterward  courses  again  to  northeast,  but  diverging 
somewhat  farther  from  Missionary  Ridge.  The  river  has 
innumerable  crooks  or  bends.  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  stood  on 
the  left  side  of  the  river  where  it  bends  to  the  east,  and  where 
the  main  Lafayette- and -Chattanooga  road  crosses  the -river. 
The  mill  stands  just  about  half-way  between  those  two  towns.  . 
Around  the  mill  and  for  some  distance  east  and  northeast  of  it, 
the  left  side  of  the  river  is  high  and  precipitous,  but  farther 
north  the  ground  on  both  sides  of  the  river  is  comparitively 
level,  yet  the  banks  are  in  many  places  high  and  preciptous. 
The  water  below  the  mill  is  of  considerable  depth,  but  there 
were  many  fords.  Dalton’s  and  Tedford’s  fords  below  the 
mill  are  the  nearest  to  it.  Then  comes  Alexander’s  bridge 
between  two  and  three  miles  from  it.  Reed’s  bridge  is  almost 
due  west  of  Ringgold,  whence  a  road  goes  directly  to  it. 
Lambert’s  and  Byron’s  fords  are  between  these  two  bridges. 

Pea-Vine  Creek  and  Chickamauga  River  form  almost  one 
valley,  Chickamauga  Ridge  limiting  it  on  the  east.  The 
ground  in  that  bend  of  Chickamauga  is  a  table-land,  but  slighly 
rolling,  gradually  rising  from  the  river  toward  the  spurs  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  at  that  time  was  covered  with  scatterd 
timber,  principally  oak,  the  woods  in  places  being  filled  with 
thick  underbrush.  Missionary  Ridge  was  also  covered  with 
woods.  Between  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  and  Rossville,  a  ham- 

56 


TOPOGRAPHY. 


57 


let  on  the  south  slope  of  Missionary  Ridge  four  miles  from 
Chattanooga,  there  were  many  clearings  around  farms  on  both 
sides  of  the  road,  as  there  were  also  openings  along  the  river, 
but  the  intermediate  ground  was  wooded. 

The  roads  from  the  before-mentioned  bridges  and  fords  ran 
in  a  northwesterly  direction  through  these  woods  into  the  main 
road  or  continued  beyond  it  and  over  Missionary  Ridge  into 
Dry-Valley  road,  leading  to  Rossville.  Among  the  farms  which 
played  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  Chickamauga  battle  were: 
Vineyard’s  farm,  one  and  three-quarter  m;les  north  of  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill;  Kelley’s  farm,  three  and  one-quarter  miles  from 
the  mill;  Snodgrass’  farm  one-half  mile  due  west  of  Kelley; 
Dyer’s,  three-quarters  mile  northwest  of  Vineyard;  Widow 
Glenn’s,  three-quarters  mile  south  of  Dyer’s  and  on  a  road  com¬ 
ing  from  Crawfish  Spring.  From  Glenn’s  house  runs  a  road 
leading  northwest  by  Vidito’s  farm,  passing  through  a  gorge  in 
the  spurs  of  Missionary '  Ridge,  there  climbs  the  ridge  and, 
passing  through  McFarland  Gap,  goes  to  Rossville.  On  that 
road,  one  mile  from  Glenn’s,  was  Vidito’s  farm.  A  quarter  of  a 
mile  south  of  Kelley’s  field  was  Poe’s  field,  and  a  quarter  of 
a  mile  beyond  this  was  Brotherton’s  farm.  Three-quarters  of  a 
mile  north  of  Kelley’s  house  on  the  main  road  stood  Mc- 
Dannel’s  house,  and  half  a  mile  north  of  this  stood  a  meeting¬ 
house,  east  of  which  was  Col.  Cloud’s.  The  roads  from  Alex¬ 
ander’s  and  Reed’s  bridges  pass  by  McDannel’s  and,  crossing 
the  ridge  by  McFarland  Gap,  go  to  Rossville. 

Missionary  Ridge  with  its  foot-hills  and  spurs  presents  very 
strong  positions  for  defence,  but  running  in  a  slanting  direction 
toward  the  main  Lafayette -and -Chattanooga  road  and  thus 
forming  an  acute  angle  with  it,  makes  those  positions  faulty. 
A  position  to  be  advantageous,  ought  to  intersect  our  main 
communications  squarely.  But  in  this  instance,  whatever  posi¬ 
tion  we  might  have  selected  on  the  slopes  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
its  right  flank  would  have  been  advancing  too  much  toward  the 
enemy  and  the  left  flank  receding  too  much.  If  a  position 
were  taken  south  of  Rossville  along  Missionary  Ridge  it  would 
not  have  covered  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road.  If  it 
were  taken  at  Rossville  where  that  road  crosses  the  ridge,  its 
left  flank  would  have  been  easily  turned  and  the  army  com- 

5 


* 


58  CHICKAMAUGA. 

pelled  to  leave  the  position.  In  fact  the  topography  of  the 
ground  between  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  and  Chattanooga,  not¬ 
withstanding  the  strength  and  natural  advantages  of  Missionary 
Ridge  for  defensive  operations,  does  not  present  a  suitable  pos¬ 
ition  for  an  army  to  perfectly  cover  Chattanooga,  and  oblige 
the  enemy  to  attack  that  position  squarely  in  front. 

The  only  proper  position  for  an  army  to  advantageously 
resist  the  enemy  coming  from  the  south  is  in  front  and  around 
Chattanooga,  where  the  elevations  encircling  that  town  admitted 
the  erection  of  strong  lines  of  fortifications.  Yet  even  that 
position,  strategically  considered,  is  also  faulty,  because, 
although  protecting  Chattanooga,  it  does  not  cover  the  com¬ 
munications  of  the  army.  Those  communications  by  railroad 
would  have  been  untenable,  as  they  run  to  Bridgeport  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,' which  the  enemy  approach¬ 
ing  Chattanooga  would  easily  intercept,  while  the  common 
roads  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  through  the  mountains  are 
too  difficult  and  long  to  reach  the  base  of  supplies,  which  neces¬ 
sarily  would  have  to  be  at  Stevenson  or  Bridgeport. 

These  topographical  features  alone,  when  properly  considered 
by  a  military  man,  should  have  induced  our  authorities  at 
Washington  to  reenforce  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  before 
it  was  entering  the  campaign  for  the  possesion  of  Chattanooga, 
by  at  least  one-third  if  not  one-half  more  troops  than  it  had. 
But  our  great  generalissimo,  Halleck,  apparently  had  no  such 
consideration  to  entertain  himself,  and  would  not  consider  any 
suggestions  presented  by  others,  even  by  the  commander-in¬ 
chief  of  the  army,  appointed  to  enter  into  such  a  campaign. 

The  object  of  the  commander  of  the  enemy’s  army  was  now 
to  flank  our  left  and  interpose  his  army  between  our  army  and 
Chattanooga.  On  the  17th,  he  commenced  to  move  his  troops 
toward  his  right,  which  we  could  plainly  observe  from  our  pos¬ 
itions  looking  at  the  clouds  of  dust  rising  beyond  Pigeon 
Mountain,  and  could  judge  of  the  direction  of  the  movement 
by  the  way  the  wind  was  drifting  them.  Buckner’s  corps,  con¬ 
sisting  of  Preston’s  division  of  three  brigades  and  Stewart’s 
division  of  three  brigades,*  moved  from  the  neighborhood  of 

*  The  fourth  brigade  of  B.  R.  Johnson  was  detached  to  Ringgold,  and  when  two 
Mississippi  brigades  of  Gregg  and  McNair  came  to  Ringgold  on  the  eve  of  the 


POSITIONS. 


59 


Lafayette  and  bivouacked  half-way  between  Rock-Spring 
church  and  Pea-Vine  church.  Walker’s  reserve  corps,  consist¬ 
ing  of  two  divisions,  his  own  of  two  brigades,  the  third  under 
Gen.  Gist  being  detached  to  Rome*  and  Liddell’s  division  of 
two  brigades,  bivouacked  at  Rock -Spring  church.  Polk’s 
corps,  consisting  of  Cheatham’s  division  of  five  brigades  and 
Hindman’s  division  of  three  brigades,  bivouacked  at  Anderson’s. 
Hill’s  corps,  consisting  of  Cleburne’s  division  of  three  brigades 
and  Breckenridge’s  division  of  three  brigades,  did  not  move  on 
the  17th,  but  remained  at  the  gaps  of  Pigeon  Mountain.  Three 
brigades  from  the  Mississippi  and  two  brigades  of  Hood’s 
division,  Longstreet’s  corps,  just  arrived  at  Coosa  Station, 
together  with  Johnson’s  brigade,  moved  under  Gen.  B.  R. 
Johnson  to  Ringgold. 

While  these  movements  were  going  on,  our  brigade  of  cav¬ 
alry,  under  command  of  Col.  Minty,  was  posted  to  protect 
Reed’s  bridge,  and  a  mounted-infantry  brigade,  under  Col. 
Wilder,  was  stationed  at  Alexander’s  bridge.  Gen.  Granger 
with  his  three  brigades  and  two  batteries  of  artillery  of  the 
reserve  corps,  posted  in  front  of  Rossville,  sent,  on  the  17th, 
Gen.  Steedman,  with  six  regiments  and  a  battery,  on  a  recon- 
noitering  expedition  toward  Ringgold.  Steedman  started  at 
3  a.m.,  and  moved  without  opposition  until  within  two  miles  of 
Ringgold,  where  he  encountered  and  drove  in  the  enemy’s 
pickets,  and  crossing  the  East  Chickamauga  within  three-fourths 
of  a  mile  of  Ringgold,  placed  a  section  of  artillery  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  commanding  the  town,  and  drove  the  enemy  out  of 
it.  Discovering  from  the  heavy  clouds  of  dust  rising  from  the 
roads  leading  from  Tunnel  Hill  toward  Lafayette,  that  large 
bodies  of  troops  were  moving,  he  deemed  it  prudent  to  with¬ 
draw.  Recrossing  the  Chickamauga,  he  returned  six  miles  to¬ 
ward  Rossville,  bivouacking  for  the  night  at  Battle  Springs. 
At  11  p.m.,  the  enemy,  who  followed  him,  threw  half-a-dozen 
shells  into  his  camp,  and  then,  under  cover  of  night,  speedily 
retired.  At  8  a.m.,  on  the  18th,  discovering  no  signs  of  the 
enemy,  Steedman  moved,  reaching  Rossville  at  I  p.m. 

battle  as  reenforcements  to  Bragg,  they  were  put  under  command  of  Johnson, 
making  for  him  a  provisional  division. 

*  Gist’s  brigade  participated  in  the  battle  on  September  20. 


6o 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Early  in  the  morning  of  September  18,  the  movements  of  the 
enemy’s  various  commands  commenced,  in  order  to  achieve  the 
grand  out-flanking  of  our  army.  Temporarily  leaving  Ben- 
ning’s  brigade — of  Longstreet’s  corps — at  Ringgold  to  protect 
the  depot  at  that  point,  Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  with  his  brigade, 
moved  at  5  a.m.,  toward  Leet’s  tan-yard,  pursuant  to  orders 
from  headquarters.  He  also  had  the  following  force  with  him: 
McNair’s  and  Gregg’s  brigades,  from  the  Mississippi;  Robert¬ 
son’s  brigade  of  Hood’s  division — Law’s  brigade  of  the  same 
division  remaining  at  Ringgold  long  enough  to  cook  their 
rations — and  two  batteries  of  artillery.  This  force  had  only 
proceeded  three  miles  from  Ringgold  when  a  despatch  was 
received  from  the  headquarters  of  the  army  to  return  to  Ring- 
gold,  and  thence  take  a  direct  route  to  Reed’s  bridge.  Gen. 
Johnson  at  the  same  time  received  orders  for  the  execution  of 
the  entire  movement.  He  reached  the  Graysville-and-Lafay- 
ette  road,  and  there  heard  from  some  citizens  that  the  Yankees 
were  about  a  mile  from  that  point.  He  had  commenced  the 
formation  of  a  line  of  his  three  brigades,  with  Robertson’s  in 
reserve,  when  Gen.  Forrest  came  up  with  his  escort  and  some 
cavalry  and  started  to  the  front,  supported  by  Johnson’s  skir¬ 
mishers.  He  soon  commenced  skirmishing  with  Minty’s  cav¬ 
alry,  which  was  disposed  along  Pea-Vine  Creek,  with  its  re¬ 
serves  and  a  section  of  artillery  posted  on  a  ridge. 

Some  of  Johnson’s  artillery  was  put  in  position,  which  drove 
back  the  Union  dismounted  reserves  and  their  artillery.  The 
line  of  brigades  after  crossing  the  creek,  traversed  the  western 
declivity  of  the  ridge  and  found  our  cavalry  in  position  back  of 
the  bridge,  and  a  party  by  the  bridge  trying  to  destroy  it. 
The  skirmishers  of  the  Twenty-third  Tennessee  regiment  be¬ 
coming  engaged,  the  whole  regiment,  supported  by  the  brigade, 
charged  the  Union  forces  and  drove  them  off,  saving  the  bridge. 
A  few  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  both  sides. 

Gen.  Hood,  having  arrived  from  Dalton,  joined  Johnson’s 
command  at  the  bridge,  and  assumed  command  of  the  whole 
force.  The  troops  crossed  by  4  p.m.,  partly  over  the  bridge 
and  partly  by  the  ford  immediately  above  it,  and  advanced  to 
Jay’s  steam-mill,  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  bridge,  and 
there  took  the  road  to  Alexander’s  bridge,  one  regiment  of  the 


*1 


enemy’s  MOVEMENTS.  6 1 

left  or  Gregg’s  brigade  being  deployed  across  the  road,  while 
the  others  formed  in  columns  by  companies,  and  thus  preserved 
their  original  formation.  After  traveling  the  road  to  Alexan¬ 
der’s  bridge  for  a  short  distance,  the  troops  moved  southwest 
for  two  and  one-half  miles  on  the  road  to  Lee -and -Gordon’s 
mill.  They  then  halted  within  half  a  mile  of  the  fields  of  Vine¬ 
yard’s  farm  on  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road,  and  about 
half  a  mile  west  of  Dalton’s  Ford,  where,  in  the  darkness  of  the 
evening,  the  skirmishers  at  the  head  of  the  column  became 
engaged.  Gregg’s  brigade  immediately  deployed  under  a 
sharp  fire,  losing  a  few  men,  while  McNair’s  and  Johnson’s 
brigades  deployed  facing  southwest.  Robertson’s  brigade 
formed  facing  northwest  to  protect  the  train  in  the  rear,  one 
regiment  guarding  the  train. 

One-third  of  the  forces  remained  awake  during  the  night,  the 
rest  sleeping  on  their  arms.  Obstructions  to  cavalry  were 
hastily  placed  in  front,  skirmishers  thrown  out  to  the  field  east 
of  Vineyard’s  house,  150  yards  in  front  of  their  left,  and  scouts 
were  sent  toward  the  Lafayette  road.  Law’s  and  Benning’s 
brigades,  of  Hood’s  division,  joined  this  column  during  the 
night,  and  Forrest’s  command  of  cavalry  bivouacked  behind 
Hood’s  line. 

While  this  force  of  daring  rebels  was  penetrating  so  far  on 
our  side  of  the  river,  and  so  closely  approaching  to  our  extreme 
left  at  Lee -and -Gordon’s  mill,  Col.  Minty  after  being  driven 
from  Reed’s  bridge,  was  informing  Gen.  Granger  of  the  circum¬ 
stances.  Thereupon  Granger,  at  4  p.m.,  started  McCook’s 
brigade  toward  Reed’s  bridge,  and  Whittaker’s  brigade  to 
Ringgold  or  Red- House  bridge  over  the  Chickamauga.  Mc¬ 
Cook  advanced  to  within  one  mile  of  the  bridge  and  there 
skirmished  with  the  enemy,  taking  some  prisoners.  To  ensure 
the  safety  of  McCook’s  brigade,  Gen.  Steedman  moved,  at  5 
p.m.,  with  Mitchell’s  brigade  to  support  it,  effecting  a  juncture 
therewith  late  in  the  evening.  Whittaker  could  not  reach  the 
Red- House  bridge,  as  he  met  a  large  force  of  the  enemy 
before  he  arrived  there,  and,  although  he  held  his  ground,  he 
lost  sixty  men.  Of  course,  none  of  these  commanders  knew 
anything  of  the  number  and  character  of  the  rebel  troops  that 
crossed  the  river  by  Reed’s  bridge  after  the  retreat  of  Minty’s 
command. 


62 


CHICK  AM  AU  G  A. 


Pursuant  to  Gen.  Bragg’s  orders,  Walker’s  corps  started  early 
but,  although  the  distance  from  Rock-Spring  church  to  Alex¬ 
ander’s  bridge  is  only  about  five  miles,  yet  it  was  nearly  2  p.m. 
when  the  advance  of  that  corps  was  half  a  mile  from  that  bridge, 
which  was  defended  by  Wilder’s  mounted  infantry.  As  Gen. 
Liddell’s  division  formed  the  head  of  Walker’s  column,  Gen. 
Walthall  was  ordered  to  capture  the  bridge  with  his  brigade. 
He  deployed  it  to  the  right  of  the  road  and,  after  driving  in  the 
Union  skirmishers,  moved  his  brigade  under  the  fire  of  a  Union 
battery  posted  on  the  opposite  side,  through  thick  underbrush 
toward  the  river.  His  men  laid  down,  a  battery  was  put  in 
position,  and  the  Twenty-ninth  Mississippi  regiment,  which 
stood  opposite  the  bridge,  charged  to  the  bank  of  the  river, 
under  the  galling  and  heavy  fire  of  Wilder’s  men,  and  drove  the 
Union  troops  from  the  bridge.  But  it  was  found  that  the 
planking  had  been  removed  from  the  stringers,  hence  crossing 
it  was  impracticable. 

The  whole  corps  then  moved  one  and  one-half  miles  down  the 
river  and  crossed  at  Byron’s  Ford  at  night,  the  ordnance  train 
being  left  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  because  of  the  rocky 
and  uneven  bottom  of  the  ford.  The  troops  moved  up  the 
river  for  about  a  mile,  and  there  bivouacked  nearly  opposite 
Alexander’s  bridge. 

Buckner’s  corps  started  early,  but  as  his  column  had  to  fol¬ 
low  a  part  of  the  road  taken  by  Walker’s  corps,  there  was  con¬ 
siderable  delay  occasioned  by  the  encounter  of  the  two  columns 
so  that  Stewart’s  division  reached  Tedford’s  Ford  at  2  p.m.,  and 
formed:  Bate’s  and  Clayton’s  brigades  in  front,  and  Brown’s  in 
the  reserve,  with  batteries  posted  on  the  wooded  heights  above 
and  below  the  ford.  There  were  some  Union  troops  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river  toward  Alexander’s  bridge,  which  retired 
when  sharpshooters  and  batteries  opened  on  them.  Three 
companies  from  Clayton’s  brigade  were  then  sent  across  the 
stream  to  occupy  as  skirmishers,  a  wooded  hill  beyond,  and 
after  nightfall  the  whole  brigade  crossed  and  bivouacked  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  creek.  Preston’s  division  was  directed 
to  cross  at  Dalton’s  P'ord,  but  only  Gracie’s  brigade  crossed 
there  and  bivouacked  on  the  other  side.  The  whole  of  Cheat¬ 
ham’s  division  of  five  brigades  also  moved  to,  and  bivouacked 


enemy’s  movements. 


63 

in  the  vicinity  of  Dalton’s  Ford.  Hindman’s  division  pressed 
down  toward  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill.  Cleburne  was  stationed 
at  Anderson’s,  and  Breckenridge  at  Glass’  mill. 

Thus,  on  the  evening  of  September  18,  Gen.  Bragg  succeeded 
in  throwing  a  force  of  four  divisions  over  the  Chickamauga 
River,  and  securing  crossings  for  three  more  divisions,  while  we 
were  far  from  being  aware  of  the  extent  of  that  movement. 
This  was  a  bold  and  a  proper  plan,  and,  as  a  grand  tactical 
movement,  it  is  worthy  of  critical  consideration.  We  should 
imagine  that  Gen.  Bragg  had  at  least  a  common  sketch  of  the 
ground  on  which  that  manoeuvre  had  to  take  place,  and  that  he 
studied  that  sketch  somewhat  diligently  before  he  issued  his 
orders  for  the  movement.  That  sketch  should  have  shown  him 
that  the  only  road  by  which  Thomas  and  McCook  could  slip 
out  of  the  bag  formed  by  Pigeon  Mountain  and  Missionary 
Ridge — in  which  their  army  corps  were  still  deeply  immured 
even  during  September  18 — was  the  road  leading  from  Craw¬ 
fish  Spring  into  the  Lafayette -and -Chattanooga  road,  and 
joining  it  about  a  mile  south  of  Kelly’s  house.  That,  in  order 
to  interpose  his  own  army  between  the  Union  army  and  Chat¬ 
tanooga,  he  had  to  bar  that  road.  He  could  have  done  so  just 
as  well  as  not,  yet  he  did  not  do  it.  There  was  less  distance 
for  Hood’s  and  B.  R.  Johnson’s  columns  to  make  from  Reed’s 
bridge  to  the  fork  of  those  roads  than  the  distance  they  made 
to  reach  Vineyard’s  farm,  and  there  at  the  fork  the  country  was 
more  open,  and  several  farm-houses  stood  around  which  could . 
guide  the  formation  of  the  line  in  the  night.  There  was  also  a 
direct  road  from  Reed’s  bridge  to  Dyer’s  tan-yard  and  farm. 
If  Hood’s  position  had  been  taken  there,  only  a  mile  would  be 
needful  for  Walker’s  brigades  to  reach  it  from  the  locality  of  his 
bivouac. 

To  accomplish  that,  Bragg’s  orders  (circular)  of  the  18th 
should  have  been  amended  to  read  something  like  this: 

1.  Johnson’s  column  (Hood’s)  on  crossing  at  or  near  Reed’s 
bridge  to  move  on  the  road  leading  from  Jay’s  steam -mill 
southwest  to  Dyer’s  farm  and  tan-yard,  and  to  form  there 
across  Lafayette  and  Crawfish-Spring  roads,  facing  south. 

2.  Walker,  crossing  at  Alexander’s  bridge  or  nearest  ford, 
to  move  toward  Dyer’s  farm  and  tan-yard  and  join  Hood. 


64 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


3.  Buckner  and  Cheatham  to  cross  behind  Walker  and  con¬ 
nect  with  him  in  forming  a  line. 

The  balance  of  the  orders  might  have  remained  as  they  were. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Hood  would  have  carried  such  an  order 
out  to  the  letter,  and  the  others  would  not  have  failed.  It  is 
said  that  sometimes  a  pen-stroke  changes  the  fate  of  empires, 
and  surely  a  slight  change  in  Bragg’s  order  might  have  led  to 
different  results  of  the  campaign.  But  it  is  useless  to  speculate 
as  to  the  possibility  of  the  owl  changing  its  heavy  flagging 
flight  from  tree  to  tree,  to  the  eagle’s  graceful  sweep  and  bold 
ascent  into  the  clouds. 

But  what  is  still  more  remarkable  is  the  fact  that  as  soon  as 
there  was  sufficient  light  for  the  movement,  Hood’s  line  was 
shifted  to  the  rear  and  its  right  flank,  which  in  the  night  was 
not  far  from  the  Lafayette- and -Chattanooga  road,  was  now 
thrown  far  back  to  correspond  with  the  elevated  ground  in  the 
rear,  so  as  to  make  the  line  of  formation  in  the  shape  of  a 
graceful  curve,  leaving  that  road  to  us  entirely  unobstructed. 
We  were  surely  thankful  for  that  sort  of  accommodation  and 
were  not  slow  to  profit  by  it. 

While  the  enemy  was  throwing  some  of  his  troops  on  our 
side  of  the  river  and  securing  the  crossings  for  others,  Gen. 
Rosecrans’  intention  was  to  shift  as  secretly  and  quietly  as 
possible,  VanCleve’s  and  P  dmer’s  divisions  of  Crittenden’s 
corps,  to  the  left  of  WoiciL,  at  Lee- and -Gordon’s  mill;  to 
pass  Thomas’  corps  beyond  Crittenden  toward  Kelley’s  house, 
and  to  bring  McCook  up  far  enough  for  him  to  be  able  to  sup¬ 
port  the  right  or  the  left  of  our  army.  Hence  there  was  a 
necessity  for  most  of  the  movements  to  be  made  during  tlr* 
night. 

In  the  afternoon  of  September  18,  VanCleve  was  ordered  to 
move  his  division  and  form  it  on  the  left  of  Wood’s  division, 
and  Gen.  Palmer  to  relieve  Barnes’  brigade  of  VanCleve’s 
division,  stationed  at  Glenn’s  Ford,  with  one  of  his  brigades, 
which  was  done,  Col.  Grose  relieving  Col.  Barnes.  Toward 
evening,  Gen.  Negley  was  ordered  with  his  division  to  relieve 
Palmer  and  send  one  brigade  to  Crawfish  Spring,  while  Palmer 
was  ordered  to  march  his  division  and  form  it  on  the  left  of 
VanCleve.  Palmer  wrote  an  order  for  Grose,  as  soon  as  relieved 


OUR  COUNTER- MOVEMENTS.  65 

to  march  to  Crawfish  Spring  and  await  orders;  for  Gens.  Hazen 
and  Cruft  to  follow  Grose,  the  movement  being  placed  under 
Gen.  Cruft’s  supervision,  and  Palmer  went  ahead  to  look  up  the 
position  to  the  left  of  VanCleve. 

Unfortunately,  before  Grose  was  relieved,  Gen.  Beatty,  of 
Negley’s  division,  wanted  to  relieve  Gen.  Hazen’s  brigade,  but 
Hazen  refused  to  be  relieved  before  Grose  was.  Considerable 
time  was  lost  before  the  thing  could  be  rectified,  and  it  was 
nearly  midnight  before  Grose  was  relieved  and  the  division 
started.  Palmer  expected  to  get  his  division  in  position  by  10 
p.m.,  but  it  was  nearly  daylight  when  it  at  last  was  formed. 
When  there  are  many  troops  to  follow  the  same  road  in  the 
night-time,  the  march  becomes  most  fatiguing  to  the  troops 
and  wears  out  men  more  than  a  battle.  Such  a  march  on  the 
eve  of  battle  is  ruinous,  yet  just  such  marches  happen,  if  at  all, 
on  the  eve  of  battles. 

Gen.  Thomas,  leaving  Negley  to  relieve  Palmer,  was  to  move 
with  Baird’s,  Brannan’s,  and  Reynolds’  divisions.  Baird’s  was 
the  first  to  start;  it  was  only  three  and  one-half  miles  from  its 
position  to  Crawfish  Spring,  yet  the  roads  were  so  encumbered 
by  troops  and  trains  that  it  did  not  reach  Crawfish  Spring  until 
midnight.  At  Crawfish  Spring,  Gen.  Thomas  received  orders 
“to  march  [with  these  three  divisions]  on  the  cross-road  leading 
by  the  Widow  Glenn’s  house  to  the  Chattanooga-and-Lafayette 
road,  and  take  up  a  position  near  Kelley’s  farm  on  the  Lafay¬ 
ette  road,  connecting  with  Crittenden  on  my  right  at  Gordon’s 
Mill.”* 

The  divisions  commenced  to  move,  but  there  was  more  halt¬ 
ing  than  moving.  Although  the  supply-trains  were  sent  by  the 
Chattanooga -Valley  road  toward  Chattanooga  and  separate 
from  the  troops,  yet  the  ammunition-train  was  moving  with  the 
troops  by  the  same  road  behind  each  division.  The  night  was 
dark  and  foggy;  the  fences  along  the  road  were  set  on  fire 
wherever  farms  were,  and  the  smoke  filling  the  air  made  it 
heavy  and  oppressive.  A  wagon  delayed  by  broken  harness  or 
some  other  trifling  cause,  detained  the  whole  division  following 
it  for  an  hour.  Sometimes  an  ammunition  wagon  would 

*  Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  September  30,  1863. 


*•4 


66 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


approach  dangerously  close  to  the  burning  fence,  and  occasion¬ 
ally  one  would  dart  over  the  burning  rails  scattered  on  the 
ground.  It  was  a  wonder  that  some  fearful  explosions  did  not 
happen.  The  dull  rumbling  of  the  wheels  on  the  dusty  roads, 
the  occasional  snorting  of  animals,  the  clinking  of  arms,  and 
the  subdued  voices  of  tens  of  thousands  of  men  gathered  in 
close  proximity  presaged  the  gathering  of  the  force  that  would 
burst  in  a  storm  of  battle  on  the  morrow. 

It  was  marvelous  that  Thomas’  column  was  not  observed  as 
it  approached  the  Lafayette  road,  near  which  pickets  of 
Hood’s  forces  were  stationed,  and  about  whose  close  prox¬ 
imity  we  had  not  the  slightest  idea;  but  this  large  force  of  the 
Unionists  passed  right  by  them  without  a  shot  being  fired  or 
an  alarm  of  any  kind  sounded.  It  appeared  to  us  as  if  there 
were  no  other  troops  in  the  surrounding  woods,  and  that  we 
were  in  perfect  security. 

The  night-marches  of  large  bodies  of  troops  are  necessarily 
slow,  because  in  the  first  place,  men  and  trains  have  to  follow 
only  the  road,  hence  the  column  becomes  exceedingly  long, 
and  the  marching  made  with  a  broken  step,  now  halting  and 
again  hurrying  in  order  to  close  up.  In  the  second  place, 
every  obstacle  however  trifling  and  easily  overcome  in  the 
daytime,  appears  magnified  and  insuperable  in  the  night.  If 
the  troops  had  to  make  a  speedy  march  in  the  daytime,  they 
could  have  given  the  road  to  artillery  and  trains  and  marched 
themselves,  on  the  sides  of  the  road  and  in  closer  order;  but 
in  the  night-time  it  is  impossible  to  do  so. 

The  head  of  the  column  of  Baird’s  division  was,  at  daylight 
on  September  19,  reaching  Kelly’s  farm,  Brannan’s  following 
at  some  distance  behind,  while  Reynolds’  division  having 
passed  beyond  Crawfish  Spring,  halted  at  Osborne’s  at  day¬ 
light  to  rest  and  to  cook  coffee.  About  8  o’clock  it  again 
moved  on.  On  the  way  to  Kelly’s  farm,  Gen.  Thomas  found 
Wilder’s  mounted-infantry  brigade  in  position  on  the  heights 
east  of  Widow  Glenn’s  house,  which  it  occupied  after  having 
been  driven  from  Alexander’s  bridge  by  the  enemy  on  the 
day  before.  Thomas  formed  Baird’s  division  at  the  fork  of 
the  roads  leading  to  Reed’s  and  Alexander’s  bridges,  facing 
east  and  a  little  south,  and  Brannan’s  division  to  the  left  of 


OUR  COUNTER-MOVEMENTS. 


67 

Baird,  intending  to  form  Reynolds’  division  to  the  right  of 
Baird  when  it  arrived,  thus  connecting  the  right  of  his  line 
with  Wilder’s  brigade,  although  it  could  hardly  have  formed 
a  continuous  line.  McCook’s  corps  reached  Crawfish  Spring 
at  daylight  and  was  posted  there  as  a  reserve. 

Our  line  of  formation,  early  on  the  19th,  was  along  the 
Lafayette- and- Chattanooga  road,  Crittenden’s  three  divisions 
on  the  right  from  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  extending  for  one 
and  one-half  miles  northward;  then  there  was  a  long  break 
partially  filled  by  Wilder’s  brigade,  and  then  two  of  Thomas’ 
divisions  were  formed  on  the  extreme  left  with  a  third  one  on 
its  way  thither.  McCook’s  corps  was  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
our  extreme  right. 

While  we  were  assuming  this  shape,  the  rebel  army,  close 
to  us,  was  also  forming.  Hood’s  three  brigades  under  Gen. 
Law  on  the  right  and  rear  of  B.  R.  Johnson’s  division  with 
two  brigades  in  the  line  and  one  in  reserve,  formed  a  front 
somewhat  curved,  with  the  left  considerably  refused  along 
an  elevation  about  1000  yards  east  of  the  Lafayette-and- 
Chattanooga  road,  the  center  of  it  being  nearly  opposite  the 
eastern  field  of  Vineyard’s  farm.  This  line  was  ready  for 
action  at  7  a.m.,  both  divisions  being  under  command  of  Gen. 
Hood.  Buckner’s  two  divisions  crossed  the  river  and  Stewart’s 
division  formed  on  the  left  of  Johnson’s  in  a  brigade  column 
of  three  lines,  and  Preston’s  took  position  in  the  same  order 
to  the  left  of  Stewart’s.  Walker’s  corps  at  daylight,  marched 
in  the  direction  of  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  for  one  and  one-hall 
miles,  then  halted  for  further  instructions.  Cheatham’s  divis¬ 
ion,  early  in  the  morning,  crossed  the  river  at  Dalton’s  Ford, 
moved  northward  by  the  flank  for  some  distance,  and  halted, 
forming  front  westward,  and  stood  in  the  rear  of  Buckner’s 
corps. 

Gen.  Bragg  was  thus  packing  two-thirds  of  his  army  into 
the  narrow  corner  formed  by  the  Chickamauga  River  and  the 
Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road  just  below  Lee-and-Gor¬ 
don’s  mill,  under  the  delusion  that  on  the  morning  of  Septem¬ 
ber  19,  our  army  was  still  posted  in  the  position  in  which  he 
knew  it  to  have  been  posted  on  September  18,  that  is  with 
our  extreme  left  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill  and  our  center  and 


68 


CIIICK  AM  AUG  A. 


right  extending  far  up  into  McLamore’s  Cove,  while  it  was 
now  quite  the  reverse.  Our  night -movements  made  our  left 
of  yesterday  our  right  of  today,  while  our  left  was  three  and 
one-half  miles  north  of  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  and  by  so 
much  nearer  to  Chattanooga,  thus  outflanking  his  formation 
by  nearly  two  miles.  The  space  where  his  supposed  flanking 
columns  were  packed  was  so  small  that  Preston’s  division,  of 
Buckner’s  corps,  being  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  was 
hemmed  into  a  bend  of  Chickamauga  River  in  a  column  of 
brigades,  so  that  should  there  have  been  a  movement  to  the 
front  it  would  not  be  able  to  advance  without  twice  crossing 
another  bend  of  the  river  which  was  right  in  front  of  that 
division. 

It  was  after  9  a.m.,  and  still  Bragg  had  not  his  army  in 
readiness  for  the  advance,  and  would  not  have  been  ready  for 
some  time  longer  if  the  sounds  of  musketry  and  occasional 
firing  of  cannon  had  not  forced  the  illuminative  fact  on  his 
mind  that  the  cat  was  out  of  the  bag.  The  rebel  Gen.  Hill,  in 
his  report,  sarcastically  mentions  that  he  “found  upon  report¬ 
ing  to  the  commanding  general,  that  while  our  troops  have 
been  moving  up  the  Chickamauga,  the  Yankees  had  been 
moving  down,  and  outflanked  us.” 

Chance  plays  a  great  role  in  military  operations,  and  were 
it  not  for  chance  helping  us,  the  forces  gathered  by  Bragg  on 
this  side  of  the  river  might  have  fallen  on  Crittenden  and 
McCook  and  isolated  Thomas  from  them.  But  it  was  destined 
to  be  otherwise. 

Col  Dan.  McCook,  who,  on  receipt  of  Minty’s  report,  was 
ordered  by  Gen.  Granger  to  advance  with  his  own  brigade 
toward  Reed’s  bridge  on  the  evening  of  the  1 8th,  as  has 
been  narrated,  halted  within  a  mile  of  the  bridge  and  was 
there  supported  by  Mitchell’s  brigade,  sent  for  that  purpose. 
He  there  had  in  front  of  him  some  of  Minty’s  cavalry  who  had 
been  driven  from  the  bridge  at  2  or  3  p.m.  that  day,  and  the 
bridge — his  objective  point — was  in  the  possession  of  rebel 
cavalry.  McCook  on  his  arrival  in  the  evening  probably 
heard  from  the  cavalrymen  that  toward  evening  a  rebel  bri¬ 
gade  crossed  the  bridge  to  our  side  of  the  river  and  then 
marched  up  stream  in  the  direction  of  Alexander’s  bridge. 


OUR  COUNTER- MOVEMENTS. 


69 


The  probability  is  that  it  was  Benning’s  brigade  of  Hood’s 
division  that  remained  for  some  time  at  Ringgold  after  John¬ 
son’s  forces  left,  and  had  come  down  to  join  Robertson’s 
brigade  of  Hood’s  division,  and  it  is  likely  that  its  movement 
was  noticed  by  some  of  our  advanced  cavalry-vedettes. 

Both  our  brigades  early  in  the  morning  of  the  19th,  were 
ordered  to  move  back  to  Rossville.  But  before  moving  away, 
Gen.  Steedman,  who  was  in  command  of  both  brigades,  sent 
a  regiment  under  Lieut. -Col.  Brigham  to  destroy  the  bridge. 
Our  men  charged  on  the  rebels,  drove  them  off  the  bridge, 
and  burned  it.  Now  Dan.  McCook,  after  starting  his  brigade, 
wanted  to  know  what  was  going  on  around  Kelley’s  house. 
He  went  up  there  and,  meeting  Gen.  Thomas  at  Gen.  Baird’s 
headquarters,  reported  to  him  that  while  he  was  bivouacked 
near  the  bridge  he  was  aware  of  only  one  small  rebel  brigade 
having  crossed  the  bridge  in  the  evening,  and  he  thought 
it  was  isolated  in  the  woods  and  could  be  captured.  Gen. 
Thomas  took  it  under  consideration,  and,  being  desirous  to 
reconnoitre  the  ground  toward  Chickamauga,  ordered  Gen. 
Brannan  to  move  with  his  division  to  capture  that  little  rebel 
brigade.  He,  of  course,  was  not  aware  at  the  time  what  rebel 
forces  crossed  in  other  places  to  our  side  of  the  river,  nor 
where  they  formed. 

In  his  report,  Gen.  Thomas  says:  “Upon  this  information, 
I  directed  Gen.  Brannan  to  post  a  brigade  within  supporting 
distance  of  Baird  on  the  road  to  Alexander’s  bridge,  and  with 
his  other  two  brigades  to  reconnoitre  the  road  leading  to 
Reed’s  bridge  to  see  if  he  could  locate  the  brigade  reported 
by  Col.  McCook,  and  if  a  favorable  opportunity  occurred,  to 
capture  it.  His  dispositions  were  made  according  to  instruc¬ 
tions  by  9  a.m.”  Gen.  Brannan  apparently  put  Croxton’s 
brigade  on  the  road  to  Reed’s  bridge  instead  of  Alexander’s 
bridge,  and  with  Connel’s  and  Vanderveer’s  brigades  moved 
more  to  the  left.  But  at  that  time  the  rebel  Gen.  Forrest, 
with  his  cavalry,  was  reconnoitering  by  Bragg’s  order  in  the 
direction  of  Reed’s  bridge.  After  Brannan  moved,  Col.  Crox- 
ton  advanced  in  the  direction  of  Jay’s  steam-mill. 

About  10  a.m.,  heavy  musketry  commenced  in  the  direction 
of  Reed’s  bridge.  Brannan  found  that  the  “isolated  rebel  bri- 


7  o 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


gade”  was  too  strong  to  be  captured,  and  sent  to  Gen.  Thomas 
for  reenforcements.  Baird’s  division  moved  into  the  woods, 
but  that  was  not  enough;  Johnson’s  division  of  McCook’s 
corps,  was  hurried  up  to  Thomas  by  Rosecrans,  and  went  to 
the  right  of  Baird;  Palmer’s  and  Reynolds’  divisions  hastened 
to  the  scene,  and  went  to  the  right  of  Johnson.  Still  the  rebel 
brigade  proved  to  be  too  strong  for  capture,  and  turned  out 
to  be  the  greater  part  of  the  rebel  army.  And  the  rattle  of 
musketry,  interspersed  with  the  sullen  boom  of  the  cannon, 
spread  from  left  to  right  through  the  dense  woods  of  the 
Chickamauga,  continuing  with  unabated  fury  during  the  re¬ 
mainder  of  the  day  and  even  far  into  the  night 


PART  TWO. 


Battle  of  September  19,  1863. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

DURING  THE  DAY. 

WHEN  Col.  Croxton  advanced  with  his  brigade  he  met 
the  enemy’s  dismounted  cavalry  of  Pegram’s  division, 
and,  notwithstanding  its  stubborn  resistance,  drove  it  steadily 
for  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  while  Brannan,  with  two  other 
brigades,  Connel’s  in  front  and  Vanderveer’s  in  reserve, 
met  and  also  drove  some  cavalry.  The  rebel  Gen.  Forrest 
sent  to  Polk  for  Armstrong’s  division  of  his  cavalry,  but, 
receiving  only  Dibrell’s  brigade,  went  himself  to  get  some 
infantry  reenforcements.  Wilson’s  brigade  of  Walker’s  divis¬ 
ion,*  was  ordered  to  reenforce  him,  which  was  soon  followed 
by  Ector’s  brigade  of  the  same  division.  Wilson,  supported 
by  cavalry,  furiously  attacked  Croxton,  who  being  over¬ 
powered,  commenced  to  give  way;  and  while  stubbornly 
fighting  and  gradually  falling  back,  sent  to  Thomas  and  to 
Brannan  for  reenforcements. 

Baird’s  division  advanced  to  the  left  of  Croxton,  with  King’s 
and  Scribner’s  brigades  in  the  front  line  and  Starkweather’s  in 
reserve,  and  drove  the  enemy  back  toward  the  river,  taking 
some  200  prisoners.  In  ordering  Baird  to  move  forward, 
Gen.  Thomas  apparently  directed  Starkweather  to  help  Crox¬ 
ton  also,  but  Starkweather  mistaking  the  direction,  went  to 
the  left.  Meantime,  Ector’s  rebel  brigade,  by  Forrest’s  direc¬ 
tion,  passing  to  the  rear  and  to  the  right  of  Wilson’s,  met 
Brannan’s  force.  Brannan  sent  the  Thirty-first  Ohio  of 
Connel’s  brigade  to  reenforce  Croxton,  and  the  Seventeenth 
Ohio  was  ordered  to  join  Vanderveer;  so  Connel  had  only 
two  regiments.  The  Ninth  Ohio  remaining  back,  joined  this 

*  Gen.  Walker  commanding  a  corps,  Gen.  Gist  ought  to  have  commanded  his 
division,  but  was  detached  with  his  brigade  at  Rome. 

71 


72 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


t 


brigade  of  Vanderveer’s  about  the  same  time.  Gen.  Ector, 
supported  by  cavalry,  attacked  Brannan,  but  was  repulsed 
with  loss  and  driven  back  some  distance.  Croxton  passed  to 
the  rear  to  obtain  ammunition,  but  one  of  his  regiments,  the 
Fourth  Kentucky,  went  on  with  Baird’s  troops.  Baird  and 
Brannan  now  connected  their  forces  and  halted  for  readjust¬ 
ment;  and  Baird,  hearing  from  the  prisoners  that  a  large  rebel 
force  was  on  his  right,  made  dispositions  to  change  front  to 
the  right,  ordering  Gen.  King  to  change  front  to  the  right  at 
once,  his  left  being  supported  by  Brannan’s  forces,  Baird  him¬ 
self  going  toward  Scribner’s  brigade  to  see  his  command 
properly  posted. 

At  1 1  a.m.  the  rebel  Gen.  Walker  was  ordered  by  Gen. 
Bragg  to  move  Liddell’s  division  to  reenforce  his  troops  on 
the  right  and  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once.  By  12.15  p.m., 
just  when  Baird  was  going  to  Scribner’s  brigade,  that  brigade 
was  struck  in  flank  by  the  rebel  Liddell’s  division,  and  not¬ 
withstanding  all  the  stubborness  of  the  men  and  the  efforts  of 
the  officers,  the  brigade  could  not  withstand  the  shock  of  the 
sudden  charge,  and  was  broken  and  borne  to  the  rear  in  utter 
confusion.  Four  pieces  of  Scribner’s  battery  were  captured, 
and  the  enemy,  sweeping  further  to  his  right,  struck  the  regu¬ 
lar  brigade  of  King  before  it  could  get  into  proper  position, 
took  its  rifled  battery,*  and  drove  the  brigade  in  complete 
disorder,  upon  Brannan’s  forces,  taking  over  400  prisoners, 
almost  all  regulars. 

During  this  action,  Starkweather  was  coming  up  to  take  a 
position  to  the  right  of  Scribner,  and  his  brigade  was  attacked 
by  the  enemy  and  suffered  severely,  his  battery  also  losing 
almost  all  its  horses.  But  while  Baird’s  brigades  were  thus 
terribly  put  out  of  shape,  Vanderveer’s  and  part  of  Connel’s 
brigades,  of  Brannan’s  division,  impetuously  attacked  the 
extreme  right  of  Liddell’s  division,  and  the  Ninth  Ohio,  a 
German  regiment  commanded  by  Col.  Kamerling,  supported 
by  the  Seventeenth  Ohio  and  Eighty-seventh  Indiana  regi¬ 
ments,  with  an  extraordinary  dash,  wedged  themselves  into 
the  rebel  crowd,  driving  it  back,  and  the  Ninth  recaptured 

*  Battery  “H”,  Fifth  U.S.A.,  formerly  Loomis’  Michigan  battery;  Capt.  VanPelt 
was  taken  prisoner. 


) 


# 


DURING  THE  DAY.  73 

'  * 

King’s  regular  battery.  The  enemy  rallied  and  commenced 
to  press  Vanderveer’s  left  again,  which  began  to  falter,  the 
brigade  under  this  pressure,  gradually  changing  front,  when 
the  Ninth  Ohio  and  two  other  regiments  attacked  this  part  of 
the  enemy  in  flank  and  drove  him  back  demoralized.  Mean¬ 
time,  to  the  right  of  Baird,  Johnson’s  division  of  McCook’s 
corps,  which  was  sent  to  Thomas  by  Gen.  Rosecrans,  was 
advancing,  and  Liddell,  being  outflanked,  commenced  to 
quickly  fall  back,  and  then  retired  toward  the  river,  there  to 
reform  his  successful  but  decimated  command. 

This  encounter  on  our  left,  continuing  for  over  three  hours, 
told  disastrously  on  some  of  our  commands.  King’s  regular 
brigade  and  Croxton’s  brigade  having  sustained  heavy  losses, 
particularly  the  first;  but  the  enemy,  being  terribly  in  earnest, 
suffered  still  more.  Wilson’s  and  Ector’s  brigades  were  badly 
broken;  the  first  after  this  encounter  mustered  only  a  little 
over  400  men,*  and  Ector’s  fared  no  better.  Liddell’s  division 
also  sustained  heavy  losses  here,  more  than  at  any  time  during 
the  balance  of  the  two-days  battle. 

This  battle  on  our  left  disconcerted  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  rebel  army.  His  contemplated  plan  to  fall  upon  the 
supposed  left  of  our  army  in  the  cove  had  dissolved  like  a 
dream.  After  sending  the  whole  of  Walker’s  reserve  corps 
against  our  left,  he  hurried  there  Cheatham’s  division  of  five 
brigades,  and  ordered  Gen.  Polk  to  also  send  to  the  extreme 
right  of  the  line  Cleburne’s  division  of  Hill’s  corps.  Until  he 
was  assured  of  stopping  our  advance  on  his  right,  he  dared 
not  order  the  attack  of  his  center,  and  that  gave  us  time  and  * 
opportunity  to  form  our  line,  if  not  perfectly,  yet  with  the 
possibility  of  resisting  Hood’s  and  Buckner’s  forces,  which 
stood  waiting  opposite  our  center  and  right. 

When  Gen.  Johnson  reported  to  Thomas,  he  was  ordered  to 
form  his  command,  move  forward  to  the  right  of  Baird,  and 
attack.  The  division  formed  with  Willich’s  brigade  on  the 
right,  Baldwin’s  on  the  left,  and  Dodge’s  in  the  reserve,  and 
moved  forward.  Meantime,  Gen.  Crittenden,  at  9  a.m.,  ordered 
Col.  Grose  of  Palmer’s  division,  to  move  north  with  his  bri¬ 
gade  and  reconnoitre  the  Chattanooga  road  as  far  as  Mc- 

*  Col.  C.  C.  Wilson’s  report,  October  1,  1863. 

6 


74 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Dannel’s  and  communicate  with  Gen.  Thomas,  which  was 
done. 

When  the  battle  commenced  on  our  left  toward  Reed’s 
bridge,  while  everything  was  perfectly  quiet  in  front  of  our 
right,  Gen.  Crittenden  ordered  Palmer’s  division  to  report  to 
Thomas,  which  order  was  approved  by  Gen.  Rosecrans.  Col. 
Grose  on  his  return,  met  and  joined  his  division.  Approach¬ 
ing  Kelly’s  farm,  Palmer  formed  his  command  and  moved  by 
brigades  in  echelon,  left  in  front,  in  the  direction  of  the  fire; 
and  almost  at  the  same  time  Johnson  advanced,  Palmer  was  on 
his  right.  Hazen’s  brigade  being  on  the  left,  Cruft’s  in  the 
centre,  and  Grose’s  on  the  right.  This  movement  of  two  of 
our  divisions  relieved  Baird,  and  drove  Liddell’s  rebel  division 
toward  the  river;  but  at  that  time  Cheatham’s  rebel  division 
was  advancing  to  the  relief  of  Walker’s  corps  with  Jackson’s, 
Preston  Smith’s,  and  Wright’s  brigades  in  the  first  line,  and 
Maney’s  and  Strahl’s  in  the  second.  They  attacked  Johnson’s 
and  part  of  Palmer’s  commands,  and,  although  they  charged 
with  determination  and  persistency,  and  compelled  Johnson  to 
recede  some  distance,  yet  our  divisions  fought  so  stubbornly 
— partly  behind  some  improvised  barricades  of  logs — that  all 
the  endeavors  of  the  enemy  to  dislodge  us  proved  futile;  and 
Cheatham’s  brigades  suffered  very  severely  in  this  struggle, 
which  lasted  over  two  hours,  besides  losing  five  pieces  of 
artillery.  The  rebel  Gen.  Jackson  claimed*  that  his  brigade 
captured  three  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  pile  of  knapsacks  left 
behind  by  our  men.  The  rebel  Gen.  Wright,  in  the  con¬ 
flict  with  Hazen’s  brigade  of  Palmer’s  division,  supported  by 
Dodge’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division,  sustained  very  severe 
losses  in  killed  and  wounded  besides  having  Carnes’  battery  of 
his  brigade  captured  by  our  side.  For  a  time,  Maney  relieved 
Jackson,  and  Strahl  relieved  Preston  Smith,  while  Wright  was 
obliged  to  fight  for  over  three  hours  until  Clayton’s  brigade 
of  Stewart’s  division,  came  to  his  support. 

Bragg  ordered  Gen.  Stewart  to  move  his  division  to  the 
right  and  take  place  between  Cheatham  and  Hood,  and  to  the 
request  for  special  instruction,  answered  that  Stewart  must  be 
guided  by  circumstances.  Knowing  that  Cheatham  required 

*  Gen.  Jackson’s  report,  October  3,  1863. 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


75 


support,  he  moved  his  division  north  and  reached  the  field  of 
battle  at  the  time  Jackson  and  Preston  Smith  fell  back  for 
want  of  ammunition,  and  Wright  was  entirely  broken.  Stewart 
moved  Clayton  at  once  with  his  brigade,  to  the  support  of 
Wright,  forming  his  other  brigades — of  Brown  and  Bate — to 
the  left  of  Clayton.  Before  Stewart’s  division  was  placed  in 
front  of  Palmer,  the  head  of  Reynold’s  column  of  two  brigades 
was  approaching  Kelly’s  farm,  Turchin’s  brigade  in  front, 
King’s  brigade  following.  Gen.  Reynolds  sent  an  order  to 
Gen.  Turchin  to  form  his  brigade  southeast  of  Kelly’s  house, 
while  he  in  person  directed  the  head  of  King’s  brigade  off  the 
road  preparatory  to  forming  it;  but  on  the  solicitation  of  Gen. 
Palmer  to  reenforce  him,  Reynolds  directed  Col.  King,  with 
three  regiments,  to  join  Palmer  on  his  right,  and  ordered  two 
rear  regiments,  the  Ninety-second  and  Thirty-sixth  Ohio  of 
Turchin’s  column,  then  within  reach,  to  take  place  on  the  left 
of  Palmer,  sending  Capt.  Wm.  B.  Curtis,  A.A.G.,  of  the  Third 
brigade,  to  inform  Turchin  of  what  had  been  done,  and  to 
order  him  to  join  his  regiments,  which  he  had  placed  on 
the  left  of  Palmer  with  the  rest  of  his  brigade.  Reynolds 
then,  with  the  Seventy- fifth  Indiana  and  Harris’  battery 
of  artillery,  remained  near  the  Chattanooga-and- Lafayette 
road  back  of  the  right  wing  of  Palmer’s  extended  line, 
for  the  purpose  of  organizing  a  reserve,  as  he  saw  no  one  in 
the  neighborhood.*  This  action  of  separating  his  own  small 
division  in  two  parts,  and  placing  those  parts  on  the  opposite 
flanks  of  another  division,  not  even  belonging  to  his  own 
corps;  removing  them  from  his  own  control;  and  leaving  them 
without  anyone  to  direct  their  movements,  while  he  remained 
in  the  rear  and  trying  to  organize  something  out  of  nothing, 
does  not  look  like  generalship.  If  Reynolds  had  stationed 
the  whole  of  his  division  and  his  two  batteries  on  the  right 
of  Palmer,  the  enemy  never  could  have  broken  our  centre; 
a  disaster  which  occurred  toward  evening. 

Rebel  Gen.  Clayton  attacked  Hazen’s  brigade,  now  sup¬ 
ported  by  two  regiments  of  Turchin’s,  but  could  not  make  an 
impression  on  our  line.  The  fire  of  musketry  was  rapid  and 
continuous,  the  enemy  occasionally  approaching  our  line  quite 

*  Gen.  Reynolds’  report,  September  23,  1863. 


76 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


closely,  and  being  terribly  punished  for  his  temerity.  After 
spending  all  his  ammunition  and  losing  about  400  men,  Clay¬ 
ton  withdrew.*  The  action  lasted  about  an  hour,  terminating 
at  about  3.30. 

There  was  now  a  lull  in  front  of  Johnson’s  and  Palmer’s 
divisions.  Gen.  Turchin,  with  the  balance  of  his  brigade,  the 
Eleventh  Ohio  and  Eighteenth  Kentucky, J*  and  the  Twenty- 
first  Indiana  battery,  joined  his  other  two  regiments  on  the  left 
of  Palmer’s  division,  and  as  Gen.  Hazen  withdrew  his  brigade 
for  want  of  ammunition,  Turchin  formed  his  brigade  in  place 
of  Hazen’s,  and  on  the  left  of  Gen.  Cruft’s  brigade.  At  that 
time  Johnson’s  diyision  that  stood  to  the  left  of  Palmer’s, 
moved  forward,  driving  Cheatham’s  skirmishers  for  about  a 
mile,  and  halted  in  front  of  the  position  on  which  Cheatham’s 
division  was  formed.  Here  Gen.  Baird,  after  leaving  King’s 
brigade  on  the  road  to  Reed’s  bridge  to  watch  the  enemy  in 
that  direction,  joined  Johnson  with  Scribner’s  and  Stark¬ 
weather’s  brigades,  while  Brannan’s  division  was  withdrawn  to 
Kelly’s  farm  to  reform,  and  there  took  position. 

Gen.  Palmer,  seeing  no  enemy  in  his  immediate  front,  and 
hearing  heavy  musketry  and  cannon  firing  to  the  right  of  him, 
had  an  idea  that  it  would  be  expedient  to  move  in  that  direc¬ 
tion  and  help  such  of  our  troops,  if  any,  who  might  be  hard 
pressed  by  the  enemy.  With  this  philanthropic  design  in 
view,  he  ordered  Grose’s  brigade — which  was  on  his  right — to 
move  to  the  right,  and  the  movement  commenced.  He  was 
then  coming  to  Gen.  Cruft,  and  when  on  the  point  of  ordering 
him  and  his  brigade  to  move  also  to  the  right  to  support 
Grose,  a  rebel  force  moving  quickly  toward  our  front  covered 
a  portion  of  Grose’s  and  Cruft’s  brigades  with  a  sheet  of  firing 
and  impetuously  charged  on  our  line.  This  was  the  attack  of 
the  rebel  Gen.  Brown  and  his  brigade,  which  was  ordered  by 
Stewart,  after  Clayton  withdrew.  Grose’s  command  being 
taken  in  flank,  gave  way,  while  the  right  of  Cruft’s  wavered 
and  then  started  to  run.  The  confusion  was  quickly  commu¬ 
nicated  to  the  balance  of  the  brigade. 

*  Gen.  Clayton’s  report,  October  3,  1863. 

+  The  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  Regiment  was  left  on  a  detached  duty  at  Tracy  City, 
north  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  afterward  came  to  Rossville  with  Steedman’s 
division  of  the  reserve  corps,  and  fought  on  September  20,  under  Gen.  Steedman. 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


11 


V.  I 


The  rebel  brigade,  at  this  particular  time,  exposed  its  right 
flank,  and  Turchin  immediately  moved  forward  and,  partially 
wheeling  to  the  right,  made  an  impetuous  bayonet-charge  on 
its  exposed  flank.  The  enemy  stopped,  faced  about,  and 
commenced  to  run;  Cruft’s  men  rallied  and  joined  Turchin’s 
in  the  chase,  pursuing  the  enemy  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile  and 
capturing  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners.  At  Gen. 
Turchin’s  suggestion,  the  commands  were  then  halted,  and 
returned  to  their  previous  position  in  the  line.  It  is  a  perti¬ 
nent  query  to  institute  here  as  to  what  would  have  become  of 
Turchin’s  and  King’s  brigades,  so  widely  separated,  if  Gen. 
Palmer,  following  his  feeling  of  commiseration  for  other  com¬ 
mands,  had  had  time  to  withdraw  his  entire  division  away  to 
the  right  and  have  left  those  brigades — unwiselv  entrusted  to 
him  by  Reynolds — isolated  and  in  the  lurch;  and  what  would 
have  become  of  Gen.  Reynolds  himself,  and  his  reserve  of  one 
battery? 

Giving  an  account  of  this  incident  in  his  report,*  Gen. 
Palmer  says:  “While  riding  toward  Cruft’s  brigade  to  order 
him  [Cruft]  to  move  to  the  right  to  support  Grose,  a  heavy 
force  came  down  upon  him  and  Turchin.  For  ten  minutes  or 
more  our  men  stood  up  under  this  fire,  and  then  the  enemy 
charged  them  and  bore  them  back .  Cruft,  Turchin,  and  all  their 
officers  exerted  themselves  with  distinguished  courage  to  arrest 
the  retreat,  and  I  gave  them  what  assistance  I  could.  It 
seemed  as  if  nothing  would  prevent  a  rout;  but  as  if  by  magic , 
the  line  straightened  up,  the  men  turning  upon  their  pursuers 
and  as  quickly  as  they  turned  and  fled,  were  in  turn  pursued. 
Many  prisoners  were  brought  to  me  at  this  point  by  soldiers 
for  orders.” 

This  report  is  incorrect.  Turchin’s  men  were  not  borne  back 
an  inch;  on  the  contrary,  when  Cruft’s  men  commenced  to 
run,  they  rushed  forward  with  bayonets  at  a  charge  as  soon 
as  the  enemy’s  flank  reached  them.  That  was  the  magic  which 
induced  Cruft’s  men  to  face  about  and  to  join  in  the  charge. 
Gen.  Palmer  should  not  have  tried  to  palliate  a  temporary 
disorder  of  one  of  his  brigades  at  the  risk  of  making  his  report 
inconsistent,  and  doing  injustice  to  another  command.  Any 

*  Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  J.  M.  Palmer,  September  30,  1863. 


73 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


practical  soldier  knows  that  if  the  whole  line  commences  to 
run  from  a  maintained  pursuit  they  would  run  indefinitely, 
unless  some  part  of  it  should  make  a  stand.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  a  part  of  the  line  retreats  and  the  other  charges 
forward,  it  stops  and  confuses  the  enemy  and  gives  a  chance 
to  the  fleeing  part  to  recover  and  face  to  the  front.  There 
is  no  magic  that  can  make  a  running  regiment  turn  and  face 
the  enemy. 

The  rebel  Gen.  Brown*  of  Stewart’s  division,  who  made  that 
attack,  unconsciously  rebukes  Gen.  Palmer  in  his  report  for 
that  incorrectness ,  and  states  the  truth  relative  to  the  action 
of  Turchin’s  brigade.  Gen.  Brown’s  brigade  consisted  of  the 
Eighteenth,  F'orty-fifth,  Thirty-second,  and  Twenty-sixth  Ten¬ 
nessee  regiments,  and  Newman’s  battalion;  in  all  1341  officers 
and  men  participated  in  that  attack.  Describing  his  on¬ 
slaught,  Gen.  Brown  says:  “but  again  we  advanced,  driving 
back  his  [our]  second  line  up  to  and  beyond  the  summit  of  the 
ridge,  until  my  right  rested  upon  and  my  center  and  left  had 
passed  the  crest.  Unfortunately ,  however,  at  the  moment 
when  the  rout  of  the  second  line  was  about  being  made  as 
complete  as  the  disaster  to  the  first  a  few  minutes  previous,  a 
force  of  the  enemy  appeared  on  my  right  flank  and  had  well-nigh 
turned  it ,  compelling  the  Eighteenth  and  Forty-fifth  Tennessee 
regiments  to  retire  rapidly  and  in  some  confusion,  under  a 
heavy  enfilading  fire.  This  necessitated  the  withdrawal  of  the 
center  and  left ,  there  being  no  support  upon  my  right  for  a 
mile  and  none  in  my  rear  nearer  than  600  yards,  and  which 
was  then  not  in  motion.” 

A  fair  question  may  now  be  asked, — could  the  enemy  have 
been  outflanked  on  his  right  if  the  whole  line  were  “borne 
back”  as  Palmer  says?  It  is  due  to  the  brave  men  who  com¬ 
posed  Turchin’s  brigade  at  that  time  and  who  gallantly  rushed 
against  the  rebel  bullets  without  wavering,  that  the  unfairness 
of  the  report  of  Gen.  Palmer,  who  was  then  present  and  in 
temporary  command  of  them,  should  be  exposed  and  refuted. 

But  this  episode  was  only  a  preliminary  to  the  attacks  that 
succeeded  it.  At  the  time  when  Brown’s  brigade  was  ordered 
to  the  attack  by  Gen.  Stewart,  he  also  ordered  Gen.  Bate,  with 

*  Report  of  Brig.- Gen.  J.  C.  Brown,  C.S.,  October  13,  1863. 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


79 


his  brigade,  to  form  on  the  left  of  Brown,  and  Gen.  Clayton, 
with  his  brigade,  after  it  had  been  supplied  with  ammunition, 
to  form  on  the  left  of  Bate,  and  when  they  were  ready  they 
were  commanded  to  attack  the  Union  line.  Bate’s  and  Clay¬ 
ton’s  brigades  attacked  Grose — of  Palmer’s  division — and  King 
— of  Reynolds’  division.  Grose’s  brigade  firmly  stood  its 
ground,  and  his  battery  on  the  left,  enfilading  the  right  of  the 
enemy,  compelled  him  to  fall  back;  but  King’s  brigade,  being 
taken  in  front  and  flank  gave  way.  At  that  time,  Gen.  Hazen, 
after  supplying  his  brigade  with  ammunition,  was  moving  with 
it  in  the  rear  of  the  line  toward  the  right,  and  seeing  the  mis¬ 
haps  of  King’s  brigade,  formed  behind  it  while  it  was  being 
driven  by  the  enemy,  but  the  rebel  charge  was  so  impetuous 
that  his  brigade  could  not  arrest  it,  and  his  men  commenced 
to  fall  back  also. 

Meantime,  Gen.  Reynolds,  with  Harris’  and  Swallow’s  two 
batteries,  Lieut.  Russel’s  battery  “H,”  Fourth  U.-S.  Artillery, 
and  a  section  of  howitzers  of  the  Ninety-second  Illinois,  was 
exciting  himself  to  rally  sufficient  stragglers  to  support  these 
batteries.  Gen.  Hazen,  also,  leaving  his  own  command, 
applied  himself  to  collecting  into  one  battery  as  much  of 
Palmer’s  artillery  as  possible,  and  gathering  enough  stragglers 
to  support  it.  At  the  request  of  Reynolds,  Gen.  Thomas  sent 
Brannan’s  two  brigades  from  Kelly’s  farm  to  support  Reyn¬ 
olds,  and  these  rapidly  neared  the  scene  of  conflict  where 
most  of  Clayton’s  and  a  half  of  Bate’s  rebel  brigades  were 
chasing  our  fugitives  across  and  beyond  the  Lafayette-and- 
Chattanooga  road.  Met  by  the  fire  of  our  artillery,  and 
threatened  by  Brannan’s  troops  on  their  right,  and  some  of 
our  troops  from  our  line  on  the  left,  the  rebels  deemed  it  dis¬ 
creet  to  withdraw. 

This  incident  is  worthy  of  critical  consideration,  in  order  to 
show  how,  under  excitement  and  want  of  knowledge  of  the 
enemy’s  forces  brought  into  action,  a  comparatively  trifling 
affair  is  sometimes  magnified  into  an  event  of  almost  national 
importance. 

In  his  report*  Gen.  Reynolds,  states  that  when  he  was  send¬ 
ing  the  Ninety-second  Illinois  to  the  support  of  Col.  King,  that 

*  Maj.-Gen.  J.  J.  Reynolds’  report,  September  23,  1863. 


8o 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


regiment  could  hardly  clear  the  front  of  the  batteries,  when  it 
was  struck  and  routed  by  our  own  fugitives  from  the  front, 
followed  by  the  enemy;  that  with  all  his  exertions  he  finally 
succeeded  in  reforming  several  regiments  in  rear  of  batteries; 
that  battery  “H,”  Fourth  U.-S.  Artillery,  commanded  by  Lieut. 
Russell,  joined  him  at  this  time;  that  these  batteries  “ fired 
with  terrible  effect  upon  the  enemy,”  and  checked  him;  that 
the  enemy  then  “shifted  further  to  the  right  where  there  was 
evidently  an  opening  in  our  lines,”  and  flanking  our  troops 
and  batteries,  compelled  them  to  fall  to  their  right-rear,  the 
batteries  “changed  front  and  fired  to  the  right,  and  the  line 
was  reformed  along  a  fence,  nearly  perpendicular  to  its  former 
position,  with  the  batteries  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  the 
enemy  pushing  still  further  to  the  right  and  rear.”  There  was 
evidently  something  extraordinary  about  those  rebel  troops, 
when  they  could  not  be  torn  to  shreds  by  twenty-four  of  our 
guns  firing  canister  in  their  front,  and  afterward  in  their  flank, 
in  addition  to  the  musketry  fire  at  short  range. 

But  this  was  not  all.  We  have  before  related  how  Gen. 
Hazen,  after  being  relieved  by  Gen.  Turchin,  moved  to  the 
rear  to  supply  his  brigade  with  ammunition.  Hazen,  in  his 
report*  states  that  just  after  accomplishing  it  there  appeared 
to  be  a  vigorous  attack  made  on  our  lines  immediately  beyond 
the  ground  fought  over  by  Grose’s  brigade;  that  he  moved 
his  brigade  to  the  right  and,  “forming  it  so  as  to  face  the 
sound  of  battle,”  moved  forward  and  took  position  as  support 
to  Reynolds’  troops,  at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees  with 
the  Lafayette- and- Chattanooga  road;  that  when  the  line  (of 
Reynolds’  troops)  in  his  front  gave  way,  his  men  moved  “to 
the  top  of  the  crest  and  withstood  the  shock  until  they  were 
completely  flanked  tipon  their  left ,  then  obliqued  well  to  the 
right  and  took  position  upon  a  high  elevation  of  ground,  con¬ 
fronting  the  left  flank  of  that  portion  of  the  enemy  which  had 
broken  our  center.” 

Now,  remembering  that  our  fugitives  and  artillery  under 
Reynolds  wheeled  before  the  rebels  to  the  right  and  rear,  and 
were  consequently  confronting  the  right  flank  of  the  rebels; 
while  Hazen’s  brigade,  according  to  his  report,  was  confronting 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  W.  B.  Hazen,  September  28,  1863. 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


8x 


their  left  flank.  The  rebejs  were  apparently  passing  between 
the  musketry  firing  of  Hazen’s  brigade  on  their  left  and  the 
batteries  of  twenty-four  guns  of  Reynolds,  “fired  with  terrible 
effect”  on  their  right,  and  yet  the  rebels  moved  on.  Hazen 
says:  “I  found  myself  the  only  general  officer  upon  that  part 
of  the  field,  and  to  check  the  farther  advance  of  the  enemy 
was  of  the  utmost  importance.”  So  Hazen  leaves  his  brigade 
and  goes  to  work  to  get  into  position  all  the  artillery  “then  in 
reach,  including  a  portion  of  Standards,  Cockrell’s,  Cushing’s, 
and  Russell’s  batteries,  in  all  about  twenty  pieces,  and  with 
the  aid  of  all  the  mounted  officers  I  could  find,  succeeded  in 
checking  and  rallying  a  sufficient  number  of  straggling  infan¬ 
try  to  form  a  fair  line  in  support  of  the  artillery.”  Here,  then, 
are  two  generals,  one  a  division  commander  rallying  his  own 
command  behind  his  own  batteries,  while  the  other,  command¬ 
ing  a  brigade,  forms  batteries  belonging  to  his  division,  and 
flies  around  to  get  stragglers  to  support  them,  while  his  own 
brigade,  left  “upon  a  high  elevation  of  ground,”  was  standing 
alone  and  inert. 

Gen.  Reynolds  claims  that  Russell’s  battery  was  with  him; 
Gen.  Hazen  claims  it  was  with  him.  Dividing  that  battery 
by  two  and  supposing  it  had  only  four  guns,  Reynolds’  bat¬ 
tery  consisted  of  twenty  guns,  and  Hazen  says  his  battery 
consisted  of  twenty  guns  also,  hence  there  were  forty  guns, 
both,  according  to  the  reports  of  those  generals,  placed  in 
different  positions,  yet  both  firing  at  the  same  rebel  force,  and 
both  supported  by  stragglers  of  King’s  brigade,  with  Hazen’s 
brigade  standing  afar  off  on  the  other  side  of  the  break,  while 
the  daring  rebels  were  steadily  going  ahead.  To  explain  the 
inconsistency  of  his  brigade  being  away  from  those  batteries, 
Hazen  says:  “My  brigade  could  not  be  brought  into  position  in 
time ,  there  being  but  about  two  minutes  to  make  these  disposi¬ 
tions  before  the  bloiv  came ,  when  the  simultaneous  opening  of 
all  the  artillery  with  grape  checked  and  put  to  rout  the  con¬ 
fronting  column  of  the  enemy.”  Consequently  there  should 
be  no  doubt  but  that  Hazen’s  battery  routed  the  enemy, 
although  Gen.  Reynolds  thinks  differently. 

After  his  line  was  reformed  along  the  fence,  with  batteries 
in  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  “the  enemy  pushing  still  further 


82 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


to  the  right  and  rear,”  one  would  think  that  the  enemy  at  last 
ran  against  Hazen’s  batteries  and  there  the  “grape  checked 
and  put”  him  “to  rout”;  but  Reynolds  shows  that  it  was  not 
so;  and  says:  “I  rallied  and  formed  into  double  line  some  ten 
or  twelve  other  returning  [?]  regiments  which  came  in  from  the 
left  center,  and  placing  the  front  line  under  the  immediate 
command  of  Col.  Croxton,  Tenth  Kentucky,  ordered  them  to 
swing  around  on  the  left  flank  as  a  pivot;  this  order  was 
well  executed  by  both  lines  in  our  rear,  thus  entirely  cleared 
of  the  enemy.”  Surely,  those  “ten  or  twelve  regiments”  be¬ 
longed  to  the  two  brigades  of  Brannan  sent  there  by  Gen. 
Thomas  upon  the  request  of  Reynolds,  and,  although  the 
sense  of  the  phrases  of  the  report  is  cloudy,  still  those  two 
brigades  must  have  cleaned  out  the  rebels. 

What  is  striking  and  incongruous  in  the  reports  of  these  two 
generals  is  this:  that  Reynolds  does  not  mention  Hazen  and 
his  batteries  at  all,  or  even  his  brigade;  while  Hazen  also 
refrains  from  saying  a  word  either  of  Reynolds,  or  his  bat¬ 
teries,  or  of  Brannan’s  troops,  until  his  own  batteries  “checked 
and  put  to  rout”  the  enemy,  and  then,  and  only  then,  he  notices 
Reynolds  and  says:  “Reynolds  came  and  made  further  dis¬ 
positions  of  the  troops,”  etc.  But,  before  coming  to  that, 
Gen.  Hazen  emphatically  declares  in  his  report,  that  “It  is 
due  Lieutenants  Baldwin,  First  Ohio  Artillery,  command¬ 
ing  Standards  battery,  Cockerill  of  the  same  regiment,  com¬ 
manding  battery,  Cushing  and  Russell,  Fourth  U.-S.  Artillery, 
commanding  batteries,  to  state  for  accuracy  in  manceuvering 
and  firing  their  guns  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy 
on  the  occasion  above  referred  to,  the  army  and  country  are 
placed  under  lasting  obligations. ”  At  such  an  emphatic,  almost 
solemn,  declaration  of  a  brigadier-general  intimating  that  by 
routing  that  rebel  force  which,  as  he  says,  “broke  our  center,” 
the  great  danger,  not  only  to  the  army,  but  to  the  country  has 
been  averted,  it  is  well  to  inquire  what  that  rebel  force  was. 

The  rebel  Gen.  Bate  had  in  this  attack*  three  regiments  in 
the  line  of  battle,  the  Twentieth  Tennessee,  Thirty-seventh 
Georgia,  and  the  Fifty-eighth  Alabama,  and  two  regiments, 
the  Fifteenth  and  Thirty-seventh  Tennessee,  consolidated  as  a 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  W.  B.  Bate,  C.-S.  Army,  October  9,  1863. 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


83 

reserve,  besides  the  Fourth  Georgia  Sharpshooters  on  the 
right  of  the  brigade.  On  the  left  of  the  front  line  stood  the 
Fifty-eighth  Alabama.  His  effective  force  is  shown  to  have 
been  1212  infantry,  officers  and  men.  Gen.  Clayton*  had  three 
Alabama  regiments  that  were  originally  1446  strong,  but  in 
his  first  engagement  that  afternoon,  and  before  he  was  ordered 
to  support  Bate  in  his  attack,  he  lost — according  to  his  own 
report — about  400  officers  and  men;  consequently,  in  his 
attack  with  Bate  he  could  not  have  had  but  a  few  more  than 
1000  men.  When  the  attack  was  first  made  the  right  of  Bates’ 
line  was  repulsed,  but  the  Union  troops  in  front  of  his  left,  as 
well  as  in  front  of  Clayton,  gave  way  and  were  pressed  and 
pursued  only  by  the  Fiftieth  Alabama  and  the  Fifteenth  and 
Thirty-seventh  Tennessee  of  Bates’  force,  comprising  at  the 
most  liberal  computation  but  two-fifths  of  that  brigade,  and  by 
all  of  Clayton’s  brigade.  Adding  to  this  number  some  forty 
or  fifty  stragglers  belonging  to  Law’s  brigade  of  Hood’s 
division,  who  joined  in  the  attack,  and  the  whole  rebel  force 
which,  as  Hazen  says,  “broke  our  center,”  amounted  to  but 
1500  men.  Upon  our  side,  Col.  King  had  four  regiments  in 
his  brigade,  and  there  was  the  Ninety-second  Illinois,  and  add¬ 
ing  the  strength  of  these  regiments  to  that  of  Hazen’s  brigade, 
there  must  have  been  at  least  2500  men  right  at  hand,  sup¬ 
ported  by  forty  pieces  of  artillery,  to  resist  the  enemy’s  1500. 
Then,  our  troops  were  reenforced  by  two  more  brigades  of 
Brannan’s  division,  the  whole  force  thus  amounting  to  between 
5000  and  6000  men  concentrated  against  1500  of  the  enemy. 
What  danger  could  there  have  been  to  the  army  or  the  coun¬ 
try  resulting  from  such  disproportionate  forces,?  If  those 
rebels  went  as  far  as  Chattanooga,  there  is  no  doubt  that  our 
army,  not  saying  anything  of  the  country,  would  have  been 
just  as  safe  as  if  they  never  went  there.  The  fact  of  the  mat¬ 
ter  is  that  if  Gen.  Hazen,  after  putting  his  brigade  in  support 
of  Reynolds’  troops  and  seeing  the  breaking-up  of  the  line  in 
front  of  him,  had  quickly  folded  his  deployed  regiments  into 
columns  on  the  center,  thus  leaving  space  enough  between  the 
battalions  for  the  fugitives  to  pass  through,  and  then  impet¬ 
uously  charged  upon  the  enemy,  who  by  the  success  had  itself 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  H.  D.  Clayton,  October  3,  1863. 


84 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


become  disorganized,  he  would  have  scattered  the  rebels  to 
the  winds. 

Instead  of  that,  according  to  Col.  Aquila  Wiley’s  report  of 
September  25,  1863,  commanding  the  Forty-first  Ohio,  one 
of  Hazen’s  own  regiments,  Hazen  allowed  the  left  of  his  bri¬ 
gade  to  be  struck  and  carried  by  the  impetus  of  our  fugitives, 
while  a  part  of  his  right  flank,  including  the  Forty-first  Ohio, 
were  pushed  to  the  right  and  were  falling  back,  occasionally 
firing,  until  the  rebels  commenced  to  retreat,  and  then  Wiley 
says:  “the  regiment  again  moved  to  the  left  and  joined  the 
brigade.”*  Impartially  considering  the  whole  performance,  it 
is  hard  not  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  our  commanders  lost 
their  presence  of  mind  in  the  face  of  that  brilliant  dash  of  the 
enemy,  and  in  order  to  cover  their  lack  of  military  self-posses¬ 
sion  and  quickness  of  decision  under  the  adverse  circumstances, 
magnified  the  mouse  into  an  elephant. 

A  much  more  serious  and  important  struggle  was  going  on 
farther  to  the  right  of  Palmer  and  Reynolds,  where  our  five 
brigades  were  withstanding  the  pressure  of  the  seven  brigades 
of  the  enemy  for  over  two  hours,  and  were  on  the  point  of 
succumbing.  At  the  time  that  Palmer’s  division  reached 
Johnson’s  and,  moving  east  to  the  front,  engaged  the  enemy, 
Gen.  Crittenden,  being  at  that  time  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Widow  Glenn’s  house,  where  Gen.  Rosecrans’  headquarters  had 
been  established,  sent  Maj.  Mendenhall,  his  chief  of  artillery, 
and  Col.  McKibbin  of  Rosecrans’  staff,  toward  Palmer’s  posi¬ 
tion  to  see  what  was  going  on,  and  to  communicate  with  Gen. 
Palmer;  but  they  quickly  returned  without  attaining  their 

*  The  pompous  report  of  Gen.  Hazen  so  struck  Horace  Greeley  that  he,  in  his 
“American  Conflict,”  making  his,  as  usual,  garbled  account  of  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  talks  of  the  “breaking  of  our  center”  on  September  19,  and  sub¬ 
stantially  repeats  that  report,  winding  up  the  thing  in  the  following  way :  “  the 
rebel  charge  being  so  impetuous  and  weighty  as  to  throw  our  front  into  disorder; 
but  this  was  soon  retrieved.  Brig. -Gen.  W.  B.  Hazen  of  Crittenden’s  corps,  massing 
twenty  guns  on  a  ridge  that  commanded  the  Rossville  road,  forming  an  infantry 
support  of  such  men  as  he  could  hastily  collect — his  own  brigade  not  being  at 
hand — and  pouring  a  cross-fire  of  grape  at  short  range  into  the  enemy’s  charg¬ 
ing  column,  till  it  recoiled  in  disorder ,  and  the  day  was  saved.” — [Vol.  II,  xviii., 
“The  Chattanooga  Campaign.”]  The  commanders  of  all  rebel  regiments  which 
participated  in  this  dash,  including  Gen.  Clayton,  say  that  they  “fell  back  leisurely 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


85 


object,  having  been  halted  and  fired  upon  by  the  enemy.  This 
information  led  Crittenden  to  believe  that  Palmer  was  not  only 
fighting  in  his  front,  but  was  also  attacked  in  his  rear  and  per¬ 
haps  surrounded.*  He  at  once  despatched  Lieut.-Col.  Loder, 
his  inspector-general,  and  Col.  McKibbin  ^o  Rosecrans  to  report 
facts  and  ask  permission  to  bring  up  VanCleve  to  support 
Palmer.  VanCleve,  leaving  Barnes’  brigade  with  Wood's  divis¬ 
ion  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  moved  his  other  two  brigades — 
of  Gen.  Sam.  Beatty  and  Col.  Dick — northward  and  formed  to 
the  right  of  Reynolds’  second  brigade  under  Col.  King,  which 
was  formed  on  the  right  of  Palmer’s  division. 

Meantime,  Rosecrans  ordered  McCook  to  send  Davis’  divis¬ 
ion  to  support  VanCleve.  Gen.  Davis  formed  his  two  brigades 
of  Heg  and  Carlin,  on  the  right  of  VanCleve.  His  line  thus 
formed  was  placed  a  few  hundred  yards  east  of  the  Lafayette- 
and-Chattanooga  road  in  front  of  Vineyard’s  farm,  on  a  slight 
ridge  and  ran  across  a  field  belonging  to  that  farm,  and  lying 
on  the  east  side  of  the  road,  and  into  the  woods  on  the  south 
side  of  that  field.  Col.  Wilder,  with  a  part  of  his  mounted- 
infantry  brigade  also  joined  these  forces  on  Davis’  left. 

That  made  this  line  consist  from  left  to  right  of  the  following 
troops,  and  in  the  order  designated:  Beatty,  Dick,  Heg,  Carlin, 
and  Wilder.  Without  the  slightest  knowledge  of  our  com¬ 
manders  at  the  time,  this  alignment  of  troops  faced  the  enemy’s 
line,  composed  of  Hood’s  division  of  three  brigades,  under  Gen. 
Law,  and  B.  R.  Johnson’s  provisional  division,  also  of  three 
brigades;  the  whole  force  being  under  the  command  of  Gen. 
Hood,  and  also  being  the  same  force  that,  on  the  preceeding 
evening,  crossed  by  Reed’s  bridge  and  an  adjacent  ford  above 
it  and  penetrated  so  daringly  into  the  territory  on  our  side  of 
the  Chickamauga  River.  This  latter  force,  which  was  formed 
as  early  as  7  a.m.  for  an  attack,  was  standing  idle  because  Gen. 
Bragg,  having  been  unexpectedly  attacked  on  his  extreme 
right  where  only  his  reconnoitring  cavalry  discovered  the 
enemy  in  force,  was  constantly  sending  troops  there,  and  had 
not  till  now  ordered  this  force  to  attack,  until  he  could  be  sure 
of  making  his  right  entirely  secure.  For  four  hours  the  battle 
was  raging  on  the  rebel  right  and  center,  while  here  everything 

*  Maj.-Gen.  T.  L.  Crittenden’s  report,  October  I,  1863. 


86 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


was  comparatively  quiet.  There  were  some  shots  exchanged 
between  the  skirmishers  of  Preston’s  division  that  stood  to  the 
left  of  B.  R.  Johnson,  and  our  own  troops  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s 
mill,  and  occasionally  there  was  some  cannon  firing,  but  there 
was  no  fight  on  Hood’s  line,  and  perhaps  there  would  not  have 
been  for  some  time  longer  if  our  troops  had  not  challenged  the 
enemy. 

After  forming  his  brigades,  at  2  p.m.,  VanCleve  commenced 
to  advance.  His  skirmishers  met  the  skirmishers  of  B.  R. 
Johnson’s  rebel  division  and  drove  then!  in;  then  our  troops 
attacked  Johnson’s  and  Gregg’s  brigades,  Beatty’s  brigade 
striking  the  left  of  Johnson  and  the  right  of  Gregg;  but,  after 
considerable  firing,  this  attack  was  repulsed  by  the  enemy. 
The  rest  of  Gregg’s  brigade,  which  was  far  larger  than  John¬ 
son’s,  was  hotly  engaged  by  Dick’s  brigade,  the  struggle  there 
being  stubborn  and  more  protracted  than  on  our  left,  but  the 
enemy,  although  suffering  severely,*  repulsed  our  attack. 

At  2.30  p.m.,  rebel  Gen.  Hood  ordered  Johnson  to  advance 
and  attack.  The  enemy  moved  forward,  but  owing  to  thick 
underbrush,  could  not  preserve  the  alignment.  Johnson’s  bri¬ 
gade  and  two  regiments  of  Gregg’s  were  separated  from  the 
balance  of  Gregg’s  brigade,  while  the  left  regiment  of  this  bri¬ 
gade — the  Fiftieth  Tennessee — that  faced  more  southwest,  was 
extending  its  front  so  much  that  two  regiments  of  McNair’s 
brigade  were  put  in  between  it  and  the  centre  of  Gregg’s.  In 
this  formation  Gregg’s  and  McNair’s  brigades  were  pressing 
Dick’s  brigade  of  our  line,  which,  notwithstanding  the  stub¬ 
born  resistance  of  our  men,  was  gradually  giving  way.  At  this 
time,  Gen.  Davis  advanced  in  echelons  from  his  right  with  the 
intention  of  taking  the  enemy  in  flank,  but  Robertson’s  brigade 
of  Hood’s  division,  was  brought  forward,  and  changing  front 
by  regiments  to  the  left,  met  Davis’  troops  at  Vineyard’s  field 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Lafayette- and -Chattanooga  road. 
Davis’  brigades  stood  the  ground  for  some  time,  his  Second 
Minnesota  battery,  planted  in  the  field  on  an  elevation,  causing 
great  loss  to  the  enemy,  they  having  none  wherewith  to  oppose 
it.J*  Hood  called  on  Buckner  for  reenforcements,  and  he 

*  Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  C. S.,  October  23,  1863. 

+  Longstreet’s  troops  did  not  bring  any  artillery  with  them. 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


87 


ordered  Gen.  Preston,  who  stood  on  the  left  of  Hood’s  line,  to 
send  a  brigade  to  him.  Col.  Trigg  was  ordered,  with  his  bri¬ 
gade,  to  move  to  the  relief  of  Hood’s  troops. 

Our  Col.  Heg’s  brigade,  meantime,  was  pressing  Robertson’s, 
but  the  latter,  by  an  impetuous  charge,  drove  our  men  from 
their  position  and  obliged  them  to  fall  back  across  the  field 
and  take  a  position  west  of  the  Lafayette- and -Chattanooga 
road,  behind  Vineyard’s  farm  -  buildings,  fences,  and  trees. 
There  a  desperate  struggle  ensued,  during  which  Col.  Heg 
was  killed ;  and  there  also  some  hand-to-hand  fighting  occurred. 
Still,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Robertson  was  reenforced 
by  Benning’s  brigade  of  Hood’s  division,  our  men  clung  to 
their  position  with  desperate  tenacity,  dealing  hard  blows  to 
the  enemy  and  thinning  his  ranks  terribly.* 

While  this  struggle  was  going  on  around  Vineyard’s  farm, 
Gregg  and  McNair  were  driving  our  troops,  under  command  of 
Col.  Dick,  toward  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road  through 
the  thick  woods  and  then  halted  for  alignment.  Gen.  Gregg 
went  a  short  distance  to  the  front  to  reconnoitre,  when  our  skir¬ 
mishers  halted  him,  and  when  he  turned  his  horse  to  escape  was 
shot  through  the  neck.  The  brigade  moved  on,  but  in  a  short 
time  Robertson’s  men,  on  the  left  and  rear  of  that  brigade, 
happened  to  pass  over  the  same  ground  where  the  incident  hap¬ 
pened,  and  recaptured  Gregg  and  his  horse.  Dick’s  brigade 
now  was  driven  beyond  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road, 
and  the  left  of  Davis’  line  became  exposed  and  terribly  pressed 
by  Hood’s  brigades,  while  his  right  brigade  under  Gen.  Carlin, 
was  now  assailed  by  Trigg’s  brigade,  who  joined  Robertson. 
Carlin  was  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  skirt  of  woods  border¬ 
ing  and  on  the  east  side  of  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga 
road,  with  his  battery  posted  in  Vineyard’s  field  on  the  west 
side  of  the  road,  and  there  our  men  made  a  stand. 

Meantime,  Johnson’s  rebel  brigade,  commanded  by  Col. 
Fulton,  and  the  Forty- first  and  Third  Tennessee  regiments 
of  Gregg’s  brigade,  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  enemy’s  line, 
after  moving  some  distance,  encountered  our  brigade  com¬ 
manded  by  Gen.  Sam.  Beatty,  who  stood  on  the  left  of  Dick. 

*  In  the  reports  of  three  regimental  commanders  of  Robertson’s  brigade  and  in 
the  report  of  Brig. -Gen.  H.  L.  Benning,  C. S.,  these  facts  are  stated. 


88 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


The  rebel  troops  were  hotly  received  by  musketry  and  cannon. 
Our  position  being  on  the  rising  ground,  the  enemy  was  freely 
showered  with  bullets  and  grape.  The  fight  continued  for  an 
hour,  when  the  defection  of  Dick’s  brigade  on  the  right  of 
Beatty  compelled  our  troops  to  retire  to  the  open  woods  on 
the  west  side  of  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road.  Rebel 
Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  in  his  report  of  October  23,  1863,  says: 

‘Approaching  the  road,  a  part  of  the  brigade  halted  and 
poured  its  fire  into  the  enemy’s  ranks,  now  in  full  view  200 
yards  in  front;  again  advanced,  crossed  the  road  gained  the 
cover  of  the  woods  on  the  left  of  the  field  in  which  the  enemy’s 
battery  was  posted,  a  clearing  with  enclosure  intervening. 
The  Twenty-fifth  Tennessee  regiment,  under  Lieut.-Col.  Snow¬ 
den,  and  a  part  of  the  Twenty-third  Tennessee  regiment  now 
wheeled  to  the  right,  moved  on  the  flank  of  the  battery,  gained 
the  cover  of  a  fence  north  of  the  clearing,  poured  into  it  a  few 
volleys,  charged  and  captured  the  battery.” 

The  remainder  of  the  rebel  brigade  now  crossed  the  road, 
the  Seventeenth  Tennessee,  the  left  regiment,  advanced  about 
200  yards  beyond  the  road,  and  the  Third  and  Forty-first 
Tennessee  of  Gregg’s  brigade,  a  little  farther,  when  a  column 
of  Union  troops  marching  by  the  flank  on  the  road,  appeared 
on  the  left  and  rear  of  those  two  regiments.  The  Third  quickly 
faced  about  and  recrossed  the  road,  but  the  Forty-first  received 
a  volley  from  our  troops.  The  rebel  brigade,  as  if  under  an 
electric  shock,  darted  to  the  right  and  beyond  the  road  into 
the  woods,  leaving  eleven  officers,  sixty  men,  and  the  captured 
battery  in  our  hands.  This  was  a  strong  reminder  to  the 
enemy’s  commander  that  he  went  too  far,  and  that  reenforce¬ 
ments  from  our  right  to  this  part  of  the  battle  had  arrived. 
For  a  time  the  rebels  stood  in  view  of  the  road  and  then  slowly 
withdrew. 

But  the  contest  on  Davis’  front  continued.  As  early  as  3 
p.m.,  Gen.  Wood,  who  had  remained  until  then  at  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill  with  his  two  brigades,  received  an  order  from 
Gen.  Crittenden  to  go  to  the  support  of  VanCleve.  Col. 
Barnes,  who  was  in  command  of  the  brigade  left  with  Wood 
by  VanCleve,  was  likewise  ordered  to  move  in  the  same  direc¬ 
tion  for  a  similar  purpose.  On  leaving  his  position,  Gen.  Wood 


DURING  THE  DAY. 


89 


suggested  to  Gen.  McCook  that  it  would  be  well  to  hold  that 
position  by  at  least  a  brigade,  and,  pursuant  to  that  recommen¬ 
dation,  Lytle’s  brigade  of  Sheridan’s  division,  was  ordered  to 
reoccupy  it.  The  move  was  timely,  because  Gen.  Lytle  arrived 
there  just  in  time  to  prevent  the  enemy  crossing  the  river  at 
the  mill,  with  the  intention  of  occupying  our  position  if  it 
were  vacated. 

Going  ahead  of  his  command,  Gen.  Wood  met  Gen.  Davis. 
While  conferring  relative  to  the  situation,  a  staff  officer  came 
from  Col.  Martin,  now  commanding  the  brigade  of  Heg,  report¬ 
ing  from  the  colonel  that  he  could  not  maintain  his  position 
any  longer,  and  at  the  same  time  a  stream  of  fugitives  com¬ 
menced  to  pour  out  of  the  woods  east  of  the  Lafayette-and- 
Chattanooga  road,  crossing  over  the  field  on  the  west  side  of 
that  road.  They  belonged  to  Heg’s  brigade.  Col.  Harker 
came  up  with  his  brigade  of  Wood’s  division,  formed  it,  and 
engaged  the  enemy  in  front  of  Heg’s  brigade,  while  Buell’s 
brigade,  also  of  Wood’s  division,  was  forming  in  the  rear  of 
Carlin’s  brigade,  which  was  fighting  in  the  woods  on  the  east 
side  of  the  Chattanooga  road. 

Gen.  Carlin’s  troops  at  that  time  were  hard  pressed  by  a 
determined  attack  of  the  rebel  brigade  of  Col.  Trigg  of  Pres¬ 
ton’s  division,  sent  to  reenforce  Hood’s  command.  Trigg,  sup¬ 
ported  by  Robertson,  of  Hood’s  division,  impetuously  attacked 
Carlin  and  Barnes  who  formed  on  the  right  of  Carlin.  Our 
troops  gave  way,  and  being  hotly  pressed  by  the  enemy,  poured 
out  of  the  woods,  swept  away  Buell’s  brigade  which  was  form¬ 
ing  in  the  field  on  the  west  side  of  the  road,  and  then  the  whole 
crowd  went  beyond  the  field  into  the  woods.  The  field  was 
only  about  200  yards  wide,  but  the  masses  of  our  troops  cross¬ 
ing  it  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy  suffered  terribly.  Wilder’s 
men  were  lying  behind  the  fence  and  opened  fire  upon  the 
rebels,  who  stopped  on  the  other  side  of  the  field  in  the  woods. 
Our  men  then  rallied  and,  forming  a  line  behind  the  western 
fence  of  the  field  and  assisted  by  Bradley’s  and  Esteps’  bat¬ 
teries,  which  poured  grape  into  the  enemy  at  short  range, 
checked  the  rebels  and  compelled  them  to  fall  back. 

After  our  troops  had  been  reformed,  Buell,  supported  by  a 
portion  of  Carlin’s  brigade,  moved  into  the  field,  but  the 

7 


90 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


enemy’s  lines  emerged  from  the  woods  on  the  east  side  of  the 
road  and  advanced,  steadily  firing.  At  this  time  Col.  Bradley 
with  his  brigade  of  Sheridan’s  division,  appeared  in  the  field, 
and  advancing  boldly  to  the  front,  engaged  the  enemy  in  con¬ 
junction  with  the  others.  Many  losses  were  sustained,  a  great 
many  horses  of  the  batteries  were  shot,  but  the  enemy’s  attack 
was  repulsed.  Barnes’  brigade,  which  formed  to  the  right  of 
Davis,  supported  by  Laiboldt’s  brigade  of  Sheridan’s  division, 
threatening  the  rebels  in  flank,  contributed  to  the  final  retreat 
and  withdrawal  of  the  enemy. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

DURING  THE  EVENING.  RESULTS. 


THE  evening  was  approaching  and  the  woods  in  the  valley 
of  Chickamauga,  that  had  been  so  full  of  the  rattle  of 
musketry  and  the  boom  of  cannon  during  the  day,  were  gradu¬ 
ally  becoming  stilled,  when,  from  the  ground  traversed  by  the 
rebel  troops  in  the  charge  by  which  VanCleve’s  brigades  were 
driven  beyond  the  Lafayette-and- Chattanooga  road,  a  volley 
of  musketry  was  heard.  Then  there  was  silence  again;  then 
again  sharp  musketry  broke  out  and  continued  for  several 
minutes.  This  firing  was  occasioned  by  the  advance  of  Neg¬ 
ley’s  division  from  the  vicinity  of  Widow  Glenn’s  house  to  the 
front. 

During  the  preceding  night,  Negley  relieved  Palmer  and 
VanCleve,  and,  during  the  day,  guarded  Owen’s  and  Glenn’s 
fords,  the  latter  being  by  Glass’  mill,  where  Beatty’s  brigade 
was  stationed.  This  position  brought  Negley’s  division  op¬ 
posite  to  the  rebel  division  commanded  by  Breckinridge. 
Early  in  the  morning,  pursuant  to  orders  from  Gen.  Hill, 
Helm’s  brigade,  of  Breckinridge’s  division,  made  a  demonstra¬ 
tion  at  Glass’  mill  by  crossing  the  river  and  attacking  Gen. 
Beatty’s  brigade.  Two  of  his  batteries  opened  fire,  and  a  part 
of  Beatty’s  command  was  driven  back.  After  some  cannon¬ 
ading,  during  which  Bridges’  battery  lost  a  number  of  men  and 
horses,  the  enemy  withdrew.  At  2.30  p.m.,  Gen.  Negley  re¬ 
ceived  orders  to  report  to  Gen.  McCook;  then,  at  3.30  p.m., 
was  directed  by  Gen.  Rosecrans  to  take  position  and  support 
Gen.  Thomas.  He  moved  half  a  mile  to  the  left  of  Widow 
Glenn’s  house,  or  rather  beyond  it,  when  he  discovered  a  gap 
in  our  line,  through  which  as  he  thought,*  the  enemy  was 
moving  upon  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  Thomas’  line. 

These  w£te  rebel  troops  of  B.  R.  Johnson’s  division,  driving 
VanCleve’s  two  brigades  to  the  west  of  the  Chattanooga  road. 

*  Maj.-Gen.  J.  S.  Negley’s  report,  September  26,  1863. 

91 


92 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Stanley’s  brigade  was  sent  forward,  and  Sirwell’s  brigade  was 
sent  in  support  of  it.  It  was  the  advance  of  this  command 
that  got  in  the  rear  of  the  two  rebel  regiments — the  Third 
and  Forty- first  Tennessee  of  Gregg’s  command,  then  with 
Johnson’s  brigade  on  the  west  side  of  the  Lafayette- and  - 
Chattanooga  road — and  fired  a  volley  into  their  rear,  creating 
consternation  throughout  the  whole  rebel  brigade.  After  the 
two  rebel  regiments  recrossed  the  road,  they  were  put  in 
position  by  Capt.  W.  T.  Blakemore,  Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
aide-de-cainp ,  and  charged  our  force  driving  it  back.  This 
incident  produced  that  short,  sharp  musketry  which  broke 
the  stillness  of  the  woods.  At  6  p.m.,  Negley  ordered  his 
brigades  to  again  push  forward,  hoping  that  by  pressing  the 
enemy  farther  back  at  that  point,  he  would  be  able  to  con¬ 
nect  with  our  other  troops  on  his  right  or  left.  Our  troops 
advanced  on  the  enemy  and  skirmished  for  an  hour,  but  no 
connection  resulted,  so  Negley’s  division  halted  to  bivouac. 

But  it  was  not  destined  that  the  struggle  should  terminate 
with  the  setting  of  the  sun.  When  it  was  almost  nightfall 
heavy  musketry  and  cannon-firing  were  heard  upon  our  ex¬ 
treme  left,  the  cause  of  which  was  as  follows:  In  the  afternoon 
Gen.  Hill,  of  the  rebel  army,  was  ordered  to  report  in  person  to 
Gen.  Bragg  at  Tedford’s  ford,  and  also  to  hurry  Cleburne’s 
division — which  was  at  Anderson’s,  about  four  miles  south  of 
the  ford — to  that  place.  Hindman’s  division  was  likewise 
moved  down  the  river  from  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  its  position 
being  occupied  by  Breckinridge.  Gen.  Hill,  with  Cleburne’s 
division,  was  ordered  to  cross  the  river  at  Tedford’s  and  move 
to  the  extreme  right  of  the  rebel  lines,  where  Walker  and 
Cheatham  were,  and  attack  our  line.  The  march  to  the  ford, 
the  crossing  of  the  river  there  and  traversing  the  four  miles 
from  the  ford  to  Cheatham’s  position,  consumed  the  entire 
afternoon,  and  it  was  after  sunset  when  he  reached  the  position 
in  the  rear  of  Liddell’s  and  Cheatham’s  divisions.  With  Polk’s 
brigade  on  the  right,  in  front  of  Jay’s  steam-mill,  Wood’s  in  the 
centre,  and  Deshler’s  on  the  left,  with  three  batteries  of  artil¬ 
lery,  Gen.  Cleburne,  at  once  passing  through  Liddell’s  and 
Cheatham’s  lines,  advanced  to  the  attack.  He  was  supported 
by  two  of  Cheatham’s  brigades,  Jackson  forming  on  the  ex- 


DURING  THE  EVENING. 


93 


treme  left  of  Cleburne,  and  Preston  Smith  moving  as  a  reserve 
in  the  rear  of  Deshler’s  brigade. 

In  front  of  this  advancing  line  of  the  enemy  were  Baird’s  two 
brigades  and  Johnson’s  three  brigades  of  our  army  which  had 
thrown  up  in  their  front  rough  barricades  of  logs  for  their  pro¬ 
tection  during  the  intervals  of  quiet  that  gave  them  such  oppor¬ 
tunities  in  the  afternoon.  Toward  sundown,  Gen.  Thomas 
came  to  see  Gens.  Baird  and  Johnson  and,  taking  them  toward 
Kelley’s  farm,  showed  them  the  position  that  he  contemplated 
their  commands  should  at  once  occupy.  Before  they  had  time 
to  rejoin  their  forces,  however,  the  rebel  attack  commenced. 

Scribner’s  and  Starkweather’s  brigades  of  Baird’s  division, 
occupied  the  same  position  from  which  they  drove  the  rebels 
in  the  forenoon  and  which  they  were  subsequently  forced  to 
abandon,  while  in  front  of  a  portion  of  Johnson’s  division  was 
a  large  open  held,  opposite  which  his  batteries  were  posted. 
Wood’s  and  part  of  Polk’s  brigades  both  of  Cleburne’s  division, 
were  moving  through  that  held  to  the  assault,  and  the  shower 
of  bullets  and  grape  hurled  at  them  by  our  men  was  terrihc. 
As  Cleburne*  says:  “For  half  an  hour  the  bring  was  the  heavi¬ 
est  I  had  ever  heard.  It  was  dark,  however,  and  accurate 
shooting  was  impossible.  Each  party  was  aiming  at  the  hashes 
of  the  other’s  guns,  and  few  of  the  shots  from  either  side  took 
effect.” 

As  no  night  attack  can  be  orderly,  so  there  happened  con¬ 
siderable  confusion  and  disorder  in  the  advance  of  the  rebel 
line.  Gen.  Polk’s  brigade  was  crowding  on  Wood’s,  and  this  in 
turn  was  crowding  on  Deshler’s.  Finally  Deshler  moved  far  to 
the  left,  and  opened  Preston  Smith’s  brigade  of  Cheatham’s 
division,  and  Smith,  with  Capt.  King,  a  volunteer  aid,  rode  to 
the  front  in  the  dark,  thinking  they  were  with  Deshler’s  com¬ 
mand,  and  strayed  into  the  Union  line,  where  both  were  killed. 
Col.  Vaughn,  accompanied  by  Capt.  Donelson,  A.  A.  A.G.  of  the 
brigade,  also  came  among  the  Union  troops,  making  the  same 
error  as  Smith  and  King;f  and  riding  up  to  a  soldier  asked  him 
to  what  command  he  belonged ;  the  soldier  for  an  answer  hred 
at  him,  missed,  and  killed  Capt.  Donelson.  Vaughn  called  up 

*  Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  P.  R.  Cleburne,  C.S.,  October  18,  1863. 

■f  Report  of  Col.  A.  J.  Vaughn,  October  4,  1863. 


94 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


some  men  of  his  command,  who  shot  the  Union  soldier,  when 
about  300  other  Union  soldiers  surrendered,  among  whom  was 
the  color-bearer  with  the  flag  of  the  Seventy-seventh  Penn¬ 
sylvania.  Some  of  these  men  probably  belonged  to  Baldwin’s 
brigade.  When  the  attack  was  repulsed,  Gen.  Johnson  sent 
directions  to  his  brigade-commanders  to  fall  back.  Soon  after 
that  Col.  Baldwin,  commanding  a  brigade,  was  killed,  and 
Col.  Berry,  who  was  senior  officer  in  the  brigade,  not  being 
aware  of  the  order,  remained  too  long  in  the  line  after  the 
other  brigades  commenced  the  movement  to  the  rear.  This 
was  a  senseless  attack,  lasting  almost  till  9  p.m.;  it  cost  many 
lives  to  both  sides,  and  was  not  of  the  slightest  advantage  to 
the  enemy,  neither  was  there  the  least  occasion  for  its  having 
been  made. 

At  last  the  struggle  of  September  19  was  over,  and  it  will 
be  well  to  critically  consider  what  sort  of  a  battle  it  was. 
Upon  the  18th,  Gen.  Bragg  concentrated  eight  divisions,  of 
the  ten  of  which  his  army  was  composed,  to  fall  upon  the  left 
of  our  army  during  the  ensuing  day.  During  the  night  be¬ 
tween  the  1 8th  and  19th,  Gen.  Rosecrans  passed  a  large  portion 
of  his  army  to  the  north,  so  that  his  left  of  the  18th  became 
his  right  on  the  19th.  And  in  the  early  morning,  even  as  late 
as  9  a.m.,  the  bulk  of  our  army  was  at  Lee- and -Gordon’s 
mill  and  at  Crawfish  Spring;  only  the  two  divisions  of  Baird 
and  Brannan  had  reached  Kelley’s  farm,  and  were,  therefore, 
separated  from  the  main  command  by  an  interval  of  three 
miles.  If  Bragg  had  adhered  to  his  original  plan  of  attack¬ 
ing  Rosecrans  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  there  is  no  doubt 
but  that  it  would  have  greatly  if  not  seriously  embarrassed 
our  army.  But  the  first  shots  that  he  heard  from  our  troops 
at  Reed’s  bridge,  disconcerted  and  alarmed  him. 

He  then  relinquished  his  original  plan  altogether  and  des¬ 
patched  his  divisions  one  after  another  toward  the  north,  until 
he  had  unwound  the  great  ball  of  his  troops  that  he  had  so 
carefully  twisted  up  during  the  night  and  morning  in  an  area 
of  less  than  three  square  miles.  Upon  its  evolution  it  was 
made  a  line  extending  seven  miles  long,  and  the  conflict  that 
occurred  assumed  the  character  of  a  purely  accidental  battle. 
Gen.  Rosecrans  had  a  plan — it  consisted  in  putting  his  army, 


DURING  THE  EVENING.  95 

as  far  as  possible,  between  the  enemy  and  its  objective  point, 
Chattanooga;  but  Gen.  Bragg,  after  giving  up  his  original  plan, 
had  no  plan  at  all,  and  simply  rushed  into  the  method  of 
attrition — the  indiscriminate  rubbing  of  his  army  against  that 
of  the  enemy — a  method  consisting  of  perpetual  attacks,  with¬ 
out  regard  to  losses  or  consequences;  a  method  that  has 
become  somewhat  celebrated  since  Gen.  Grant  used  it  in  his 
Virginia  campaign.  But  what  might  have  been  excusable  in 
Grant,  who,  being  supported  by  the  unlimited  resources  of  the 
North,  could  disregard  the  magnitude  of  his  losses  was  any¬ 
thing  but  pardonable  in  Bragg,  who  should  have  known  and 
remembered  what  limited  resources  the  rebels  possessed  at 
that  time.  If  Bragg  had  only  manifested  any  desire  to  evade 
the  battle,  we  certainly  should  not  have  provoked  one  at  that 
time.  But  he  rushed  madly  into  the  fight,  and  there  was 
nothing  for  us  to  do  but  to  accept  the  gage  and  defend  our¬ 
selves.  He  told  Gen.  Longstreet,*  when  that  officer  joined  him 
in  the  evening,  “that  the  troops  have  been  engaged  during  the 
day  in  severe  skirmishing,  while  endeavoring  to  get  in  line  of 
battle.”  If  he  called  actions  of  such  magnitude  and  loss  of  life 
skirmishing,  what  species  of  action  would  he  deem  worthy  of 
being  designated  a  battle?  In  that  alleged  “skirmishing”  some 
of  his  brigades,  as  well  as  some  of  ours,  lost  one-half  their  num¬ 
bers,  and  there  were  many  that  lost  fully  one -third  of  their 
effective  strength. 

No!  it  was  not  simple  skirmishing,  but  a  battle;  a  mad, 
irregular  battle,  very  much  resembling  guerilla  warfare  on  a 
vast  scale,  in  which  one  army  was  bushwhacking  the  other, 
and  wherein  all  the  science  and  the  art  of  war  went  for  nothing. 
Both  armies  were  scattered  over  a  space  of  seven  miles,  and 
upon  both  sides  there  were  formed  three  groups  of  troops 
that  were  desperately  fighting,  and  that  constituted  three 
separate  and  distinct  battles.  One  group  was  on  our  extreme 
left,  where  Brannan’s,  Baird’s,  and  Johnson’s  divisions  were 
fip-htine  the  rebel  divisions  of  Walker,  Cheatham,  and  Cleburne. 
To  the  right  of  that,  or  in  the  centre,  was  a  smaller  group, 
where  Palmer’s  and  Reynold’s  Union  divisions  were  contending 
with  Stewart’s  division.  The  third  group  was  on  our  right,  in 

*  Report  of  Lieut. -Gen.  James  Longstreet,  October  [no  date],  1863. 


9  6 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


the  vicinity  of  Vineyard’s  farm,  where  we  had  VanCleve’s, 
Davis’,  and  part  of  Sheridan’s  division,  and  the  enemy  was 
represented  by  Hood’s,  B.  R.  Johnson’s,  and  part  of  Preston’s 
division. 

Gen.  Bragg,  angry  at  being  foiled  in  his  combinations,  set 
his  soldiers  on  ours  without  any  plan,  but  simply  to  fight  and 
damage  our  army  in  some  way;  to  bleed  it  and  tie  it  up  in 
those  woods  where  he  found  it,  so  that  he  might  have  the 
opportunity  to  more  regularly  and  scientifically  butcher  it,  if 
possible,  the  ensuing  day. 

On  the  whole,  whatever  advantage  there  was  was  gained 
by  our  troops.  By  a  night  manoeuvre,  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy,  we  extricated  ourselves  from  a  very  awkward  position, 
and  in  doing  so  used  a  road  close  to  which  the  enemy  was 
encamped  in  large  masses.  That  road  was  our  sole  means  of 
escape,  and  by  its  advantageous  use  we  not  only  righted  our¬ 
selves  but  blocked  access  to  Chattanooga  so  effectually  that 
before  the  enemy  could  get  there  he  would  have  to  destroy  our 
army.  By  this  manoeuvre,  Gen.  Rosecrans  demonstrated  and 
boldly  asserted  his  military  talent. 

On  the  cessation  of  hostilities  our  troops  withdrew  toward 
Missionary  Ridge ;  the  enemy’s  bivouacked  principally  where 
night  found  them. 

The  morale  of  our  army  was  somewhat  shaken,  as  the  men 
felt  sore  that  they  were  outnumbered  by  the  enemy.  The 
supicion  that  the  rebels  were  reenforced  from  the  East  was 
made  a  certainty  by  the  prisoners,  who  informed  us  that  Long- 
street’s  corps  had  joined  Bragg.  But  whatever  evil  forebodings 
there  might  have  been,  were  stifled  by  the  sense  of  stern  duty, 
and  every  soldier  who  was  a  man  was  determined  to  fight. 

The  night  came,  dark,  cold,  and  cheerless.  No  fires  were 
allowed  to  be  kindled  by  either  our  men  or  those  of  the  enemy. 
Fatigued  by  the  last  night’s  march,  unnerved  by  the  whole 
day’s  fighting,  after  munching  some  hard-tack,  our  soldiers 
wrapped  themselves  in  their  blankets,  laid  down  on  the  cold 
ground,  and  fell  asleep  on  their  arms;  while  details  from  regi¬ 
ments  and  brigades  were  working  industriously  in  felling  trees, 
cutting  and  dragging  old  logs,  carrying  rails,  and  building 
barricades  on  the  line  to  strengthen  the  position. 


PART  THREE. 

Battle  of  September  20,  1863. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


OUR  POSITION.  THE  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT. 

HE  renewal  of  the  battle  with  daylight  being  unavoidable, 


X  the  great  question  was,  where  should  the  position  be 
taken?  Although  there  was  only  a  slight  disparity  in  numbers 
between  our  army  and  the  enemy’s  —  except  in  cavalry,  of 
which  the  rebels  had  more — yet  the  general  impression  was 
that  the  rebels  had  received  many  reenforcements,  including  the 
whole  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  and  that  we  were  largely  outnum¬ 
bered.  There  were  only  three  small  brigades  of  Hood’s  division 
that  participated  in  the  battle  on  September  19,  and  two  more 
brigades  of  McLaw’s  division,  which  joined  Bragg  during  the 
night,  so  that  the  whole  force  of  Longstreet’s  troops  was  esti¬ 
mated  by  Gen.  Bragg,  in  his  report,  at  about  5000,  and  by 
some  correspondents  at  7000.  But  as  there  was  no  knowledge 
on  our  side  of  the  real  strength  of  that  corps,  it  was  thought 
that  it  must  be  at  least  15,000  to  17,000  strong. 

We  supposed  that  the  losses  during  the  day  were  about  equal 
on  both  sides,  although  the  rebel  reports  show  that  they  were 
larger  on  their  side;  yet  it  was  thought  the  enemy  had  the 
advantage  over  us  in  troops  that  had  not  been  used.  Hind¬ 
man’s  and  Breckinridge’s  divisions  had  not  been  engaged,  and 
two  brigades  of  Preston’s  but  very  little;  and,  besides  these, 
two  brigades  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  and  Gist’s  brigade  of 
Walker’s  corps,  came  up  during  the  night;  thus  making  eleven 
fresh  brigades  in  all  to  go  into  battle  the  next  day,  while  we 
had  only  three  brigades  of  the  reserve  corps  and  Lytle’s  and 
Laiboldt’s  brigades  of  Sheridan’s  division,  in  all  five  brigades 
which  had  sustained  but  slight  loss. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  had  Negley’s  division,  which  was  not 
much  under  fire;  and  if  Post’s  brigade,  which  on  the  20th  acted 


97 


98 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


with  cavalry,  had  been  ordered  to  join  its  division,  and  Wag¬ 
ner’s  brigade  been  ordered  to  the  front  from  Chattanooga,  we 
would  have  had  ten  fresh  brigades  to  go  into  the  battle  the 
next  day.  But  for  some  reason  neither  Post  nor  Wagner  were 
ordered  to  join  their  divisions.  The  rebels  moved  all  that  was 
possible  of  their  commands  from  the  rear  to  the  front.  We 
had  at  least  12,000  troops  posted  in  various  places  along  the 
railroad,  out  of  which  it  seems  as  though  one-half  could  have 
been  brought  to  the  front  for  a  few  days  and  then  returned. 
With  5000  more  troops  we  should  have  outnumbered  the 
enemy  on  the  battle-field,  which  might  have  been  a  great 
advantage  to  us. 

We  have  fully  demonstrated  that,  owing  to  the  topograph¬ 
ical  features  of  the  country,  it  is  impossible  to  find  a  satisfactory 
position  for  an  army  north  of  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  in  order 
that  it  may  properly  cover  the  approaches  to  Chattanooga,  and 
that  the  best  position  to  protect  that  point  is  right  in  front  of 
it.  Except  the  position  of  Chattanooga,  there  was  only  one 
position  that  perhaps  might  have  answered  our  purpose,  if 
occupied,  better  than  any  other  between  Chattanooga  and  Lee- 
and-Gordon’s  mill,  and  that  was  in  front  of  Rossville  Gap,  with 
its  left  resting  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  McAfifee  church  and 
its  right  extending  toward  McFarland’s  Gap,  thus  intersecting 
the  Ringgold  and  Lafayette  roads. 

But  there  was  no  time  to  move  the  army  to  a  distant  position 
and  to  properly  prepare  that  position  for  defence.  The  battle 
continued  so  late  in  the  night  and  the  troops  were  so  fatigued 
and  scattered  so  far  south,  that  to  move  them  even  a  few  miles 
north  on  a  single  road  would  have  deprived  them  of  a  few 
hours  of  rest  which  they  greatly  needed.  So  the  position  was 
taken  in  the  rear  of  the  ground  on  which  our  troops  had  been 
fighting  during  the  day.  It  commenced  at  a  point  northeast  of 
Kelley’s  house,  extending  in  front  and  around  Kelley’s  fi^ld  in  a 
southwesterly  direction,  thence  diagonally  crossed  the  Lafay- 
ette-and-Chattanooga  road  and  rested  its  right  at  Widow 
Glenn’s  house.  It  intended  to  cover  two  good  roads  leading 
across  Missionary  Ridge  to  Rossville  and  Chattanooga — the 
southern  or  Crawfish-Spring  road,  passing  by  Widow  Glenn’s 
house  and  then  ascending  the  ridge,  and  the  northern  road 


OUR  POSITION. 


99 


that  comes  from  Alexander’s  bridge  and  crosses  the  Lafay- 
ette-and-Chattanooga  road  between  McDannel’s  and  Kelley’s 
houses,  then  ascends  the  ridge  and  joins  the  other  road  in 
McFarland’s  Gap.  Thence  the  united  road  goes  to  Rossville 
along  the  western  slope  of  Missionary  Ridge.  Between  those 
two  roads  there  were  several  intermediate  roads  also  leading  to 
McFarland’s  Gap. 

Gen.  Thomas  having  had  an  opportunity  to  look  over  the 
ground  around  Kelley’s  farm,  put  the  divisions  that  fought 
under  him  during  the  day  on  the  left  wing  of  that  position  in 
the  following  order:  Baird’s  on  the  extreme  left  with  its  left 
refused,  then  Johnson’s,  Palmer’s,  and  Reynolds’  at  the  crossing 
of  the  line  with  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road,  and  then 
Brannan’s,  although  the  last  bivouacked  far  back  of  the  line 
toward  the  ridge. 

This  part  of  the  line,  constituting  the  left  wing,  under  the 
command  of  Gen.  Thomas,  was  formed  during  the  evening, 
was  strengthened  by  barricades  in  the  night  and  early  morning, 
and  during  the  morning  underwent  but  slight  changes.  Neg- 
ley’s  division,  which  belonged  to  Thomas’  corps,  was  not  with 
him  during  the  day,  and  took — as  has  been  shown — an  advanced 
position  toward  evening,  occupying  the  east  side  of  the  Chat¬ 
tanooga  road  opposite  the  space  intervening  between  Dyer’s 
and  Widow  Glenn’s  houses,  and  it  was  intended  to  be  moved 
to  the  extreme  left  early  in  the  morning,  and  placed  to  the  left 
and  rear  of  Baird’s  division  to  prevent  that  flank  being  turned 
by  the  enemy. 

The  right  wing,  consisting  of  Wood’s,  VanCleve’s,  Davis’,  and 
Sheridan’s  divisions  of  infantry,  and  all  the  cavalry  that  was  on 
the  right,  including  Wilder’s  mounted -infantry  brigade,  was 
put  under  command  of  Gen.  .  McCook.  It  was  already  dark 
when  these  divisions  moved  back  toward  the  ridge,  where  it 
was  impossible  to  form  on  the  continuation  of  the  line  of  the 
left  wing,  so  they  bivouacked  in  a  somewhat  irregular  way: 
Sheridan’s  and  Davis’  west  of  Widow  Glenn’s  house,  and  Van¬ 
Cleve’s  farther  back  on  the  slope  of  Missionary  Ridge. 

The  fault  of  our  position  was  this:  that  our  army  posted  on 
it  did  not  present  a  bar  to  the  enemy  which  he  was  bound  to 
remove  before  he  could  venture  to  move  on  Chattanooga.  It 


IOO 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


was  a  flank  position,  and  did  not  cover  the  main  Lafayette- 
and  -  Chattanooga  road,  which  was  open  to  the  enemy  just 
beyond  our  left. 

If  the  enemy,  not  wishing  to  fight  us  behind  our  barricades, 
had  directed  his  columns  to  the  north,  beyond  our  left,  we  would 
have  been  obliged  to  leave  that  position  and  move  across  the 
ridge  in  a  hurry,  so  as  to  catch  up  with  our  communications. 
It  was  so  with  the  Russian  position  at  Borodino  in  1812;  the 
left  of  that  position  was  coming  to  the  main  road  on  Moscow, 
while  the  centre  and  right  of  the  position  was  extending  north 
of  that  road  along  the  Moscow  River.  Napoleon,  disregarding 
the  balance  of  the  position,  moved  several  heavy  columns 
against  the  left  and  beyond  it,  and  all  the  Russian  troops  of 
the  centre  and  right  were  rushing  madly  to  support  the  left. 
So  it  would  have  happened  to  us,  if  Bragg,  without  fighting 
our  centre  and  right,  had  directed  his  columns  beyond  our  left. 
But,  as  at  Borodino,  Napoleon  wanted  to  damage  the  Russian 
army,  instead  of  obliging  it  to  fall  back,  so  it  was  here;  Bragg 
wanted  to  fight  our  army,  instead  of  compelling  it  to  leave  the 
position,  and  hence  he  did  not  care  to  make  what  would  have 
been  the  proper  movement.  Still  the  falsity  of  our  position 
indirectly  led  to  the  reverses  which  our  right  wing  sustained,  as 
will  be  later  explained.  That  we  took  that  position  was  a  mat¬ 
ter  of  necessity;  we  could  not  have  any  better  nearer  than 
Chattanooga,  and  we  could  not  very  well  go  there.  Our  enemy 
helped  us;  he  expected  to  kill  two  birds  with  one  stone — to 
destroy  our  army  and  take  Chattanooga  at  the  same  time — 
and  he  failed. 

When  the  memorable  morning  of  Sunday,  Sept.  20,  1863, 
came,  a  dense  fog  was  hanging  in  the  valley  of  Chickamauga. 
Thomas’  wing  was  soon  in  shape,  the  troops  closing  up  toward 
the  left  and  the  batteries  were  placed  in  position;  there  was 
no  change  in  Baird’s,  Johnson’s,  or  Palmer’s  locations,  but 
Turchin’s  brigade,  constituting  the  left  of  Reynold’s  division, 
closed  up  on  Palmer’s  right,  with  its  right  a  short  distance  east 
of  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road.  Col.  King’s  brigade, 
which  was  the  right  of  Reynolds’  division,  was  put  fifty  steps 
back,  in  echelon,  on  account  of  more  favorable  ground  for  its 
position,  and  faced  the  Chattanooga  road.  Brannan  came  up 


OUR  POSITION. 


IOI 


into  line  and  formed  on  the  prolongation  of  Reynolds’  right 
brigade.  At  the  same  time  Gen.  McCook  was  forming  his 
wing;  Lytle’s  brigade  of  Sheridan’s  division,  was  posted  in  a 
strong  position  in  the  rear  of  Glenn’s  house,  with  the  two  other 
brigades  of  Sheridan’s  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Lytle.  Two 
small  brigades  of  Davis’  were  put  on  the  left  and  rear  of  this 
position  in  the  reserve,  the  left  connecting  with  Crittenden’s 
divisions  posted  on  the  ridge.  Col.  Wilder  reported  to  Gen. 
McCook  that  his  two  regiments,  armed  with  Spencer  rifles,  were 
posted  in  the  woods  on  the  right  of  Negley,  who  still  occupied 
his  former  position,  and  stood  now  to  the  left  and  front  of 
Lytle’s;  and  that  the  remainder  of  his  command  and  artillery 
were  posted  on  strong  ground  immediately  to  Sheridan’s  right. 

Although  our  left  wing  was  well  protected  with  barricades, 
there  were  no  continuous  barricades  on  the  front  of  our  right 
wing,  except  in  two  places,  where  short  lines  of  them  had  been 
put  up  by  Wilder’s  men  the  previous  day.  On  the  other  hand, 
while  the  left  flank  of  the  left  wing,  where  Baird  was,  was 
hanging  in  the  air,  and  the  ground  whereon  the  line  of  that 
wing  formed  was  only  slightly  undulating,  the  ground  on  which 
the  right  wing  was  formed  was  more  broken,  and  therefore 
stronger  for  defence.  The  shape  of  the  field  of  Kelley’s  farm 
determined  the  shape  of  the  line  of  our  left  wing.  The  barri¬ 
cades  were  put  up  through  the  woods  in  front  of  and  about 
150  yards  from  the  field.  Baird’s  division  was  posted  around 
the  northeast  corner  of  the  field;  Starkweather’s  brigade  stood 
on  the  right,  and  next  to  Johnson’s  division,  facing  east,  and 
at  the  break  of  the  line  there  were  posted  four  guns,  in  such  a 
position  as  to  enfilade  the  line;  Scribner’s  brigade  stood  upon 
the  turn,  facing  partly  east  and  partly  north;  and  King’s  stood 
in  echelon  on  the  left,  but  could  face  north  if  needed.  Except 
the  four  pieces  mentioned,  the  balance  of  the  artillery,  much 
disabled,  was  held  in  reserve.  All  the  other  divisions  had  two 
brigades  in  front,  formed  in  double  lines,  and  one  in  reserve, 
if  there  were  three  brigades,  and  in  double  lines  where  there 
were  but  two.  This  arrangement  shortened  the  front  of  the 
left  wing  too  much,  and  proffered  to  the  enemy  the  possibility 
of  enveloping  our  extreme  left  during  his  assault.  Such  a 
formation  would  have  been  more  proper  in  an  open  field  than 


102 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


behind  barricades,  where  we  could  place  our  front  brigades  in 
one  line  and  thus  double  the  length  of  the  formation.  It 
would  also  be  just  as  effective,  as  but  one  line  could  fire,  and 
in  each  division  we  would  have  had  half  of  the  troops  in  reserve. 

It  was  agreed  that  Negley’s  division  should  be  sent  early  in 
the  morning  to  the  extreme  left,  and  be  placed  to  the  rear  and 
left  of  Baird’s  line,  to  secure  that  flank  from  being  turned;  but 
it  was  daylight,  and  Negley  was  not  relieved.  Gen.  Thomas  sent 
Capt.  Willard  of  his  staff,  to  urge  Gen.  Negley  to  move;  but 
at  the  time  Negley  was  prepared  to  withdraw,  his  skirmishers 
were  engaged  by  the  enemy,  who  was  apparently  mustering  a 
strong  force  in  front  of  him. 

Gen.  Rosecrans  ordered  Beatty’s  brigade  to  go  to  Thomas, 
and  Negley  was  ordered  to  follow  it  when  relieved,  which  Gen. 
Crittenden  was  directed  to  do  with  Wood’s  division.  Reaching 
the  left,  Gen.  John  Beatty  formed  his  brigade  to  the  left  of 
Baird  and  north  of  Kelley’s  field,  and  soon  received  an  order 
from  Gen.  Thomas,  through  Capt.  Gaw,  to  move  farther  to  the 
left  to  McDannel’s,  and  stating  that  Gen.  Negley  was  expected 
to  support  him.  Beatty  succeeded  in  placing  his  two  left 
regiments  at  McDannel’s,  but  the  movement  of  his  other  two 
regiments  was  resisted  by  the  enemy,  who  was  beginning  the 
attack. 

Negley’s  division  ought  to  have  been  relieved  early  in  the 
morning,  and  the  whole  of  it  sent  to  the  left,  which  would  have 
obviated  much  difficulty  that  subsequently  arose.  When  sharp 
skirmishing  commenced  in  front  of  our  left,  Thomas  again  sent 
for  the  balance  of  Negley’s  division.  This  time,  Stanley’s 
brigade  moved  to  the  left,  and  Negley  himself  went  with  it, 
expecting  that  Sirwell’s  brigade,  the  last  one  of  his  division, 
and  the  artillery  would  be  relieved  at  once  and  would  follow 
him.  On  his  way  to,  and  before  he  reached  the  extreme  left, 
Negley  received  an  order  from  Gen.  Thomas,*  through  Capt. 
Gaw,  chief  topographical  officer  of  his  staff,  to  mass  as  much 
artillery  as  he  could  spare  from  his  lines,  strongly  supported  by 
infantry,  and  to  place  that  artillery  beyond  the  extreme  left  in 
a  position  on  the  slopes  of  Missionary  Ridge,  so  as  to  sweep 


*  Report  of  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Septemer  30,  1863. 


THE  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT.  103 

the  ground  beyond  Baird’s  left,  and  thus  to  secure  it  from  the 
enemy’s  renewed  assaults. 

At  this  time  our  commanders  commenced  to  feel  the  falsity 
of  the  position  occupied  and  perceived  danger  to  its  extreme 
left.  Had  this  order  been  given  earlier  and  could  have  been 
carried  out  in  time,  it  would  have  saved  us  a  great  deal  of  suc¬ 
cessive  trouble  and  mortification.  But  it  was  then  too  late. 
Negley’s  last  brigade  was  not  yet  relieved;  the  time  was  9.45 
a.m.,*  and  the  battle  was  raging  furiously  on  our  left. 

Gen.  Bragg  ordered  Hindman  and  Breckinridge  to  cross  the 
river  during  the  evening  of  the  19th.  The  first  joined  Hood’s 
forces  and  the  latter  reached  his  position  in  the  rear  of  Cle¬ 
burne’s  division  about  1 1  p.m.  During  the  night  Gen.  Gist, 
with  his  brigade  convoying  a  large  ammunition  train  from 
Ringgold  to  the  front,  joined  Walker;  and  toward  morning  two 
brigades  of  McLaw’s  division  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  under  Gen. 
Kershaw,  also  joined  Hood.  Gen.  Longstreet  himself  reached 
Bragg’s  headquarters  at  1 1  p.m.  The  rebel  army  was  divided 
into  two  wings.  The  right  wing,  consisting  of  Breckinridge’s, 
Cleburne’s,  Gist’s  and  Liddell’s  of  Walker’s  corps,  and  Cheat¬ 
ham’s  divisions,  was  put  under  command  of  Lieut.-Gen.  Polk. 
The  left  wing,  consisting  of  Hood’s  and  McLaw’s  under  Hood, 
of  Stewart’s  and  Preston’s  under  Buckner,  and  of  Hindman’s 
and  B.  R.  Johnson’s  divisions,  was  put  under  command  of 
Lieut.-Gen.  Longstreet. 

In  his  report  Bragg  says:  “Polk  was  ordered  to  assail  the 
enemy  on  our  extreme  right  at  daydawn  on  the  20th,  and  to 
take  up  the  attack  in  succession  rapidly  to  the  left.  The  left 
wing  to  await  the  attack  by  the  right,  take  it  up  promptly 
when  made,  and  the  whole  line  was  then  to  be  pushed  vigor¬ 
ously  and  persistently  against  the  enemy  throughout  its  ex¬ 
tent.”’]* 

The  above  is  so  plain  that  anyone  can  perceive  that  Gen. 
Bragg  had  no  plan  at  all,  and  that  his  order  condensed  meant 
simply,  “just  go  ahead  and  pitch  in.”  But  there  was  one 
phrase  used  in  the  order  by  Bragg  which  was  assuredly  said 
without  any  mental  reservation  or  occult  significance,  but  which 

*  Gen.  W.  S.  Rosecrans’  report. 

+  Gen.  Bragg’s  report  of  December  28,  1863. 


104 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


nevertheless,  led  to  his  good  fortune  and  to  our  discomfiture, 
and  that  was  the  order  for  the  left  wing  to  wait  until  the  attack 
by  the  right  wing  was  made.  Such  a  mere  chance  would 
appear  a  strange  reason  for  such  results,  but  that  it  was  so 
will  be  demonstrated  further  in  the  narrative. 

Breckinridge  formed  his  division  on  the  prolongation  and  on 
the  right  of  Cleburne’s  line.  Both  Breckinridge  and  Cleburne 
received  orders  from  Polk  to  attack  soon  after  sunrise,  but  Gen. 
Hill,  their  corps-commander,  came  and  delayed  the  movement. 
In  his  report,*  Hill  says  that  the  principal  reason  for  delay  was 
that  the  men  of  one  of  his  divisions  had  to  get  their  cooked 
rations,  and  secondly,  that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  order  to 
attack  at  daylight,  that  the  Yankees’  position  was  not  recon- 
noitered,  that  their  own  line  was  not  adjusted  and  part  of  it 
was  at  right  angles  to  the  rest,  and  some  of  the  troops  were 
mixed  up  with  those  of  the  left  wing.  Gen.  Bragg  was  bound 
to  commence  the  battle  at  daylight,  mainly  to  prevent  our  men 
working  on  the  barricades  in  the  morning;  but  Polk  and  Hill 
disobeyed  the  orders, j*  and  the  attack  was  delayed  until  9.30 
a.  m. 

In  reading  the  reports  of  Gens.  Bragg  and  Hill,  it  is  a 
curious  and  interesting  study  to  note  how  both  these  officers 
rejoiced  when  they  discovered  by  reconnoitering  shortly  be¬ 
fore  the  attack,  that  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road  was 
entirely  uncovered  beyond  our  left,  not  even  a  detachment 
of  our  cavalry  being  there  to  make  an  attempt  to  guard  it.  In 
being  jubilant  over  this  discovery  they  unwittingly  showed 
how  limited  their  knowledge  of  generalship  was,  otherwise 
they  would  have  surmised  that  such  must  have  been  the 
case.  Hill  even  boasts  that  he  had  perceived  the  practicability 
of  out-flanking  the  Yankees  during  the  fight  of  the  preced¬ 
ing  evening;  but  he  had  evidently  kept  the  knowledge  to  him¬ 
self  and  was  now  going  to  utilize  it  by  carrying  out  the  idea. 

In  forming  his  division,  Gen.  Breckinridge  had  Helm’s  bri¬ 
gade  on  the  left,  Stovall’s  in  the  center,  and  Adams’  on  the 

*  Report  of  Lieut. -Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  C.-S.  Army,  commanding  corps  of  oper¬ 
ations  July  19  to  September  20  (1863),  with  correspondence. 

+  Bragg  relieved  both  Polk  and  Hill  from  their  commands  in  October  for  this 
delay. 


THE  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT.  105 

right.  His  division  and  that  of  Cleburne,  with  Polk’s  on  the 
right,  Wood’s  in  the  center,  and  Deshler’s  on  the  left,  were 
formed  in  a  single  line.  Cheatham  was  first  ordered  to  partici¬ 
pate  in  the  attack,  but  when  he  tried  to  form  his  line  on  the 
left  of  Cleburne  he  found  Stewart’s  division  of  the  left  wing  in 
his  front.  Asking  for  orders,  he  was  directed  by  Bragg  to 
stand  in  the  reserve.  Walker  was  first  ordered  to  support 
Cheatham,  but  when  between  9  and  10  a.m.,  Cheatham  did  not 
go  into  the  attack,  Walker  was  directed  to  form  in  the  rear  of 
Breckinridge. 

In  the  meantime  Hill  ordered  his  line  to  advance.  There 
ensued  considerable  sharp  skirmishing  lasting  for  half  an  hour, 
or  until  9.30  a.m.,  when  Breckinridge  advanced,  and  then  the 
battle  opened  by  Helm’s  brigade  with  intense  fury.  The  two 
regiments  of  the  left  of  Helm’s  command  with  part  of  another 
regiment,  encountered  the  left  of  our  line  of  barricades,  where 
Baird’s  division  was  stationed,  and  were  met  by  direct  mus¬ 
ketry  in  their  front,  and  were  also  enfiladed  by  the  battery  of 
four  guns.  They  were  literally  mowed  down,  and  recoiled 
from  the  devastating  hail  of  bullets,  but  with  undaunted  her¬ 
oism  and  invincible  resolution  they  twice  renewed  the  assault, 
but  were  each  time  beaten  back  with  great  slaughter.  The 
right  of  Helm’s  brigade  passed  beyond  our  works  and,  with 
Stovall,  fell  on  the  One-hundred-and-fourth  Illinois  and  Fif¬ 
teenth  Kentucky,  which  with  Bridges’  battery,  were  on  Beatty’s 
right,  while  his  left  regiments,  the  Eighty-eighth  and  Forty- 
second  Indiana,  were  driven  west  by  Adams.  Lieut.  Bishop  of 
Bridges’  battery  was  killed  and  his  section  of  guns  captured, 
the  balance  of  the  battery  escaping.  The  One-hundred-and- 
fourth  Illinois  and  Fifteenth  Kentucky  changed  front  and, 
assisted  by  the  battery,  resisted  the  enemy  in  the  rear  of 
Baird  until  the  attack  ceased. 

Cleburne,  about  10  a.m.,  received  orders  to  advance,  when 
Breckinridge  was  already  in  motion.  Trying  to  dress  on 
Breckinridge,  his  line  got  confused  and  Polk’s  and  Wood’s 
brigades  fell  under  a  heavy  fire  of  our  artillery.  When  the 
rebels  advanced  to  within  short-canister  range  of  our  line  a 
hurricane  of  bullets  and  shells  fired  by  our  line  swept  the 
woods  filled  with  the  enemy.  Polk’s  brigade  and  one  regiment 
8 


io  6 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


of  Wood’s  were  checked  within  175  yards  of  our  line,  and  the 
rest  halted  with  them. 

During  this  advance  of  Cleburne,  part  of  Wood’s  brigade 
passed  over  Bate’s  brigade  of  Stewart’s  division  and  Deshler’s 
was  entirely  in  the  rear  of  the  troops  of  the  left  wing.  Wood’s 
left  now  attempted  to  advance  across  an  old  field  by  Poe’s 
house,  but  was  driven  back  by  oblique  fire  opened  on  both  its 
flanks  with  the  loss  of  500  men.  Cleburne  withdrew  Wood’s 
brigade  to  the  rear,  and  moved  Deshler’s  to  the  right  so  as  to 
connect  it  with  Polk’s,  but  Polk’s  left  was  driven  back  and  the 
connection  was  impossible  to  be  made  under  fire.  In  this 
movement  Gen,  Deshler  was  killed  by  a  shell  striking  him  in 
the  breast,  when  the  brigade  withdrew.  In  his  report,  Gen. 
Cleburne  remarks:  “finding  it  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life  for  Polk  . 
to  retain  his  position,  I  ordered  him  to  fall  back  with  the  rest 
of  his  line.” 

This  attack  of  the  enemy  shows  how  short  our  line  behind 
the  breastworks  was,  when  the  front  of  four  of  our  divisions 
was  fully  covered  by  only  two  and  a-half  deployed  brigades  of 
the  enemy.  While  the  left  of  Helm’s  was  opposite  Baird,  the 
left  of  Wood’s  was  opposite  Reynolds,  as  the  oblique  cross-fire 
*  on  the  left  of  Wood’s  could  come  only  from  Turchin’s  and 
King’s  brigades  of  Reynold’s  division,  posted  in  echelon  right 
by  Poe’s  field.  On  the  other  hand,  it  shows  how  senseless  it 
is  to  send  to  the  assault  of  a  line  of  troops  behind  breastworks 
only  one  thin  line  of  troops,  unsupported  by  any  reserves.. 
Those  regiments  of  Helm’s  brigade  that  struck  Baird’s  front 
were  terribly  slaughtered.  Gen.  Helm  was  killed,  Col.  Hewitt 
of  the  Second  Kentucky  killed,  Cols.  Nuckols  of  the  Fourth 
and  Caldwell  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky  severely  wounded,  and 
many  more  officers  and  almost  half  of  the  men  lost.  This  first 
assault  of  the  enemy  on  our  left  wing  lasted  one  hour;  then 
there  was  a  lull  continuing  for  some  time  and  presaging  another 
outbreak  of  the  storm. 

When  Helm’s  brigade  was  withdrawn,  a  crowd  of  our  skir¬ 
mishers  occupied  that  space  and,  notwithstanding  some  stren¬ 
uous  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  drive  them  to  the  breastworks, 
they  held  their  position.  Hill  ordered  Gist’s  brigade  under 
Col.  Colquitt  to  fill  up  the  gap,  and  Gist  was  ordered  to  support 


THE  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT. 


107 


it  with  Wilson’s  and  Ector’s  brigades  of  his  division  (formerly 
Walker’s).  Walthall’s  brigade  of  Liddell’s  division  was  ordered 
to  support  Gist  on  his  left. 

And  now  Hill  was  going  to  carry  out  that  plan  of  out-flank¬ 
ing  the  Yankees,  the  practicability  of  which  he  discovered 
during  Cleburne’s  advance  the  previous  evening.  He  and 
Breckinridge  decided  to  move  in  the  rear  of  our  left.  When 
Helm’s  brigade  met  with  disaster,  Stovall  and  Adams  brushed 
away  Beatty’s  line  of  our  troops  with  their  brigades;  Stovall 
stopped  at  the  Chattanooga  road,  and  Adams  crossed  the  road 
at  Glenn’s  farm  and,  advancing  beyond,  halted  in  its  open  field. 
And  now  Breckinridge  ordered  both  to  change  front  to  the 
left,  perpendicularly  to  their  former  line,  to  advance  south¬ 
ward  and  attack. 

But  during  the  first  attack  Gen.  Thomas  sent  for  Negley’s 
troops,  and  Stanley’s  brigade  was  directed  to  the  left;  besides, 
he  ordered  the  reserve  brigade  of  Palmer  under  Col.  Grose,  to 
move  to  the  left  and  form  in  the  rear  of  Baird’s.  Then,  antici¬ 
pating  the  enemy’s  attack  in  the  rear,  Thomas  sent  to  Rose- 
crans  asking  for  more  reenforcements;  and  a  reserve  brigade  of 
Brannan,  under  Col.  Vanderveer,  also  moved  quickly  to  the  left. 
Thus  from  various  sources,  troops  were  hastening  to  the  left  to 
defeat  the  rebel  move  into  the  rear  of  our  wing. 

Gen.  Beatty,  after  his  first  defeat,  lost  his  Eighty-eighth  and 
Forty-second  Indiana.  They  were  thrown  west,  and  after  con¬ 
siderable  roving  through  the  woods,  joined  Negley  near  Ross- 
ville.  When  Col.  Stanley  came  with  his  brigade,  Gen.  Beatty 
'added  his  two  remaining  regiments  to  the  three  of  Stanley  and 
formed  this  command  on  the  left  side  of  and  at  right  angles 
to  the  road.  The  rebels  moved  to  attack.  Stovall’s  brigade 
furiously  charged  Baird’s  left;  our  men  were  driven  from  the 
barricades;  the  rebels  were  filling  the  field.  Adams’  brigade 
was  pushing  along  the  road  in  the  direction  of  Kelley’s  house, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  our  left  was  going  to  pieces.  But  Grose’s 
brigade,  joined  by  part  of  Baird’s  troops,  faced  about,  wheeled 
to  the  right,  and  met  Stovall’s  men  with  deadly  fire.  Encour¬ 
aged  by  Gen.  Baird  and  other  officers,  our  men  rushed  with  a 
shout  upon  the  enemy,  drove  him  beyond  the  line  of  works  in 
confusion  and  pursued  for  quite  a  distance.  Our  line  was 
reestablished  and  the  enemy,  beaten,  retired. 


io8 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Adams’  brigade  was  still  advancing,  when  it  met  Stanley’s 
brigade  and  a  portion  of  Beatty’s,  which,  by  a  well-directed 
fire,  checked  its  advance,  and  then  shouting,  impetuously 
charged  the  enemy  and  drove  his  line  for  nearly  half  a  mile, 
capturing  a  number  of  prisoners.  In  the  melee ,  the  rebel  com¬ 
mander,  Gen.  Adams  was  wounded  and  captured  by  the  Nin- 
teenth  Illinois,  surrendering  to  Capt.  James  V.  Guthrie  of  that 
regiment. 

Breckenridge  withdrew  Adams’  and  Stovall’s  brigades  behind 
Walker’s  troops.  Then  Gen.  Hill  ordered  Gen.  Gist  to  attack 
our  works  on  the  left  with  his  own  brigade,  under  Col.  Colquitt, 
— supported  by  Wilson’s  and  Ector’s — and  Gen.  Liddell  with 
his  own  brigade,  under  Col.  Govan,  to  move  in  the  rear  of  our 
works  and  attack. 

After  Col.  Stanley  had  pursued  the  enemy  with  his  brigade 
he  fell  back  to  his  previous  position  and  looked  for  reenforce- 
ments.  Gen.  Beatty  found  three  regiments — belonging,  as  he 
says  in  his  report,  to  some  brigade  in  the  woods,  probably  Col. 
Dick’s  brigade — brought  them  to  the  front  and  formed  in  sup¬ 
porting  distance  in  the  rear  of  Stanley.  It  was  agreed  that  if 
the  enemy  again  engaged  Stanley  he  would  meet  the  attack 
and  then  fall  back  on  this  reenforcement. 

Meanwhile,  Gist  moved  to  the  attack.  Colquitt  advanced  with 
his  brigade,  struck  the  left  flank  of  Baird’s  line,  being  met  with 
a  murderous  fire  in  front  and  flank,  could  stand  but  a  short 
time,  and  was  compelled  to  retire,  having  sustained  severe  loss. 
Colquitt  was  mortally  wounded,  and  all  the  field-officers  but 
two  were  killed  or  missing,  as  were  one-third  of  the  men. 
Walthall  on  the  left  of  Colquitt  could  not  get  near  our  lines, 
and  the  supporting  brigades  of  Wilson  and  Ector,  each  reduced 
to  less  than  500  men,  could  do  but  little  toward  the  support 
of  Colquitt. 

Gen.  Liddell  was  advancing  with  Govan’s  to  the  rear  of  our 
line.  Stanley  was  attacked  and  obliged  to  fall  back  on  his 
support;  but  the  support  was  gone.*  Yet  Col.  Dick  of  Van 
Cleve’s  division  says  in  his  reportj*  that  he  supported  Stanley, 
although  when  Stanley’s  brigade  broke  and  ran  over  his  line,  his 

*  Col.  T.  R.  Stanley’s  report,  September  28,  1863. 

t  Report  of  Col.  Geo,  F.  Dick,  September  28,  1863. 


THE  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT.  '  IO9 

own  brigade  was  disordered,  but  rallied  and  resisted  the  enemy 
for  some  time,  and,  being  overpowered,  was  obliged  to  with¬ 
draw. 

The  rebels  advancing  still  farther,  ran  against  Vanderveer’s 
brigade,  which  was  well  prepared  for  their  reception.  Lying  on 
the  ground,  they  allowed  the  rebels  to  approach  to  within  100 
yards,  when  the  first  line,  consisting  of  the  Second  Minnesota 
and  the  Eighty-seventh  Indiana,  arose  and  delivered  a  volley; 
the  second  line,  comprising  the  Thirty-fifth  and  the  Ninth  Ohio, 
supported  by  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  of  Willich’s  brigade,  passed 
quickly  to  the  front;  the  whole  brigade  charged  at  the  double- 
quick,  while  Goodspeed’s  battery  of  Willich’s  command,  opened 
fire,  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  the  Fifth  Kentucky  of  Berry’s 
brigade  rapidly  advanced  on  the  flanks  of  the  rebels.  The 
enemy  was  routed  and  driven  from  the  field  several  hundred 
yards  into  the  woods  beyond.  Afterward,  Gen.  Willich,  with 
the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  pursued  the  enemy  over  a  mile,  until 
he  met  rebel  cavalry,  when  he  returned. 

Thus  terminated  what  was  intended  to  be  a  master-stroke  of 
the  military  genius  of  the  rebel  Gen.  Hill — outflanking  the 
Yankees.  Reasoning  about  their  failure,  both  Hill  and  Breck¬ 
inridge  came  to  the  conclusion  that  if  their  assault  had  been 
supported  by  strong  reserves  it  would  have  succeeded.  They 
should  have  arrived  at  that  conclusion  before  the  attack.  When 
the  French  attacked  Fort  Malakoff  at  Sebastopol,  only  a  few 
thousand  zouaves  participated  in  the  assault  itself,  but  there 
were  40,000  reserves  packed  in  the  trenches  ready  to  support 
them. 

Walker’s  and  Cheatham’s  troops  being  so  badly  beaten  and 
having  sustained  such  severe  losses  the  previous  day  that  Bragg 
did  not  use  Cheatham  in  the  assault  on  our  left;  and  after 
the  assault,  Breckinridge’s  and  Cleburne’s  divisions  were  in  no 
better  condition  than  the  others.  In  fact  we  were  here  stronger 
than  the  enemy,  and  remained  unmolested  until  evening,  the 
time  of  our  withdrawal  from  the  position.  But  it  was  other¬ 
wise  on  our  right. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT. 


SIRWELL’S  brigade  of  Negley’s  division  and  artillery  with¬ 
drew,  and  the  space  opposite  in  the  line  was  filled  up  by 
Wood’s  two  brigades  of  Crittenden’s  corps,  to  which  Barnes’ 
brigade  of  VanCleve  was  added.  Wood’s  left  rested  on  Bran- 
nan’s  right.  Davis,  with  his  two  brigades  in  two  lines,  stood 
on  the  right  of  Wood,  occupying  a  short  line  of  barricades, 
and  being  supported  on  his  right  and  rear  by  Laiboldt’s  bri¬ 
gade  of  Sheridan’s  division.  The  balance  of  that  division  and 
Wilder’s  troops  remained  in  the  same  places  as  before,  but 
VanCleve’s  two  brigades  were  put  closer  to  the  line  and  formed 
in  the  rear  of  Wood’s  division  as  a  reserve. 

These  changes  were  being  made  when  the  battle  on  the  left 
was  in  progress,  and  here  on  the  entire  front  reigned  perfect 
calm,  as  if  there  were  no  enemy  in  existence.  This  quietude 
in  front  of  our  right,  connected  with  the  fierceness  of  the  as¬ 
saults  of  the  enemy  on  our  left  and  the  reiterated  demands  for 
reenforcements  from  Gen.  Thomas,  made  Gen.  Rosecrans  solic¬ 
itous.  Understanding  the  position  of  his  army  to  be  strategic¬ 
ally  faulty,  he  thought  that  Bragg  was  general  enough  to  see 
it  also,  and  that  perhaps  he  was  moving  the  troops  of  his  left 
beyond  our  left  or  toward  Chattanooga.  He  clearly  shows  his 
impressions  in  his  report  and  in  the  orders  he  issued.  In  his 
report  he  says:  “The  battle  in  the  meanwhile  roared  with 
increasing  fury  and  approached  from  the  left  to  the  centre. 
Two  aids  arrived  successively  within  a  few  minutes  from  Gen. 
Thomas  asking  for  reenforcements.  The  first  was  directed  to 
say  that  Gen.  Negley  had  already  gone  and  should  be  near  at 
hand  at  that  time,  and  that  Brannan’s  reserve  brigade  was 
available.  The  other  was  directed  to  say  that  Gen.  VanCleve 
would  at  once  be  sent  to  his  assistance,  which  was  accordingly 
done.” 


I  io 


THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT. 


1 1 1 


This  order  for  VanCleve,  Gen.  Crittenden  in  his  report*  of 
October  i,  1863,  acknowledges  as  received  and  acted  upon 
immediately.  But  almost  simultaneously  with  it,  Rosecrans 
sent  communication  to  McCook  in  the  following  words:  “Sep¬ 
tember  20,  10. 10  a.m.,  Gen.  Thomas  is  being  heavily  pressed 
on  the  left.  The  general  commanding  directs  you  to  make 
immediate  dispositions  to  withdraw  the  right  so  as  to  spare  as 
much  force  as  possible  to  reenforce  Thomas.  The  left  must  be 
held  at  all  hazards ,  even  if  the  right  is  withdrawn  wholly  back 
to  the  prese7it  left .  Select  a  good  position  back  this  way  and 
be  ready  to  start  reenforcements  to  Thomas  at  a  moment’s 
warning.  J.  A.  Garfield.”  In  his  report  of  October  1,  1863,^ 
Gen.  McCook  says  that  “within  five  minutes  after  the  receipt 
of  the  above  order  and  instructions  given  to  carry  it  out,  the 
following  was  received:  ‘September  20,  10.30  a.m.  The  general 
commanding  directs  you  to  send  two  brigades  of  Gen.  Sher¬ 
idan’s  division  at  once  and  with  all  possible  despatch  to  support 
Gen.  Thomas,  and  send  the  third  brigade  as  soon  as  the  lines 
can  be  drawn  sufficiently.  March  them  as  rapidly  as  you  can 
without  exhausting  the  men.  Report  in  person  to  these  head¬ 
quarters  as  soon  as  your  orders  are  given  in  regard  to  Sheridan’s 
movement.  Have  you  any  news  from  Col.  Post?  J.  A.  Gar¬ 
field.’ ”  This  order  was  executed  at  once.  Two  brigades  of 
Sheridan’s  division — Lytle’s  and  Walworth’s — were  taken  from 
the  extreme  right  and  moved  at  the  double-quick  to  the  sup¬ 
port  of  Gen.  Thomas. 

Thus  the  alarming  reports  of  Gen.  Thomas  of  the  insecurity 
of  our  left,  the  possibility  of  concentration  of  the  enemy’s  forces 
beyond  our  left,  and  an  entire  inactivity  of  the  enemy  against 
our  right  induced  Gen.  Rosecrans  to  make  a  movement,  always 
dangerous  to  execute  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  but  doubly 
dangerous  at  such  a  late  hour  and  without  any  certainty  as 
to  whether  one-half  of  the  rebel  army  stood  formed  in  front 
of  our  right  wing  or  had  withdrawn  from  it.  It  was  an  error 
to  give  too  much  credit  to  the  enemy’s  strategical  skill,  of 
which  he  was  not  possessed,  yet  it  was  a  justifiable  error,  as 
Bragg  coidd  have  concentrated  his  army  beyond  our  left  if 

*  Maj.-Gen.  T.  L.  Crittenden’s  report,  October  1,  1863. 

+  Maj.-Gen.  A.  McD.  McCook’s  report,  October  1,  1863. 


I  12 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


he  could  only  see  the  advantage  of  doing  so,  particularly 
as  he  was  on  the  offensive  and  therefore  at  liberty  to  choose 
his  point  of  attack,  or  to  change  his  front  any  way  he  pleased, 
without  the  slightest  risk  of  endangering  his  own  communica¬ 
tions. 

But  this  simultaneous  movement  of  four  of  our  brigades  to 
the  left,  might  have  been  perhaps  accomplished  or  stopped  on 
the  way,  in  case  of  an  attack  by  the  enemy,  without  much  detri¬ 
ment  to  the  formation  of  the  army,  provided  our  front  line, 
behind  which  the  execution  of  the  movements  commenced, 
stood  solid  to  meet  the  attack,  should  it  have  come.  But  fate 
willed  it  differently,  as  if  to  put  the  mettle  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  to  trial  by  a  crucial  test  of  unexampled  calamity. 

Capt.  Kellogg,  an  aide-de-camp  of  Gen.  Thomas,  coming  to 
Gen.  Rosecrans  with  another  request  for  reenforcements  for  the 
left,  reported  at  the  same  time  that  “Brannan’s  division  was 
out  of  line,  and  that  Reynolds’  right  was  exposed.”  *  Galloping 
along  the  line  and  being  in  a  hurry  to  reach  Gen.  Rosecrans, 
Kellogg  stopped  to  hear  the  statement  from  Gen.  Reynolds  that 
his  flank  was  in  the  air  and  exposed.")*  Accepting  it  as  a  fact, 
Kellogg  reported  it  to  the  general  commanding.  But  there  was 
no  break  in  the  line.  There  was  an  echelon  between  Turchin’s 
and  King’s  brigades,  as  before  mentioned,  but  no  break,  and 
Brannan’s  division  stood  in  line  with  King’s  brigade  of  Reyn¬ 
olds.  Pressed  so  much  with  business,  Rosecrans  credited  the 
report  and  ordered  his  aide-de-camp ,  Maj.  Bond,  to  write  that 
order  to  Wood,  which  proved  so  fatal  to  us:  “Headquarters 
Department  of  the  Cumberland,  Sept.  20,  10.45  a-m-  Brig.-Gen. 
Wood,  commanding  division:  The  general  commanding  directs 
that  you  close  up  on  Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible  and  support 
him.  Frank  S.  Bond,  major  and  aide-de-camp .” 

In  his  report^  of  September  29,  1863,  Gen.  Wood  explains 
how  he  understood  that  order.  He  says:  “Reynolds’  division 
was  posted  on  the  left  of  Brannan’s  division,  which  in  turn  was 
on  the  left  of  the  position  I  was  just  quitting.  I  had  conse¬ 
quently  to  pass  my  command  in  the  rear  of  Brannan’s  division 

*  Report  of  Gen.  Rosecrans. 

+  Personal  statement  of  Capt.  Kellogg  to  writer,  at  Chattanooga,  Nov.  14,  1888. 

£  Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  T.  J.  Wood,  Sept.  29,  1863. 


THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT.  113 

% 

to  close  up  on  and  go  into  the  support  of  Reynolds.”  But  it 
seems  as  if  this  explanation  was  not  exactly  correct.  If  there 
were  no  Brannan’s  division  between  Wood’s  and  Reynolds’  the 
order  would  read  all  right.  Gen.  Wood  being  in  the  same  line 
with  Reynolds,  by  simply  moving  his  division  to  the  left  in  the 
line  would  have  closed  up  on  Reynolds  and  supported  him. 
But  when  Brannan’s  division  stood  between  Wood’s  and  Reyn¬ 
olds’,  such  an  order  was  a  puzzle;  it  could  not  be  executed. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  Gen.  Wood  stood  at  a  distance  in  the 
rear  of  Reynolds  and  received  such  an  order,  the  order  would 
be  all  right  again.  He  would  have  to  move  his  division 
forward  and  put  it  behind  Reynolds’  at  a  supporting  distance. 
But  the  way  the  things  stood  at  that  time  that  order  contra¬ 
dicted  itself.  The  first  part  of  it  meant  for  Gen.  Wood  to 
move  his  division  to  the  left  in  the  line  and  join  Reynolds,  and 
the  second  meant  to  move  it  out  of  the  line  and  place  it  in  the 
rear  of  Reynolds.  According  to  the  phraseology  accepted  in 
military  language  the  order  had  no  sense;  one  part  of  it  was 
contradicting  the  other  part.  Why  then  not  to  ascertain  the 
meaning  of  it  from  the  person  who  wrote  the  order  before 
moving? 

In  his  report  Gen.  Wood  says  that  when  he  moved  into  the 
position  and  sent  out  his  skirmishers  to  cover  his  front,  he  “had 
quite  a  sharp  affair  with  him,”  (meaning  the  enemy),  and  Col. 
Bartleson  was  shot.  He  also  says:  “Although  I  had  not  been 
seriously  engaged  at  any  time  during  the  morning,  I  was  well 
satisfied  the  enemy  was  in  considerable  force  in  my  immediate 
front,  consequently  I  was  extremely  vigilant.” 

Now,  Gen.  Crittenden  says  in  his  report:  “In  a  few  moments 
I  received  orders  to  move  Gen.  VanCleve’s  division  with  the 
utmost  despatch,  not  exhausting  the  troops,  to  the  support  of 
Gen.  Thomas’  left.  I  gave  the  order  immediately  to  Gen. 
VanCleve,  and  its  execution  at  once  began.  At  this  moment 
I  received  a  message  from  Gen.  Wood,  that  it  was  useless  to 
bring  artillery  into  the  woods.  The  chief  of  artillery  to  this 
corps  was  ordered  to  put  the  batteries  back  on  the  ridge,”  etc. 
Then  further,  Crittenden  says:  “I  now  received  a  message  from 
Gen.  Wood,  informing  me  that  he  had  received  an  order  direct 
from  headquarters  of  the  department  to  move  at  once  to  the 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


114 

support  of  Gen.  Reynolds.”  The  above  shows  that  Gen.  Wood 
knew  of  the  movement  of  VanCleve’s  two  brigades  to  the  left 
before  he  received  his  order,  because  he  advised  his  corps-com¬ 
mander  to  leave  the  artillery  behind.  Then  again  Wood  says 
in  his  report  that  he  received  his  order  about  1 1  a.m.,  and  that 
Gen.  McCook  was  with  him  at  the  time,  who,  a  little  before 
this,  ordered  Gen.  Sheridan  to  move  two  brigades  to  the  left, 
and  Gen.  Wood  certainly  knew  about  that  also. 

In  view  of  all  these  facts:  that  Gen.  Wood  knew  that  the 
enemy  was  in  force  in  his  front,  that  as  many  as  four  of  our  bri¬ 
gades  had  been  ordered  to  the  left  and  had  already  commenced 
to  move  before  he  received  his  order,  that  the  movement  had 
to  be  made  right  behind  and  under  cover  of  the  front  line  in 
which  he  stood  with  his  division;  and  also,  being  an  old  and 
experienced  officer  of  the  regular  army,  he  ought  to  have 
known  how  dangerous  such  a  movement  was  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  and  how  important  it  was  to  preserve  the  solidity 
of  the  front  line  until  that  movement  had  been  accomplished. 
If  that  order  was  as  plain  as  day,  saying  that  he  should  move 
out  of  the  line  and  place  his  division  in  the  rear  of  Reynolds, 
he  never  would  have  been  considered  as  being  derelict  in  his 
duties,  if  he  had  postponed  the  execution  of  that  order  until  the 
movement  of  the  rear  brigades  had  been  accomplished. 

But  such  a  doubtful  order  as  that  was,  and  an  order  which 
was  opening  the  gap  in  the  front  line  and  obliging  every 
brigade  and  division  of  the  line  of  the  whole  wing  to  move,  in 
order  to  close  it;  an  order  too,  which  bore  on  its  face  the  con¬ 
tradiction  in  terms,  certainly  ought  not  to  have  been  executed 
until  the  real  wish  of  the  general  commanding  could  have  been 
ascertained,  which  could  not  have  taken  but  a  few  minutes’ 
time  to  do.  Unfortunately  Gen.  Wood,  construing  the  order 
in  the  way  above  mentioned,  hastily  faced  his  division  about, 
moved  it  a  short  distance  to  the  rear,  leaving  a  wide  gap  in  the 
line,  and  then  turning  to  the  right,  continued  his  movement 
along  and  behind  the  line  in  the  direction  of  our  left. 

The  idea  of  implicitly  obeying  orders  by  such  officers  as 
commanders  of  divisions,  without  reasoning  about  them  is 
absurd.  A  division  in  the  army  is  not  a  small  factor  of  its 
strength.  Very  often  one  division  has  enabled  large  armies  to 


THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT.  115 

achieve  a  victory,  or  saved  them  from  defeat.  Desaix,  with 
his  division,  won  the  battle  of  Marengo,  when  everything  indi¬ 
cated  that  the  battle  was  lost ;  Macmahon,  coming  with  his 
division  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy  at  Magenta,  compelled  the 
Austrians  to  retreat;  Bosquet,  with  his  division,  gained  the  bat¬ 
tle  of  Alma,  and  another  time  at  Inkerman,  during  the  night- 
attack  of  the  Russian  army,  saved  with  his  division  the  British 
from  utter  destruction;  and  also  here,  in  the  Chickamauga 
battle — as  will  be  shown  later — a  division  of  Granger’s  corps 
under  Steedman,  saved  our  right  from  grave  reverses,  and  per¬ 
haps  saved  our  whole  army  from  disastrous  defeat.  And  thus,  if 
a  division-commander  wisely  rectifies  an  order,  erroneous  on  its 
face,  he  ought  to  be  thanked  for  it,  and  not  reprimanded  or 
court-martialed.  Martinetism  nowadays  has  ceased  to  win  vic¬ 
tories;  and  all  seem  to  realize  that  the  military  service,  like  any 
other  intelligent  service,  requires  reason,  tact,  and  knowledge. 

Early  in  the  morning,  Gen.  Longstreet,  in  command  of  the 
left  wing  of  the  rebel  army,  commenced  to  form  his  line  of 
battle.  Stewart’s  division  was  put  on  the  right  of  the  wing, 
with  its  right  resting  near  Cleburne’s  left;  it  was  facing  our 
two  brigades  of  Reynolds’  division  and  part  of  Brannan’s. 
Brown’s  brigade  was  on  the  left,  Bate’s  on  the  right,  its  right 
sharply  refused  as  Cleburne’s  line  was  far  behind,  and  Clay¬ 
ton’s  in  the  rear  of  Brown’s.  Barricades  were  put  up  in 
front  of  Brown.  On  the  left  of  Stewart’s  was  formed  the 
main  column  of  attack.  B.  R.  Johnson’s  division  in  front,  with 
McNair’s  brigade  on  the  right,  Johnson’s  with  the  First  and 
Fiftieth  Tennessee  regiments  consolidated,  and  Seventh  Texas 
of  Gregg’s  brigade,  on  the  left,  and  the  rest  of  Gregg’s,  under 
Col.  Sugg,  formed  the  second  line.  Immediately  in  the  rear  of 
Johnson’s  division  were  formed  three  small  brigades — Law’s, 
Robertson’s,  and  Benning’s — of  Hood’s  division  in  one  line,  under 
command  of  Gen.  Law.  The  whole  column  was  put  under 
command  of  Gen.  Hood,  to  which,  soon  after  the  action  com¬ 
menced,  were  added  the  brigades  of  Kershaw  and  Humphrey 
of  McLaw’s  division  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  which  had  arrived 
during  the  night  This  column  stood  opposite  Wood’s  division. 

To  the  left  of  this  column  formed  Hindman’s  division,  with 
Deas’  and  Manigault’s  brigades  in  the  front  line,  and  Ander- 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


1 1 6 

son’s  in  the  second.  Preston’s  division  of  Buckner’s  corps  with 
its  three  brigades  of  Gracie,  Kelly,  and  Trigg  was  held  in 
reserve.  It  is  evident  from  this  formation  of  the  attacking 
columns  of  the  rebel  left  wing  that  Longstreet’s  experience  in 
these  matters  was  as  much  larger  than  Polk’s  or  Hill’s,  as  his 
columns  of  attack  were  stronger  than  Cleburne’s  and  Breckin¬ 
ridge’s  single  lines. 

At  n  a.m.,  just  when  Gen.  Wood  moved  out  of  the  line, 
when  VanCleve’s  two  brigades  were  crowding  on  Wood’s 
division  moving  to  our  left,  and  when  Sheridan’s  two  brigades 
started  at  double-quick  from  our  extreme  right  to  go  to  our 
extreme  left,  Longstreet  moved  his  divisions  to  attack.  Stewart 
moved  forward  his  brigades.  For  several  hundred  yards  both 
lines  pressed  on  under  the  most  terrible  fire;  when,  taken  in 
front  and  in  fiank  by  Reynolds’  brigades  and  by  Brannan,  the 
right  of  Brown’s  fell  back  in  confusion;  his  left  continuing  to 
advance  with  the  other  two  brigades,  after  passing  the  corn¬ 
field  by  Poe’s  house,  they  were  met  by  such  musketry  and 
canister  from  our  front  that  they  broke  and  after  sustaining 
severe  losses,  fell  back  to  their  former  position.  After  this 
attack,  Stewart’s  division  did  not  participate  in  any  action  until 
evening;  it  had  enough. 

The  enemy’s  main  column  of  attack — that  next  to  Stewart — 
Hood’s  column,  struck  our  line  at  the  time  when  almost  every 
brigade  composing  it  was  on  the  move.  Moving  toward  our 
left,  Wood’s  division  had  not  time  to  get  beyond  the  opening, 
when  the  fiery  wedge  of  the  two  rebel  divisions  was  driven  mto 
it.  Buell’s  brigade  of  Wood’s  division  had  not  time  to  clear 
the  gap  and,  being  struck  in  fiank,  broke  in  confusion,  and 
Brannan’s  right  was  forced  to  bend  to  the  rear.  Davis’  rear 
brigade  moved  to  the  front,  trying  to  close  the  gap,  but  had 
not  time,  as  both  his  brigades  were  taken  in  flank  and  assailed  in 
front  by  the  enemy  and  routed.  Laiboldt’s  brigade  of  Sheridan’s 
division,  from  a  column  of  regiments  in  which  it  stood,  formed  to 
the  front,  but  the  enemy’s  attack  was  so  precipitous,  and  Davis’ 
men  were  rushing  through  its  ranks  with  such  force  that  Lai¬ 
boldt’s  brigade  also  broke  without  firing  a  shot. 

A  battery  of  artillery  was  stampeded  and  ran  over  Sam. 
Beatty’s  brigade,  which  was  deployed  and  was  lying  close  to 


THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT.  II/ 

Brannan’s  line,  and  broke  it;  quite  a  numoer  of  men  being 
injured  by  horses  and  gun-carriages.  Brannan’s  front  was 
forced  back,  his  right  brigade — Connell’s — being  most  pressed 
by  the  enemy,  broke  with  considerable  disorder,  and  later  the 
most  of  it  rallied.  For  some  time  this  division  held  the  ene¬ 
my  in  check;  but  on  seeing  the  confusion  in  the  rear,  the  line 
broken,  and  the  enemy  moving  to  his  right  and  gaining  the 
valley,  Brannan,  taking  up  all  sorts  of  stragglers,  swung  his 
right  back  and,  moving  about  half  a  mile  to  the  rear,  took 
position  on  a  ridge.  When  Brannan  was  obliged  to  fall  back 
he  carried  with  his  line  more  than  one-half  of  Reynolds’  second 
brigade  under  Col.  King,  that  stood  on  his  left. 

When  this  main  attacking-column  of  the  enemy  pierced  our 
lines,  its  front  division,  under  Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  continued 
to  press  our  retreating  crowds  right  to  the  west,  while  Hood, 
with  three  brigades  of  his  own  division,  on  reaching  open  fields, 
wheeled  to  the  right  and  pursued  our  broken  commands  to 
the  northwest.  At  this  juncture,  Hood  was  severely  wounded 
and  at  the  same  time  Gen.  Kershaw  of  McLaw’s  division,  with 
his  own  and  Humphrey’s  brigades,  joined  Hood.  Being  rank¬ 
ing  officer  in  these  two  divisions,  Gen.  Kershaw  assumed  the 
command  of  all  five  brigades  of  Longstreet’s  corps. 

While  this  was  going  on  at  the  left  of  and  opposite  the  break 
in  our  lines,  Sheridan’s  two  brigades  that  started  toward  our 
extreme  left  and  Wilder’s  command  were  attacked  by  the  rebel 
division  of  Gen.  Hindman,  with  Deas’  and  Manigault’s  brigades 
in  front  and  Anderson’s  in  the  second  line.  Gen.  Sheridan 
formed  his  brigades  of  Lytle  and  Bradley,  the  last  commanded 
by  Col.  Walworth,  to  the  front  under  a  heavy  fire  of  the  ad¬ 
vancing  enemy,  and  after  a  stubborn  resistance,  the  rebels  drove 
our  brigades  nearly  to  the  Cove  road,*  a  distance  of  about  300 
yards.  At  this  point  our  men  again  rallied  and  charging  the 
enemy,  drove  Manigault’s  brigade  back  with  terrible  slaughter, 
capturing  the  colors  of  the  Twenty- fourth  Alabama  and  a  num¬ 
ber  of  prisoners.  Then  Anderson’s  brigade  pushed  in  front  of 
Manigault’s  and  with  Deas’  brigade  drove  our  brigades  again 
back  to  the  Cove  road.  During  this  engagement,  Gen.  Lytle 
and  many  other  officers  were  killed. 

*  In  his  report  of  September  30,  1863,  Gen.  Sheridan  calls  it,  by  mistake,  the 
Lafayette  road. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


1 1 8 

Retreating  west  to  the  spurs  of  Missionary  Ridge,  Sheridan 
again  formed  his  brigades,  but  the  enemy  had  abandoned  pur¬ 
suit  Manigault,  taken  in  flank  by  Wilder’s  men  and  pressed 
in  front  by  Sheridan’s,  was  driven  back,  sent  for  reenforcements, 
and  when  Trigg’s  brigade  of  Preston’s  division  joined  him,  the 
Union  troops  had  retired.  In  this  advance  of  the  enemy,  Gen 
Hindman  reports  as  captured,*  seventeen  cannon  (excluding  the 
ten  guns  found  abandoned  in  a  gorge  in  front  of  his  position 
west  of  the  Crawfish- Spring  road),  noo  prisoners,  including 
three  colonels,  five  or  six  standards,  several  caissons,  some 
mules  and  horses,  and  nine  ordnance- wagons  with  165,000 
rounds  of  ammunition. 

In  his  report  of  September  30,  1863,  Gen.  Sheridan  gives 
the  total  strength  of  his  division  on  the  morning  of  September 
19,  as  about  4000  bayonets,  and  says  further  of  the  struggle  on 
the  20th:  “The  division  gave  up  its  ground  after  a  sanguinary 
contest,  with  a  loss  of  ninety-six  of  its  gallant  officers  and  1421 
of  its  brave  men.” 

Thus  the  enemy’s  main  column  of  attack,  consisting  of  two 
divisions,  and  favored  by  the  movement  of  our  four  brigades 
and  the  gap  produced  in  our  line  by  the  withdrawal  of  Wood’s 
division,  broke  our  lines  in  the  centre,  separating  two  of  our 
divisions,  Davis’  and  Sheridan’s,  from  the  balance  of  the  army 
and  broke  and  crowded  three  and  a-half  of  our  other  divisions, 
Brannan’s,  VanCleve’s,  Wood’s,  and  a  part  of  one  brigade  of 
Reynolds,  to  the  left  and  rear  of  the  break. 

B.  R.  Johnson,  advancing  through  the  woods  west  of  the 
Chattanooga  road,  emerged  upon  the  fields  around  Dyer’s 
house.  His  left,  consisting  of  Johnson’s  brigade,  was  passing 
on  both  sides  of  that  house,  Gregg’s  brigade  on  the  right  and 
McNair’s  bearing  still  more  to  the  right  but  somewhat  in  the 
rear.  Several  batteries  that  were  moved  in  this  direction  by 
Gen.  Negley  and  supported  by  Sirwell’s  brigade  of  his  division, 
as  also  some  batteries  that  belonged  to  Crittenden’s  corps,  were 
placed  on  the  elevations  opposite  the  front  and  both  flanks  of 
the  enemy’s  division,  now  advancing  across  the  fields.  In 
advancing,  the  enemy  suffered  severely  from  the  fire  of  our 
artillery,  and  on  their  approach  most  of  our  batteries  were 

*  Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  T.  C.  Hindman,  C.  S.,  Atlanta,  Ga. ,  October  25,  1863. 


THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT.  119 

withdrawn,  but  Gregg’s  brigade  of  the  enemy  captured  nine 
pieces  in  the  northwest  corner  of  the  field  stretching  north 
from  Dyer’s  house. 

In  this  advance,  the  rebel  Gen.  McNair  was  wounded,  when 
Col.  Colman  of  the  Thirty-ninth  North-Carolina  took  command 
of  his  brigade.  This  brigade  fell  back  for  want  of  ammunition 
and  support  and  formed  afterward  on  the  left  of  Robertson’s 
brigade  .of  Hood’s  division.  Johnson  now  moved  across  the 
field  and  occupied  a  ridge  running  nearly  north  and  south,  from 
the  crest  of  which  the  ground  slopes  abruptly  into  a  corn-field 
and  cove  lying  south  of  Vidito’s  house.  West  of  this  cove  is  a 
range  of  Missionary  Ridge,  while  north  of  it,  a  spur  of  that 
ridge  spreads  out  to  the  east.  Along  the  'base  of  the  above- 
mentioned  range  passes  Crawfish-Spring  road  through  a  gorge, 
and  leads  over  Missionary  Ridge  to  McFarland’s  Gap  and 
through  it  to  Rossville.  Along  this  road  a  line  of  telegraph 
wires  extended  from  Chattanooga  to  the  headquarters  of  Gen. 
Rosecrans,  and  at  the  gorge  a  train  of  our  wagons  filled 
the  road,  while  a  number  of  caissons  and  a  battery  of  artil¬ 
lery  for  defence  of  the  train  occupied  the  ground  near  Vidito’s 
house. 

This  position  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  without  much 
resistance  on  our  side,  although  a  line  of  breastworks  of  rails 
had  been  built  on  the  crest,  and  a  large  number  of  our  knap¬ 
sacks,  piled  up  here,  were  captured.  It  was  noon.  The  enemy’s 
skirmishers  were  thrown  forward  and  Everett’s  battery  opened 
fire  on  our  train.  The  consternation  and  stampede  of  our 
teamsters  had  no  bounds.  The  enemy’s  skirmishers  were  ad¬ 
vancing,  firing ;  the  horses  were  unhitched  and  ran  off,  and 
three  cannon  and  thirty  wagons  of  ammunition  were  left  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

While  the  right  wing,  and  a  portion  of  the  left  wing,  of  our 
army  were  crumbling  under  a  pressure  of  the  enemy’s  columns; 
while  hundreds  of  killed  and  thousands  of  wounded  Union 
soldiers  were  marking  our  former  line,  and  were  lying  scattered 
through  the  woods  and  open  fields  in  its  rear;  while  our  cannon, 
ammunition  trains,  and  ambulances  of  half  an  army  were  fall¬ 
ing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy;  while  our  prisoners  in  droves 
were  hurried  through  the  rebel  lines;  while  the  enemy  was 


120 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


shouting  with  joy  at  the  victory  in  easy  reach;  while  skulkers 
and  cowards  from  our  own  troops  were  hurrying  back  toward 
the  mountains  and  Chattanooga;  and  while  Sheridan  and  Davis 
were  cut  off  and  separated  from  the  bulk  of  the  army;  the 
bravest  and  steadiest  men  of  the  commands,  broken  on  the 
left  of  that  fatal  gap,  pursued  by  the  enemy’s  bullets  and 
shells,  in  a  silent,  hurried,  but  steady  stream,  augmented  on  its 
way  by  stragglers  of  various  commands,  moved  to  the  north¬ 
west,  led  by  Gen.  Brannan,  and  increasing  more  and  more  in 
numbers  as  they  neared  a  rough,  steep,  and  narrow  ridge,  Tun¬ 
ing  almost  at  right  angles  with  our  original  position,  occupied 
the  middle  part  of  that  ridge,  where  they  made  a  stand  and 
were  bound  to  fight  to  the  last. 

That  place  was  a  wooded  and  irregular  spur  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  whose  commencement  was  north  of  Vidito’s  farm,  and 
south  of  which — and  opposite  thereto  across  the  cove — was  an¬ 
other  but  much  lower  spur,  whereon  the  rebel  Gen.  B.  R.  John¬ 
son  took  position  with  his  division.  Our  ridge,  running  nearly 
east  and  west,  had  the  contour  of  a  flattened  crescent,  with  its 
concavity  turned  to  the  south  or  toward  the  enemy.  It  was 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  long,  its  general  elevation  being 
from  ioo  to  150  feet,  but  its  greatest  acclivities  were  at  the 
east  and  west  ends.  The  southern  slope  of  the  ridge  was  in 
some  places  of  easy  ascent,  the  ground  being  of  a  species  of 
terraced  formation;  but  in  other  places  was  quite  rough  and 
difficult.  At  the  west  end  particularly,  where  it  descends  to¬ 
ward  the  cove  in  small  foot-hills  and  gulches,  or  short  ravines, 
the  ascent  was  much  more  difficult. 

The  top  of  this  ridge,  which  consisted  of  a  few  points  and 
recesses,  was  in  places  very  narrow,  and  from  its  shape  was 
admirably  adapted  for  defence.  The  troops  could  mount  on 
the  elevations,  fire  at  the  enemy,  and,  falling  back  a  few  steps, 
were  perfectly  protected  from  the  enemy’s  fire  by  a  natural 
breastwork,  while  they  reloaded.  And  the  case  was  similar 
with  the  artillery;  after  being  loaded,  the  piece  was  run  forward 
by  hand  a  few  steps,  fired,  and  its  recoil  would  send  it  back  far 
enough  for  the  artillerists  to  reload  it  in  complete  safety.  The 
rebels  called  this  ridge  Horseshoe  Ridge. 

The  enemy  by  his  very  success  had  become  disorganized  and 


THE  ATTACK  ON  OUR  RIGHT  AND  ITS  ROUT. 


1 2 1 


scattered,  and  it  took  over  an  hour’s  time  for  him  to  form  a 
line  and  approach  our  position  on  the  ridge.  During  this  time, 
the  number  of  our  troops  was  constantly  increasing  and  rough 
barricades  were  put  up  along  the  top  of  the  ridge. 

Gen.  Wood,  after  leaving  that  famous  gap  in  the  line  and 
losing  a  good  part  of  Buell’s  brigade,  which  had  not  time  to 
clear  the  gap  before  the  enemy’s  attack,  was  riding  at  the  head 
oi  the  column — which  consisted  of  Barnes’  brigade  of  Van 
Cleves  division — when  he  met  Gen.  Thomas,  whom  he  informed 
that  he  was  ordered  to  support  Reynolds.  Thomas  said  Reyn¬ 
olds  was  not  in  need  of  support,  but  that  Baird  should  be 
supported,  and  directed  Wood  to  take  his  division  to  the  ex¬ 
treme  left,  taking  the  responsibility  of  changing  the  order  on 
himself.  Thereupon  a  staff-officer  conducted  Barnes  and  his 
command  to  Gen.  Baird.  Meantime,  Wood  returning  to  his 
other  brigades,  saw  the  whole  valley  inundated  by  the  rebels, 
and  at  once  surmised  that  the  flood  must  have  come  through  the 
gate  he  had  himself  opened  in  the  line.  The  disaster  caused 
him  to  forget  to  lead  his  other  brigades  to  the  extreme  left,  and 
he  commenced  to  look  around  for  expedient  methods  to  resist 
the  flood.  He  then  discovered  that  he  had  but  one  brigade, 
Harker’s,  and  that  Buell’s  brigade  was  gone.  So  he  directed 
his  course  toward  the  ridge  where  Brannan  was,  and  seeing  the 
enemy  advancing  through  the  field  north  of  Dyer’s  house,  the 
north  end  of  which  reaches  the  east  end  of  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
Gen.  Wood  formed  Harker’s  brigade  along  the  north  fence  of 
that  field  nearest  to  the  ridge  and  opened  fire  on  the  enemy’s 
force,  which  halted. 

But,  as  le  says  in  his  report,*  he  and  most  of  his  command 
were  under  an  optical  delusion  whereby  they  mistook  the 
rebels  for  our  own  men  for  some  time,  until  the  advancing 
force  commenced  firing,  when  the  charm  vanished;  then,  threat¬ 
ened  on  its  right  by  the  enemy,  the  brigade  fell  back  and 
occupied  the  eastern  end  of  Horseshoe  Ridge. 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  T.  J.  Wood,  September  29,  1863. 


9 


CHAPTER  X. 

BETWEEN  THE  ACTS. 


ET  us  now  see  what  forces  were  gathered  on  Horseshoe 


Ridge  for  the  coming  struggle,  the  parallel  of  which 
scarcely  exists  in  the  annals  of  history. 

When  Gen.  Brannan  moved  toward  the  ridge,  he  had  the 
Fourth  and  Tenth  Kentucky  and  the  Fourteenth  Ohio  of  Crox- 
ton’s  brigade,  and  although  the  Seventy-fourth  and  Tenth  Indi¬ 
ana  had  separated  from  that  brigade  during  the  enemy’s  attack 
and  joined  Reynolds,*  yet  there  is  no  reasonable  doubt  but  that 
many  of  their  men,  in  straggling  squads,  went  with  Brannan. 
Beside  that-,  the  Sixty-eighth  and  One-hundred-and-first  Indi¬ 
ana  of  King’s  brigade,  Reynolds’  division,  and  stragglers  of  the 
Seventy-fifth  Indiana  and  One-hundred-and-fifth  Ohio  of  the 
same  brigade,  also  went  to  the  ridge  with  Brannan.i*  After  the 
rout  when  Col.  King  joined  Gen.  Turchin,  the  former’s  brigade 
was  very  small,  comprising  but  a  few  hundred  men.  On  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  Croxton  had  2279  men;  the  losses  on  both 
days  were  926  men,  thus  it  may  reasonably  be  estimated  that  in 
all  the  above-noted  regiments  there  were  about  1400  muskets. 

Again,  Col.  Connell  in  his  report  of  September  26,  1863,  says 
that  on  the  road  to  Rossville,  Lieut.-Col.  Lister  of  the  Thirty- 
first  Ohio,  Maj.  Butterfield  of  the  Seventeenth  Ohio,  and  Adjt. 
Hunter  of  the  Eighty-second  Indiana,  collected  in  all  about  350 
stragglers  of  his  brigade;  but  as  he  had,  on  the  morning  of  the 
19th,  1338  officers  and  men,  and  during  the  two  days  lost  441 
officers  and  men,  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that  on  the  after¬ 
noon  of  the  20th  there  were  on  the  ridge  about  600  muskets  of 
his  brigade.  Lieut.-Col.  Ward  of  the  Seventeenth  Ohio,  and 
Col.  Hunter  of  the  Eighty-second  Indiana,  were  with  these 
men  on  the  ridge. 

*  Report  of  Col.  C.  W.  Chapman,  September  27,  1863. 

+  Gen.  Brannan  in  his  report  says  that  Gen.  Thomas  had  sent  him  the  Sixty- 
eighth  and  One-hundred-and-first  Indiana  regiments,  but  this  is  a  mistake,  as  they 
joined  Brannan  of  their  own  accord. 


122 


BETWEEN  THE  ACTS. 


123 


There  was  also  Vanderveer’s  brigade  of  Brannan’s  division 
in  its  full  organization  on  the  ridge.  Col.  Vanderveer,  after 
driving  Govan’s  brigade  of  the  enemy  away  from  the  extreme 
left  of  the  army  and  resting  in  the  woods  for  some  time, 
learned  that  his  division,  with  Gen.  Brannan,  was  fighting  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge.  He  moved  cautiously  through  the  woods 
and  joined  Brannan  at  about  2.30  p.m.,  just  in  the  nick  of  time 
to  relieve  our  line  of  exhausted  men,  immediately  after  the 
first  assault  that  the  enemy  made  on  that  position.  In  his 
report  he  gives  the  aggregate  strength  of  his  brigade  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th  as  1783,  and  his  losses  during  the  two 
days  802.  Then  it  may  be  assumed  that  he  had  over  1000 
officers  and  men  on  the  ridge. 

Col.  Buell  of  Wood’s  division,  with  the  Fifty-eighth  Indiana 
under  Lieut. -Col.  Embree  and  with  a  number  of  stragglers  from 
other  regiments  of  his  brigade,  also  formed  with  Brannan’s 
command.  If  their  strength  be  placed  at  700  men  then,  the 
number  of  troops  under  Brannan’s  immediate  command  on  the 
ridge,  including  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  of  Negley’s  division, 
amounted  to  about  4000  men. 

Col.  Stanley,  of  Negley’s  division,  after  his  first  successful 
engagement  against  Adams’  brigade  of  the  enemy  on  the 
extreme  left,  having  been  again  attacked  by  the  enemy  just 
before  Col.  Vanderveer  engaged  them,  had  his  brigade  some¬ 
what  scattered.  But  when  the  action  ceased,  he  reformed  his 
brigade  and  being  at  that  time  nearer  to  Horseshoe  Ridge 
than  to  Baird’s  left,  which  was  reenforced  by  Barnes’  brigade 
sent  there  by  Gen.  Wood,  joined  the  forces  on  the  ridge  with 
his  three  regiments,  the  Nineteenth  Illinois,  the  Eighteenth 
Ohio,  and  the  Eleventh  Michigan,  taking  position  bn  the  left 
of  Brannan,  between  him  and  Wood,  where  there  were  two 
sections  of  Battery  I,  Fourth  U.-S.  Artillery.  Although  this 
brigade  was  light,  yet  it  may  safely  be  estimated  at  600  strong. 

Gen.  Wood’s  forces  comprised  Harker’s  brigade  of  his  own 
division,  consisting  of  the  Third  Kentucky  and  the  Sixty- 
fourth,  Sixty-fifth,  and  One-hundred-and-twenty-fifth  Ohio, 
also  a  portion  of  VanCleve’s  division,  consisting  of  a  part  of 
the  Ninth  Kentucky  under  Col.  Cram,  and  the  whole  of  the 
Seventeenth  Kentucky  under  Col.  Stout,  both  of  Sam.  Beatty  s 


124 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


brigade,  with  a  number  of  stragglers  from  other  regiments  of 
that  brigade;  also  the  Forty-fourth  Indiana  of  Dick’s  brigade, 
commanded  by  Lieut.-Col.  Aldrich,  the  total  number  amounting 
to  something  over  2000. 

Thus  the  whole  force  on  the  ridge  amounted  to  about  6500 
officers  and  men. 

When  Gen.  Thomas,  through  Capt.  Gaw,  ordered  Gen.  Negley 
to  put  his  artillery  in  position  beyond  his  extreme  left,  there 
apparently  was  a  misunderstanding  on  the  side  of  Negley  or  a 
want  of  explicitness,  while  giving  the  order,  on  the  part  of  Gaw, 
because  in  his  report  of  September  26,  1863,  Negley  says  that 
he  was  with  Stanley’s  brigade,  which  met  a  heavy  force  of  the 
enemy  on  our  extreme  left,  and  that,  while  there,  he  “received 
orders  through  Capt.  Gaw,  to  mass  all  the  artillery  at  hand  on 
a  high  ridge  facing  the  south .”  The  order  was  to  mass  the 
artillery  on  a  ridge  facing  the  east,  beyond  our  left.  So  there 
certainly  was  an  error  somewhere.  But  beside  that,  as  we 
mentioned  before,  this  order  was  given  too  late.  The  enemy, 
under  Breckinridge,  was  attacking  the  rear  of  our  left;  most 
of  Negley’s  artillery  was  behind,  while  Sirwell’s  brigade  was 
also  on  the  move  to  the  left. 

Nevertheless,  Gen.  Negley,  as  he  says  in  his  report,  posted 
Bridges’  battery  of  his  own,  and  Battery  I,  Fourth  U.-S. 
Artillery,  of  Brannan’s  division,  then  in  hand,  in  position  on  a 
ridge  facing  eastward,  which  opened  on  the  enemy,  “causing 
him  to  fall  back,  thus  temporarily  relieving  the  left  wing.” 
This  ridge  was  the  east  end  of  Horseshoe  Ridge,  the  configu¬ 
ration  of  which  was  such  that  it  admitted  the  use  of  artillery 
from  it  eastward,  and  also,  by  changing  front,  southward. 

Finding  the  ground  here  unfavorable  for  posting  much  of  the 
artillery,  Negley  went  back  toward  the  center  of  our  line,  in  the 
rear  of  which  his  other  two  batteries  of  Schultz  and  Marshall 
had  been  left,  and  posted  them  in  position  on  a  ridge  southeast 
of  Vidito’s  farm,  some  distance  back  and  west  of  the  line,  where 
they  were  joined  by  Bridges’  battery  and  Sirwell’s  brigade  of 
Negley,  the  last  acting  as  support  to  the  artillery;  while  Lieut. 
Frank  G.  Smith,  with  his  Battery  I,  Fourth  U.-S.  Artillery, 
consisting  of  four  guns,  supported  by  some  stragglers  from  the 
left  wing,  remained  on  Horseshoe  Ridge  the  rest  of  the  day, 


BETWEEN  THE  ACTS. 


125 


occupying  the  highest  ground  near  its  east  end,  and  largely 
contributing  to  the  successive  repulse  of  the  enemy’s  assaults 
on  that  position.  The  rebel  commanders,  in  their  reports,  call 
the  eminence  on  which  Battery  I  was  placed  Battery  Hill. 
Stanley’s  brigade  of  Negley’s  division,  under  Col.  Stoughton, 
Col.  Stanley  having  been  disabled  by  slight  contusion,  sup¬ 
ported  this  battery  during  the  whole  afternoon. 

Soon  after  came  the  crash  on  our  centre  and  right,  the  lines 
were  broken,  and  B.  R.  Johnson’s  rebel  division  was  pushing 
west  toward  the  position  where  stood  Negley’s  batteries  and 
their  support.  Col.  Sirwell  in  his  report  of  September  27,  1863, 
says:  “Whilst  in  this  position,  which  was  a  good  one,  with  open 
fields  in  front,  my  men  rapidly  threw  up  fine  breastworks  of 
logs  and  rails;  but  we  had  no  chance  to  try  their  defensive 
qualities,  for  the  sharp,  quick  firing  of  skirmishers  in  our  rear 
made  us  face  about  and  hasten  up  the  hill  immediately  behind 
us.”  Now  this  last  hill  evidently  was  north  of  Vidito’s  farm, 
beyond  the  cove,  and  on  the  extreme  right  of  Brannan’s  posi¬ 
tion  on  Horseshoe  Ridge.  Because  “here,”  Sirwell  says,  “  I  was 
solicited  by  Gen.  Brannan  to  leave  a  regiment  to  support  one 
of  his  batteries.  I  detached  the  Twenty- first  Ohio  for  that 
purpose.”  In  another  place,  Col.  Sirwell  mentions  that  this 
regiment  was  at  the  time  500  strong.  And  here  probably  was 
held  a  conference  between  Gens.  Negley  and  Brannan,  the 
result  of  which  Brannan  in  his  report  thus  states:  “Gen.  Negley, 
who  had  a  portion  of  his  command  intact,  having  pledged  him¬ 
self  to  hold  my  right  and  rear.”  Further  in  his  report,  Brannan 
also  says:  “Gen.  Negley,  so  far  from  holding  my  right,  as  he 
had  promised,  retired  with  extraordinary  deliberation  to  Ross- 
ville  at  an  early  period  of  the  day,  taking  with  him  a  portion 
of  my  division  (as  will  be  seen  by  the  report  of  Col.  Connell, 
commanding  First  brigade),  and  leaving  me  open  to  attack 
from  the  right,”  etc.  But  this  imputation,  founded  on  the 
report  of  Col.  Connell,  which  in  turn  was  apparently  founded 
on  hearsay  and  not  on  positive  orders,  is  haidly  pioper  to 

consider. 

On  the  other  hand,  Negley  says  that  at  2  p.m.  he  found  out 
that  our  right  and  centre  had  given  way;  that  he  applied  to 
Gen.  Rosecrans  for  a  brigade,  but  he  could  give  him  no  help; 


126 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


that  then  Brannan  applied  to  him  for  support,  and  he  ordered 
the  Twenty-first  Ohio  to  his  assistance;  that  he  rode  forward  to 
the  crest  of  the  ridge,  over  which  troops  were  retiring,  to  get  a 
position  for  his  artillery,  but  was  met  by  a  strong  column  of 
the  enemy,  who  pressed  forward  between  him  and  the  troops 
to  his  left,  leaving  him  but  one  regiment ,  the  Seventy -eighth 
Pennsylvania ,  and  a  part  of  another ,  with  the  artillery  in  his 
charge,  its  ammunition  nearly  exhausted,  and  the  ammunition- 
train  away.  Then  information  reached  him  that  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  was  moving  from  the  right  to  his  rear,  and  a  column 
of  infantry  on  his  front  and  left.  Finally  he  says:  “Finding  it 
impossible  to  organize  any  of  the  passing  troops,  and  unable  to 
communicate  with  Gen.  Thomas,  and  being  informed  by  a  staff- 
officer  that  Gens.  Rosecrans,  McCook,  and  Crittenden  had  left 
the  field,  I  deemed  it  vitally  important  to  secure  the  safety  of  the 
artillery ,  which  appeared  to  be  threatened  with  immediate  cap¬ 
ture  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  who  was  pressing  forward 
on  my  front  and  right.”  And  so  he  withdrew  to  McFarland’s 
Gap,  two  and  three-quarter  miles  from  the  right  of  Brannan’s 
position. 

It  appears  that  Gen.  Negley  was  mistaken  in  regard  to  there 
being  only  one  regiment  left  him.  Col.  Sirwell,  in  command 
of  the  brigade,  reports  that  after  he  detached  the  Twenty-first 
Ohio  to  support  a  battery  belonging  to  Brannan,  “taking  the 
Seventy-fourth  Ohio  to  another  point  to  protect  another  battery, 
when  I  returned  I  could  not  find  my  other  two  regiments 
[meaning  the  Seventy-eighth  Pennsylvania  and  Thirty-seventh 
Indiana]  where  I  had  left  them,  but  soon  ascertained  that  by 
order  of  Gen.  Negley  they  had  been  taken  to  the  Rossville 
road  to  take  up  a  new  line  and  gather  up  all  the  stragglers. 
The  battery  the  Seventy-fourth  was  supporting  having  left,  the 
regiment  was  brought  back  and  joined  to  the  others  on  the 
Rossville  road.”  But  Negley  was  correct  in  saying  that  the 
enemy  was  advancing  toward  him,  because  B.  R.  Johnson,  the 
commander  of  a  rebel  division  which  occupied  Negley’s  previ¬ 
ous  position,  in  his  report  acknowledges  that  he  found  there 
a  line  of  breastworks,  and  that  at  a  few  minutes  of  2  p.m.  he 
commenced  movements  for  the  assault  on  the  right  of  Bran- 
nan’s  position. 


BETWEEN  THE  ACTS. 


•  127 

But,  reasoning  upon  the  whole  thing,  the  conclusion  becomes 
unavoidable  that  Gen.  Negley  labored  under  difficulties,  know¬ 
ing  the  need  of  saving  not  only  his  own  but  as  much  as  possible 
of  other  artillery  whose  commanders  applied  to  him  for  pro¬ 
tection;  that  being  certain  of  the  rout  of  our  right,  and  learning 
that  the  commander  of  the  army  and  two  commanders  of  army 
corps  had  left  the  field,  and  deeming  it,  as  he  says,  vitally  im¬ 
portant  to  save  the  artillery ,  which  he  thought,  as  the  enemy 
advanced,  was  threatened  with  immediate  capture,  considered 
it  prudent  to  withdraw  to  McFarland’s  Gap. 

Negley  was  too  far  from  the  centre  of  Horseshoe  Ridge  to 
know  what  was  going  on  there,  and  could  not  judge  of  the 
general  position.  What  he  saw  around  himself  was  nothing 
but  rout  and  disorder.  He  did  not  know  but  what  our  left 
wing  was  also  routed,  and  perhaps  at  that  time  was  retreating 
to  Rossville  by  the  main  road.  Had  he  been  ordered  by  Gen. 
Thomas  to  support  Brannan,  he  certainly  would  have  remained 
on  the  ridge  to  the  last  as  the  other  troops  did;  but  to  decide 
for  himself  under  such  distressing  circumstances  to  stay  on  the 
ridge,  which,  as  far  as  he  could  see,  was  unoccupied,  when  there 
were  eight  batteries  of  artillery  on  his  hands  to  take  care  of 
was  more  than  could  have  been  reasonably  asked  of  him. 

All  this  digression  is  made  for  the  reason  that  Gen.  Negley, 
at  the  time,  was  blamed  for  his  conduct.  Remembering  what 
blunders  and  omissions  have  been  made  by  some  regular-army 
officers,  it  seems  as  if  Gen.  Negley,  who  was  only  a  volunteer 
officer,  by  saving  eight  batteries  of  artillery,  at  the  time  when 
fifty  guns  had  been  lost  in  the  rout,  and  gathering  and  organiz¬ 
ing  several  thousands  of  stragglers  at  McFarland’s  Gap,  who 
were  all  in  the  ranks  again  the  next  day,  ought  rather  to  have 
been  praised  than  blamed  for  what  he  had  done  during  the 
Chickamauga  battle." 

Not  alone  Gen.  Negley,  but  even  Gen.  Rosecrans  was  not 
sure,  when  he  saw  the  demoralization  ot  the  right  and  centre, 
that  the  left  could  possibly  avoid  being  enveloped  therewith 
also.  When  the  rebel  assault  was  made,  Gen.  Rosecrans  was 

*  Complaints  and  accusations  against  Gen.  Negley  may  be  found  in  the  reports 
of  Gen.  John  Beatty,  who  commanded  a  brigade  in  Negley ’s  division,  and  Gens. 
J.  M.  Brannan  and  T.  J.  Wood,  commanding*  divisions. 


* 


128  CHICKAMAUGA. 

standing  behind  Davis’  troops,  and  immediately  started  toward 
Sheridan  to  direct  his  movements,  but  he  was  too  late,  and  was 
carried  west  by  the  tide  of  our  fugitives.  He  attempted  to  get 
to  the  left,  where  Thomas  was,  as  he  says  in  his  report,  “  by 
passing  to  the  rear  of  the  broken  portion  of  our  line,  but  found 
the  routed  troops  far  toward  the  left,  and  hearing  the  enemy’s 
advancing  musketry  and  cheers,  I  became  doubtful  whether  the 
left  had  held  its  ground ,  and  started  for  Rossville.  On  consul¬ 
tation  and  further  reflection,  I  determined  to  send  Gen.  Garfield 
there,  while  I  went  to  Chattanooga,”  etc. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Gen.  Rosecrans  could  not  remain  at 
Rossville  or,  what  would  have  been  still  more  desirable,  at 
McFarland’s  Gap,  and  have  despatched  some  one  else,  to  Chat¬ 
tanooga  to  carry  out  the  needful  orders.  By  remaining  at 
McFarland’s  Gap  he  could  easily  communicate  with  Thomas, 
as  there  were  several  roads  leading  from  the  gap  to  our  posi¬ 
tion,  and  he  could  also  have  directed  many  troops,  that  were 
collected  and  organized  there,  to  his  support. 

According  to  Gen.  Rosecrans’  statement,  he,  on  consultation 
with  Gen.  Garfield,  desired  him  to  go  to  Chattanooga  and  at¬ 
tend  to  all  measures  necessary  to  resistance  in  case  the  army 
should  be  forced  to  retreat  there,  enumerating  those  measures; 
but  Garfield  said  that  he  felt  he  would  not  be  able  to  carry 
those  measures  out;  whereupon  Rosecrans  ordered  Garfield  to 
Rossville,  and  endeavor  to  communicate  with  Gen.  Thomas 
while  he  himself  went  to  Chattanooga. 

Negley  says  in  his  report  that  when  he  passed  McFarland’s 
Gap  he  there  found  Col.  Parkhurst  with  the  Ninth  Michigan — 
the  provost-guard  of  Gen.  Thomas — who  was  collecting  and 
organizing  the  stragglers;  that  Parkhurst  said  that  Gen.  Crit¬ 
tenden  ordered  him,  with  all  the  troops,  to  fall  back  to  Chatta¬ 
nooga;  that  he  (Negley)  opposed  it,  and  said  that  all  the  troops 
ought  to  be  organized  and  sent  to  the  front;  that  there  were 
quite  a  number  of  general  staff-officers  who  helped  Negley; 
that  the  gap  was  cleared  of  the  artillery  and  transportation, 
and  that  the  scattered  troops  were  formed  in  battalions;  that 
he  then  learned  that  Gen.  Sheridan  was  coming  up  with  1500 
men;  and  that  he  suggested  to  Sheridan  the  expediency  of 
going  to  the  support  of  Gen.  Thomas,  and  also  said  that  he 


BETWEEN  THE  ACTS. 


129 

(Negley)  would  join  him  with  all  the  troops  he  had  collected; 
that  he  rode  forward  to  try  and  communicate  with  Gen. 
Thomas,  but  found  the  enemy’s  cavalry  in  possession  of  the 
road;  that  when  he  returned  he  held  a  consultation  with  Gens. 
Davis  and  Sheridan,  and  Col.  Arthur  C.  Ducat,  inspector-gen¬ 
eral  of  the  army.  He  further  says:  “It  was  determined  as 
advisable  to  proceed  to  Rossville,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
obtaining  possession  of  the  cross-roads,  and  from  there  Gen. 
Sheridan  would  move  to  the  support  of  Gen.  Thomas  via 
Lafayette  road.”  Gen.  Davis  in  his  report  says  that  his  com¬ 
mand  was  joined  by  several  detached  battalions  and  commands, 
making  in  all  a  force  of  between  2500  and  3000  men. 

Then  at  McFarland’s  Gap,  about  the  hour  of  3  p.m.,  were 
gathered  1500  men  with  Sheridan;  not  less  than  2500  with 
Davis;  Negley’s  three  regiments  of  Sirwell’s  brigade,  and  the 
whole  of  Beatty’s  brigade,  which  had  reached  there  or  Rossville 
after  the  engagement  on  the  extreme  left,  making  at  least 
2200  men;  Parkhurst’s  Ninth  Michigan,  probably  500  men; 
Col.  Connell’s  350  men,  and  the  stragglers  collected  by  Gen. 
Negley  of  other  commands,  of  the  number  of  whom  we  have 
no  reliable  information,  but  supposing  them  to  have  been  only 
1000  men,  then  the  whole  amount  of  troops  there  made  an 
organized  force  of  8000  men,  with  any  quantity  of  artillery. 

And  there  that  number  of  troops  stood  idle,  with  their  com¬ 
manders  coolly  deliberating  what  was  best  to  be  done,  while 
within  three  miles  of  them  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  was  a  body 
of  Union  soldiers  less  numerous  than  they,  who  were  engaged 
in  a  death-struggle  with  one-half  of  the  rebel  army.  There 
might  have  been  some  palliation  for  this  indecision  to  move 
to  the  front,  if  there  had  been  no  possibility  of  reaching  our 
field  of  battle,  but  there  were  three  or  four  plain  roads,  by 
which  afterward  the  whole  army,  in  the  dark  night,  retired  to 
Rossville — and  the  distance  separating  the  idlers  and  the  fighters 
was  but  three  miles.  And  there  was  where  Gen.  Rosecrans’ 
presence  would  have  been  of  incalculable  advantage  to  his 
struggling  army. 

Remembering  the  activity  and  energy  of  Gen.  Sheridan  in 
the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  his  display  of  these  quali¬ 
ties  subsequently  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  is  surprising 


> 


130  CHICKAMAUGA. 

why,  as  the  senior  officer,  he  did  not  assume  the  command  of 
those  troops  and  have  handled  them  as  he  was  eminently  able 
to  do.  By  taking  the  Crawfish-Spring  road,  he  could  have 
reached  Vidito’s  house,  and  there  have  fallen  upon  the  left 
flank  of  Longstreet’s  troops  when  they  were  out  of  breath 
from  their  exertions,  and  have  then  knocked  the  last  of  the 
Southern  dash  out  of  them. 

But  no !  the  whole  crowd  moved  toward  Rossville.  Lieut.- 
Col.  Thurston,  Gen.  McCook’s  assistant  adjutant-general,  after 
communicating  with  Gen.  Thomas,  caught  up  with  the  retiring 
column  and  said  that  Thomas  would  like  to  have  Gens.  Davis 
and  Sheridan  move  up  and  support  Brannan’s  right.  Davis 
faced  his  column  about  and  moved  through  McFarland’s  Gap, 
but  Sheridan  said  he  preferred  to  go  by  the  Lafayette  road, 
while  Negley  stopped  at  Rossville ;  but  neither  Davis  nor 
Sheridan  could  reach  the  field  of  battle  early  enough  to  partic¬ 
ipate  in  the  fight,  and  returned  to  Rossville  with  the  other 
troops. 

But  there  was  one  wonderful  peregrination  made  by  a  brigade 
of  VanCleve’s  division  during  and  after  the  rout,  which  is  de¬ 
serving  of  especial  mention.  It  was  performed  by  Col.  Dick’s 
brigade,  and  he  says  in  his  report*  that  he  was  on  the  left  of 
Sam  Beatty’s  brigade  when  his  own  and  that  of  Beatty  moved 
close  to  Brannan’s  lines  just  before  the  rout  occurred;  that  he 
then  received  orders  to  move,  on  double-quick,  by  the  left  flank 
to  the  support  of  some  artillery,  said  to  be  in  position  in  the 
woods;  that  he  thus  moved  for  500  or  600  yards  and  seeing  no 
artillery ,  but  seeing  Col.  Vanderveer’s  brigade,  he  formed  in  the 
rear  of  it.  Then  he  saw  Col.  Stanley’s  brigade  on  the  left  of 
Vanderveer  hard  pressed,  and  he  went  to  its  support.  Col. 
Stanley  mentions  in  his  report  that  there  were  three  regiments 
that  were  goiig  to  support  him,  but  when  he  fell  back  the 
support  was  gone.  The  probability  is  that  it  was  Dick’s 
brigade. 

Stanley  talks  about  that  support  somewhat  disparagingly, 
but  perhaps  he  was  in  a  hurry  himself  and  did  not  see  the 
support,  because  Col.  Dick  positively  says  that  Stanley’s  line 
gave  way  and  retreated  in  disorder  over  his  command  lying  on 

*  Report  of  Col.  Geo.  F.  Dick,  September  28,  1863. 


BETWEEN  THE  ACTS. 


131 

the  ground;  that  his  line  was  somewhat  confused,  but  recover¬ 
ing,  ^  gave  the  enemy  a  galling  fire  for  more  than  fifteen 
minutes.  He  was  then  overwhelmed  by  a  greater  force  of  the 
enemy,  and  fell  back  in  disorder,  and  that  Capt.  Gunsenhauser 
of  the  Forty-fourth  Indiana  was  killed;  he  then  reports  that 
there  the  rebel  Brig.-Gen.  Adams  of  Texas  was  wounded  and 
captured. 

Then  he  again  rallied  a  portion  of  his  command  500  yards  to 
the  rear,  while  Lieut.-Col.  Aldrich  of  the  Forty-fourth  Indiana, 
rallied  the  remainder  in  another  part  of  the  field  and  went  to 
support  Gen.  Wood.  Then  he  remained  with  what  he  had  of 
his  men  in  support  of  a  battery  on  some  hill  for  an  hour;  then 
marched  to  the  left  to  reform,  but  this  did  not  take  long,  and 
then  went  to  support  Brannan.  He  then  states  that  he  held 
the  enemy  in  check  until  they  had  succeeded  in  planting  a 
battery,  still  farther  to  his  right  on  a  ridge,  commanding  his 
position  and  enfilading  his  line;  then  the  enemy  threw  a  fresh 
line  of  infantry  upon  his  exposed  flank,  which  compelled  him 
to  again  fall  back.  Then  he  saw  the  greater  part  of  the  army 
falling  back  and  he  himself  fell  back  through  the  woods,  gather¬ 
ing  stragglers.  Having  gone  nearly  a  mile,  he  struck  the  Chat¬ 
tanooga  road,  where  his  command  was  again  attacked  by  the 
enemy’s  cavalry.  Still  he  continued  to  march  on  that  road 
another  mile,  and,  halting  in  a  large  field,  collected  nearly  600 
men  of  the  division;  met  Lieut.-Col.  Loder  of  Gen.  Crittenden’s 
staff,  who  directed  him  to  march  to  Chattanooga;  but  on  near¬ 
ing  Rossville,  he  learned  that  Gen.  VanCleve  had  established  his 
headquarters  there,  so  he  reported  to  him  and  went  into  camp. 

This  report  shows  that  Dick’s  brigade  was  not  in  the  rout, 
and  that  Col.  Dick  performed  many  feats  during  the  afternoon 
of  the  20th  with  which  the  world  would  be  unacquainted  were 
it  not  for  his  individual  report,  as  none  of  those  who  could 
testify  to  these  various  deeds  mentions  anything  about  him. 
Lieut.-Col.  Aldrich  under  Gen.  Wood,  was  doing  well,  and 
received  especial  mention;  but,  of  Col.  Dick’s  engagements,  no 
mention  is  made  by  either  Cols.  Stanley  or  Vanderveer,  nor  by 
Gens.  Baird  or  Brannan.  It  is  a  sad  report  of  how  it  is  pos¬ 
sible  for  a  whole  brigade  to  straggle  around,  waste  its  strength, 

and  accomplish  nothing. 


132 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Gen.  John  Beatty,  after  losing  his  brigade  on  the  extreme 
left,  which  fact  he  ascribes  to  the  orders  given  by  Maj.  Lowrie, 
A.A.G.  of  Negley’s  division  to  his  scattered  regiments  with¬ 
out  his  knowledge,  joined  Stanley’s  command  and  remained 
with  it  during  the  whole  afternoon  on  Horseshoe  Ridge.  His 
energetic  activity  and  bravery  animated  and  encouraged  the 
defenders  of  that  position,  and  thereby  he  alone  compensated 
considerably  for  the  absence  of  his  brigade.  Col.  M.  B.  Walker 
of  the  Thirty-first  Ohio,  being  under  arrest,  had  no  command, 
acted  on  the  staff  of  Gen.  Brannan,  according  to  his  report,  and 
did  good  service  by  rallying  and  encouraging  the  men. 

But  how  many  officers  and  squads  of  men  there  were  whose 
presence  and  brilliant  fighting  have  not  been  acknowledged  by 
any  of  the  reports,  who  certainly  contributed  greatly  to  the 
general  success,  is  not  now  and  never  will  be  known.  One 
reason  for  such  species  of  fighting  lies  in  the  character  and 
independent  spirit  of  an  American  volunteer,  preferring  rather 
to  fight  single-handed  and  on  his  own  account,  than  to  be 
merely  a  cipher  among  the  thousands.  This  -spontaneous 
rally  on  Horseshoe  Ridge  was  an  opportunity  for  just  such 
independent  spirits  to  join  the  crowd  and  to  fight  in  their 
own  way  and  not  under  subordination  and  strict  orders.  And 
they  fought  splendidly.  This  occasion  was  only  one  out  of 
many  others  that  happened  during  our  war,  and  these  for  a 
thinking  man,  have  a  great  significance.  They  effectually 
demonstrate  that  the  discipline  and  management  of  an  Amer¬ 
ican  volunteer  must  be  radically  different  from  the  strict,  nar¬ 
row,  iron-clad  martinetism  of  European  armies,  which  would 
turn  sensible  men  into  unreasoning  automatons;  and  also  that 
those  who  take  the  discipline  of  the  European  soldiery  for  the 
model  to  be  imitated  in  our  volunteer  army,  can  never  be  either 
successful  or  popular  commanders. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  ASSAULTS  ON  HORSESHOE  RIDGE.  STEEDMAN’S 

ADVANCE. 


FTER  our  line  was  broken  and  the  enemy’s  force  pushed 


n.  west  beyond  Dyer’s  house  and  to  the  cove  at  Vidito’s 
farm,  on  the  Crawfish-Spring- and -Rossville  road,  Gen.  Hood 
wheeled  partially  to  the  right  and  pursued  our  broken  troops  in 
a  northwesterly  direction.  Law’s  and  Robertson’s  brigades  were 
in  the  line,  and  Benning’s  in  the  rear  of  Law’s.  Crossing  the 
field,  north  of  Dyer’s  house,  they  met  considerable  resistance 
from  our  men,  supported  by  a  battery;  but  Benning’s  brigade 
coming  into  line,  the  enemy  drove  our  force  from  the  position 
and  captured  the  battery.  At  this  encounter  Gen.  Hood  was 
severely  wounded,  a  minie-ball  breaking  his  thigh,  the  com¬ 
mand  devolving  on  Gen.  Kershaw. 

After  a  little  while  our  men  charged  the  rebels,  trying  to 
reoccupy  the  position  and  retake  the  battery,  when  Kershaw 
coming  with  two  brigades  of  McLaw’s  division,  his  own  consist¬ 
ing  of  six  regiments  of  South-Carolina  troops,  and  Humphrey’s 
brigade  of  four  regiments  of  Mississippi  troops,  our  men  with¬ 
drew  still  farther.  This  encounter  was  with  our  column  under 
Brannan,  consisting  of  his  brigade  and  straggling  commands  of 
Reynolds,  Wood,  and  Sam  Beatty,  which,  after  reaching  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge,  occupied  the  middle  part  of  it. 


Hood’s  brigades  falling  back,  Kershaw  changed  front  to  the 
right  and  advanced  north  across  the  field,  at  the  othei  end  of 
which,  as  we  before  described,  was  Gen.  Wood  with  Harker’s 
brigade;  Humphrey’s  brigade  was  ordered  to  come  up  on  the 
right  of  Kershaw’s.  Kershaw  attacked  Wood,  and  sending  the 
Second  South-Corolina,  his  left  regiment,  around  our  right, 
compelled  our  force  to  retire  and  occupy  the  east  end  of  the 
ridge;  but  the  enemy  was  obliged  to  halt  undei  a  heavy  file 
from  our  artillery,  already  stationed  on  the  ridge.  Humphrey  s 
brigade  joined  Kershaw’s  on  the  right;  and  Col.  Oates  with 
the  Fifteenth  Alabama  of  Law’s  brigade,  joined  Kershaw’s  of 


134 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


his<  own  volition,  acting  without  orders.  There  Gen.  Kershaw 
was  preparing  to  make  an  assault. 

Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson  with  his  division  on  the  extreme  left  of 
the  enemy’s  lines,  was  also  preparing  to  assault  our  position. 
Trying  to  get  reenforcements,  Gen.  Johnson  rode  about  half  a 
mile  toward  the  right  and  rear  and  was  informed  that  Kershaw 
was  preparing  to  attack;  and  while  trying  to  find  his  brigade, 
McNair’s,  which  was  left  behind  for  want  of  ammunition,  met 
Gens.  Hindman  and  Anderson.  Explaining  to  them  what  he 
wanted,  he  was  promised  by  Hindman,  whose  division  was  now 
disengaged,  that  Deas’  brigade  would  be  ordered  to  his  sup¬ 
port  on  the  left,  while  Anderson  with  his  brigade  would  fill  the 
gap  between  his  division  and  that  of  Kershaw.  Returning  to 
his  position,  Johnson  ordered  three  pieces  of  Dent’s  battery  of 
Hindman’s  division,  that  he  put  on  a  knoll  in  Vidito’s  field,  to 
fire  in  the  rear  of  the  eminence  600  yards  to  the  right,  on  which 
Kershaw  was  advancing. 

Having  been  in  this  position  over  an  hour,  Johnson  resolved 
to  press  forward  before  the  promised  support  reached  him,  and 
commenced  to  form  his  line  in  continuation  of  the  north  end 
of  the  field,  Gregg’s  being  on  the  right  and  Johnson’s  on  the 
left,  extending  through  this  cornfield  south  of  Vidito’s  house  and 
to  the  Crawfish-Spring  road.  Receiving  information  that  the 
Union  forces  occupied  the  ridge  beyond  Vidito’s  field,  and  west 
of  the  Crawfish-Spring  road,  he  ordered  skirmishers  to  be 
thrown  from  the  left  brigade  in  that  direction  to  protect  his 
left  flank.  The  advance  commenced  about  the  time  Deas’ 
brigade  formed,  facing  west,  on  the  ridge  just  left  by  Johnson’s 
brigades.  Gen.  Deas  was  directed  to  move  straight  to  his 
front  until  his  right  reached  the  position  of  Johnson’s  left,  then 
wheel  to  the  right,  sweeping  the  ridge  west  of  the  road,  and 
come  up  and  form  on  the  left  of  Johnson’s  line. 

But  before  Gen.  Johnson  moved  forward,  Gen.  Kershaw 
made  the  assault,  his  own  brigade  being  on  the  left  and 
Humphrey’s  on  the  right.  Humphrey  advanced  and  engaged 
Wood’s  command,  while  the  left  of  Kershaw’s,  consisting  of  the 
Second  and  Third  South-Carolina  and  James’  battalion,  being 
posted  opposite  the  section  of  our  artillery,  dashed  at  Stanley’s 
brigade,  and,  after  a  most  determined  struggle,  in  some  places 


THE  ASSAULTS  ON  HORSESHOE  RIDGE.  135 

gained  the  crest  of  the  hill  within  a  few  yards  of  our  lines. 
But  the  enemy  was  baffled  in  his  efforts;  those  of  his  troops 
who  reached  the  crest  were  driven  down  the  hill  or  killed,  and 
the  whole  of  Kershaw  s  force  was  repulsed  with  slaughter  and 
followed  some  distance  down  the  slope.  Gen.  Humphrey  re¬ 
ported  that  he  could  not  advance  on  account  of  his  right  flank 
being  exposed,  and  he  was  ordered  not  to  advance  but  to  make 
dispositions  to  secure  the  right  flank  of  Kershaw’s  forces. 

Soon  after  the  repulse  of  Kershaw,  the  rebel  Gen.  B.  R. 
Johnson  with  his  two  brigades  advanced,  his  left  passing  over 
our  wagons,  caissons,  and  some  cannon,  captured  before  by 
the  enemy,  and  the  line  reached  the  brow  of  the  secondary 
spurs  or  foot-hills,  north  of  Vidito’s  house.  Four  of  Dent’s  and 
three  of  Everett’s  guns  were  placed  in  position  on  the  spur 
occupied  by  Johnson’s  brigade  and  two  of  Dent’s  upon  the  hill 
with  Gregg’s.  The  artillery  opened,  and  at  2  p.m.  the  line 
again  advanced  toward  the  crest  of  the  ridge  under  a  very 
severe  Are  from  our  men.  The  left  of  the  enemy  found  a 
position  where  they  could  hold  our  troops  in  check;  part  of 
our  force  advanced  on  that  flank  of  the  enemy  along  a  sec¬ 
ondary  spur  which  united  at  the  elevation,  at  the  west  end 
of  the  main  ridge,  with  that  upon  which  the  left  of  Johnson 
was  fighting,  but  was  held  in  check  by  the  oblique  fire  of  the 
enemy. 

Gregg’s  brigade  gained  the  crest  of  the  ridge  after  a  sharp 
contest,  driving  our  defenders  down  the  northern  slope  by  their 
volume  of  firing;  but  our  men  rallied  and,  charging  in  return  on 
the  scattering  rebels  who  had  no  support  on  the  right,  drove 
them  from  the  crest  down  the  slope  by  which  they  ascended. 
There  Lieut.-Col.  Tillman  of  the  Forty-first  Tennessee  regiment 
of  Gregg’s  brigade  was  severely  wounded.  When  Gregg’s  bri¬ 
gade  fell  back,  Johnson’s,  under  our  flank-fire,  was  also  obliged 
to  fall  back. 

Anderson’s  brigade  of  Hindman’s  division,  before  Johnson 
moved  to  the  assault,  filled  up  the  space  between  his  right  and 
Kershaw’s  forces.  When  Johnson  moved  in  assault,  Gen.  Ander¬ 
son  also  moved,  and  soon  was  covered  with  a  shower  of  bullets 
from  the  ridge.  The  rebel  brigade  pressed  on  and  a  portion  of 
two  of  his  regiments  gained  the  crest  of  the  ridge  and  planted 


CHICICAMAUGA. 


136 

colors  there,  “but,”  he  says*  in  his  report,  “the  position  was  a 
hot  one;”  his  troops  were  impetuously  driven  down  the  hill, 
but  rallied  and  after  sustaining  firing  for  some  time,  finally  fell 
back  to  the  position  previously  occupied. 

Thus  the  triumphant  ardor  of  the  rebels  in  breaking  our 
lines,  chasing  our  routed  troops,  capturing  men,  cannon,  and 
trains,  was  very  much  cooled  down  by  these  assaults,  in  which 
they  sustained  fearful  losses.  In  place  of  walking  over  our — as 
it  seemed  to  them — beaten  and  demoralized  fugitives,  they  met 
at  Horseshoe  Ridge  a  wall  of  adamant,  on  which  stood  men 
whose  courage  and  determination  bordered  on  the  sublime,  and 
whose  patriotism  spurned  death  itself. 

Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  although  commander  only  of  a  brigade 
and  now  in  command  of  a  temporary  division,  was  one  of  the 
best,  if  not  the  best,  general  in  Bragg’s  army.  He  saw  that 
our  line  was  weak  on  our  right,  and  now  commenced  making 
preparations  to  turn  it.  Hindman,  receiving  a  slight  contusion 
in  the  neck  from  a  piece  of  shell,  placed  Johnson  in  command 
of  the  left  wing,  consisting  of  his  own  and  Johnson’s  divisions. 
Manigault’s  brigade  of  Hindman’s  division  came  up  and  ad¬ 
vanced  through  Vidito’s  corn-field,  and  Deas  swept  the  ridge 
west  of  the  road.  Both  formed  on  the  left  and  in  continuation 
of  Johnson’s  line.  McNair’s  brigade  joined  Johnson  and  formed 
in  the  rear  of  Johnson’s  brigade.  The  line  of  the  brigades, 
commencing  from  the  left,  was:  Deas’,  Manigault’s,  Johnson’s, 
Gregg’s,  and  Anderson’s,  with  McNair’s  behind  Johnson’s. 
Deas’  occupied  the  brow  of  the  steep  spur  which  forms  the 
north  side  of  the  gorge  through  which  the  Crawfish-Spring 
road  passes  Missionary  Ridge;  Manigault’s  stretched  across 
the  ravine,  between  the  two  western  spurs  of  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
and  extended  up  the  side  of  this  adjacent  spur  to  the  right,  on 
which  Johnson’s  and  McNair’s,  with  seven  pieces  of  artillery, 
were  posted;  Gregg’s  was  formed  on  a  spur  of  some  greater 
length,  extending  more  toward  the  east  and  separated  in  part 
from  the  main  ridge  by  a  hollow  with  a  piece  of  table-land  at 
its  head  to  the  west;  Anderson’s  formed  in  two  lines  on  the 
right,  the  front  line  extending  up  the  slope  of  the  spur*  on 
which  Gregg’s  was  formed  on  the  left,  and  across  the  hollow 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  Patton  Anderson,  C.S.,  October  6,  1863. 


THE  ASSAULTS  ON  HORSESHOE  RIDGE. 


137 

on  the  right.  The  section  of  Dent’s  battery  was  moved  to  the 
hollow  on  the  right,  ready  to  be  run  up  by  hand  on  the  main 
ridge  as  soon  as  it  should  be  carried.  Kershaw  was  on  the 
right  but  not  connected  with  this  line. 

Thus  the  enemy  was  preparing  a  skilful  movement  of  two 
divisions,  by  which  he  expected  to  turn  the  right  of  our  force 
on  Horseshoe  Ridge  and,  with  the  front  attack  of  Kershaw’s 
division,  sweep  it  from  the  ridge. 

Our  three  brigades  of  the  reserve  corps,  under  Gen.  Granger, 
were  posted  on  the  Chattanooga-and- Ringgold  road  —  Dan. 
McCook’s,  at  McAffee  church;  and  Whittaker’s  and  Mitchell’s, 
under  Gen.  Steedman,  at  the  Red-House  bridge.  Alarmed  by 
the  fierceness  of  the  conflict  on  the  battle-field,  at  11.30  a.m., 
Granger  ordered  Gen.  Steedman  to  move  with  his  brigades  to 
the  battle-field  and  report  to  Gen.  Thomas.  Steedman  moved 
at  once  and,  after  marching  five  miles  with  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
hanging  on  his  left  flank  and  shelling  his  troops  for  two  miles  of 
the  distance,  reached  the  ridge  and  reported  to  Gen.  Thomas 
at  1.30  p.m.  He  first  received  orders  to  form  on  the  left  of 
Wood’s  division  and  was  getting  into  position,  when  Thomas, 
probably  learning  of  the  enemy’s  preparations  to  assault  Bran- 
nan’s  right,  directed  Gen.  Granger,  who  had  reported  to  him,  to 
send  Steedman  to  support  Brannan’s  right,  and  to  put  Dan. 
McCook’s  brigade,  with  a  battery  of  artillery,  on  the  heights 
west  of  McDannel’s. 

The  enemy’s  left,  consisting  of  B.  R.  Johnson’s  division  and 
two  brigades  of  Hindman’s,  was  instructed  to  attack,  moving 
in  a  sort  of  a  wheel  to  the  right,  the  right  of  Johnson’s  being 
a  pivot,  while  Anderson’s,  Kershaw’s,  and  Humphrey’s  bri¬ 
gades  should  attack  to  the  front.  The  enemy’s  batteries 
opened  a  rapid  fire  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and,  the  infantry 
advancing,  a  fearful  roll  of  musketry  broke  out  on  both  sides 
along  the  whole  of  our  position.  Deas’  and  Manigault’s  bri¬ 
gades  were  reaching  the  heights  and  assailing  the  right  of 
Brannan,  while  Johnson’s,  Gregg’s,  and  McNairs  supported 
those  brigades  on  the  right  and  pressed  on,  climbing  to  the 
crest;  Anderson  and  Kershaw  were  dashing  at  the  hill  directly 
in  their  front. 

The  smoke  was  so  dense  that  only  the  rows  of  flashes  from 


10 


138 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


their  guns  marked  the  situation  of  the  contending  lines,  but 
they  showed  that  the  enemy  was  gaining  ground,  and  it  looked 
as  though  our  heroes  were  going  to  be  swept  from  the  ridge. 

But  Steedman’s  batteries  were  in  position,  his  brigades  were 
ready;  Whittaker’s  brigade — supported  on  the  left  by  the  Eighty- 
ninth  Ohio  of  Turchin’s,  and  the  Twenty-second  Michigan  of 
Dooolittle’s  brigade,  both  temporarily  attached — impetuously 
charged  Deas’  and  Manigault’s  brigades;  Mitchell’s  brigade,  com¬ 
ing  up  on  Whittaker’s  left,  joined  in  the  charge.  Whittaker 
was  knocked  off  his  horse  and  stunned,  and  Steedman’s  horse 
was  killed  under  him.  Bruised  and  hatless,  Steedman,  seeing  one 
of  his  regiments  wavering,  seized  its  flag  and  placing  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  regiment,  led  it  into  the  fight.  The  whole  of  our 
line,  shouting  vehemently,  rushed  upon  the  enemy.  The  shock 
was  irresistible,  and  the  rebel  wave  stopped,  vacillated,  and 
then  rolled  back  down  the  steep  slope  which  they  had  so 
valiantly  and  successfully  climbed  but  half  an  hour  before. 

The  rebels  were  driven  back  to  their  guns  on  their  left; 
Anderson’s  disordered  brigade  was  pursued  by  our  men  down 
the  slope  of  the  ridge,  when  Kershaw’s  men  rushed  to  its 
rescue;  Anderson’s  men  promptly  rallied  and  opened  fire,  and 
our  line  commenced  to  fall  back,  when  the  South  Carolinians 
of  Kershaw  dashed  after  them.  The  Second  South-Carolina 
regiment,  under  Lieut.-Col.  Gaillard,  gained  the  crest,  but  was 
soon  obliged  to  retire  with  the  others. 

Such  was  the  rebel  attack  upon  our  extreme  right.  It 
lasted  but  half  an  hour,  but  in  the  intensity  and  ferocity  of 
the  struggle,  and  the  wonderful  bravery  of  our  soldiers,  it 
could  not  have  been  surpassed.  All  three  of  Hindman’s  bri¬ 
gades  sustained  such  losses  in  their  repulse  and  were  so  seri¬ 
ously  demoralized  that  they  were  not  used  again  that  day.* 

Gen.  Granger,  in  his  report  of  September  30,  1863,  speaking 
of  the  attack  of  Steedman’s  brigades,  says:  “the  slaughter  of 
both  friend  and  foe  was  frightful.  Gen.  Whittaker,  while  rush¬ 
ing  forward  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  was  knocked  off  his 
horse  by  a  musket-ball,  and  was  for  a  short  time  rendered 
unfit  for  duty,  while  two  of  his  staff-officers  were  killed  and 
two  mortally  wounded.  Gen.  Steedman’s  horse  was  killed 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  C.S.,  October  24,  1863. 


139 


THE  ASSAULTS  ON  HORSESHOE  RIDGE. 

and  -he  was  severely  bruised,  yet  he  was  able  to  remain  on 
duty  during  the  day.  This  attack  was  made  by  our  troops, 
very  few  of  whom  had  ever  been  in  an  action  before,  against 
a  division  of  old  soldiers  who  largely  outnumbered  them.  Yet 
with  resolution  and  energy  they  drove  the  enemy  from  this 
position,  occupied  it  themselves,  and  afterward  held  the  ground 
they  had  gained  with  such  terrible  losses.  The  victory  was 
dearly  won,  but  to  this  army  it  was  a  priceless  one.” 

Rebel  Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson,  speaking  in  his  report  of  this 
repulse  on  their  left,  says:  “The  retreat  on  this  hill  was  pre¬ 
cipitate,  and  called  for  all  the  exertions  I  could  command  to 
prevent  many  of  the  troops  from  abandoning  it.  The  officers, 
however,  joined  with  every  energy  and  zeal  in  the  effort  to 
stay  the  retreat,  and  by  appeals,  commands,  and  physical  efforts, 
all  save  a  few,  who  persisted  in  skulking  behind  trees  or  lying 
idly  on  the  ground,  were  brought  up  to  our  lines  in  support 
of  the  artillery.  In  the  meantime,  our  batteries  were  promptly 
opened  and  gallantly  served  amid  a  shower  of  the  enemy’s 
bullets,  and,  together  with  the  best  and  the  bravest  of  our 
infantry,  who  promptly  rallied  on  our  artillery,  poured  such  a 
volume  of  fire  upon  the  advancing  foe  that  his  onward  progress 
was  effectually  stayed.” 

This  candid  account  of  one  of  our  ablest  enemies,  unmistak¬ 
ably  demonstrates  what  an  irresistable  attack  Steedman’s  two 
full  brigades  and  one  demi-brigade  made  on  the  five  brigades  of 
the  enemy’s  turning  troops.  Deas’  and  Manigault’s  brigades, 
which  were  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  enemy’s  line,  were 
completely  broken,  and  retired  to  the  rear,  remaining  there 
till  the  end  of  the  day.  Johnson  says  that  about  5  p.m.,  he 
sent  his  acting  aide-de-camp ,  Lieut.  Geo.  Marchbanks,  to  re¬ 
quest  Brig.-Gens.  Deas  and  Manigault  to  bring  up  their  bri¬ 
gades  to  his  support,  but  “Deas  replied  that  on  consultation 
with  Brig.-Gen.  Manigault,  they  had  decided  that  it  would  not 
be  safe  to  put  their  commands  in  the  same  position  without 
the  support  of  fresh  troops.”  This  shows  how  badly  the 
enemy  was  beaten  and  demoralized  in  that  assault,  and  that  a 
few  thousands  of  fresh  troops  on  our  side,  thrown  at  this  time 
against  his  left  would  have  driven  him  away  from  the  ridge. 

And  now  when  this  last  carefully-prepared  and  spiritedly- 


140 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


executed  assault  proved  futile,  showing  that  our  position  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge  was  virtually  impregnable,  Gen.  Longstreet 
decided  to  still  continue  the  assaults  and  maintain  the  dis¬ 
graceful  slaughter  of  his  brave  men  for  no  valuable  object 
whatever.  If  he  had  possessed  the  discriminating  eye  of  a 
talented  general,  he  could  have  long  since  discovered  the  weak 
place  in  our  formation,  which,  had  it  been  attacked,  by  the 
combined  assault  of  his  own  and  Gen.  Polk’s  forces  would  have 
inflicted  more  harm  on  our  army  than  all  the  assaults  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge  after  3  p.m.,  could  have  possibly  accomplished. 

When  our  centre  was  broken  and  Brannan  had  to  fall  back, 
carrying  with  him  most  of  the  second  brigade  under  Col. 
King  of  Reynolds’  division,  the  balance  of  that  brigade  also 
fell  back  some  distance  to  the  rear,  but  was  reformed  with 
some  stragglers  from  Croxton’s  by  Gen.  Reynolds,  who  was 
with  that  brigade  during  the  enemy’s  attack  on  our  centre. 

Our  left  wing,  that  had  remained  intact  after  the  enemy’s  at¬ 
tack  upon  and  during  the  breaking  of  our  centre  and  right, 
consisted  of  Baird’s,  Johnson’s,  and  Palmer’s  divisions,  and 
Turchin’s  brigade  of  Reynolds’  division.  Gen.  Turchin  with 
his  brigade  thus  stood  on  the  extreme  right  of  our  present 
left  wing,  with  his  right  flank  in  air.  The  fighting  on  his 
right  was  going  farther  and  farther  to  the  right  and  rear, 
therefore  it  became  necessary  for  him  to  change  his  front 
to  the  right  rear  and  face  south,  which  was  done.  Gen.  Reyn¬ 
olds,  joining  him  with  what  there  remained  of  the  second 
brigade — perhaps  several  hundred  men — formed  this  detach¬ 
ment  as  support  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Turchin’s  brigade  in 
echelon.  Reynolds’  present  force  stood  east  of  the  Chatta¬ 
nooga  road,  and  between  his  right  and  the  eastern  hill  of 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  on  which  Wood’s  forces  were,  was  an  inter¬ 
val  of  not  less  than  half  a  mile,  wholly  unoccupied  by  any 
of  our  troops. 

The  front  of  our  army,  after  the  rout,  was  composed  of 
two  lines,  one  running  east  and  west,  passing  along  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge,  across  this  half-mile  interval,  and  along  Reynolds’ 
present  front  to  its  left;  and  the  other,  an  almost  north-and- 
south  line,  commencing  at  Reynolds’  left  or  Palmer’s  right, 
and  continuing  along  the  front  of  Palmer’s,  Johnson’s,  and 


\  T  \ 

X 


THE  ASSAULTS  ON  HORSESHOE  RIDGE.  141 

Baird’s  divisions.  These  two  lines  intersected  each  other  at 
almost  a  right  angle,  probably  at  an  angle  of  about  1150,  the 
north-and-south  line  bending  to  the  west  near  its  north  end, 
where  stood  Baird’s  division. 

Now,  there  stood  two  lines  of  our  army  formed  at  almost 
a  right  angle  to  each  other,  both  strongly  protected  by  barri¬ 
cades,  one  wholly  impregnable,  the  other  nearly  so,  sepa¬ 
rated  from  each  other  by  a  half-a-mile-long  interval  entirely 
unoccupied.  Where  was,  then,  the  weakest  place  in  our  posi¬ 
tion?  A  blind,  but  thoroughly- posted,  soldier  would  have 
known  where  it  was,  but  the  rebel  chieftain  did  not.  This  hole 
Gen.  Thomas  was  thinking  of  patching  with  Steedman’s  divis¬ 
ion,  but  Steedman  was  needed  on  the  extreme  right,  so  the 
interval  remained  open  all  the  time,  inviting  the  enemy  to 
wedge  in  and  tear  our  army  asunder.  What  is  still  more 
curious,  that  opposite  to,  and  fronting  this  interval,  the 
greater  part  of  Stewart’s  division  stood,  and  behind  it,  the 
whole  of  Preston’s  division — the  strongest  division  in  Bragg’s 
whole  army.  They  stood  there  until  3.30  p.m.,  doing  abso¬ 
lutely  nothing;  Stewart’s,  because  it  was  worsted  in  the  tore- 
noon  attack;  and  Preston’s,  because  Longstreet  had  till  now 
kept  it  in  the  reserve. 

Gen.  Longstreet  in  his  report,  says:  “It  was  evident  that 
with  this  position  [meaning  the  position  on  Horseshoe  Ridge] 
gained,  I  should  be  master  of  the  field.  I  therefore  ordered 
Gen.  Buckner  to  move  Preston  forward.”  It  is  evident  that 
he  considered  that  the  key  to  our  whole  position  was  on  that 
ridge;  but  the  tactical  key  of  the  position  changes  its  place  dur¬ 
ing  a  long-continued  battle  with  the  changes  made  in  the  line 
of  battle.  Except  that,  the  key  of  a  position  is  a  single  point 
by  gaining  which  a  great  advantage  is  gained.  Half  of  the 
front  of  an  army  can  not  be  considered  as  the  key  of  the 
position.  If  the  taking  of  the  position  on  the  ridge  would 
have  given  Longstreet  the  mastership  of  the  field,  so  likewise 
the  taking  of  the  barricades  of  our  left  wing  by  Polk  would 
have  given  him  the  mastership  of  that  field. 

But  as  both  fronts  were  virtually  impregnable,  the  key  to 
the  mastership  of  the  field  ought  to  have  been  looked  for 
somewhere  else,  and  it  was  right  there  in  the  open  half  mile 


142 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


space  between  the  wings.  This  was  the  key  to  our  last  posi¬ 
tion,  the  key  to  our  final  destruction.  If  Longstreet,  instead 
of  ordering  Preston  to  attack  Horseshoe  Ridge,  had  sup¬ 
ported  him  by  Stewart  and,  say,  by  Cheatham  who  until  that 
time  had  not  been  used  during  the  day,  and  wedged  those 
three  divisions  into  this  space  between  our  two  wings,  while 
the  other  rebel  troops  took  the  offensive  at  the  same  time  all 
along  the  lines,  it  is  frightful  to  contemplate  what  would  have 
become  of  our  decimated  army.  Fortunately  for  us  such  a 
move  by  the  enemy  was  not  undertaken. 

Thus  it  was  decided  by  Longstreet  to  lead  a  new  victim  in 
the  shape  of  Preston’s  division  to  be  slaughtered  at  Horseshoe 
Ridge,  to  get  the  mastership  of  our  field,  and  the  slaughter  of 
the  innocents  commenced.  We  say  “of  the  innocents”  advis¬ 
edly,  as  it  was  the  first  time  that  that  fine  division  was  to 
participate  in  a  great  battle.* 

At  3.30  p.m.,  Gen.  Preston  received  orders  to  move  to 
Dyers’  field  to  support  Kershaw,  and  leaving  Trigg’s  brigade 
with  Gen.  Buckner  in  his  former  position,  he  moved  with  two 
other  brigades,  Gracie’s,  consisting  of  five  regiments,  (one  was 
left  on  the  Chickamauga  with  the  trains),  and  Kelly’s,  of  four 
regiments,  and  formed  them  in  the  rear  of  Kershaw’s  forces — 
Gracie  on  the  right,  Kelly  on  the  left — thus  facing  Battery  Hill 
with  our  forces  to  the  right  and  left  of  it  on  Horseshoe  Ridge. 

And  then,  soon  after  4  p.m.,  the  fiercest  and  the  bloodiest 
assault  commenced,  in  which  Gracie,  supported  by  half  of  the 
forces  of  Kershaw  on  the  right,  Kelly  with  part  of  Anderson’s 
in  the  centre,  and  the  whole  of  Johnson’s  division  on  the  left 
of  the  line  participated.  Gracie  moved  through  Kershaw’s 
ranks  toward  the  ridge  over  a  hollow,  and  was  met  by  a  fearful 
volume  of  artillery  and  musketry  fire  from  our  men;  but  the 
rebels  advanced  without  firing  a  shot  until  they  reached  a  sort 
of  a  narrow  terrace,  when  they  opened  fire,  still  advancing,  and 
almost  reaching  the  summit.  So  did  Kelly’s  brigade,  which 
approached  close  to  our  lines.  With  a  distance  in  some  places 
of  not  over  thirty  or  forty  steps,  the  unsheltered  rebel  line 
stood  opposite  our  protected  line,  delivering  a  rapid  fire  and 
answered  by  our  volleys  for  over  an  hour. 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  W.  Preston,  C.-S.  Army,  October  31,  1863. 


THE  ASSAULTS  ON  HORSESHOE  RIDGE. 


143 


Only  new  troops  could  accomplish  such  a  wonderful  feat. 
Lieut. -Col.  Fulkerson,  commanding-  the  Sixty-third  Tennes¬ 
see,  Lieut. -Col.  Jolly,  commanding  the  Forty-third  Alabama ; 
Lieut. -Col.  Holt,  commanding  the  First- Alabama  battalion, 
and  Lieut. -Col.  Hall  of  the  Second-Alabama  battalion,  all  of 
Gracie  s  brigade,  were  severely  wounded,  and  many  brave 
officers  and  men  fell.  The  brigade  carried  into  action  2003 
officers  and  men,  and  in  the  space  of  an  hour  lost  698,  killed 
and  wounded.  So  it  was  in  Kelly’s  brigade;  out  of  852,  the 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  303.  Of  Kershaw’s  command, 
the  Second,  Fighth,  and  Fifteenth  South-Carolina  participated 
with  Gracie’s  brigade,  while  the  Seventh  Mississippi  of  Ander¬ 
son  s  brigade,  supported  Kelly.  The  loss  in  Kershaw’s  bri¬ 
gade  was  504. 

While  this  was  going  on  the  right  of  the  rebel  line,  the 
brigades  of  Johnson’s  division  on  the  left,  advanced  several 
times,  and  were  in  turn  forced  to  yield  a  portion  of  the 
ground  gained,  and,  although  finally  ordered  by  the  division- 
corn  rrn’v'er  to  advance  as  far  as  possible,  then  hold  their 
position  and  never  retreat,  yet  it  is  presumed  they  never 
carried  out  that  order,  as  his  lines  never  reached  the  summit 
of  the  ridge  until  our  troops  left  it. 

But,  notwithstanding  such  an  unparalled  assault,  our  heroes 
on  the  ridge  stood  firm.  Their  firing  was  cool  and  deliberate, 
almost  automatic ;  only  occasionally  when  a  daring  color- 
bearer  of  the  enemy  reached  our  breastworks  and  planted  the 
rebel  stars-and-bars  on  it,  there  would  be  an  excitement  and 
a  rush  to  cut  it  down,  which  always  succeeded,  sometimes  the 
bearer  of  the  flag  himself  being  struck  down.  Sometimes  to 
save  his  flag  he  -would  throw  it  flying  down  the  hill  before 
escaping  himself.  Rebel  Gen. .Preston  in  his  report  mentions 
that  the  Second-Alabama  battalion  of  Gracie’s  brigade  in  the 
assault,  out  of  239  men,  lost  169  killed  and  wounded,  and  that 
its  colors  were  pierced  by  bullets  in  eighty-three  places,  and 
were  “presented  to  his  Excellency  the  President,  who  pro¬ 
moted  the  brave  standard-bearer,  Robert  W.  Hirth,  for  con¬ 
spicuous  courage.” 

It  was  not  so  much  the  rebel  attacks  as  the  lack  of  ammu¬ 
nition  that  troubled  our  heroes  on  the  ridge.  Duiing  the 


144 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


rout  and  disorder,  all  of  the  ammunition- train  that  was  not 
captured  moved  away,  and  our  fighters  on  the  ridge  had  to 
empty  the  cartridge-boxes  of  their  dead  and  wounded  com¬ 
rades.  Steedman  brought  some  extra  ammunition  with  his 
brigades,  which  was  distributed  to  Brannan’s  troops  and  others, 
but  it  gave  only  about  ten  cartridges  apiece,  which  were  soon 
consumed,  and  then  the  men  fixed  bayonets,  and  were  pre¬ 
paring  to  use  them  in  repelling  the  assaults. 

During  this  time  and  while  the  fighting  at  the  ridge  was  at 
its  highest  pitch,  it  was  decided  by  the  division-commanders 
of  our  left  to  send  a  brigade  to  the  ridge.  It  appeared  that 
Hazen’s  men  had  nearly  forty  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man, 
and  his  brigade  was  designated  for  the  purpose.  Gen.  Hazen 
moved  at  double-quick  to  the  scene  of  action,  and  rushed  into 
the  fight  at  once  at  the  east  end  of  the  ridge,  sending  the 
Ninth-Indiana  regiment  to  Brannan.  Between  4  and  5  p.m., 
the  ammunition-train  of  Gen.  Thomas  being  brought  to  the 
lines,  the  commanders  were  notified  to  distribute  the  ammuni¬ 
tion.  About  the  same  time,  or  a  little  earlier,  Gen.  Garfield 
succeeded  in  reaching  Gen.  Thomas,  and  became  a  witness  of 
the  fight  during  the  severest  assaults  of  the  enemy  on  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge.  Gen.  Thomas  also  received  an  order  from  Gen. 
Rosecrans  to  assume  command  of  all  the  troops,  to  withdraw 
to  Rossville,  and  occupy  a  position  at  that  place. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  SECOND  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT.  TURCHIN’S  CHARGE 
TO  THE  REAR.  CAPTURE  OF  THREE  REGIMENTS. 

BUT  while  all  this  conflict  and  destruction  was  being  carried 
on  in  the  front  of  and  upon  Horseshoe  Ridge,  Gen. 
Bragg  ordered  an  assault  to  be  made  upon  the  troops  of  our 
left  wing,  who  had  been  quietly  lying  behind  their  barricades 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  afternoon;  and  while  Thomas 
was  sending  orders  to  various  commanders,  preparing  them  for 
withdrawal,  commencing  with  the  troops  of  Gen.  Reynolds, 
Bragg  was  completing  the  arrangements  for  his  right  to  make 
another  assault  upon  our  left  wing. 

In  his  report  of  December  28,  1863,  Gen.  Bragg  says: 
“About  2  p.m.,  passing  along  the  line  to  our  left,  I  found  we 
had  been  checked  in  our  progress  by  encountering  a  strong 
position,  strengthened  by  works,  and  obstinately  defended. 
Unable  to  afford  assistance  from  any  other  part  of  the  field, 
written  orders  were  immediately  despatched  to  Lieut. -Gen. 
Polk  to  again  assault  the  enemy  in  his  front  with  his  whole 
force,  and  to  persist  until  he  should  dislodge  him  from  his 
position.  Directing  the  operations  on  our  left  to  be  continued, 
I  moved  again  to  the  right  and  soon  despatched  a  staff-officer 
to  Gen.  Polk,  urging  a  prompt  and  vigorous  execution  of  my 
written  orders.” 

Bragg  was  evidently  a  great  stickler  for  red-tape  business, 
and  his  orders  for  important  movements  were  always  given 
in  black  and  white  so  as  to  place  him  in  the  right  beyond  any 
controversy  when  his  orders  were  not  strictly  obeyed  b\  his 
subordinate  commanders.  But  in  almost  eveiy  instance  dur¬ 
ing  this  campaign  he  was  disappointed,  because  the  combina¬ 
tions  he  was  making  refused  to  assume  the  piactical  shape  in 
the  way  he  had  conceived  them.  Was  it  his  own  fault  01  the 
fault  of  his  subordinates?  It  looks  as  if  there  were  something 
wanting  on  both  sides.  He  had  not  that  capacity  of  a  math¬ 
ematician,  so  necessary  for  the  commander- in- chief,  which 

145 


146 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


calculates  everything  to  a  nicety,  in  order  to  put  the  troops 
into  action  during  a  certain  time  and  at  a  certain  place,  the 
various  distances  to  be  made  by  various  columns,  the  number 
of  roads,  their  direction  and  condition  for  the  passage  of 
artillery  and  trains,  the  various  eventualities  to  be  encountered 
while  moving,  and  a  great  many  other  details,  all  of  which 
determine  the  promptness  and  punctuality  of  several  columns 
in  concentrating.  In  his  failures  to  destroy  our  army  corps 
when  widely  separated  after  crossing  the  mountains,  he  clearly 
showed  that  he  was  lacking  in  that  needful  capacity  for  con¬ 
centrating  his  troops. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  clear  that  he  was  unpopular 
among  his  subordinates  of  the  highest  rank;  that  they  even 
doubted  his  capacity  for  commanding  an  army.  And  without 
unbounded  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  commander-in¬ 
chief,  perfect  harmony  of  the  operations  of  the  parts  of  an 
army  is  impossible,  and  no  army  regulations  can  remedy  it. 
Having  issued  his  written  orders  to  Polk  soon  after  2  p.m., 
Bragg  was  later  obliged  to  send  one  of  his  stafif-officefs  to 
urge  Gen.  Polk  to  prompt,  vigorous,  and  immediate  action; 
and  still  he  could  not  have  those  troops  of  his  right  wing  ready 
for  action  until  5  p.m.,  when  we  were  all  ready  to  withdraw. 

Gen.  Hill  was  forming  the  rebel  troops  for  the  assault 
Breckinridge  was  again  designated  at  his  own  request  to  pass 
through  Walker’s  troops  to  the  front  and  attack  our  extreme 
left;  while  Cleburne,  supported  by  Jackson’s  and  Maney’s 
brigades  of  Cheatham’s  division,  who  filled  the  space  between 
Breckinridge  and  Cleburne,  were  to  attack  in  front.  Stewart 
was  to  participate  in  the  attack  on  the  left  of  Cleburne,  while 
Liddell’s  division  of  two  brigades  of  Walker’s  corps  was  to 
move  beyond  the  extreme  left  of  our  line,  take  possession  of 
the  Chattanooga  road,  and,  forming  across  it,  be  ready  to 
cooperate  with  the  front  attack  by  cutting  off  the  retreat  of 
our  troops  when  driven  from  the  works,  or  to  attack  them  in 
the  rear.  Gist’s  division,  posted  on  the  left  of  Liddell’s,  was 
ordered  to  cooperate  with  the  last,  in  its  attack. 

In  his  report  of  October  10,  1863,  Gen.  Liddell  says:  “About 
6  p.m.,*  Lieut.-Gen.  Hill  ordered  me  to  move  straight  forward 

*  Probably  5  p.m. 


THE  SECOND  ASSAULT  ON  OUR  LEFT.  147 

and  occupy  the  Chattanooga  road.  I  requested  Gen.  Hill  to 
support  me  on  the  left,  as  I  was  satisfied  from  personal  obser¬ 
vation  during  Col.  Govan’s  attack  [meaning  before  noon]  that 
I  would  be  enfiladed.  This  he  said  he  would  give  me,  and  I 
moved  ofif  at  once.  The  line  had  passed  some  little  distance 
beyond  the  Chattanooga  road,  meeting  with  little  or  no  resist¬ 
ance  to  that  point,  when,  as  expected,  it  was  enfiladed  by 
batteries  on  both  flanks,  while  a  battery  in  front  played  upon 
it  across  a  waste  field.  I  immediately  placed  seven  pieces  of 
artillery  on  a  high  point  on  the  right  of  Walthall’s  brigade, 
which  held  the  right  wing  [meaning  of  his  division]  to  engage 
the  enemy’s  batteries  and  draw  the  fire,  if  possible,  from  the 
infantry.  My  line  was  parallel  with  the  enemy’s  works  [mean¬ 
ing,  probably,  works  of  our  extreme  left],  and  in  his  rear,  upon 
his  left  flank,  nearly  half  a  mile.  Here  I  had  halted  and 
ordered  the  men  to  lie  down,  no  enemy  just  then  appearing  in 
front.  There  was  a  wide  open  field  in  front  and  on  my  left.” 

When  Walthall’s  and  Govan’s  brigades  of  Liddell’s  division 
assumed  this  position  across  the  Chattanooga  road,  numbers  of 
their  skirmishers  filled  up  the  woods  south  of  McDannel’s 
fields  on  the  west  side  of  the  road  between  Kelley’s  and 
Snodgrass’  fields.  At  the  northwest  corner  of  Kelley’s  field 
Willich’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division  was  lying,  and  his  bat¬ 
tery  opened  fire  on  Liddell’s  front.  Dan.  McCook’s  brigade 
of  the  reserve  corps,  with  a  battery  was  posted  on  the  heights 
west  of  McDannel’s  fields,  and  that  battery  engaged  Swett’s 
battery,  commanded  by  Lieut.  Shannon,  of  Liddell  s  division. 
Probably  from  this  battery  of  Liddell’s,  Reynolds’  troops,  fac¬ 
ing  south  were  receiving  occasional  cannon-shots  from  the 

rear  just  before  leaving  their  position. 

At  5.30  p.m.,  Gen.  Reynolds  was  notified,  through  Capt. 
Barker  of  Thomas’  staff,  to  commence  the  withdrawal.  Gen. 
Turchin  moved  his  brigade  in  two  lines  by  the  right  flank  to 
the  rear  along  the  Chattanooga  road,  Col.  Robinson,  now  com¬ 
manding  the  detachment  of  King’s  brigade,  (Col.  E.  A.  King 
having  been  killed  during  the  afternoon  by  a  stiay  bullet), 
moving  in  the  rear.  Gen.  Thomas,  leaving  his  position  in  the 
rear  of  Gen.  Wood  on  the  ridge  to  meet  Reynolds  and  point 
out  to  him  the  position  where  he  wished  him  to  form  his 


148 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


command  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  other  troops  of  our  left, 
was  passing  through  open  woods  bordering  on  the  Chatta¬ 
nooga  road  toward  Reynolds’  former  position,  when  he  was 
informed  by  some  of  our  soldiers  who  had  been  hunting  for 
water,  that  there  was  a  large  rebel  force  in  those  woods  drawn 
up  in  line  and  advancing  toward  him.  Of  course  Thomas  did 
not  know  what  force  it  was,  and  what  was  behind  it.  These 
were  the  skirmishers  of  Liddell’s  division  of  the  enemy,  which 
formed  across  the  Chattanooga  road  beyond  our  extreme  left, 
preparing  to  move  to  the  rear  of  our  line,  and  were  supported 
by  a  battery. 

Reynolds  was  told  what  was  in  the  woods  and  was  ordered 
to  form  Turchin’s  brigade  at  right  angles  to  the  road,  which 
was  done,  and  the  lines  stood  again  in  their  previous  formation 
facing  south.  Gen.  Thomas  was  standing  on  the  left  with 
Gen.  Garfield  and  the  staff,  and  Gen.  Turchin,  not  clearly 
understanding  what  was  wanted,  approached  Thomas  and 
asked  him  where  the  enemy  was,  when  he  was  answered, 
“  Right  there  in  the  woods.”  Having  no  time  to  reform  or 
countermarch,*  Turchin  faced  his  brigade  about,  which  was 
in  two  lines,  and  marching  by  the  rear  rank,  met  the  enemy  in 
the  woods.  Some  shots  were  exchanged  and  then  the  brigade 
impetuously  charged  upon  the  enemy,  drove  the  skirmishers 
out  of  the  woods,  and,  undaunted  by  the  volley  received  from 
the  enemy,  took  in  flank  the  left  rebel  brigade  of  Govan, 
struck  at  the  centre  of  Walthall’s  brigade,  and  drove  them 
away  beyond  our  left  and  to  the  right  of  the  Chattanooga 
road,  cleanly  clearing  the  rear  of  our  lines  from  the  enemy,  and 
capturing  nearly  300  prisoners  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  of 
the  battery  that  was  in  the  position  on  the  right  of  the  rebel 
division  and  could  not  escape  with  all  its  guns  from  our  rapid 
advance. 

Gen.  Liddell,  continuing  his  report,  says:  “The  enemy  soon 
after  this,  apparently  left  his  works  and  pressed  upon  the  rear 
of  my  left  flank,  while  his  batteries  enfiladed  me.  Soon 

*  The  detailed  accounts  given  here  and  in  Chapter  VI.  of  the  engagements,  in 
which  Turchin’s  brigade  participated,  were  of  a  matter  that  occurred  under  Gen. 
Turchin’s  individual  observation  and  with  his  participation.  In  other  parts  of 
his  narrative  he  has  collated  the  facts  from  official  letters,  recitals,  and  reports. — 
Publishers. 


turchin’s  charge  to  the  REAR.  149 

afterward,  a  cloud  of  skirmishers  [taking  our  brigade,  which, 
from  the  rapid  motion,  assumed  an  irregular  formation,  for  a 
cloud  of  skirmishers]  suddenly  appeared  from  the  woods,  en¬ 
circling  my  front  and  right  wing.  From  this  combination  of 
attacks  my  command  was  forced  to  withdraw  to  avoid  being 
captured.  A  part  of  my  skirmishers  were,  nevertheless,  capt¬ 
ured,  together  with  Col.  [Junius  I.]  Scales,  Thirtieth  Missis¬ 
sippi  regiment,  Wathall’s  brigade.” 

Lieut.  Shannon,  commanding  Liddell’s  battery,  in  his  re¬ 
port*  says:  “The  infantry  thus  compelled  to  give  way,  I  was 
ordered  to  retire  with  the  battery,  which  was  done  as  expedi¬ 
tiously  as  possible;  but  on  reaching  the  foot  of  the  hill  east  of 

McDannel’s  house,  a  line  of  Union  skirmishers  being  within 
% 

thirty  yards  of  us,  killed  one  off-wheel  horse  in  the  leading 
gun,  thereby  causing  the  piece  to  upset  and  breaking  the  pole. 
The  rest  of  the  battery  passed  the  disabled  piece  before  the 
enemy  had  time  to  reload.  They,  however,  closed  upon  the 
disabled  gun,  quickly  capturing  Lieut.  [W.  P.]  McDonald  and 
several  wounded  men.”  But  there  apparently  was  another 
piece,  “one  lost  by  Capt.  [W.  H.]  P'owler  near  the  same  spot.” 

In  contrast,  with  the  candid  statement  of  the  rebel  Gen. 
Liddell  of  our  attack  on  his  division  and  his  retreat,  may 
be  placed  the  reticence  of  his  brigade  commanders,  Gen. 
Walthall  and  Col.  Govan,  as  to  our  infantry  having  driven 
them  from  their  position,  and  attributing  to  our  artillery 
the  main  cause  of  their  withdrawal.  Farther,  Gen.  Stovall, 
commanding  a  brigade  in  Breckinridge  s  division,  in  his 
report  of  October  3*  1863,  says:  About  that  hour  [4  p.m.] 
I  was  ordered  to  move  my  brigade  to  the  extreme  right 
of  the  line;  again  formed  nearly  parallel  to  the  Chattanooga 
road.  This  latter  movement  was  ordered  that  we  might 
form  the  part  of  a  support  to  the  brigades  of  Brig.-Gens. 
Liddell  and  Walthall.  They  were  soon  driven  in ,  but  were 

immediately  reformed,’  etc.  . 

Gen.  Thomas,  in  his  report,  says  about  this  attack:  “This 

movement  was  made  with  the  utmost  promptitude,  and  facing 
to  the  right,  whilst  on  the  march,  Turchin  threw  his  brigade 

*  Report  of  H.  Shannon,  first  lieutenant,  commanding  Swett’s  battery,  October 
5>  1863. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


150 

upon  the  rebel  force,  routing  them  and  driving  them  in  utter 
confusion  entirely  beyond  Baird’s  left.  In  this  splendid  ad¬ 
vance  more  than  200  prisoners  were  captured  and  sent  to  the 
rear.”  This  praise  is  very  good,  but  if  Gen.  Thomas  knew  at 
the  time  he  wrote  this  report,  the  size  of  the  enemy’s  force 
thus  driven  away,  which  was  about  double  ours,  and  knew 
with  what  intent  that  force  was  advancing,  he  would,  no  doubt, 
have  given  still  more  praise  to  the  brave  men  of  Turchin’s 
brigade. 

That  force  was  supported  by  Gist’s  division  and  had  the 
intention  of  taking  our  divisions  in  flank  and  rear  at  the  time 
when  they  were  to  be  attacked  by  the  whole  line  of  the  rebel 
right  in  front,  and  as  the  time  of  the  withdrawal  of  our  three 
left  divisions  from  the  breastworks  exactly  coincided  with  the 
time  of  the  beginning  of  the  enemy’s  assault,  the  falling  on 
their  flank  of  Liddell’s  and  Gist’s  divisions  at  the  time  they 
were  withdrawing,  would  have  caused  a  fearful  loss.  After 
this  clearing  of  the  rear  by  Turchin’s  brigade,  when  Palmer 
first,  then  Johnson,  and  finally  Baird  were  withdrawing  their 
divisions,  there  was  now  no  enemy  on  their  flank  or  rear  to 
interfere  with  them;  still  they  sustained  some  losses,  being 
greatly  pressed  in  front  at  the  time,  particularly  Baird’s  divis¬ 
ion,  which  suffered  most,  as  there  were  rebel  troops  attacking 
it  in  front  and  partly  in  flank;  but  should  the  enemy’s  front 
attack  have  been  combined  with  an  attack  of  Liddell’s  and 
Gist’s  on  their  flank  and  rear  after  they  left  the  intrenchments, 
Baird’s  division  being  the  last  to  retreat,  would  probably 
have  been  annihilated. 

Gen.  Reynolds,  in  his  report  of  September  23,  1863,  says: 
“The  division  was  faced  about  and  a  charge  ordered  and  exe¬ 
cuted  in  two  lines  at  double-quick  through  the  rebel  lines, 
dispersing  them  and  capturing  more  than  two  hundred  pris¬ 
oners,  under  a  fire  of  infantry  in  front  and  artillery  in  flank.” 
This  statement  of  the  division^commander  is  incorrect.  If  a 
detachment  of  a  few  hundred  men,  among  whom  were  strag¬ 
glers  of  other  commands,  can  be  called  a  brigade,  then  Gen. 
Reynolds  in  the  charge  had  a  division  of  two  brigades;  and  if 
not,  then  there  was  only  one  brigade  and  a  small  detachment 
of  another.  He  says  that  the  charge  was  “executed  in  two 


turchin’s  charge  to  the  rear. 


15 1 

lines;”  when  Turchin’s  brigade  alone  had  two  lines.  Where  then 
was  that  detachment  which  Reynolds  persists  in  calling  a  bri¬ 
gade?  Gen.  Thomas  plainly  answers  this  question  in  his  report, 
and  says:  “Col.  Robinson,  commanding  the  second  brigade, 
Reynolds’  division,  followed  closely  upon  Turchin,  and  I  posted 
him  [Robinson]  on  the  road  leading  through  the  ridge  to  hold 
the  ground,  whilst  the  troops  on  our  right  and  left  passed  by.” 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  Reynolds’  so-called  second  brigade  of 
his  division  not  only  was  not  in  the  charge,  but  was  taken  by 
Thomas  away  in  another  direction  at  the  beginning  of  the 
movement  and  never  saw  the  enemy  attacked  by  Turchin’s 
brigade.  This  is  not  said  in  disparagement  of  the  men  who 
belonged  to  the  second  brigade  of  Reynolds,  and  who  had  as 
much  hard  fighting  as  the  rest,  but  it  is  said  to  show  that  some 
of  our  division-commanders  did  not  state  the  truth  in  their 
reports,  and  acted  with  marked  unfairness  to  those  parts  of 
their  commands  whose  services  were  more  distinguished  than 
those  of  some  others.  In  fact,  Reynolds  not  only  did  not  see 
that  the  detachment  of  his  second  brigade  was  not  in  the 
charge,  but  he,  riding  behind  the  extreme  right  of  the  line 
of  Turchin’s  brigade,  did  not  look  anywhere,  and  did  not  even 
see  what  Turchin’s  brigade  was  doing. 

During  the  advance,  there  were  a  few  of  our  men  in  charge 
of  a  crowd  of  rebel  prisoners,  who  were  sheltered  behind  a  small 
log-shanty  from  the  fire  of  the  rebel  battery  that  was  playing  on 
our  right  as  we  advanced,  and  not  knowing  which  way  to  take 
those  prisoners,  Gen.  Turchin  stopped  for  a  moment  to  direct 
them,  when  a  solid  shot  from  that  rebel  battery  struck  his  horse 
square  on  the  flank;  and  before  he  could  disengage  himself 
from  the  fallen  animal,  the  brigade  had  rapidly  advanced  and, 
no  staff-officer  being  near,  Turchin  was  obliged  to  run  behind 
the  brigade  through  a  stubble-field,  endeavoring  by  motion¬ 
ing-  with  his  arms  to  direct  the  officers  of  his  command  to 
turn  to  the  left,  and  thus  to  again  join  our  troops  posted  on  the 
ridge.  Some  of  the  officers  understood  what  was  required, 
and  the  brigade  in  sections  was  turned  to  the  left  toward  the 
ridge,  except  that  part — of  perhaps  150  men  which  was  on 
the  extreme  right  of  the  brigade,  and  where  the  division-com¬ 
mander  was.  A  man  of  the  Ninty-second  Ohio  brought  a  capt- 


152 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


ured  artillery-horse  with  saddle  on  to  Turchin,  who  then  joined 
his  brigade,  and  formed  it  on  the  left  of  Dan.  McCook’s  brigade 
on  the  ridge,  ready  for  action.  Reynolds,  at  this  time,  did  not 
know  what  became  of  Turchin  or  of  his  brigade. 

Looking  neither  to  the  sides  nor  the  rear,  Gen.  Reynolds 
passed  a  clump  of  timber,  skirting  the  left  side  of  the  Chatta¬ 
nooga  road,  and  there  saw  a  body  of  rebels  in  front  and  a 
larger  one  on  the  flank.  It  was  Forrest’s  dismounted  cavalry. 
Reynolds  now  found  that  he  was  in  a  tight  place  and  that  the 
balance  of  the  brigade  had  disappeared.  He  even  imagined 
that  the  troops  on  the  ridge  were  not  ours,  but  rebel.  The 
command  halted,  and  the  division-commander  was  discussing 
the  chances  of  escape  and  the  possibility  of  a  surrender  while 
our  troops  on  the  ridge  were  in  view.  Finally,  the  coming  of 
some  of  our  soldiers  from  McCook’s  brigade,  loaded  with  can¬ 
teens,  to  find  water,  broke  the  spell  and  showed  the  way  for 
the  detachment  to  reach  the  balance  of  the  brigade  on  the 
ridge. 

Speaking  of  this  incident,  Reynolds  says  in  his  report:  “I 
understand  that  this  movement  was  intended  to  open  the  way  to 
Rossville  for  the  army ,  and  did  not  then  know  of  any  other  road 
to  that  point.  I  therefore  pressed  right  on,  expecting  the  whole 
division  to  do  the  same ,  until  the  rebel  lines  and  batteries  were 
cleared  and  the  road  opened ,  and  found  myself  with  only  about 
150  of  the  third  brigade,  under  Col.  Lane,  Eleventh  Ohio,  near 
the  field-hospital  of  the  Fourteenth  corps.  The  remainder  of 
the  division  proceeded  to  the  high  grounds  on  the  left  by  order 
of  Gen.  Thomas,”  etc. 

A  major-general  declaring  that  he  did  not  know  that  there 
were  any  other  roads  leading  from  our  position  to  Rossville, 
except  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road,  while  fighting  two 
days  in  a  position  which  covered  those  other  roads  to  Rossville 
and  Chattanooga,  shows  one  of  two  things :  either  that  he  was 
grossly  ignorant  of  military  matters,  or  that  he  was  inexcusably 
indifferent  to  what  surely  interested  not  only  the  major-generals 
but  also  every  intelligent  private  in  the  army,  namely,  how  our 
army  could  reach  Chattanooga.  Was  it  possible  for  our  army 
to  retreat  by  the  main  Chattanooga  road  when  it  Was  on  its 
flank  and  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  as  Reynolds  himself 


CAPTURE  OF  THREE  REGIMENTS. 


153 


at  last  found  out?  He  continually  refers  to  his  division  and 
the  order  of  Gen.  Thomas,  when  his  second  brigade  and  Gen. 
Thomas  were  a  mile  away.  It  is  a  remarkable  report. 

After  the  divisions  of  our  left  wing  were  withdrawn,  the 
troops  were  also  taken  away  from  Horseshoe  Ridge,  the  whole 
army  falling  back  to  Rossville.  It  is  impossible  to  remove  an 
army  from  its  position  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  without 
sustaining  some  losses.  In  this  case,  it  was  especially  imprac¬ 
ticable,  as  the  enemy  was  still  continuing  his  assaults  on  our 
right  upon  the  ridge,  and  had  just  commenced  his  last  assault 
on  our  left,  it  still  being  daylight,  when  we  were  withdrawing. 
Our  right  withdrew  when  it  was  dark,  but  on  the  left  it  was 
done  at  sunset.  Baird’s  division  was  the  last  to  withdraw,  and 
while  crossing  Kelley’s  field  many  men  were  struck  down  or 
captured,  particularly  from  the  brigade  of  regulars.  Willich 
with  his  brigade  was  acting  as  rear-guard  for  the  left  wing. 

A  capture  was  made  on  our  right  worthy  of  being  recorded. 
The  Twenty-first  Ohio  of  Negley’s  division  was  entrusted  to 
Brannan  and  posted  on  his  right.  When  Steedman  came  with 
his  two  brigades,  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  and  the  Twenty-second 
Michigan — temporarily  brigaded  and  commanded  by  Col.  Le- 
Favor  of  the  latter — went  into  action  and  occupied  the  position 
on  the  left  of  Steedman,  thus  joining  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  on 
its  right.  Steedman  was  the  first  to  withdraw  from  the  ridge, 
but  for  some  reason,  those  three  regiments  did  not  accompany 
him,  but  remained  with  Brannan  on  the  right  of  Vanderveer’s 
brigade.  Kelly’s  rebel  brigade  that  was  storming  the  ridge  in 
front  of  them  was  getting  out  of  ammunition,  hence  Col.  Kelly 
desired  to  be  either  relieved  or  reenforced ;  and  in  compliance 
therewith,  Trigg’s  brigade  of  three  regiments  came  up,  one 
regiment  being  sent  to  Grade’s  support  on  Kelly’s  right. 

Col.  Kelly  in  his  report  of  September  25,  1863,  says  that 
after  exchanging  fire  with  the  enemy  for  about  one  and  a-half 
hours,  he  transferred  the  Fifty-eighth  North-Carolina  regiment 
to  his  left,  and  moved  forward,  swinging  the  front  to  the  right, 
when  he  heard  the  cry  “we  surrender.”  That  he  stepped  up  to 
the  front  and  wanted  the  Union  troops  to  lay  down  their  arms, 
but  that  they  fired  on  him  and  broke  his  command,  which  he 
rallied,  and  then  met  Col.  Trigg,  and  asked  him  to  cooperate 


154 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


with  him  in  capturing  a  Union  force  in  his  front.  Trigg  agreed 
and  formed  his  command  on  the  left  of  Kelly  with  intention  of 
swinging  the  left  on  the  ridge  and  around  to  the  right.  At  this 
time,  Gen.  Preston  sent  word  to  Kelly  that  he  wanted  to  see 
him,  and  when  Kelly  returned  he  found  that  Trigg  had  capt¬ 
ured  the  Union  force,  but  that  Col.  PI.  Plawkins  of  the  Fifth 
Kentucky  of  his  own  brigade,  had  also  captured  249  prisoners, 
including  two  colonels,  one  lieutenant-colonel,  and  a  number  of 
company  officers. 

Col.  Trigg,  in  his  report  of  September  26,  1863,  says:  “When 
near  the  base  of  this  ridge  [meaning  Horseshoe  Ridge]  I 
learned  from  Col.  Kelly  the  precise  locality  of  the  enemy,  and 
immediately  determined,  with  him,  to  attempt  the  capture  of 
that  part  of  his  force  in  my  front,  my  position  being  particu¬ 
larly  favorable  for  the  attainment  of  this  end.  I  immediately 
wheeled  my  brigade  to  the  right,  which  brought  me  in  rear 
of  the  enemy,  and  moved  rapidly  up  the  hill  [probably  from 
the  other  side  of  the  ridge]  to  within  twenty  paces  of  his  lines. 
This  movement  surprised  him  and  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
the  Twenty-second  Michigan,  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio,  and  part 
of  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  regiments,  five  stands  of  colors,  and 
over  1500  small  arms  of  the  latest  and  most  approved  pattern. 
Darkness  having  fallen  and  the  enemy  having  withdrawn  from 
his  position  on  my  left,  no  further  movement  was  attempted.” 

Then  he  further  states  what  men  of  his  command  captured 
the  flags  of  these  regiments:  Serg.  L.  E.  Timmons,  Co.  I, 
Seventh  Florida,  regimental  flag  of  the  Twenty-first  Ohio; 
Private  O.  F.  Honaker,  Co.  F,  Fifty-fourth  Virginia,  regimental 
flag  of  the  Twenty  -  second  Michigan;  Private  Henderson 
Hylton,  Co.  A,  Fifty-fourth  Virginia,  regimental  flag  of  the 
Eighty-ninth  Ohio.  Beside  these,  there  were  captured  two 
state-flags  of  the  Twenty-second  Michigan  and  Twenty-first 
Ohio. 

Col.  Vanderveer,  in  his  report  of  September  25,  1863,  says 
that  Steedman  was  on  his  right  and  withdrew  early  in  the 
evening.  That  by  order  of  Brannan,  he  posted  the  Thirty-fifth 
Ohio  perpendicularly  to  his  front,  as  it  was  dark  and  it  was 
suspected  that  the  troops  to  his  right  were  gone.  That  a  rebel 
force  appeared  in  the  gloom  in  front  of  the  Thirty-fifth  Ohio 


CAPTURE  OF  THREE  REGIMENTS. 


155 


and  an  officer  riding  to  within  a  few  paces  of  the  line,  asked 
what  regiment  it  was.  In  reply  to  “Thirty-fifth  Ohio,”  the 
officer  attempted  to  escape,  when  the  regiment  fired  a  volley 
that  brought  down  horse  and  rider  and  put  the  force  to  flight. 
This  evidently  happened  after  the  surrender  of  those  three 
regiments  which  stood  to  the  right  of  Vanderveer,  and  that  the 
rebel  force  which  approached  the  Thirty-fifth  Ohio  was  a  part 
of  that  rebel  force  that  made  the  capture.  Col.  Carlton,  of  the 
Eighty-ninth  Ohio,  writes  as  follows:  “We  had  sent  Lieut.  Drake, 
adjutant  of  the  Twenty-second  Michigan,  to  [Gen.]  Granger  [com¬ 
manding  reserve  corps]  for  ammunition.  Granger  said  he  had  no 
ammunition,  and  to  ‘tell  Carlton  and  Le Favor  they  must  use  the 
bayonet,  and  hold  their  position  at  all  hazards.’  This  was  the 
last  order  we  received.  Drake,  on  returning  to  us,  was  fired  on 
from  both  sides,  that  is,  the  rebels  had  a  cross-fire  in  our  rear; 
that  was  half-past  four.  I  mention  my  name  first  as  it  was 
mentioned  first  in  the  message.” 

It  is  evident  from  these  facts  that  the  commanders,  to  whom 
had  been  assigned  the  temporary  command  of  these  three  regi¬ 
ments,  did  not  take  proper  means  to  inform  them  in  time  to  with¬ 
draw.  Such  neglect  ought  to  have  been  investigated,  its  source 
discovered,  and  the  parties  guilty  of  dereliction  of  duty  held 
brave  and  patriotic  men  for  no  fault  of  their  own,  but  because 
of  the  inexcusable  neglect  of  others  are  too  damnable  facts  to> 
be  passed  over  in  silence;  and  an  officer  to  whom,  temporarily, 
are  entrusted  troops  of  another  command,  and  who  wantonly 
sacrifices  them,  while  saving  his  own,  is  not  worthy  of  the  sacred 
trust  put  into  his  hands,  and  should  be  considered  rather  an 
unworthy  wretch  than  a  dignified  member  of  a  great  army. 

This  episode  was  the  most  shameful  that  happened  during 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  and  only  merits  record  that  future 
generations  may  read  the  disgraceful  occurrence  and  hold  in 
abhorrence  such  acts  of  criminal  neglect. 


to  a  rigid  accountability.  There  was  no  occasion  whatever  for 
the  sacrifice  of  those  fine  regiments.  They  could  have ^  * 
drawn  just  as  easily  as  did  Steedman’s  or  Brannan  s  troops 
The  horrors  of  the  southern  prison-pens,  in  which  men  of  the 
Eighty-ninth  Ohio  and  others  suffered,  and  the  foul  Peatmen 
oy°the  Sftrou.  keepers  of  those  horrible  dees  of  iohom,^ 
and  shame,  which  killed  or  ruined  for  life  so  many 

Read  between  lines  22  and  23,  pa^e  155 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

WAS  IT  A  REBEL  VICTORY  OR  DEFEAT?  OUR  COMMANDER- 
IN-CHIEF  AND  HIS  LIEUTENANT.  THE  SOLDIER. 


THE  continuation  of  the  enemy’s  assaults  on  our  position 
on  Horseshoe  Ridge  and  the  coincidence  of  time  between 
the  last  assault  made  toward  evening  by  the  rebel  lines  on  our 
left  and  our  voluntary  and  deliberate  withdrawal  —  first  from 
our  position  on  the  left  and  then  from  the  ridge — made  the 
rebel  troops  believe  they  had  at  last  driven  us  from  our  position 
by  force  of  arms  and  by  their  reckless  assaults.  The  trium¬ 
phant  shouts  and  yells  of  the  enemy’s  pressing  lines  in  taking- 
possession  of  our  works,  against  which  they  were  hammering- 
in  vain  during  the  day,  extended  far  into  the  night;  but  their 
pursuit  followed  but  a  few  hundred  yards  beyond  our  lines. 
The  fronts  of  our  wings  being  drawn  up  at  a  right  angle  to 
each  other,  the  wings  of  the  enemy’s  troops  soon  commenced 
to  cross  each  other’s  advance.  This  dangerous  interference, 
which  threatened  to  produce  frightful  collisions  in  the  darkness, 
prevented  the  enemy  from  pursuit. 

It  is  laughable  to  read,  in  various  reports  of  the  rebel  com¬ 
manders,  their  exultations  over  having  driven  us  from  the  field. 
Apparently,  the  idea  that  we  might  voluntarily  leave  the  field 
of  battle,  never  crossed  their  minds.  Cleburne  claims  that 
Polk’s  brigade  of  his  division  took  possession  of  the  northwest 
angle  of  the  works  on  our  left;  Breckenridge  claims  that,  this 
time,  he  did  not  fail  to  take  the  extreme  left  wing  of  our  works; 
Longstreet  says  that  “by  a  flank  movement  and  another  ad¬ 
vance  the  heights  were  gained.”  So  at  last  he  was  the  master 
of  the  coveted  field,  only  with  that  difference  that  now  there 
was  no  enemy  on  the  field.  Even  Forrest  claims:*  “termina¬ 
ting  on  the  right  flank  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.”  But  all 
those  exultations  over  driving  the  foe  from  the  field  were  only 
the  product  of  Southern  imagination. 

On  our  side,  we  simply  withdrew  about  four  miles  toward 

*  Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  N.  B.  Forrest,  C.-S.  Army,  October  22,  1863. 

156 


WAS  IT  A  REBEL  VICTORY  OR  DEFEAT? 


157 


Chattanooga  to  gather  our  stragglers  and  to  assume  a  new  posi¬ 
tion.  But,  as  we  before  remarked,  the  position  at  Rossville  is 
faulty.  We  occupied  on  September  21,  with  Gen.  Thomas’ 
corps,  Rossville  Gap  and  the  heights  adjoining  it.  Gen.  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  corps  was  placed  on  Missionary  Ridge  north  of  the 
gap,  and  Gen.  McCook’s  corps  across  the  valley  of  Chattanooga. 
Gen.  Thomas  saw  at  once  that  the  position  was  liable  to  be 
turned,  and  he  so  advised  Gen.  Rosecrans,  and  during  the  night 
the  army  was  withdrawn  to  Chattanooga,  the  pickets  joining  it 
at  daylight.  By  digging  trenches,  putting  up  batteries,  and 
rearranging  some  of  the  rebel  forts,  our  position  in  a  few  days 
was  rendered  unassailable. 

Thus  terminated  the  most  arduous,  the  most  complicated, 
and  the  bloodiest  campaign  in  the  West  for  the  possession  of 
Chattanooga,  which  a  little  over  a  year  before,  after  the  enemy 
was  driven  from  Corinth,  could  have  been  occupied  at  but 
trifling  cost. 

The  rebels  harped  and  are  still  harping  on  the  Chicka- 
mauga  battle  as  a  great  victory.  Gen.  Bragg,  in  his  order  of 
the  day  of  September  22,  1863,  says:  “It  has  pleased  Almighty 
God  to  award  the  valor  and  endurance  of  our  troops  by  giving 
to  our  arms  a  complete  victory  over  the  enemy’s  superior  num¬ 
bers .”  In  his  address  to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  the  pres¬ 
ident  of  the  Confederacy  says:  “Soldiers:  a  grateful  country 
has  recognized  your  arduous  service  and  rejoiced  over  your 
glorious  victory  on  the  field  of  Chickamauga.  Gen.  Longstreet 
in  his  letter  to  rebel  Secretary-of-War  J.  A.  Seddon,  Septem¬ 
ber  26,  1863,  calls  it  “ the  most  complete  victoiy  of  the  war , 
except  perhaps  the  first  Manassas.”  [Bull  Run.] 

Now  the  question  is:  What  is  a  complete  victory?  All 
military  men  agree  on  the  definition  of  the  expression  “  a 
complete  victory,”  in  that  it  is  a  victory  which  terminates  war, 
or  gives  such  preponderance  in  advantages  to  terminate  war 
that  the  final  success  is  undoubted;  or  that  the  victory  termi¬ 
nates  a  campaign,  or  at  least  attains  an  important  advantage 
for  future  operations.  If  the  battle  is  fought  and  one  side 
voluntarily  withdraws,  without  being  vigorously  pursued,  leav¬ 
ing  the  field  of  battle  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  it  is  a  drazvu 
battle .  If  the  battle  is  fought,  resulting  in  slight  preponderance 


i5» 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


of  captures,  but  without  attaining  any  important  object,  it  is 
a  negative  victory.  To  which  of  the  above  categories,  then, 
belongs  the  battle  of  Chickamauga? 

The  battle  of  Marengo  compelled  the  Austrians  to  conclude 
peace  and  give  up  Upper  Italy.  The  battles  of  Jena  and 
Auerstadt  led  to  the  conquest  of  Prussia.  The  battle  of 
Sadowa  crippled  the  Austrian  army  so  as  to  compel  Franz 
Joseph  to  beg  for  peace.  The  battle  of  Sedan  led  to  the 
capture  of  one-third  of  the  French  army,  and  to  the  isolation 
of  the  other  army  at  Metz,  which  led  to  its  surrender.  To 
what  did  the  pretended  complete  victory  at  Chickamauga  lead? 
To  absolutely  nothing  advantageous  to  the  enemy,  except 
increasing  the  number  of  his  guns,  wagons,  and  ambulances, 
when  he  had  not  animals  enough  to  draw  his  own. 

The  object  of  the  battle  was  to  destroy  our  army  and  take 
possession  of  Chattanooga.  Was  it  accomplished?  Our  loss 
in  men  in  round  numbers  was  16,000;  the  enemy’s  was  18,000; 
but  out  of  16,000  we  lost  5000  in  prisoners,  while  he  lost  only 
1 500  in  prisoners.  Then  his  number  in  killed  and  wounded 
exceeded  ours  by  5500,  and  as  the  number  of  infantry  in  the 
battle  was  nearly  equal  on  both  sides,  which  side,  then,  suffered 
most?  Of  course,  the  rebels.  Our  loss  in  guns  and  wagons 
had  no  tendency  to  cripple  us,  but  the  frightful  loss  of  life 
in  the  army  of  the  enemy  was  telling.  Our  object  in  the 
campaign  was  to  take  possession  of  Chattanooga,  which  was 
of  paramount  importance  to  us  as  a  base  for  further  operations 
toward  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy.  We  attained  our  object 
completely.  We  had  Chattanooga  in  our  hands,  and  the 
enemy  dared  not  approach  our  lines.  Since  its  occupancy, 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  it  was  never 
afterward  surrendered  to  the  enemy.  But  what  important 
object  had  been  attained  by  the  enemy  by  that  complete 
victory  of  his?  None;  on  the  contrary,  the  battle  of  Chicka¬ 
mauga  was  the  ruin  of  the  rebel  Army  of  Tennessee. 

On  the  morning  following  the  battle,  Gen.  Bragg  stopped 
at  the  bivouac  of  Gen.  Longstreet  and  asked  him  what  was 
best  to  do  next.  Longstreet  suggested  *  crossing  the  river 
above  Chattanooga  and  making  themselves  sufficiently  felt  on 

*  Report  of  Lieut. -Gen.  Jas.  Longstreet,  C.-S.  Army,  October  — ,  1863. 


WAS  IT  A  REBEL  VICTORY  OR  DEFEAT  ? 


159 


our  rear  so  as  to  force  our  evacuation  of  Chattanooga,  and 
indeed,  force  us  back  upon  Nashville;  but  should  they  find 
their  transportation  inadequate  for  a  continuance  of  such  a 
movement,  then  to  follow  up  the  railroad  to  Knoxville,  destroy 
Burnside,  and  from  there  threaten  our  railroad  communication 
in  the  rear  of  Nashville. 

Bragg  listened  very  attentively,  nodding  his  head,  and 
afterward  denounced  Longstreet  as  an  impracticable  dreamer. 
He  gives  his  answer  to  the  scheme  proposed,  in  his  report 
of  December  28,  1863,  couched  in  these  terse  words:  “The 
suggestion  of  a  movement  by  our  right  immediately  after  the 
battle,  to  the  north  of  the  Tennessee  and  thence  upon  Nash¬ 
ville,  requires  notice  only  because  it  will  find  a  place  on  the  files 
of  the  Department.  Such  a  movement  was  utterly  impossible 
for  want  of  transportation.  Nearly  half  our  army  consisted 
of  reenforcements  just  before  the  battle  without  a  wagon  or 
an  artillery  horse,  and  nearly,  if  not  quite,  a  third  of  the 

artillery  horses  on  the  field  had  been  lost.  The  railroad 

% 

bridges,  too,  had  been  destroyed  to  a  point  south  of  Ringgold, 
and  on  all  the  road  from  Cleveland  to  Knoxville.  To  these 
insurmountable  difficulties  were  added  the  entire  absence  of 
means  to  cross  the  river,  except  by  fording  at  a  few  precarious 
points,  too  deep  for  artillery,  and  the  well-known  danger  of 
sudden  rises,  by  which  all  communication  would  be  cut,  a 
contingency  which  did  actually  happen  a  few  days  after  the 
visionary  scheme  was  proposed. 

“But  the  most  serious  objection  to  the  proposition  was  its 

entire  want  of  military  propriety.  It  abandoned  to  the  enemy 

our  entire  line  of  communication,  and  laid  open  to  him  our 

depots  of  supplies,  while  it  placed  us  with  a' greatly  inferior 

force  beyond  a  difficult,  and  at  times  impassable,  river,  in  a 

country  affording  no  subsistence  to  men  or  animals.  It  also 

left  open  to  the  enemy,  at  a  distance  of  only  ten  miles,  our 

battle-field,  with  thousands  of  our  wounded  and  his  own,  and 

all  the  trophies  and  supplies  we  had  won.  All  this  was  to  be 

risked  for  what?  To  gain  the  enemy’s  rear  and  cut  him  off 

from  his  depot  of  supplies  by  the  route  over  the  mountains, 

when  the  very  movement  abandoned  to  his  unmolested  use 
* 

the  better  and  more  practicable  route  of  half  the  length,  on 


i6o 


CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 


the  south  side  of  the  river.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  the 
proposition  was  not  even  entertained ,  whatsoever  may  have 
been  the  inferences  drawn  from  the  subsequent  movements.” 

To  obtain  a  complete  victory ,  as  they  thought,  and  not  to 
know  what  to  do  afterward  is,  of  itself,  a  sufficient  proof  that 
the  battle,  however  bloody  it  might  have  been,  was,  after  all, 
nothing  but  a  drawn  battle ,  and  the  victory  was  a  negative  one. 

Thus,  having  nothing  to  do,  Bragg  squatted  down  with  his 
army  on  the  heights  around  Chattanooga,  and  inertly  gazed 
on  our  men  piling  up  breastworks  and  digging  trenches.  He 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  if  he  sent  his  cavalry  to  intercept 
our  communications  over  the  mountains  and  destroyed  some 
wagons  and  mules  that  this  would  starve  us  out  and  we  would 
have  to  abandon  Chattanooga.  But  this  scheme  did  not 
work.  His  cavalry  did  some  mischief,  but  was  thoroughly 
whipped,  chased  over  the  mountains  and  through  the  whole 
of  Middle  Tennessee,  and  saved  themselves  by  swimming  the 
Tennessee  River  below  Decatur. 

While  the  rebel  chiefs  were  pondering  over  what  it  was  best 
to  do,  and  before  their  commanders’  reports  of  the  battle  were 
ready,  20,000  of  our  troops  under  Hooker  came  from  the  East 
and  placed  themselves  along  the  railroad  between  Murfreesboro 
and  Stevenson,  ready  to  join  us  at  Chattanooga,  while  Sherman 
with  his  corps,  was  also  on  his  way  from  Memphis  toward 
Chattanooga. 

Pretty  soon  Longstreet  went  to  destroy  Burnside,  as  he 
thought,  but  hardly  saved  himself  from  destruction,  while 
Bragg,  left  with  40,000  troops  in  front  of  Chattanooga,  was 
swept  from  the  heights  of  Missionary  Ridge  on  November  25, 
losing  as  many  prisoners  as  he  took  from  us  in  Chickamauga 
battle,  and  almost  as  many  guns.  We  mentioned  before  that 
Chickamauga  ruined  the  rebel  army  of  Tennessee,  and  it  is  a 
fact,  just  as  Gettysburg  ruined  the  rebel  army  of  Virginia,  as  it 
never  could  recruit  itself  afterward.  It  amounted  to  only 
40,000  under  Joe  Johnston,  while  Sherman  had  at  the  start  of 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  95,000  against  it,  and  it  dwindled  down 
to  30,000  under  Hood,  and  finally  was  dispersed  to  the  winds 
by  Thomas  at  Nashville. 

If  there  was  a  final  victory  on  the  battle-field  of  Chicka- 


WAS  IT  A  REBEL  VICTORY  OR  DEFEAT?  l6l 

mauga,  it  rested  on  the  standards  of  our  own  regiments,  rather 
than  on  those  of  the  rebels.  After  getting  out  of  that  bag, 
McLamore’s  Cove — where  we  gave  the  enemy  the  opportunity 
to  strangle  us,  and  which  he  tried  to  do,  but  did  not  know 
enough — we  had  in  the  woods,  between  Missionary  Ridge  and 
Chickamauga,  plenty  of  elbow-room,  and,  in  an  uncultivated, 
Indian-fashion  sort  of  battle  on  September  19,  we  damaged 
the  enemy  more  than  he  hurt  us.  Then,  on  Sunday  morning 
until  1 1  o’clock,  we  whipped  the  enemy  on  the  left  so  badly 
chat  he  did  not  touch  us  there  until  evening — until,  in  fact,  we 
commenced  to  withdraw.  Then  the  luck  turned  against  us, 
and  under  most  provoking  circumstances  and  through  sheer 
accident,  the  enemy  broke  our  centre  and  routed  the  whole  of 
our  right  wing  and  partially  demoralized  our  centre,  and  for 
two  hours  had  his  own  way,  capturing  several  thousand  pris¬ 
oners,  half  of  the  artillery  of  that  wing,  and  a  great  amount  of 
small  arms,  wagons,  and  ambulances.  But,  under  a  shower  of 
bullets  and  grape,  the  bravest  of  the  routed  commands — with¬ 
out  organization  or  distinction  between  companies  and  regi¬ 
ments,  some  under  strange  commanders  whom  they  never  saw 
before,  but  who  were  their  comrades  in  arms,  with  colors  often 
not  their  own,  but  the  colors  of  their  common  country — instinc¬ 
tively  rallied  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  took  possession  of  it,  clearly 
understanding  that  in  holding  that  ridge  they  would  stay  the 
rebel  victory,  and  by  stubborn  fighting  might  turn  that  victory 
into  defeat  and  save  their  army  from  destruction. 

Their  bravery  and  contempt  for  danger  approached  the 
sublime,  and  their  patriotic  devotion  to  the  flag  determined 
them  to  die  before  giving  up  the  position.  Those  6000  men 
fought  for  a  whole  long  hour  15,000  rebels,  who  attempted  to 
scale  the  ridge  and  take  possession  of  it.  And  when  6000 
more  rebel  troops  of  Hindman’s  division  extended  the  rebel 
left  and,  turning  the  right  of  our  heroes,  threatened  at  last  to 
sweep  them  from  the  ridge,  Steedman’s  division  came  up  and, 
under  fearful  musketry  that  reverberated  like  thunder  in  the 
mountains  and  continued  uninterruptedly  for  half  an  hour,  the 
rebel  attack  was  beaten  back  with  such  slaughter  that  Hind¬ 
man’s  two  brigades  were  entirely  broken  and  could  not  be 
used  for  the  rest  of  that  day. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


162 

Then  fresh  rebel  troops  were  sent  in.  Preston’s  division 
commenced  the  assault,  supported  by  the  rest  of  the  enemy’s 
line,  and  for  an  hour  and  a-half  the  rebel  waves  angrily  surged 
against  the  ridge  with  unexampled  bravery  and  determination 
worthy  of  a  better  cause;  but  in  vain.  And  when  our  braves 
were  out  of  ammunition  they  fixed  bayonets  with  a  jerk  that 
had  a  deep  significance  in  it,  and  many  times  the  most  reckless 
of  the  enemy,  when  they  succeeded  in  reaching  the  barricades, 
were  met  by  cold  steel  and  clubbed  muskets.  And  that  sort 
of  fighting  lasted  from  2  to  6  o’clock  that  afternoon.  In  front 
of  that  ridge  and  on  its  slopes,  during  those  four  long  hours, 
were  killed  and  wounded  over  8000  rebels,  just  half  of  the 
entire  loss  of  the  enemy’s  infantry  sustained  during  the  two 
days’  battle. 

That  ridge  and  the  barricades  on  our  left  wing  never  would 
have  been  taken  by  the  enemy  if  we  had  not  voluntarily  aban¬ 
doned  them.  Many  of  our  soldiers  thought  at  the  time,  and 
are  still  thinking,  that  if  we  had  stayed  behind  our  works 
instead  of  withdrawing,  and  brought  to  the  front  some  10,000 
stragglers  and  several  batteries  during  the  night,  we  would  have 
whipped  the  rebel  army  the  next  day,  and  that  would  have 
perhaps  happened. 

From  the  rebel  records,  now  quite  complete,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  enemy’s  army,  by  its  innumerable  assaults  made 
on  our  fortified  lines  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  so  terribly 
crippled  itself  as  to  be  liable  to  be  whipped  the  next  day.  On 
Sunday’s  afternoon  after  the  rout,  we  fought  the  enemy  with 
20,000  troops,  all  told,  and  we  could  have  drawn  15,000  more 
the  next  day,  among  which  might  have  come  Post’s  and 
Wagner’s  brigades,  that  had  not  participated  in  the  battle. 

But  however,  it  might  have  been,  the  battle  of  Chickamauga 
placed  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  who  may  be 
considered  as  military  representatives  of  our  people,  in  bravery, 
intelligence,  and  patriotism,  on  the  pinnacle  of  military  fame  and 
glory.  After  the  rout,  Gen.  Brannan  led  the  shattered  com¬ 
mands  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  placed  them  there,  and  then  the 
soldiers  took  matters  into  their  own  hands  and  performed 
wonders.  The  honor  of  making  the  initiatory  movement 
toward  a  stand  on  the  ridge  belongs  to  Brannan.  Other  com- 


OUR  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  AND  HIS  LIEUTENANT.  1 63 

mands  joined  him  there,  and  when  the  soldiers  understood  the 
situation  they  did  not  care  how  many  rebels  attacked  them. 
With  those  slight  barricades  in  front,  they  almost  laughed  at 
the  foaming  rebels  trying  in  vain  to  take  possession  of  the 
crest  of  the  ridge;  and  when  a  reckless  party  of  the  enemy 
succeeded  in  making  a  lodgement  on  the  crest,  our  men  jumped 
over  the  barricades  and,  charging  upon  the  intruders,  drove 
them  pell-mell  down  the  ridge. 

Constant  success  makes  soldiers  over  -  confident,  while  a 
reverse  calls  upon  the  latent  resources  of  human  character,  and 
an  extraordinary  struggle  under  most  adverse  circumstances 
steels  man’s  bravery  into  heroism.  Gen.  Grant  never  studied 
and  never  understood  the  battle  of  Chickamauga;  if  he  had 
he  would  not  have  thought,  before  the  battle  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  so  demoralized 
by  defeat  at  Chickamauga  and  lying  for  so  long  time  in  the 
trenches  that  it  would  not  fight;  and  he  wanted  Sherman  to 
hurry  up,  so  as  to  show  to  that  army  how  to  fight. 

But  before  Sherman  crossed  the  river,  that  army  took 
possesion  of  the  advanced  rebel  position,  and  stood  half-way 
between  their  fortifications  and  the  ridge;  and  when  Sherman 
attacked  the  north  end  of  the  ridge  and  stuck  there,  the  men 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  having  a  chance  at  their  old 
rebel  acquaintances,  swept  the  ridge  of  the  enemy  in  half  an 
hour’s  time.  So,  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  instead  of  demor¬ 
alizing  our  men,  served  as  a  fiery  furnace,  in  which  their  bravery 
was  steeled  and  hardened  so  as  to  be  proof  against  any  danger 
and  undaunted  under  any  reverse,  however  appalling. 

But  the  creation  of  such  an  army,  as  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  showed  itself  to  be  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
and  the  infusing  of  such  a  spirit  into  its  men,  as  they  mani¬ 
fested  themselves,  under  the  most  trying  circumstances,  during 
that  campaign  and  battle,  required  a  commander-in-chief 
capable  of  doing  so.  Gen.  Rosecrans,  before  he  assumed  the 
command  of  that  army,  was  considered  one  of  the  most  distin¬ 
guished  officers  in  the  West,  and  came  to  the  army  immediately 
after  Gen.  Buell’s  unfortunate  campaign,  in  which  all  was  lost 
that  was  gained  before  through  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  He 
reorganized  the  army,  increased  the  cavalry,  established  depots 


164 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


of  supplies,  and  in  a  short  time  advanced  from  Nashville, 
as  the  base,  against  the  rebel  army  under  Bragg,  lying  at 
Murfreesboro. 

By  his  personal  bravery,  shown  during  the  battle  of  Stone 
River,  his  untiring  energy  and  the  success  achieved,  his  kind 
treatment  of  soldiers,  his  splendid  equipment,  and  particular 
care  taken  of  the  army,  Rosecrans  made  himself  exceedingly 
popular  among  his  soldiers,  who  had  unbounded  confidence 
in  him.  His  brilliant  campaign  of  Tullahooma  strengthened 
his  hold  on  the  army  still  more,  and  when  the  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga  came,  the  army  was  in  the  best  of  trim  and  its  mettle 
unsurpassed.  It  is  an  historical  fact  that  what  Rosecrans 
gained  he  held,  and  that  for  which  he  fought  he  obtained. 

He  left  to  his  successor  a  splendid  army,  and  in  a  position 
to  strike  the  Confederacy  at  its  very  heart;  he  achieved  all 
that  he  undertook,  and  if  he  did  not  achieve  more  his  com¬ 
mander-in-chief,  Gen.  Halleck,  was  responsible  in  refusing  to 
reenforce  him  and  in  misleading  him  in  regard  to  the  strength 
of  the  enemy’s  army;  he  made  the  most  difficult  campaign  of 
the  late  war,  through  the  roughest  and  most  mountainous  part 
of  the  entire  theatre  of  our  operations;  he  skillfully  extricated 
his  army  from  great  danger  in  the  face  of  a  much  stronger 
enemy,  and  in  the  battle  every  blow  of  the  enemy  was  returned 
with  liberal  interest.  When  at  Chattanooga,  he  would  have 
brought  Hooker  to  his  help  and  reopened  the  railroad  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  if  he  had  stayed  longer 
with  the  army.  What  was  done  afterward  at  Brown’s  ferry, 
was  but  the  carrying  out  of  Rosecrans’  plan.  Whatever  failings 
he  had  will  be  forgotten,  while  the  splendid  service  he  per¬ 
formed,  the  country  will  gratefully  remember  and  the  name 
of  Wm.  S.  Rosecrans  will  shine  in  history. 

And  Rosecrans  had  a  splendid  lieutenant,  on  whom  he  could 
implicitly  rely.  George  H.  Thomas  was  a  man  and  a  general; 
if  he  had  an -ambition,  it  was  honorable  and  legitimate;  and 
he  never  stooped  to  cross  another  man’s  path  for  the  sake  of 
profiting  himself;  he  was  ready  to  give  everybody  his  due, 
and  retain  nothing  for  himself ;  he  distinguished  himself 
greatly  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  particularly  on  the 
second  day.  During  the  existence  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 


TIIE  SOLDIER. 


165 


berland,  Thomas  always  held  the  second  place  in  it.  before  he 
was  elevated  to  the  first;  he  was  the  right-hand  of  Gen.  Buell, 
and  also  the  right-hand  of  Gen.  Rosecrans.  As  he  declined  to 
supersede  Buell,  so  he  was  determined  to  decline  to  supersede 
Rosecrans;  but  the  latter,  when  relieved,  persuaded  Thomas 
to  accept  the  command  of  the  army. 

The  soldiers  were  so  accustomed  to  seeing  Rosecrans  and 
Thomas  together,  and  their  respect  for  Thomas  was  so  great, 
that  when  they  saw  Thomas  in  command  and  did  not  see 
Rosecrans,  they  were  sure  everything  was  going  right.  So 
when,  on  the  second  day,  Rosecrans — being  on  the  extreme 
right  during  the  rout,  and  separated  from  and  could  not  reach 
our  left — finally  decided  that  his  presence  in  Chattanooga  was 
indispensable  in  case  the  balance  of  the  army  was  routed,  and 
that  in  leaving  Thomas  with  the  army,  he  was  sure  that  if  any¬ 
thing  could  be  done  to  stay  the  momentum  of  the  rebel  army, 
Thomas  would  do  it. 

Thomas  managed  five  divisions  in  the  morning,  and  also 
the  whole  of  what  remained  of  the  army  on  the  battle-field 
during  the  afternoon.  He  was  present  everywhere  and  inspired 
soldiers  with  confidence  and  determination  to  fight  to  the  last 
In  the  morning  he  showed  himself  as  having  the  intuition 
of  a  capable  and  talented  general  by  foreseeing  the  moves 
of  the  enemy  and  preparing  means  to  defeat  them.  There  was 
no  general  reserve  to  draw  upon  in  cases  of  emergency,  so  he 
used  reserves  of  various  divisions,  and  they  were  put  in  place 
just  in  time  to  meet  and  fight  the  flanking  enemy.  And  during 
that  afternoon,  when  the  heaviest  musketry  was  rolling  uninter¬ 
ruptedly,  and  the  hours  of  the  day  appeared,  to  those  who 
fought,  inordinately  long,  Thomas  watched  the  heroes  fighting 
on  the  ridge.  The  soldiers  were  the  rock,  and  Thomas — repre¬ 
senting  those  soldiers — was  properly  nicknamed  after  them,  as 
“the  Rock  of  Chickamauga.” 

But  the  greatest  hero  during  those  long,  anxious  hours,  and 
the  savior  of  our  army,  was  the  soldier.  On  that  ridge  he  was 
the  captain,  the  general,  and  the  grand  private;  and  if  at  any 
time  a  monument  should  be  reared  up  to  the  memory  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  the  soldier  should  be  the  crowning 
and  dominating  figure  of  it.  No  praise  and  no  laurels  can 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


1 66 

recompense  that  self-abnegation,  that  patient  endurance,  that 
daring  courage,  that  contempt  of  danger,  illuminated  with  high 
intelligence  and  combined  with  the  deepest  patriotism  and 
devotion  to  his  country  which  preeminently  distinguished  our 
Northern  soldier-volunteer. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

PARTICULAR  LESSONS  OF  THE  -CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  AND 

« 

SOME  OF  THE  GENERAL  LESSONS  OF  THE  LATE  WAR. 


HE  campaign  and  battle  of  Chickamauga,  to  a  military 


X  student,  present  many  valuable  lessons  to  learn,  and  to 
a  legislator  some  important  suggestions  to  study. 

First.  A  topographical  map  is  the  headlight  of  an  army 
operating  in  an  enemy’s  country.  With  a  topographical  map, 
all  the  routes,  places  for  camps  and  bivouacs,  and  even  the 
best  positions  to  occupy,  are  seen  at  a  glance.  The  informa¬ 
tion  gathered  from  citizens  or  through  scouts  is  also  indispen¬ 
sable;  but  that  only  furnishes  details  of  the  description  which 
a  map  can  not  show.  With  a  topographical  map,  all  the  move¬ 
ments  and  concentration  of  troops  can  be  perfectly  planned, 
and  all  the  distances  separating  various  points  can  be  known 
almost  to  a  nicety.  Without  such  maps,  an  army  gropes  in  the 
dark,  and  that  was  the  case  with  us.  If  it  were  not  for  the 
Union  men  and  the  negroes  whom  we  met  through  the  South¬ 
ern  States,  we  could  hardly  have  advanced. 

One  of  the  principal  duties  of  ambassadors  at  the  foreign 
courts  of  Europe  is  to  collect  topographical  maps  of  the  coun¬ 
tries  to  which  they  are  accredited.  Moltke  whipped  Austria 
and  France  by  the  liberal  use  of  thorough  topographical  maps 
of  those  countries.  It  is  as  much  a  weapon  for  an  army  as  the 
rifle  and  the  cannon.  We  neither  had  topographical  maps  in 
the  campaign  of  Chickamauga,  nor  in  any  other  during  our 
war,  nor  have  we  any  now.  Even  in  commercial  or  every-day 
life,  to  the  navigator,  the  farmer,  the  miner,  and  the  tourist  the 
topographical  map  would  give  more  information  in  a  glance  than 
could  be  derived  by  verbal  instruction  in  a  month.  To  spend 
some  of  the  United-States-treasury  surplus  on  geodetical  surveys 
and  in  publishing  topographical  maps,  would  be  of  immense 
benefit  to  the  people  of  our  country,  both  in  peace  and  in  war. 

Second.  The  scattering  of  various  columns  of  troops  at  a 
distance  from  the  enemy  is  necessary  and  useful,  but  to  do  it 


167 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


1 68 

in  proximity  to  the  enemy  is  dangerous.  This  maxim  was 
plentifully  illustrated  by  our  advance  over  the  mountains  in 
widely-separated  columns  and  our  liability  of  being  defeated  in 
detail.  Had  Bragg  been  more  enterprising,  more  daring,  and 
more  steadfast  in  carrying  out  his  plans  he  would  have  had  an 
easy  victory,  and  we  should  not  have  taken  Chattanooga. 

Third.  For  a  daring  expedition  ( coup  de  main),  choose  rather 
a  reckless  and  rash  commander  than  one  who  is  methodical  and 
scientific.  Hindman  was  not  the  man  to  attack  Negley  and 
Baird  at  Dug  Gap,  or  Thomas  at  Stevens’  Gap;  still  less  was 
Polk  a  fit  man  to  quickly  and  impetuously  attack  Crittenden. 

Fourth.  When  an  important  movement  is  projected,  on 
which  the  success  of  the  campaign  depends,  the  commander- 
in-chief,  who  planned  it,  must  assume  the  command  and  carry 
it  out,  instead  of  giving  written  orders  to  his  subalterns,  as 
Bragg  so  often  did  during  this  campaign. 

Fifth.  Think  twice  before  you  adopt  a  plan,  but  when  it  is 
adopted,  stick  to  it  until  it  is  carried  out.  Bragg’s  plan  of 
striking  Thomas  at  Stevens’  Gap  was  a  good  one,  but  he  only 
dared  to  go  half-way.  So  it  was  with  his  attempt  against 
Crittenden  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill. 

Sixth.  Night  movements  are  sometimes  indispensable;  such 
was  our  passing  the  army  to  the  left  in  the  night  from  Septem¬ 
ber  1 8  to  19.  But  night  attacks,  such  as  Cleburne’s  on  our  left 
in  the  evening  of  the  19th,  are  to  be  avoided;  they  hardly  ever 
attain  the  desired  object,  and  result  in  a  great  deal  of  noise  and 
very  little  execution. 

Seventh.  No  army  can  be  complete  without  the  staff-officers 
being  thoroughly  educated  and  specially  prepared  for  this 
important  duty.  It  is  universally  acknowledged  in  Europe  that 
an  army  without  a  corps  of  staff-officers  of  the  highest  military 
education  can  never  be  efficient.  Some  of  the  difficulties  ex¬ 
perienced  from  this  deficiency  were:  that  our  troops  could  not 
find  their  proper  places  in  the  line,  and  no  one  was  looking  up 
their  position;  our  orders  for  the  day  were  not  properly  written ; 
the  verbal  orders  of  the  commanders  were  improperly  trans¬ 
mitted  in  many  cases,  and  were  sometimes  disfigured  in  transit; 
an  order  that  was  not  perfectly  clear  could  not  be  explained; 
no  one  had  any  special  care  in  the  retirement  of  troops,  hence 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


169 


many  captures  happened  that  were  needless;  our  division-com¬ 
manders  had  no  real  assistants;  our  commander-in-chief  was  help¬ 
less,  for  Gen.  Rosecrans  was  compelled  to  go  to  Chattanooga 
because  Gen.  Garfield  declared  that  he  was  unable  to  perform 
what  Rosecrans  wanted  done  there,  and  numberless  other  matters 
constantly  occurred  to  make  friction  and  stoppage  in  the  army 
machinery  on  the  field  of  battle.  This  was  because  our  staff- 
officers  were  selected  at  random,  and  being  utterly  unprepared  for 
their  duties,  encumbered  rather  than  facilitated  our  operations. 

But,  although  we  could  not  have  staff- officers  possessed  of 
the  needful  qualifications  during  our  late  war,  because  of  the 
officers  having  been  unexpectedly  thrown  into  the  struggle 
from  civil  life,  should  we  not  learn  wisdom  from  experience  and 
take  the  measures  needful  to  have  them  in  the  future?  Our 
generals  may  be  indifferent  to  that  necessity,  even  with  the 
added  light  thrown  upon  the  subject  by  the  European  cam¬ 
paigns,  wherein  the  German  staff  played  such  an  important 
part;  should  this  be  so,  our  enlightened  legislators  ought  to  pay 
proper  heed  to  this  want.  It  would  be  a  humane  as  well  as 
a  highly-expedient  measure  to  prevent,  in  future  wars,  such 
massacres  of  our  citizen-soldiers  as  were  sometimes  occasioned 
by  the  incompetence  of  staff-officers  in  the  wars  of  former  years. 
In  our  case,  Capt.  Kellogg  was  the  initiatory  occasion  of  the 
rout  of  the  army.  McClellan,  at  the  cost  of  the  government, 
crossed  Europe  throughout  its  length  and  breadth  and  was  even 
at  Sevastopol,  to  study  the  organization  of  armies;  yet  he  did 
not  organize  his  divisions  into  army  corps  until  some  senators 
induced  President  Lincoln  to  order  him  to  do  it. 

Almost  all  our  assistant-adjutant-generals  were  mere  clerks, 
instead  of  real  military  helpers  to  their  generals,  and  because  of 
the  incapacity  of  their  staff-officers,  our  major-generals  had  to 
run  around  like  lieutenants  to  place  their  divisions  in  line,  or 
to  locate  the  reserves  of  their  pickets.  If  any  generals  at  this 
time  should  deny  the  importance  of  having  a  corps  of  highly- 
educated  staff-officers  in  the  army,  they  ougnt  to  be  considered 
old  fogies,  and  their  opinion  disregarded. 

Eighth.  A  continuous  formation  of  a  deployed  front  in  an 
uninterrupted  line  that  crosses  hill  and  dale,  often  disregarding 
the  topographical  sinuosities  or  changes  of  the  ground,  belongs 
12 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


170 

to  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great,  was  afterward  adopted  by 
the  British  and  transferred  to  America,  but  since  the  time  of 
Napoleon,  has  been  abandoned  on  the  European  continent. 
We  often  too  strictly  adhered  to  it.  The  lines  in  nature  are 
never  geometrically  straight,  and  the  sinuosities  along  the  hills 
and  valleys  are  curved.  Add  to  them  groves,  fields,  buildings, 
woods,  and  other  objects  of  defense,  and  if  you  adopt  your  forma¬ 
tion  for  defensive  purposes  to  a  so-varying  ground,  you  never 
will  have  the  line  of  your  formation  straight,  but  broken,  con¬ 
sisting  in  salients,  points,  and  recesses,  which,  if  properly  occu¬ 
pied,  will  make  your  position  strong.  Salients  give  a  cross-fire 
in  front  of  the  intermediate  spaces,  and  they  would  make  it 
unpleasant  for  the  enemy  between  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
they  also  protect  each  other  by  an  oblique  fire.  If  the  flanks 
of  such  a  formation  are  secure  from  turning,  the  position  may 
be  considered  the  best.  That  salient  of  our  breastworks  on 
the  left,  where  Gen.  Baird  had  a  few  guns  planted  so  that  they 
could  enfilade  the  line,  did  a  great  deal  of  damage  to  the 
enemy.  Then  our  Horseshoe  Ridge,  with  its  spurs  and  recesses 
making  a  broken  front,  proved  to  be  impregnable.  If  we  could 
have  chosen  our  position  on  the  spurs  of  Missionary  Ridge  at 
the  start,  that  position,  considered  tactically,  would  have  been 
difficult  to  assail. 

Our  front,  in  the  afternoon  of  Sept.  20,  assumed  two  lines 
perpendicular  to  each  other,  which  naturally  and  artificially 
/  were  made  almost  impregnable.  The  enemy,  after  the  first 
unsuccessful  assaults  on  them,  saw  that  they  were  extremely 
difficult  to  take;  and  so  they  were,  separately.  Yet,  they 
would  have  fallen  to  pieces,  if  their  salient  point  had  been 
attacked  and  forced,  in  which  event  both  those  lines  could  have 
been  taken  in  flank  and  enfiladed  with  artillery.  Therefore, 
to  have  one  salient  point  on  the  position  is  not  an  advantage, 
and  may  sometime  lead  to  its  abandonment;  but  a  number  of 
salient  points  make  the  position  strong.  The  loss  of  a  posi¬ 
tion  with  but  one  salient  point,  did  not  happen  at  Chickamauga, 
but  might  have  happened  with  an  enemy  of  a  different  sort. 

Ninth.  Then  we  had  no  general  reserve.  Gen.  Rosecrans 
intended  to  have  two  divisions  of  Crittenden’s  corps  in  re¬ 
serve,  but  the  line  intended  to  be  occupied  proved  so  long 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


171 


that  one  division  was  taken  into  line  in  the  morning,  and  the 
other  was  on  the  move  during  the  rebel  attack  on  our  centre. 
When  we  have  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  a  strong  reserve  is 
indispensable.  It  is  the  means  of  repulsing  the  enemy  in  case  he 
penetrates  the  line,  and  is  necessary  to  patch  up  the  breaks.  If 
we  had  had  two  divisions  by  Dyer’s  farm  standing  in  reserve, 
we  could  have  met  Hood’s  column  after  it  broke  our  line  and 
have  forced  it  back.  But,  as  we  had  no  such  reserve,  the 
enemy,  after  breaking  the  line,  had  his  own  way.  The  disad¬ 
vantage  of  being  forced  to  stand  on  the  defensive  consists  in 
this:  that  the  attacking  party  can  chose  the  point  of  attack, 
and  that  a  reserve  is  not  so  indispensable  to  it  as  to  the  party 
standing  on  the  defensive.  It  is  true  that  there  were  other 
circumstances  connected  with  this  attack  which  put  us  at  still 
greater  disadvantage,  but  the  want  of  a  strong  reserve  was  the 
main  cause  of  the  rout. 

Tenth.  The  shifting  of  troops  from  one  point  of  the  line  to 
another  during  the  action  is  always  dangerous.  And  here  is 
another  proof  of  the  importance  of  having  a  reserve.  If  we 
had  had  a  strong  reserve  it  might  have  been  sent  to  the  ex¬ 
treme  left,  and  a  certain  number  of  troops  from  the  right  might 
have  been  withdrawn  from  the  line  and  placed  in  the  reserve. 
When  the  enemy’s  attack  came,  three  of  our  divisions  were 
moving  by  the  flank  to  the  left;  how,  then,  could  they  suc¬ 
cessfully  resist  the  enemy’s  attack?  It  was  impossible. 

Eleventh.  It  is  infinitely  better  to  spend  the  whole  night  in 
toilsome  marching  in  order  to  get  into  a  good  position,  than  to 
risk  meeting  the  enemy  in  a  faulty  position.  We  did  not 
have  a  proper  position  where  we  fought  on  the  19th,  and  could 
not  find  one  between  there  and  Chattanooga;  but  we  had  three 
good  roads  to  retreat  to  Chattanooga,  where  the  position  was 
good,  and  the  distance  was  but  from  eight  to  nine  miles.  Still 
it  was  thought  preferable  to  fight  on  the  20th  close  to  where 
night  found  us  on  the  19th,  and  it  might  have  proved  all  right 
if  our  right  wing  had  not  been  routed;  and  the  right  was 
routed  just  because  the  position,  although  good  tactically, 
was  faulty  strategically.  The  road  to  Chattanooga  on  our 
left  was  open  to  the  enemy,  and  no  action  being  undertaken 
by  the  enemy  against  our  right  until  almost  noon,  gave  Rose- 


172 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


crans  the  idea  that  the  enemy  was  moving  his  army  beyond  his 
left,  hence  the  shifting  of  troops  to  the  left,  and  therefore  the 
rout.  If  our  position  could  have  thoroughly  covered  the  direct 
road  to  Chattanooga,  nothing  of  the  kind  could  have  happened. 

Tzvelfth.  It  is  always  better  to  use  troops  in  the  battle  in 
their  proper  organization  if  possible;  that  is  to  say  as  an  entire 
corps,  division,  brigade,  or  regiment.  Mixing  of  parts  of  com¬ 
mands  interferes  with  the  highest  usefulness  of  the  troops. 
The  regiments  accustomed  to  act  together  when  brigaded,  rely 
on  each  other  in  the  fight;  a  regiment,  detached  from  its  own 
brigade  and  attached  to  an  unknown  brigade,  loses  confidence 
when  in  the  fight.  Every  brigade  has  its  own  reputation  and 
the  ties  betwen  the  regiments  formed  on  the  battle-field  are 
the  strongest.  So  it  is  with  divisions,  and  so  it  is  with  army 
corps.  Unfortunatlely  this  rule  can  not  be  always  preserved; 
but  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  too  much  of  that  sort  of 
breaking  and  mixing  up  of  the  commands  occurred.  The 
circumstances  were  such  as  to  compel  this  mixing  up,  and  it 
was  a  great  disadvantage. 

For  instance,  on  the  first  day,  on  our  extreme  left,  were 
Brannans’  and  Baird’s  divisons  of  Thomas’  corps,  and  Johnson’s 
of  McCook’s  corps.  In  the  centre,  Palmer’s  belonged  to  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  corps,  while  Reynolds’  was  of  Thomas’  corps;  and  even 
Reynolds’  two  brigades  were  separated  by  Palmer’s  division, 
so  that  the  division-commander  did  not  see  one  of  his  brigades 
during  the  fight  in  the  afternoon.  Then  on  the  right,  two 
brigades  of  Crittenden’s  and  two  of  McCook’s  were  fighting 
together  for  several  hours,  and  toward  evening  they  were  joined 
by  more  of  Crittenden’s  and  more  of  McCook’s  brigades,  all 
intermixed,  while  Negley’s  division,  belonging  to  Thomas’ 
corps,  remained  for  the  greater  portion  of  that  day  away  be¬ 
yond  our  extreme  right,  separated  from  the  balance  of  its  corps 
by  eight  or  nine  miles.  The  cause,  of  such  a  mixture  of  com¬ 
mands,  was  the  necessity  of  passing  our  centre  and  right  behind 
and  beyond  our  left.  Many  things  might  have  been  obviated, 
had  there  been  good  staff- officers  to  help  the  commander  of 
the  army.  For  instance,  Negley’s  place  might  have  been 
occupied  by  a  division  of  McCook’s  corps.  Then,  when  the 
fight  on  our  extreme  left  commenced,  instead  of  sending  parts 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


173 


of  Crittenden’s  corps  to  help  Thomas,  the  whole  of  McCook’s 
corps  might  have  been  put  between  Thomas  and  Crittenden. 
The  divisions  of  different  army  corps  that  were  intermixed  on 
the  first  $lay,  remained  so  on  the  second  day. 

Thirteenth.  It  is  pernicious  usage  to  appoint  separate  com¬ 
manders  of  wings.  What  was  good  in  the  last  century  is  out 
of  date  now.  For  instance,  our  army  consisted  of  three  army 
corps;  to  make  two  wings  it  was  necessary  to  break  one  of  the 
corps,  and  what  was  to  become  of  the  commander  of  the  broken 
corps?  He  did  not  know  where  to  stay.  On  the  second  day, 
in  our  left  wing  under  Thomas,  were  six  divisions,  four  of  his 
own  and  two  of  two  other  corps;  while  in  our  right  wing,  under 
McCook,  were  four  divisions,  two  of  his  own  and  two  of  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  corps,  and  most  of  the  cavalry.  What  could  be  the 
purpose,  of  such  an  artificial  subdivision  of  the  three  corps  into 
two  wings,  it  is  hard  to  conceive.  There  can  be  no  convenience 
to  the  commander-ia-chief  in  such  a  subdivision,  and  there 
must  be  some  considerable  inconvenience  to  commanders  of 
the  wings,  as  they  are  unacquainted  with  the  troops  of  the 
corps  that  are  not  their  own. 

As'it  was  on  our  side,  so  it  was  on  the  rebel  side.  Polk  was 
commanding  the  right  wing  and  Longstreet  the  left.  Polk  had 
only  Cheatham’s  division  of  his  own  corps,  the  others  were  two 
divisions  of  Hill’s  corps  and  two  divisions  of  Walker’s  corps, 
perfect  strangers  to  him.  Longstreet  had  two  divisions  of  his 
own  corps,  two  of  Buckner’s  corps,  one  of  Polk’s  corps,  and  one 
provisional  not  belonging  to  any  corps  in  particular,  a  mixture 
worse  than  any.  It  is  easy  to  understand  why  such  a  method 
may  be  advantageous  when  an  army  consists  of  a  number  of 
army  corps;  then  if  two  or  three  armies  are  made  from  them, 
and  commanders  are  appointed  for  each,  it  is  more  conve¬ 
nient  for  the  commander-in-chief  to  communicate  his  orders 
to  three  instead  of  nine  commandants.  But  where  only  three 
corps  are  present,  and  they  are  intermixed  and  divided  into 
two,  it  only  causes  inconvenience,  dissatisfaction,  and  confusion 
without  the  achievement  of  any  useful  or  beneficial  result. 

Fourteenth.  The  battle  of  Chickamauga  proved  to  the  full 
satisfaction  of  our  own  and  the  enemy’s  soldiers  that  barricades 
— even  of  old  rails  and  rotten  logs — make  a  good  protection 


l7  4 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


against  the  rifle.  Where  the  ground  is  covered  with  such  wood 
and  underbrush  as  it  was  at  Chickamauga,  artillery  has  not 
much  chance  for  use,  particularly  against  such  a  high  and 
wooded  ridge  as  was  Horseshoe  Ridge,  hence  our  barricades 
were  safe.  But  should  it  have  been  in  an  open  country,  strong 
batteries  concentrated  against  a  point  where  the  assault  was 
intended  to  be  made,  would  have  demolished  such  barricades 
in  a  short  time,  and  opened  the  way  for  the  assaulting  column 
But  could  the  barricades  be  made  of  freshly-fallen  trees  and 
covered  on  the  outside  with  piled-up  earth,  field-artillery  would 
not  be  able  to  do  them  much  damage. 

Fifteenth.  The  assault  on  our  right,  where  the  barricades 
were  not  continuous,  although  met  by  our  troops  under  seri¬ 
ous  disadvantage,  sufficiently  proved  that,  with  a  determined 
enemy  formed  in  a  strong  column  of  attack  —  as  was  Hood’s 
column — a  line  of  troops,  unsupported  by  strong  reserves,  can 
not  resist  the  pressure  without  being  broken.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  assault  in  single  line,  unsupported  by  reserves,  as  was 
Breckinridge’s  assault  on  our  extreme  left,  and,  in  fact,  all  the 
rebel  assaults  made  on  the  barricades  of  our  left  wing,  scarcely 
ever  succeed. 

Sixteenth.  When  an  enemy’s  army,  in  a  rough  and  wooded 
region  is  lying  behind  barricades,  to  attack  it  in  front  is  the 
same  as  a  man  seizing  a  mad  bull  by  the  horns.  But  there  is 
hardly  a  position  without  some  weak  point;  and  that  should  be 
turned  to  account  so  as  to  oblige  the  enemy  to  abandon  the 
barricades  and  fight  us  on  equal  terms.  On  the  morning  of 
the  20th,  the  danger  for  us  was  centering  on  our  left.  Bragg 
knew  that  we  were  working  during  the  night  and  in  the  morn¬ 
ing  on  our  barricades.  He  was  on  the  offensive  and  could  shift 
his  troops  in  any  way  he  pleased,  without  any  danger  of  our 
leaving  our  lines.  His  communications  were  along  the  Chatta- 
nooga-and-Atlanta  railroad  and  his  line  of  retreat  was  by  Ring- 
gold.  He  could  move  his  columns  north  in  the  morning,  pass 
by  our  extreme  left,  and  direct  them  on  Rossville.  That 
movement  alone  would  have  compelled  us  to  abandon  our 
fortified  position  and  move  hurriedly  toward  Chattanooga;  then 
he  could  fight  us  on  equal  terms,  and  perhaps  would  have 
succeeded  in  defeating  our  army  and  taking  Chattanooga. 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


175 


Seventeenth.  The  first  time  that  the  rifle  was  universally 
used  by  the  armies  was  in  our  late  war.  There  were  only  a 
few  troops  among  the  British  and  French,  armed  with  the  rifle 
during  the  Crimean  war.  The -rifle  compelled  our  armies  and 
the  rebel  armies  to  extensively  use  barricades  and  trenches,  and 
is  an  indication  of  what  is  coming,  when  the  ordinary  rifle  will 
be  replaced  by  a  breech-loading,  repeating,  and  self-acting  rifle; 
and  the  time  will  come  when  those  who  dig  the  most  and 
move  the  quickest  will  be  the  victors. 

Eighteenth.  The  publication  of  the  war  records  is  of  National 
importance,  yet  the  appropriations  granted  by  congress  for  the 
purpose  are  so  insignificant  that,  during  the  twenty-six  years 
since  the  end  of  the  war,  the  published  records  do  not  reach  the 
end  of  the  year  1863.  According  to  this  rate  of  progress, 
when  all  the  records  are  published  the  skeletons  of  all  the  sur¬ 
vivors  of  the  war  will  be  mouldering  in  the  grave.  Yet  those 
of  them,  who  are  able  to  write  histories  of  campaigns  and  bat¬ 
tles  of  that  war,  are  the  very  men  who  never  will  see  the  records 
completed.  It  is  surprising  to  see  the  indifference  to  this 
matter  of  our  National  legislators,  when  at  least  one-quarter  of 
them  consist  of  old  soldiers.  The  German  records  of  the  great 
Franco-Prussian  war  were  completed  and  published  in  six  years 
after  that  war  ended. 

The  one-sided  memoirs  and  histories  that  flood  our  book¬ 
stores  are  often  not  worth  the  paper  they  are  printed  on,  as 
their  recitals  and  deductions  are  not  founded  on  the  official 
records  of  both  contending  armies.  They  will  not,  and  can  not, 
contribute  to  the  later  historian’s  proper  data  of  the  struggle, 
unless  it  be  of  some  incidents  or  stories.  They  can  not  right  the 
parties  who  may  sometimes  be  wrongfully  accused  of  derelic¬ 
tion  of  duty  or  of  causing  a  defeat,  because  their  writers  do  not 
know  the  circumstances  that  happened  on  the  enemy’s  side 
which  brought  about  that  defeat.  On  the  other  hand,  they  can 
not  pull  down  a  false  hero  from  a  pedestal  of  unmerited  glory, 
acquired  from  an  imaginary  victory,  because  those  writers  do 
not  know  what  the  other  side  was  doing,  and  hence  could  not 
judge  whether  it  was  a  victory. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  the  records  are  all  in  the  war-office, 
and  anybody  can  have  access  to  them.  True,  but  that  is  too 
expensive. 


176 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Nineteenth .  The  method  of  organizing  an  army  and  for 
keeping  up  its  regiments  to  their  full  quotas  was  improper. 
There  were  no  organized  reserves  in  the  states  to  fill  up  the 
old  regiments  as  the  campaigns  were  reducing  their  strength. 
It  was  left  with  the  governors  of  states  to  manage  the  raising 
of  the  troops;  and  as  the  companies  were  organized  in  various 
parts  of  the  states,  it  became  impossible  to  recruit  reduced 
companies  in  the  field  with  men  from  the  same  neighborhood 
where  those  companies  had  been  originally  raised,  as  it  would 
have  required  for  each  of  those  companies  a  recruiting  party 
at  home.  The  consequence  was  that  every  time  new  levees 
for  troops  were  made  on  the  States,  new  regiments  were  raised 
and  a  lot  of  officers  commisioned,  while  the  old  regiments  in 
the  field  were  dwindling  down  to  almost  nothing. 

Perhaps  political  considerations  guided  the  governors  in 
adopting  this  system  of  furnishing  troops  to  the  general  Gov¬ 
ernment,  as  all  those  who  received  commissions  would,  when 
the  war  closed,  promote  the  political  advancement  of  the  dis¬ 
pensers  of  favors;  or,  not  being  instructed  in  the  method  of 
raising  troops,  they  did  not  know  any  better.  Whatever  the 
reason  may  have  been  for  such  a  policy,  it  acted  unfavorably 
upon  the  troops  in  the  field.  There  were  times  when  there 
were  more  officers  than  corporals  in  some  of  the  old  regiments; 
and,  while  new  regiments  with  green  and  inexperienced  officers 
and  men  had  every  chance  to  be  decimated  in  the  first  battle 
into  which  they  were  led,  the  old  regiments,  on  account  of  their 
small  numbers,  were  consolidated  by  two  and  three  together, 
and  thus  were  losing  their  identity,  pride,  and  energy  to  fight 
the  enemy.  If  the  old  regiments  had  been  filled  up  with  those 
men  of  whom  new  regiments  were  formed,  the  old  fighters 
would  have  made  of  new  recruits  good  soldiers  in  a  short  time, 
and  many  engagements  which  had  been  lost  on  account  of 
inexperienced  troops  would  have  been  turned  into  victories. 
This  item  alone  is  worthy  of  the  serious  consideration  of  our 
legislators. 

The  old  maxim,  “To  preserve  peace,  be  ready  for  war,”  is 
just  as  true  in  its  application  to  republics  as  to  monarchies.  It 
is  preposterous  to  think  that  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  any 
disturbances  or  war  in  the  future.  As  the  monarchies  are  liable 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


177 


to  have  foreign  wars  on  account  of  rivalry  between  their 
monarchs,  so  the  extensive  republics  are  liable  to  have  inter¬ 
necine,  if  not  foreign,  wars  on  account  of  the  rivalry  of  factions. 
There  is  a  vulgar  saying  among  the  Russians  that  “Moujik 
would  not  cross  himself  until  a  thunder-bolt  strikes,”  which 
may  be  justly  applied  to  those  who  do  not  think  of  war  until 
it  commences  to  thunder. 

Twentieth .  The  system  generally  adopted  by  the  governors 
for  the  promotion  of  commissioned  officers  as  vacancies  oc¬ 
curred  by  seniority,  was  the  most  absurd  that  could  have  been 
conceived  in  an  enlightened  country.  Not  only  was  it  absurd, 
but  highly  inconsistent,  nay,  deeply  unjust.  There  were  men 
among  the  officers  and  privates  who  were  born  soldiers  and 
who  performed  wonders  of  bravery,  daring,  and  presence  of 
mind  under  the  enemy’s  fire;  yet  none  of  them  had  any  chance 
whatever  to  be  promoted,  on  account  of  that  absurd  rule.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  were  officers  entirely  inefficient,  although 
conscientious  in  doing  their  duty,  who  were  steadily  advancing 
in  rank  as  fast  as  the  enemy’s  bullets  made  vacancies  among 
their  superiors.  The  writer  has  in  view  several  instances  where 
his  recommendations  for  promotion  of  some  gallant  officers  and 
one  soldier,  endorsed  by  all  superior  commanders,  were  refused 
by  the  governors. 

Twenty-first.  Full  power  should  be  given  commanders  of 
armies  to  recommend  for  promotion  soldiers  for  distinguished 
services,  and  it  should  be  obligatory  upon  the  governors  of 
States  to  accept  such  recommendations  unobjectionably,  and  to 
act  upon  them  at  once. 

Twenty-second.  The  jealousy  that,  to  a  great  extent,  existed 
in  our  armies  during  the  late  war,  between  regular-army  and 
volunteer  officers,  the  imputations  that  were  cast  on  the  capa¬ 
bility  of  volunteer  officers  to  credibly  occupy  high  positions  in 
the  army,  and  the  assertions,  not  without  reason,  of  their  want 
of  military  knowledge  to  command  large  bodies  of  troops,  par¬ 
ticularly  when  such  officers  happened  to  be  on  detached  service, 
and,  consequently,  had  to  exercise  their  own  judgment  in  mili¬ 
tary  actions,  are  notable  facts  and  should  not  exist  in  an  army. 
•The  regular-army  officers  were  correct  in  their  views;  while 
the  volunteer  officers,  after  all  their  sacrifices  in  the  service  of 


i73 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


the  country,  after  all  their  devotion,  patriotism,  and  honorable 
wounds  received,  to  be  thus  denied  the  promotion  for  the  lack 
of  military  knowledge — while  in  general  education,  and  often 
in  a  special  knowledge,  they  knew  themselves  to  be  not  only 
the  equals,  but  the  superiors  of,  the  regular- army  officers — 
could  not  but  feel  belittled  and  insulted.  There  could  be  no 
harmonious  cooperation  between  these  two  sets  of  officers,  each 
of  which  being  correct  in  their  views.  The  one  striving  to 
dominate  the  other  produced  a  feud,  which  occasionally  would 
break  out  and  could  not  but  have  a  demoralizing  effect  upon 
the  soldiers,  who  generally  sided  with  the  volunteer  officers. 
Such  a  state  of  things  should  not  be  tolerated  in  an  army;  it 
breeds  contempt  and  overbearing  on  one  side,  hatred  and 
bitterness  on  the  other,  particularly  with  men  of  strong  passions 
and  little  equanimity  of  character. 

The  only  remedy  for  that  is  to  make  all  the  officers  of  the 
army  thoroughly-educated  military  men.  Such  an  object  could 
be  attained  by  instituting  two  additional  military  academies, 
increasing  the  number  of  cadets  at  each  to  double  what  there 
is  at  West  Point;  make  the  admision  to  these  academies  free 
to  all,  subject  to  examinations  in  certain  branches.  This  would 
give  an  opportunity  to  those  who  feel  inclined  to  follow  the 
military  profession  to  receive  a  thorough  military  education. 
Such  an  education  would  not  prevent  those  who  received  it 
from  becoming  useful  members  of  society,  in  the  various 
branches  of  business,  when  not  on  duty.  Every  officer,  in 
consideration  of  receiving  his  education  at  the  expense  of  the 
Government,  should  be  obliged  to  serve  a  certain  number  of 
years  in  the  army,  and  to  remain  as  many  or  more  years  on 
reduced  pay,  liable  to  be  called  upon  at  any  time,  but  free  to 
engage  in  any  business.  The  number  of  cadets  from  the 
various  states  should  correspond  with  their  population. 

Twenty-third.  The  adoption  of  the  above-stated  measures  for 
providing  educated  officers  for  the  army  would  lead  to  the  entire 
reorganization  of  our  army.  Any  distinction  between  parts  of 
an  army,  connected  with  a  discrimination  shown  to  one  of  those 
parts  more  than  to  another,  must  always  be  prejudicial  to  the 
service.  The  present  “Royal”  and  “Imperial  Guards,”  as  they 
are  organized  in  the  European  armies,  are  an  example:  they 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


179 


are  composed  of  the  tallest  soldiers  and  the  richest  and  most 
aristocratic  officers,  receiving  more  privileges  in  promotion  and 
pay  than  the  bulk  of  the  “Army  of  Line,”  and  constitute 
senseless  institutions.  In  actual  campaigns  the  long-legged, 
heavy  guards  and  grenadiers  give  out  much  sooner  than  the 
medium-sized  soldiers  of  the  “Army  of  Line,”  and  their  officers, 
being  accustomed  to  luxuries,  are  in  a  far  worse  plight  in  a 
hard  campaign  than  the  officers  of  the  “Army  of  Line;”  so 
that  actually,  the  troops  of  the  “  Guards  ”  are  inferior  to  the 
troops  of  the  “Army,”  yet  they  enjoy  more  privileges;  hence, 
the  members  of  the  “Army  of  Line  ”  feel,  not  only  contempt, 
but  hatred  toward  them.  The  “Army  of  the  Line”  makes  the 
conquests,  while  the  “  Guards  ”  are  always  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  army  on  parades  and  triumphant  marches,  as  if  they 
were  the  greatest  heroes.  These  are  notorious  facts. 

In  this  respect,  as  in  many  others,  Napoleon  I.  showed  his 
military  tact  and  genius,  far  above  those  of  ordinary  kings  and 

emperors,  as  his  original  guard  consisted  of  officers  and  men, 

/ 

each  of  whom  had  really  distinguished  himself  on  many  a 
battlefield.  Such  a  guard,  as  was  his  “Old  Guard,”  could  not 
but  be  profoundly  respected  by  his  “Army  of  Line,”  as  it  was 
considered  the  key-stone  of  the  structure  of  the  French  army, 
and  as  the  most  reliable  reserve;  and,  when  moved  into  an 
action,  could  have  been  slaughtered,  but  never  routed  or  sur¬ 
rendered.  They  were  all  veterans,  decorated  with  the  Cross  of 
the  Legion  of  Honor,  earned  in  the  thickest,  not  of  one,  but  of 
many  battles,  an  undoubted  sign  of  their  extraordinary  bravery 
and  of  bearing  honorable  scars.  Such  a  guard  had  deep  signifi¬ 
cance  in  that  victorious  army,  and  was  respected  by  all  the 
soldiers,  who  considered  its  membership  as  the  highest  honor. 
But  the  impression  that  is  produced  by  the  present  “Guards” 
upon  the  soldiers  of  the  “Armies  of  Line”  in  Europe  is  quite 
the  reverse. 

In  this  respect,  our  regular  army  may  also  be  considered, 
during  the  war,  as  a  privileged  body  of  troops.  Among  a 
million  of  soldier-volunteers  raised  for  war  the  number  of  our 
regular  troops  becomes  insignificant,  and  would  be  melted  away 
into  little  squads  of  drill-masters  for  the  regiments  of  volun¬ 
teers,  while  their  privileges,  as  compared  with  the  recompense 


i8o 


CHICK  AM  AUG  A. 


of  volunteers,  particularly  the  privileges  of  officers,  are  much 
greater.  Yet,  when  we  compare  the  general  education  and  the 
social  standing  of  one  set  of  rank  and  file  with  the  other,  and 
their  consequent  usefulness  in  war,  we  find  that  the  volunteer- 
soldier,  as  a  general  thing,  stands  far  above  the  regular-army 
soldier.  In  consequence  of  this  inequality  of  the  moral  stand¬ 
ard  and  usefulness  of  troops,  contempt  for  the  regulars  and 
dissatisfaction  with  the  Government  are  generated  among  the 
volunteer-soldiers.  To  obviate  this  inequality  of  rights  and 
privileges,  and  to  establish  an  army  in  which  jealousy  and  bad 
feeling  of  one  of  its  parts  to  another,  could  not  exist  in  the 
future,  it  would  be  necessary  to  reorganize  our  army  system, 
and  it  would  be  obviously  better  to  accomplish  it  in  the  time 
of  peace. 

To  our  notion,  it  would  be  better  not  to  have  any  separate 
regular  army,  but  to  have  the  United -States  army  formed  of 
the  National  Guards  of  States.  The  present  National  Guard 
would  be  the  source  from  which  details  in  various  states  could 
be  made  to  replace  the  present  regular  army,  for  frontier  or 
garrison  duty,  or  expeditions ;  the  length  of  the  service  for 
such  details  to  be  one  year;  the  reliefs  to  be  made  in  future 
every  year,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to  have  on  duty  one-half 
of  the  troops  already  acquainted  with  the  service.  This  would 
give  an  opportunity  to  many  members  of  the  National  Guard 
to  get  practically  acquainted  with  campaign  and  garrison 
duties.  These  details,  combined  with  the  National  Guards 
remaining. on  duty  in  the  states,  in  a  few  years  would  organize 
an  embryo  of  a  large  body  of  experienced  soldiers  of  all  arms: 
infantry,  cavalry,  mounted  infantry,  artillery,  and  engineers. 
The  obligatory  service  for  all  soldiers  might  be  only  two  years. 
Reserves  to  be  raised  only  in  time  of  war. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  ready  nucleus  for  our  army  in  case 
of  war  would  thus  consist  of  those  soldiers,  who  at  the  time 
would  be  on  duty  in  the  states,  on  the  frontiers,  and  in  the 
garrisons.  Volunteers  from  those  who  had  already  seen  service 
would  first  be  invited  to  enlist ;  then  all  sorts  of  volunteers. 
In  case  the  magnitude  of  war  should  require  large  levies  of 
troops,  the  recruiting  system  could  be  used.  In  our  opinion, 
the  conscription  system  formerly  used  in  France  would  be  best 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


1 8 1 


adapted  to  our  country,  as  in  that  system  the  male  population 
first  liable  to  service  would  be  the  young  and  unmarried;  then 
the  young  and  married,  according  to  the  size  of  their  families; 
the  next  contingents  would  be  classified  according  to  the  age 
and  the  size  of  families.  The  drafting  system,  which  was  used 
during  our  late  war,  is  the  worst  and  most  unjust  of  all  recruit¬ 
ing  systems,  and  should  be  discarded.  The  system  of  substi¬ 
tutes  ought  to  be  very  much  restricted,  otherwise  it  would  lead 
to  demoralization  and  desertion,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  late 
war.  There  is  no  place  and  no  need  for  the  Landwehr  system 
in  this  country,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  considered. 

In  order  to  keep  uniformity  in  drill,  equipment,  and  military 
discipline  throughout  the  army,  active,  and  in  the  states,  model 
battalions,  squadrons,  and  batteries  should  be  instituted  and 
stationed  at  Washington.  These  model  troops  should  be 
formed  of  the  most  efficient  and  best-drilled  squads,  detailed 
every  six  months  from  each  battalion  of  infantry,  each  regiment 
of  cavalry,  and  each  battery  of  artillery,  with  officers  and 
sergeants,  out  of  which  the  model  battalions,  regiments,  and 
batteries  may  be  organized.  They  should  be  officered  with  the 
best-informed,  practical,  and  thoroughly- experienced  officers, 
as  commanders  of  regiments,  battalions,  and  companies,  who 
should  impart  to  them  the  ever-changing  details  of  the  army, 
all  changes  introduced  in  drill,  tactics,  uniforms,  and  all  other 
details,  which  thus  communicated  to  the  troops  of  the  whole 
army  every  six  months,  would  produce  that  uniformity  in  the 
regulations,  organization,  and  tactics  so  essential  to  a  well-organ¬ 
ized  army.  All  appointments  to  command  troops  in  the  active, 
garrison,  or  state  service  to  be  made  by  the  president,  by  and 
with  the  consent  of  the  senate.  Other  details  and  changes  in 
the  quartermaster  and  commissary  departments  of  the  army 
could  be  readily  effected  by  the  commission  entrusted  with  the 
reorganization  of  the  army. 

The  above  is  simply  a  skeleton-sketch  of  a  project  for  what 
seems  to  the  projector  to  be  a  necessity  for  bettering  the 
military  system  of  this  republic,  with  a  view  of  making  it  more 
just,  more  harmonious,  and  more  efficient,  in  case  a  war-cloud 
should  overshadow  the  land.  It  is,  of  course,  susceptible  of 
many  modifications  and  improvements.  The  time  for  active 


lS2 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


service,  or  for  the  service  of  «the  details  of  model  troops,  may  be 
changed  ad  libitum.  To  recapitulate  :  educated  officers  and 
one  United-States  army,  consisting  of  state  troops  ;  the  total 
exclusion  of  any  separate  regular  army;  and  the  model  troops 
to  communicate  all  the  new  improvements  and  changes  to  the 
whole  army  every  year,  are  the  main  features  of  the  proposed 
system. 

Twenty-fourth.  A  regiment  of  one  battalion  is  a  British  relic 
of  the  last  century,  and  was  long  ago  discarded  in  European 
continental  armies.  Regiments  ought  to  consist  of  not  less 
than  three,  and  better  when  of  four,  battalions,  each  battalion 
being  1000  strong.  These  battalions  to  consist  of  four  com¬ 
panies,  each  250  strong,  subdivided  into  two  platoons.  Colonels 
to  command  the  regiments,  lieutenant-colonels  and  majors  to 
command  the  battalions,  and  captains  the  companies.  Four 
of  such  regiments  would  form  a  division.  As  the  old  brigades, 
consisting  of  regiments  of  one  battalion  each,  have  lost  their 
significance,  the  rank  of  brigadier-general  has  been  abolished 
in  the  European  continental  armies,  and  exists  only  in  Great 
Britain.  Two  regiments  in  those  armies  are  still  considered  as 
a  brigade,  but  are  commanded  by  the  senior  colonel. 

A  regiment  of  four  battalions  would  be  preferable  to  one  con¬ 
sisting  of  but  three,  because  in  the  formation  of  the  line  of 
battle  two  of  its  battalions  would  be  placed  in  the  first  and 
two  in  the  second  line,  while  a  regiment  of  three  battalions 
would  have  to  be  placed  entire  in  one  line  and  supported  by 
another  entire  regiment  placed  in  the  second  line,  which  in 
practice  is  not  so  advantageous,  because  when  battalions  of 
the  same  regiment  stand  in  both  lines,  their  support  of  ach 
other  in  battle  is  more  reliable.  Such  an  organization  of  the 
regiments  is  more  judicious,  because,  even  with  the  greatest 
losses  sustained  in  a  battle,  there  would  still  remain  enough  of 
soldiers  in  a  regiment  to  be  commanded  by  its  colonel,  while 
with  our  present  regiments,  if  there  should  be  a  loss  of  one-half 
in  a  regiment  of  the  ordinary  campaign  strength,  which  hardly 
ever  exceeds  600  men,  there  would  remain  a  number  of  men 
just  large  enough  to  be  commanded  by  a  captain.  With  these 
advantages  in  a  military  point  of  view,  the  system  also  com¬ 
bines  economy,  as  there  will  be  a  lot  of  field-officers  dispensed 
with,  wBose  pay  at  present  absorbs  a  large  sum  of  money. 


PARTICULAR  LESSONS. 


183 


Twenty -fifth.  We  had  too  much  sameness  in  uniforms, 
and  there  was  no  visible  insignia  to  distinguish  divisions  and 
army  corps.  The  uniform  may  be  the  same  for  all,  but  the 
adoption  of  different  colors  for  collars,  cuffs,  and  shoulder- 
straps  would  be  the  means  of  indicating  the  difference  between 
divisions,  while  numbers  on  hats  or  caps  may  indicate  the 
difference  between  the  regiments  of  the  same  division,  and  a 
suitable  badge  pinned  on  the  left  breast  may  indicate  the  corps. 
These,  apparently,  trifles  are  of  considerable  importance  for 
the  men  to  find  their  commands,  or  to  rally  after  a  rout;  and 
they  are  also  of  importance  to  the  commanders  to  recognize 
the  men  of  their  own  or  of  other  commands.  A  variety  of 
uniforms  in  cavalry  regiments  is  still  more  important,  as  in 
action  the  cavalry  scatters  more  than  infantry.  It  is  not  nec¬ 
essary  to  have  gaudy  uniforms  of  hussars,  uhlans,  or  cuirassiers, 
but  simply  to  have  some  distinctive  colors  for  head-gear,  collars, 
cuffs,  and  shoulder-straps  to  recognize  the  commands  to  which 
men  belong. 

Then,  in  order  that  the  corps- commanders  and  the  com¬ 
manders  of  armies  may  be  enabled  to  recognize  various  troops 
in  the  line  of  battle  or  in  action,  there  should  be  some  outward 
signs  in  the  commands.  To  attain  this  object,  each  battalion 
should  be  furnished,  in  addition  to  the  United- States  flag,  a 
division-flag,  to  be  of  a  different  color  for  each  division,  as  blue 
for  the  first,  white  for  the  second,  and  yellow  for  the  third 
division  in  each  corps,  with  a  large  corps- number,  made  of  a 
different  color  and  placed  in  the  centre  of  the  flag  to  indicate 
the  number  of  the  corps.  Smaller  numbers  in  the  corners  of 
this  flag  may  indicate  the  numbers  of  the  regiments,  or  even 
battalions.  Flags  and  guidons  for  commanders  of  divisions  and 
regiments  may  be  also  of  the  same  color  as  the  division-flags 
of  the  battalions.  Thus  there  would  be  visible  signs  enough 
to  recognize  the  commands  from  a  distance. 

Twenty-sixth.  The  covering  of  the  head  is  one  of  the  most 
important  parts  of  the  soldier’s  clothing,  and  a  soft  felt  hat 
of  medium  size,  in  our  opinion,  is  the  most  convenient  and 
comfortable  head -cover.  It  protects  the  face  from  the  rain, 
the  eyes  from  the  sun,  and  is  comfortable  in  sleeping  on 
the  bivouac.  For  usefulness  and  comfort  a  fatigue-cap  can  not 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


184 

compare  with  it  in  the  campaign,  and  a  helmet  is  the  worst  of 
head-covers  imaginable,  unless  it  is  furnished  to  the  ambulance 
corps,  as  they  could  use  it,  in  case  of  necessity,  as  a  bucket  to 
fetch  water  for  the  wounded. 

With  these  remarks  on  what  was  observed,  not  only  during 
the  Chickamauga  campaign,  but  also  during  the  writer’s  service 
of  over  three  years  in  the  late  war,  we  will  close  our  book, 
hoping  that  our  remarks,  if  correct,  will  not  be  passed  over 
unnoticed,  and  may  lead  to  the  improvements  in  our  army  for 
the  benefit  of  the  future  generations  of  this  Republic. 


APPENDIX. 


DURING  the  campaign  and  battle  of  Chickamauga,  Tur- 
chin’s  brigade  consisted  of  the  Eleventh,  Thirty-sixth, 
Eighty-ninth,  and  Ninety-second  Ohio,  and  Eighteenth  Ken¬ 
tucky  regiments  of  infantry,  and  was  known  as  the  third 
brigade  of  the  fourth  division  of  the  fourteenth  army  corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The  brigade  was  commanded 
by  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Turchin,  the  division  by  Maj. -Gen.  Joseph 
J.  Reynolds,  and  the  corps  by  Maj. -Gen.  George  H.  Thomas. 
The  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  having  been  temporarily  detached  from 
the  brigade  before  the  army  moved  on  that  campaign,  came 
to  the  front  with  the  reserve  troops,  and,  having  no  opportunity 
to  join  its  brigade,  fought  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle 
under  Brig.-Gen.  James  B,  Steedman  of  the  reserve  troops  on 
the  extreme  right  of  the  army,  participating  in  the  brilliant 
repulse  of  the  most  ferocious,  determined,  and  persistent  assault 
of  the  enemy  on  the  extreme  right  of  Gen.  Brannan’s  troops  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  and  defending  that  position  till  evening. 

As  this  work  has  been  dedicated  by  the  author  to  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  his  brigade,  it  has  been  deemed  advisable  to  insert  that 
part  of  the  official  reports  referring  to  the  distinguished  services 
of  that  brigade  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  wrhich  will,  no 
doubt,  be  as  interesting  to  general  reader  as  well  as  those  con¬ 
cerned;  hence  the  following  is  inserted  by  the  publishers: 

REPORT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  B.  TURCHIN: 

Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
Headquarters  Third  Brigade,  Fourth  Division, 
Fourteenth  Army  Corps, 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Sept.  26,  1863. 

Sir: — After  holding  the  opening  of  Catlett’s  Gap  for  two 

days,  with  my  brigade  against  the  enemy,  who  tried  to  come 

out  of  it  and  occupy  our  position,  I  was  relieved,  in  the  evening 

of  the  17th  of  September,  by  the  second  brigade,  putting  my 

brigade  in  the  reserve. 

13 


185 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


1 86 

On  the  1 8th,  I  received  orders  to  march,  and  the  division 
moved  in  the  evening  by  the  Chickamauga-Cove  road,  and 
halted  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  to  cook  coffee  at  Osborne’s 
house,  north  of  Crawfish  Springs. 

At  about  10  o’clock,  on  the  19th,  the  division  moved  toward 
Widow  Glenn’s  house,  northeast  of  which  it  was  supposed  to 
take  position,  but  an  order  came  from  Gen.  Thomas  to  move 
to  McDannel’s  house,  and  the  division  moved  by  a  cross-road, 
my  brigade  being  at  the  head  of  the  column. 

While  approaching  McDannel’s  house,  I  received  an  order 
from  the  general  commanding  the  division  to  face  about  and  to 
return  to  Kelly’s  cross-roads,  but,  immediately  after  that,  my 
assistant-adjutant-general,  Capt.  Curtis,  brought  me  informa¬ 
tion  that  two  of  my  regiments,  the  Ninety-second  Ohio  and  the 
Eighteenth  Kentucky,  had  been  moved  to  the  front  already 
by  Gen.  Reynolds,  and  that  he  (Capt.  Curtis)  would  take  the 
balance  of  the  brigade  to  the  position. 

While  we  were  thus  marching  forward  and  backward,  heavy 
fighting  was  going  on  in  the  front  and  on  our  right  flank. 

At  3  o’clock  p.m.,  I  succeeded  in  finding  my  two  regiments 
that  were  engaged,  and  took  position  with  the  other  two  regi¬ 
ments  that  were  with  me  (the  Thirty-sixth  and  Eleventh  Ohio) 
in  the  second  line,  having  the  Twenty- first  Indiana  battery 
on  a  low  ridge  at  the  right  of  the  battalions.  The  position  was 
in  the  woods,  two  regiments  fighting  in  the  hollow  in  front, 
supporting  Gen.  Hazen’s  brigade  of  Palmer’s  division;  on  my 
left  was  Gen.  Willich’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division.  I  had 
hardly  taken  the  position,  when  Gen.  Hazen  requested  me  to 
send  one  of  my  regiments  to  relieve  one  or  two  of  his  regi¬ 
ments  that  were  fighting  in  front,  as  they  were  out  of  ammun¬ 
ition.  I  sent  the  Eleventh  Ohio  to  the  front.  Shortly  after¬ 
ward,  I  relieved  the  Ninety-second  Ohio  with  the  Thirty-sixth 
Ohio,  putting  the  former  in  reserve. 

The  enemy  being  repulsed  in  my  front,  the  brigade  of  Gen. 
Willich  advanced  to  the  front  and  left,  and  the  brigade  of  Gen. 
Hazen  being  withdrawn,  my  brigade  was  isolated  from  other 
troops.  I  decided  to  take  to  the  right,  and  formed  in  two  lines 
on  the  left  of  Gen.  Cruft’s  brigade  of  Palmer’s  division.  Shortly 
afterward,  at  about  4.30  p.m.,  the  enemy  came  in  heavy  columns 


APPENDIX. 


187 

on  our  front,  there  was  waving  and  indecision,  and  I  ordered  a 
charge.  The  brigade  yelled,  rushed  forward,  and  drove  the 
enemy  back  in  confusion,  taking  some  prisoners.  The  brigade' 
of  Gen.  Cruft’s  charged  with  us.  After  consulting  Gen.  Cruft, 
we  decided  to  fall  back,  to  reform  our  line,  on  the  original 
position.  This  being  done,  I  received  orders  from  the  gen¬ 
eral  commanding  to  join  the  second  brigade  which  I  subse¬ 
quently  did,  and  that  closed  the  day. 

The  charge  was  executed  by  the  whole  brigade  most  gal¬ 
lantly.  We  routed,  as  we  learned  from  the  prisoners  afterward, 
Law’s  brigade,  Hood’s  division,  Longstreet’s  corps,  a  crack 
brigade  of  the  rebel  army  of  Richmond.*  The  position  on  the 
first  day  was  so  bad  and  so  wooded  that  my  battery  could  fire 
only  three  shots  during  the  day’s  fighting,  and  those  were  fired 
at  the  rebel  stragglers  after  we  made  the  charge. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  I  was  ordered  to  shift  my  bri¬ 
gade  to  the  left  and  move  to  the  front  to  take  the  place  of  Gen. 
Hazen’s  brigade  which  moved  to  the  left,  the  second  brigade 
taking  my  place.  I  had  the  Thirty-sixth  Ohio,  Ninety-second 
Ohio,  and  a  portion  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio  in  the  first  line, 
several  companies  of  the  latter  and  the  Eighteenth  Kentucky 
regiment  being  in  the  reserve. 

At  about  10  o’clock,  we  were  attacked  by  the  enemy,  and 
for  about  one  hour  the  infantry  and  the  battery  kept  up  a 
continual  fire.  The  breastwork  of  rails  and  timber  protected 
our  men.  The  enemy  suffered  severely.  At  noon,  and  after 
until  2  o’clock  (p.m.),  there  was  a  comparative  lull  in  our  front,, 
while  the  battle  raged  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  position  of 
the  army. 

Receiving  orders  to  change  front  and  to  abandon  a  portion 
of  the  fortifications,  to  complete  the  line  with  the  second  bri¬ 
gade,  I  directed  my  battery  to  move  back  and  take  place  on 
the  left  of  Capt.  Harris’  battery  of  the  second  brigade,  and  the 
Thirty-sixth  Ohio  regiment  to  support  it,  and  was  preparing  to 
move  other  regiments  when  an  order  came  from  Gen.  Thomas 
to  hold  the  position.  I  moved  the  Thirty-sixth  and  the  battery 
to  their  original  positions,  driving  the  enemy’s  sharpshooters 
back. 

*  This  information  was  incorrect,  as  it  was  Brown’s  brigade  of  Stewart’s  division. 


1 88 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Shortly  after,  Gen.  Reynolds  came  with  the  second  brigade 
and  informed  me  that  two  brigades  of  Brannan’s  division,  on 
the  right  of  the  second  brigade,  gave  way,  and  the  second 
brigade  was  obliged  to  change  front,  and  that  I  must  change 
my  front  to  the  right.  I  reformed  my  brigade  with  the  Thirty- 
sixth  and  Eleventh  Ohio  regiments  in  the  first  line  and  Ninety- 
second  Ohio  and  Eighteenth  Kentucky  regiments  in  the  second, 
four  pieces  of  artillery  in  front  and  two  in  the  reserve;  the 
second  brigade  being  placed  in  echelon  on  my  right  and  rear. 

The  roar  of  the  battle  on  our  right  and  left  advancing  more 
and  more  to  our  rear,  the  time  was  coming  to  retreat.  At  last 
the  order  came  for  us  to  retreat  by  the  right  flank.  The  brigade 
moved,  then  halted  and  faced  to  the  front;  then  orders  came  to 
move  to  the  rear.  The  brigade  faced  about,  made  a  few  paces, 
and  faced  that  position  of  the  enemy  that  had  out-flanked  the 
left  of  our  lines  and  was  in  the  rear  of  Palmer’s,  Johnson’s,  and 
Baird’s  divisions.  The  command  “  forward  ”  was  given,  some 
few  shots  were  exchanged.  I  gave  the  order  to  charge.  The 
brigade  yelled,  rushed  forward,  and  broke  to  pieces  the  con¬ 
fronting  columns  of  the  rebels.  They  fled  pell-mell.  We  took 
two  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners,  charged  up  hill,  and,  notwith¬ 
standing  the  flank  fire  of  the  rebel  battery  and  the  front  fire 
of  the  two  pieces,  the  regiments  rushed  on  and  took  the  two 
pieces,  but  for  want  of  time  and  the  horses  being  disabled, 
could  not  get  them  away.  I  ordered  the  brigade  to  move  by 
the  left  flank  and  joined  Col.  McCook’s  brigade  of  the  reserve 
corps  that  was  in  position  on  our  left. 

As  I  learned  afterward,  Gen.  Reynolds  with  about  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  fifty  of  my  brigade,  being  on  the  extreme  right  and 
not  noticing  our  movement  to  the  left,  was  still  moving  on  the 
main  road.  Some  rebel  troops  were  met  but  gave  way,  and  the 
rest  of  the  brigade  joined  us  safely. 

That  charge  relieved  our  troops  of  the  left  that  were  out¬ 
flanked  and  partially  surrounded.  The  charge  was  made  most 
gallantly.  It  showed  that  we  have  soldiers  on  whom  we  may 
rely  in  the  most  difficult  circumstances.  The  Ninety-second 
Ohio  regiment,  having  never  been  in  action  before,  behaved 
most  gallantly  during  these  two  days.  All  the  other  regiments 
have  seen  fight  before  and  they  did  admirably.  The  officers 


APPENDIX. 


189 


and  men  of  the  brigade  did  nobly.  The  manoeuvres  were 
executed  with  precision  and  order.  We  did  not  flinch  one  inch 
from  our  position  during  both  days’  fight.  My  brigade  formed 
the  salient  point  of  the  position  on  the  second  day;  and,  while 
on  the  right  and  left  our  troops  were  falling  back,  we  held  our 
ground  until  we  charged  to  the  rear. 

Col.  Lane  and  Maj.  Higgins  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio  regiment 
most  gallantly  directed  the  movements  of  their  regiment.  After 
Col.  Jones  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Ohio  was  mortally  wounded, 
Lieut.-Col.  Deval  commanded  the  regiment  with  great  skill  and 
bravery.  Maj.  Adney  being  wounded,  Lieut.-Col.  Deval  was 
the  only  field-officer  with  the  regiment.  After  Col.  Fearing  of 
the  Ninety- second  Ohio  was  wounded,  Lieut.-Col.  Putnam 
commanded  the  regiment,  and,  notwithstanding  that  he  was 
wounded  himself,  remained  faithfully  with  the  regiment,  nobly 
assisted  by  Maj.  Golden  and  his  brave  and  intrepid  adjutant, 
Lieut.  Turner. 

Lieut.-Col.  Milward  of  the  Eighteenth  Kentucky  received  a 
severe  bruise  from  a  horse  that  overran  him,  but  remained  on 
the  field  of  battle  until  Sunday  afternoon,  when  Capt.  Heltimes 
took  charge  of  the  regiment.  Maj.  Wileman  having  been 
wounded  in  the  first  day’s  fight,  Capt.  Heltimes  conducted  the 
regiment  in  the  last  charge  bravely  and  took  a  two-gun  battery 
of  the  enemy,  showing  thereby  his  bravery  and  coolness. 

In  conclusion,  I  must  mention  the  gallant  conduct  of  my 
staff-officers  on  the  battle-field.  Capt.  Curtis,  my  assistant- 
adjutant-general,  was  my  right-hand  during  the  two- days’ 
battle.  Capt.  Price,  Eleventh  Ohio,  brigade  inspector,  and 
Capt.  Robbins,  Eighteenth  Kentucky,  brigade  provost  marshal, 
acted  as  my  aides-de-camp  and  assisted  me  gallantly. 

Our  loss  during  the  two-days’  fight  is  one  officer  and  twenty- 
nine  men  killed,  eighteen  officers  and  two  hundred  and  nine 
men  wounded,  and  six  officers  and  eighty  men  missing.* 

The  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  regiment  having,  unfortunately,  been 
previously  detached  from  the  brigade,  was,  during  the  fight, 
serving  in  Gen.  Steed  man’s  division  of  the  reserve  corps.  The 

*  In  the  report  of  Gen.  Thomas,  the  loss  in  the  Eleventh  Ohio  is  shown  63; 
Thirty-sixth  Ohio,  90;  Ninety-second  Ohio,  91;  Eighteenth  Kentucky,  85;  Twenty- 
first  Indiana  battery,  12. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


I90 

entire  regiment,  as  I  understand,  was  captured  by  the  enemy, 
except  about  one  hundred  men  and  three  officers  who  were 
detailed  to  guard  some  train.  It  was  unfortunate  for  a  brigade, 
that  came  out  of  the  campaign  so  nobly,  to  lose  one  of  its  regi¬ 
ments  by  the  fault  of  somebody  else.* 

The  list  of  the  casualties  is  herewith  submitted.  The  reports 
of  the  regimental  commanders  will  be  forwarded  as  soon  as 
received. 

An  approximate  sketch  of  a  portion  of  the  battle-field  and 
of  the  positions  of  my  brigade  is  herewith  forwarded.-!" 

I  am,  Sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  B.  Turchin, 

Brigadier-General  Commanding. 

Maj.  John  Levering, 

Assistant- Adj  utant-General, 

Fourth  Division,  Fourteenth  Army  Corps. 

REPORT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  J.  J.  REYNOLDS : 

Headquarters  Fourth  Division,  Fourteenth  Army  Corps, 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Sept.  23,  18634 

COLONEL: — I  herewith  submit  a  report  of  the  operations  of 
the  fourth  division,  fourteenth  army  corps,  in  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga  Creek,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20,  1863. 

The  division  moved  from  Pond  Spring  about  4  p.m.  on  the 
1 8th,  and  having  marched  all  night,  halted  one  hour  for  break¬ 
fast  near  Osborn’s,  and  thence  proceeded,  by  order  of  Gen. 
Thomas,  commanding  fourteenth  corps,  to  take  position  in  line 
of  battle  northeast  of  Glenn’s  house;  while  taking  this  position 
the  division  was  ordered  to  advance  immediately  toward  Mc- 
Dannel’s  and  enter  in  the  action  then  progressing  on  our  left. 
I  at  once  reported  in  person  to  the  corps-commander,  and,  in 
accordance  with  his  instructions,  directed  the  third  brigade 
(Turchin’s)  to  take  position  southeast  of  Kelley’s  cross-roads. 
The  second  brigade  (King’s)  was  about  leaving  the  main  road 

*  In  the  report  of  Gen.  Thomas,  the  loss  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  is  shown  252. 

+  Not  found  in  the  records  office. 

£  The  date  shows  that  this  report  was  written  before  the  report  of  Gen.  Turchin 
has  been  received,  as  the  last  is  dated  Sept.  26,  1863. 


APPENDIX. 


191 

to  take  place  on  the  right  of  the  third,  when  I  met  Gen.  Palmer 
in  the  road,  who  represented  that  his  command  had  gained 
upon  the  enemy,  but  was  nearly  out  of  ammunition  and  in 
great  need  of  assistance  to  enable  him  to  hold  what  he  had 
gained,  at  least  until  they  could  replenish  ammunition.  This, 
although  not  the  precise  position  indicated  to  me  for  the  second 
brigade,  was  very  close  to  it,  and  appeared  to  be  a  place  that 
it  was  essential  to  fill  at  once,  and  no  other  troops  were  in  sight 
to  take  the  position.  Three  regiments,  under  Col.  E.  A.  King, 
were,  therefore  ordered  in  at  this  point,  leaving  in  my  hands  one 
regiment,  Seventy-fifth  Indiana,  and  Harris’  battery.  I  had 
just  arrived  on  the  field,  and  found  my  division  would  occupy 
about  the  centre  of  our  line.  No  reserve  force  being  anywhere 
apparent,  I  determined  to  form  one  of  Harris’  battery  and  the 
Seventy- fifth  Indiana,  to  which  was  shortly  added  Swallow’s 
battery  (which  I  found  on  the  road  unemployed),  and  the 
Ninety-second  Illinois  (temporarily  dismounted).  In  a  short 
time  the  Sixth  Ohio  came  from  the  front  and  took  position 
near  Harris’  battery  to  resupply  ammunition.  Gen.  Palmer 
soon  called  also  for  the  Seventy-fifth  Indiana  temporarily;  it 
was  ordered  to  go,  the  Sixth  Ohio  serving  in  the  interim  as 
support  to  the  guns.  The  Sixth  having  been  resupplied  with 
ammunition,  was  subsequently  ordered  away,  leaving  the 
Ninety-second  Illinois  the  only  support  for  the  batteries.  The 
Seventy-fifth  Indiana  returned  late  in  the  day  and  in  some 
disorder,  having  relieved  an  entire  brigade  and  done  efficient 
service.  Calls  for  support  had  been  made  from  the  right,  to 
which  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  respond. 

Gen.  J.  C.  Davis  arrived  and  inquired  where  troops  were 
needed.  I  gave  him  the  substance  of  my  information,  and  he 
led  his  division  in  on  our  right.  Finally  a  call  came  direct 
from  Col.  E.  A.  King,  who  had  drifted  further  to  the  right,  that 
he  was  hard  pressed,  and  wanted  his  own  regiment,  the  Sev¬ 
enty-fifth  Indiana.  This  regiment  had  gone,  but  I  ordered  to 
him  the  Ninety-second  Illinois,  trusting  to  regiments  returning 
to  the  road  to  resupply  ammunition  for  support  to  the  batteries, 
or  that  in  case  the  force  in  front  were  driven  back,  of  which  I 
felt  there  was  danger,  I  might  rally  them  around  the  batteries 
and  reestablish  the  line.  The  two  howitzers  of  the  Ninety- 


192 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


second  Illinois  were  now  added  to  the  two  batteries,  and  the 
Ninety-second  started  to  King’s  support.  Scarcely  had  it 
cleared  the  front  of  the  guns  when  this  regiment  was  struck  in 
flank  by  our  own  forces  retiring,  followed  closely  by  the  enemy. 
I  met  our  retiring  regiments  in  person,  pointed  them  to  four¬ 
teen  guns  in  position  as  evidence  that  the  enemy  must  be 
thrown  back,  and  by  great  exertion  succeeded  in  reforming 
several  regiments  in  rear  of  the  batteries. 

Battery  H,  fourth  regiment  artillery,  commanded  by  Lieut. 
Russell,  at  this  time  came  to  our  position,  and  was  ordered  into 
action  on  Harris’  left.  These  batteries  fired  with  terrible  effect 
upon  the  enemy,  his  progress  was  checked,  and  our  line  for  a 
time  prevented  from  yielding  any  further.  The  enemy  now 
shifted  further  to  the  right,  where  there  was  evidently  an  open¬ 
ing  in  our  lines,  and  coming  in  on  their  right  flank,  our  regi¬ 
ments  again  became  disheartened  and  began  to  retire.  The 
batteries  following  the  regiments  changed  front  and  fired  to 
the  right,  and  the  line  was  reformed  along  a  fence  nearly  per¬ 
pendicular  to  its  former  position,  with  the  batteries  in  the  edge 
of  the  woods,  the  enemy  pushing  still  further  to  the  right  and 
rear.  I  rallied  and  formed  into  double  line  some  ten  or  twelve 
other  returning  regiments,  which  came  in  from  the  left  centre, 
and  placing  the  front  line  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Col.  Croxton,  Tenth  Kentucky,  ordered  them  to  swing  around 
on  the  left  flank  as  a  pivot;  this  order  was  well  executed  by 
both  lines  in  our  rear,  thus  entirely  cleared  of  the  enemy.  It 
was  now  nearly  sundown,  and  operations  on  this  part  of  the 
field  ceased  for  the  day.* 

On  the  20th,  my  division  was  posted  at  Kelley’s  cross-roads 
in  echelon,  the  third  brigade  (Turchin’s)  in  front,  and  immedi¬ 
ately  on  Gen.  Palmer’s  right ;  the  second  brigade  (King’s) 
slightly  retired  to  secure  good  ground,  and  facing  the  main 
Rossville  -  and  -  Lafayette  road.  Two  brigades  of  the  third 
division,  fourteenth  army  corps  (Brannan’s),  were  on  my  right; 
my  division  was  formed  in  two  lines,  nearly  one-half  of  the 
infantry  being  in  reserve.*)*  During  the  early  morning  of  the 

*  It  is  evident  from  this  part  of  the  report  of  the  first  day’s  action  that  Gen. 
Reynolds  did  not  know  what  Turchin’s  brigade  was  doing,  as  he  does  not  even 
mention  it. 

+  The  second  line  is  called  “reserve.” 


APPENDIX. 


193 


20th,  temporary  breastworks  were  erected  of  such  material  as 
could  be  found  at  hand,  and  were  of  great  benefit.  The  attack 
of  the  enemy  on  our  position  commenced  about  10  o’clock,  and 
was  very  heavy;  he  was  successfully  repulsed  at  all  points  in 
front  of  our  position  without  calling  upon  the  second  line  of 
infantry.  About  1 1  o’clock  the  two  brigades  of  the  third 
division  being  heavily  pressed  in  front  and  right  flank,  which 
had  been  left  uncovered,  began  to  yield.  Col.  Croxton  re¬ 
ported  this  to  me,  and  personal  inspection  verified  the  report. 
The  One-hundred-and-fifth  Ohio,  Maj.  Perkins  commanding, 
and  until  this  time  lying  in  reserve,  was  ordered  to  face  the 
enemy,  and  go  at  them  with  the  bayonet ;  the  order  was  gal¬ 
lantly  executed  ;  the  enemy  was  thrown  back,  and  the  yielding 
regiments  partially  rallied,  but  the  enemy  returning  with  in¬ 
creased  force,  and  turning  their  right,  these  regiments  were 
borne  back,  the  One-hundred-and-fifth  Ohio  with  them. 

The  latter  regiment  carried  off  the  field  the  rebel  Gen. 
Adams,  wounded,  who  had  been  previously  captured  by  Capt. 
Guthrie’s  company  of  the  Nineteenth  Illinois.  After  all  the 
troops  had  left  the  right  of  my  division,  and  the  enemy  was 
silenced  in  front,  a  column  of  the  enemy  appeared  in  the  main 
road,  in  the  prolongation  of  the  line  of  battle  of  the  second 
brigade;  at  this  same  time  a  rebel  battery  was  firing  into  the 
rear  of  this  brigade.  The  position  of  the  second  brigade  was 
therefore  changed  so  as  to  throw  its  left  nearer  the  right  of  the 
third  brigade,  and  to  face  the  enemy,  who  had  taken  position 
on  our  right  and  rear.  At  this  time  the  division  was  out  of 
ammunition,  except  such  as  was  gathered  from  the  boxes  of 
the  dead,  and  the  enemy  was  between  us  and  our  ammunition 
train;  but  for  this  circumstance  we  could  have  maintained  our 
position  indefinitely.  The  ammunition  train,  by  another  route, 
got  safely  to  Chattanooga.  We  remained  in  this  position  for 
some  time,  when  orders  were  received  from  the  corps-com¬ 
mander  to  prepare  to  change  our  position,  and  the  division  in 
a  short  time  received  an  order  to  initiate  a  movement  toward 
Rossville.  This  was  done  with  the  brigade  still  formed  in  two 
lines,  and  moving  by  flank  in  parallel  columns,  thus  ready  at 
a  moment’s  notice  to  face  in  double  line  in  either  of  the  direc¬ 
tions  in  which  firing  had  lately  been  heard.  Arriving  at  the 


194 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Rossville  road  the  command  was  met  by  the  corps-commander 
in  person,  and  I  was  directed  to  form  line  perpendicular  to  the 
Rossville  road.  This  done,  Gen.  Thomas  pointed  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  Rossville  and  said:  “There  they  are,  clear  them  out.” 
The  division  was  faced  about,  and  a  charge  ordered  and  exe¬ 
cuted  in  two  lines,  at  double-quick  through  the  rebel  lines, 
dispersing  them  and  capturing  more  than  200  prisoners,  under 
a  fire  of  infantry  in  front  and  artillery  in  flank. 

I  understand  that  this  movement  was  intended  to  open  the 
way  to  Rossville  for  the  army,  and  did  not  then  know  of  any 
other  road  to  that  point.  I  therefore  pressed  right  on  in  the 
charge,  expecting  the  whole  division  to  do  the  same,  until  the 
rebel  lines  and  batteries  were  cleared  and  the  road  opened,  and 
found  myself  with  only  about  150  of  the  third  brigade,  under 
Col.  Lane,  Eleventh  Ohio,  near  the  field  hospital  of  the  four¬ 
teenth  corps.  The  remainder  of  the  division  proceeded  to  the 
high  grounds  on  the  left,  by  order  of  Gen.  Thomas;  the  third 
brigade  was  reformed  by  Brig.-Gen.  Turchin,  who  had  his  horse 
shot  under  him  in  the  charge;  the  second  brigade  was  reformed 
by  Col.  M.  S.  Robinson,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of 
that  brigade  after  the  death  of  Col.  E.  A.  King;  the  advance 
party  reformed  the  division  on  the  ridge  to  the  west  of  the 
road,  and  the  whole  division  marched  to  Rossville  by  the  valley 
road.  The  first  brigade  (Wilder’s  mounted  infantry)  was  de¬ 
tached  from  the  division  by  order  of  the  department  com¬ 
mander,  except  the  Ninety-second  Illinois,  which  was  with  the 
division  on  the  19th.  The  operations  of  this  brigade  will  be 
reported  separately. 

The  brigade-commanders,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Turchin  and  Col. 
E.  A.  King,  handled  their  brigades  with  skill  and  judgment, 
and  no  instance  of  confusion  or  disorder  occurred  to  the  bat¬ 
teries ;  Harris’ Nineteenth  Indiana  and  Andrew’s  Twenty-first 
Indiana  were  skilfully  and  bravely  managed  and  did  fine 
execution ;  the  Nineteenth  battery  on  both  days,  and  the 
Twenty-first  battery  more  especially  on  the  20th.  Capt.  Harris 
was  wounded  on  the  19th.  His  battery  was  ably  commanded 
on  the  20th  by  Lieut.  Lackey.  This  battery  lost  two  guns, 
one  left  on  the  field,  the  horses  killed;  the  other  disabled  by 
the  enemy’s  fire.  Andrew’s  battery  lost  one  gun,  left  from  the 


APPENDIX. 


195 


breaking  of  the  harness.  The  untimely  fall  of  Col.  King 
renders  it  impracticable  to  obtain  a  connected  report  of  the 
operations  of  the  second  brigade ;  the  regiments  were  ably 
commanded,  as  follows:  One-hundred-and-first  Indiana,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Doan;  Seventy-fifth  Indiana,  Col.  Robinson;  Sixty-eighth 
Indiana,  Capt.  Espy,  wounded;  One-hundred-and-fifth  Ohio, 
Maj.  Perkins,  wounded.*  The  division  staff  were  at  their  posts 
and  discharged  their  duties  promptly  and  faithfully.  Maj. 
John  Levering,  assistant-adjutant-general,  sick  in  ambulance; 
Maj.  O.  O.  Herrick,  medical  director,  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy;  Capt.  F.  F.  Starkweather,  assistant  -  quartermaster ; 
Capt.  J.  C.  Leech,  commissary  of  subsistance ;  Capt.  C.  O. 
Howard,  mustering  officer,  aide-de-camp,  wounded  in  the  hand; 
Capt.  J.  F.  Floyd,  One-hundred-and-first  Ohio,  aide-de-camp ; 
Capt.  P.  B.  Hanna,  Seventy-second  Indiana,  provost  marshal, 
(wounded);  First-Lieut.  J.  W.  Armstrong,  Seventeenth  Indiana, 
ordnance  officer;  Second- Lieut.  W.  P.  Bainbridge,  One-hun¬ 
dred-and-first  Indiana,  aide-de-camp ,  wounded  in  the  arm  ; 
Serg.  Daniel  Bush,  company  D,  One-hundred-and-first  Indiana, 
orderly  at  headquarters,  was  badly  wounded  and  has  since,  died. 
Among  the  deaths,  the  country  has  to  deplore  the  loss  of  Col. 
E.  A.  King,  commanding  second  brigade,  and  Col.  W.  G.  Jones, 
commanding  Thirty-sixth  Ohio,  both  superior  officers.  Here¬ 
with  are  submitted  lists  of  casualties,  from  which  it  appears 
that  the  total  loss  of  the  division  in  killed  and  wounded  and 
missing  is  (963)  nine  hundred  and  sixty-three. J* 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  J.  Reynolds, 

Lieut.-Col.  Flynt,  Maj. -Gen.  Commanding  Division. 

Asst.-Adjt.-Gen.  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

True  copy:  S.  C.  KELLOGG. 

Brevet-Major  and  Aide-de-Camp. 

*  All  the  regiments  here  enumerated  belonged  to  King’s  brigade,  and  the  report 
does  not  mention  a  single  regimental-commander  of  Turchin’s  brigade. 

+  From  this  loss,  368  fell  on  King’s  brigade,  and  as  all  this  loss  was  sustained 
on  the  first  day  of  the  battle  and  in  the  rout  on  the  second  day,  it  shows  how 
insignificant  the  strength  of  this  brigade  was  after  the  rout,  as  one-half  of  the 
remaining  numbers  went  with  Brannan  to  the  ridge. 


196 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


REPORT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  M.  PALMER:* 

Headquarters  Second  Division,  Twenty-First  Army  Corps, 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Sept.  30,  1863. 

Captain:  *  *  *  About  noon  [on  the  19th],  I  received 

orders  to  move  up  my  whole  division  to  the  assistance  of  our 
troops  then  engaged.  I  moved  at  once,  and  met  Grose’s  bri¬ 
gade  returning.  After  marching  quickly  for  perhaps  a  mile 
and  a-half,  guided  by  the  sounds  of  the  firing,  and  forming 
lines  to  the  right  of  the  road,  I  ordered  Hazen,  who  was  on  the 
left,  to  march  in  the  direction  of  the  firing,  Cruft  to  keep  well 
close  up  to  him  on  his  right,  and  Grose  in  reserve,  reenforcing 
the  right,  and  engage  as  soon  as  possible.  At  this  moment  I 
received  a  note  from  the  general  commanding  the  army,  which 
led  to  a  slight,  but  turned  out  to  be  a  most  advantageous, 
change  of  formation.  He  suggested  an  advance  in  echelon 
by  brigades,  refusing  the  right,  keeping  well  closed  on  Thomas. 
This  suggestion  was  adopted;  the  brigades,  at  about  one  hun¬ 
dred  paces  intervals,  pushed  forward  and  engaged  the  enemy 
almost  simultaneously.  At  once  the  fight  became  fierce  and 
obstinate.  From  the  character  of  the  ground,  but  few  positions, 
could  be  found  for  the  effective  use  of  the  artillery.  My  batteries 
were  used  as  well  as  was  possible,  but  the  work  was  confined 
mainly  to  the  musket.  Our  men  stood  up  squarely  without 
faltering,  and  after  a  struggle  of  perhaps  an  hour,  the  enemy 
were  driven  from  the  ground  and  pursued  for  a  considerable 
distance.  The  firing  along  the  line  ceased,  and  skirmishers 
were  thrown  forward,  as  the  ammunition  of  the  Sixth  and 
Twenty-fourth  Ohio  volunteers  was  completely  exhausted,  and 
all  efforts  to  get  a  supply  to  them  had  so  far  failed  that  they 
were  ordered  back  to  the  open  ground  in  the  rear,  with  the 
hope  that  they  would  meet  the  ammunition  which  was  known 
to  be  on  the  way,  and  be  ready  to  assist  in  the  checking  of  the 
enemy’s  force,  (which  was  obstinately  driving  some  troops,  of 
what  command  I  am  unable  to  say);  and  passing  the  right, 
giving  orders  to  close  up  the  lines,  I  rode  back  to  the  open 
ground  from  which  my  command  had  marched  upon  the  enemy. 

*  On  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  Gen.  Palmer  had  temporary  command  of  the 
brigade  and  witnessed  the  fight. 


APPENDIX. 


197 


I  had  hardly  reached  the  road  when  some  troops  driven  out  of 
the  woods  crossed  the  road  and  were  pursued  to  the  edge  of 
the  road  by  the  enemy.  At  that  moment  one  brigade  of  Gen. 
Reynolds  passed,  going  to  the  right,  but  as  they  seemed  likely 
to  go  too  far,  I  requested  Col.  Robinson  of  Seventy-fifth  Indi¬ 
ana  volunteers  to  meet  the  advancing  enemy.  He  did  so  in 
fine  style,  and  drove  him  back  for  a  considerable  distance.  The 
officers  and  men  of  that  regiment  deserve  great  credit  for  their 
gallantry  in  this  affair. 

After  Robinson’s  regiment  had  moved  off  under  my  orders, 
Gen.  Reynolds  suggested  his  withdrawal  had  left  his  battery 
without  support.  I  then  ordered  Col.  Anderson,  with  the  Sixth 
Ohio  volunteers,  to  fill  his  boxes  and  remain  there  until  re¬ 
lieved,  and  returned  to  my  own  lines.  Upon  reaching  them,  I 
found  my  men  resting,  and  every  means  was  being  used  to  fill 
the  cartridge-boxes.  Hazen  had  been  relieved  by  Gen.  Turchin, 
who  had  formed  on  Cruft’s  left,  and  he  (Hazen)  had  retired  to 
fill  his  boxes,  and  protect  some  artillery  xVhich  was  threatened 
from  the  rear.  I  then  committed  the  error  of  directing  Grose 
to  move  to  the  right,  to  engage  in  a  severe  fight  going  on  in 
that  direction.  I  only  for  the  moment  saw  that  our  troops 
were  lfard  pressed,  and  that  mine  were  idle,  but  did  not  observe 
that  one  brigade  was  not  enough  to  relieve  them.  While  riding 
toward  Cruft’s  brigade  to  order  him  to  move  to  the  right  to 
support  Grose,  a  heavy  force  came  down  upon  him  and  Turchin. 
For  ten  minutes  or  more  our  men  stood  up  under  this  fire,  and 
then  the  enemy  charged  them  and  bore  them  back.  Cruft, 
Turchin,  and  all  their  officers  exerted  themselves  with  distin¬ 
guished  courage  to  arrest  the  retreat,  and  I  gave  them  what 
assistance  I  could.  It  seemed  as  if  nothing  would  prevent  a 
rout;  but,  as  if  by  magic,  the  line  straightened  up,  the  men 
turning  upon  their  pursuers  with  bayonet,  and  as  quickly  as 
they  turned  and  fled,  were  in  turn  pursued.  Many  prisoners 
were  brought  to  me  at  this  point  by  soldiers  for  orders.  I  told 
them  to  break  their  muskets  and  let  them  go,  and  then  go  back 
to  their  places  in  the  ranks.  By  this  time  the  enemy  had 
passed  to  their  rear,  and  I  felt  much  apprehension  for  Hazen. 
I  rode  in  the  direction  of  heavy  firing,  near  the  Rossville  road, 
and  found  him  with  a  part  of  his  own  brigade  and  a  large  con- 


198 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


scription  of  stragglers  and  several  pieces  of  artillery,  resisting^ 
an  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  cross  an  open  field  in  his  front. 
His  fire  was  too  hot,  and  they  abandoned  the  attempt.  Very 
soon,  other  troops  of  Reynolds’  division  came  up.  Grose  col¬ 
lected  his  troops,  which  were  somewhat  scattered.  Cruft  was 
ordered  to  fall  back  to  this  point,  our  lines  were  reformed,  and 
the  battle  seemed  over.  *  *  * 

I  can  only  say,  in  conclusion,  that  I  am  satisfied  with  the 
conduct  of  Brig.-Gens.  Cruft  and  Hazen  and  Col.  William 
Grose,  commanding  brigades.  They  have  earned  a  real  title 
to  my  respect  and  confidence;  while  subordinates  of  all  grades 
maintained  the  character  for  hardy  courage  and  endurance 
which  had  been  won  by  good  service  upon  many  fields.-!* 


I  am,  very  respectfully,  etc., 


John  M.  Palmer, 
Maj.-Gen.  Commanding. 


Capt.  P.  P.  Oldershaw, 

Asst.-Adjt.-Gen. 

True  copy: 


S.  C.  Kellogg, 

Brevet-Major  and  Aide-de-Camp. 


REPORT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  GEO.  PI.  THOMA^:J 

Headquarters  Fourteenth  Army  Corps, 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Sept.  30,  1863. 

General:  *  *  *  About  the  time  that  Wood  took  up 

his  position,  Gen.  Gordon  Granger  appeared  on  my  left  flank 
at  the  head  of  Steedman’s  division  of  his  corps.  I  immediately 
despatched  a  staff-officer,  Capt.  Johnson,  Second  Indiana  cav¬ 
alry,  of  Negley’s  division,  to  him  with  orders  to  push  forward 
and  take  position  on  Brannan’s  right,  which  order  was  complied 
with,  with  the  greatest  promptness  and  alacrity,  Steedman 
moving  his  division  into  position  with  almost  as  much  precision 
as  if  on  drill,  and  fighting  his  way  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  on 
Brannan’s  right,  moved  forward  his  artillery  and  drove  the 
enemy  down  the  southern  slope,  inflicting  on  him  a  most  terri- 

+  Of  course  nothing  is  said  about  Turchin  or  his  brigade,  as  they  belonged  to 
another  division,  although  they  saved  Palmer’s  own  division  from  utter  rout. 

£  On  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  Gen.  Thomas  ordered  and  witnessed  the 
brigade’s  charge  to  the  rear. 


APPENDIX. 


x99 


ble  loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  This  opportune  arrival  of  fresh 
troops  revived  the  flagging  spirits  of  our  men  on  the  right,  and 
inspired  them  with  new  ardor  for  the  contest.  Every  assault  of 
the  enemy  from  that  time  until  nightfall  was  repulsed  in  the 
most  gallant  style  by  the  whole  line.  By  this  time  the  ammu¬ 
nition  in  the  boxes  of  the  men  was  reduced,  on  an  average,  to 
two  or  three  rounds  per  man,  and  my  ammunition  trains  having 
been  unfortunately  ordered  to  the  rear  by  some  unauthorized 
person,  we  should  have  been  entirely  without  ammunition  in  a 
very  short  time  had  not  a  small  supply  come  up  with  Gen. 
Steedman’s  command.  This  being  distributed  among  the 
troops,  gave  them  about  ten  rounds  per  man.  Gen.  Garfield, 
chief  of  staff  of  Gen.  Rosecrans,  reached  this  position  about  4 
p.m.,  in  company  with  Lieut.-Col  Thruston  of  McCook’s  staff 
and  Capts.  Gaw  and  Barker  of  my  staff,  who  had  been  sent  to 
the  rear  to  bring  back  the  ammunition,  if  possible.  Gen. 
Garfield  gave  me  the  first  reliable  information  that  the  right 
and  centre  of  our  own  army  had  been  driven,  and  of  its  con¬ 
dition  at  that  time.  I  soon  after  received  a  despatch  from  Gen. 
Rosecrans,  directing  me  to  assume  command  of  all  the  forces, 
and  with  Crittenden  and  McCook  take  a  strong  position  and 
assume  a  threatening  attitude  at  Rossville,  sending  the  unor¬ 
ganized  forces  to  Chattanooga  for  reorganization,  stating  that 
he  would  examine  the  ground  at  Chattanooga,  and  then  join 
me;  also,  that  he  had  sent  out  rations  and  ammunition  to  meet 
me  at  Rossville.  I  determined  to  hold  the  position  until  night¬ 
fall,  if  possible,  in  the  meantime  sending  Capts.  Barker  and 
Kellogg  to  distribute  the  ammunition  —  Maj.  Lawrence,  my 
chief  of  artillery,  having  been  previously  sent  to  notify  the 
different  commanders  that  ammunition  would  be  supplied  them 
shortly.  As  soon  as  they  reported  the  distribution  of  the 
ammunition,  I  directed  Capt.  Willard  to  inform  the  division- 
commanders  to  prepare  to  withdraw  their  commands  as  soon 
as  they  received  orders. 

At  5.30  p.m.,  Capt.  Barker,  commanding  my  escort,  was  sent 
to  notify  Gen.  Reynolds  to  commence  the  movement,  and  I  left 
the  position  behind  Gen.  Wood’s  command  to  meet  Reynolds 
and  point  out  to  him  the  position  where  I  wished  him  to  form 
line  to  cover  the  retirement  of  the  other  troops  on  the  left.  In 


200 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


passing  through  an  open  woods  bordering  on  the  State  road, 
and  between  my  last  and  Reynolds’  position,  I  was  cautioned 
by  a  couple  of  soldiers,  who  had  been  to  hunt  water,  that  there 
was  a  large  rebel  force  in  these  woods,  drawn  up  in  line  and 
advancing  toward  me.  Just  at  this  time  I  saw  the  head  of 
Reynolds’  column  approaching,  and  calling  to  the  general  him¬ 
self,  directed  him  to  form  line  perpendicular  to  the  State  road, 
changing  the  head  of  his  column  to  the  left,  with  his  right  rest¬ 
ing  on  that  road,  and  to  charge  the  enemy,  who  were  then  in 
his  immediate  front.  This  movement  was  made  with  the 
utmost  promptitude,  and  facing  to  the  right,  whilst  on  the 
march,  Turchin  threw  his  brigade  upon  the  rebel  force,  routing 
them,  and  driving  them  in  utter  confusion  entirely  beyond 
Baird’s  left.  In  this  splendid  advance  more  than  200  prisoners 
were  captured  and  sent  to  the  rear.  Col.  Robinson,  command¬ 
ing  the  second  brigade,  Reynolds’  division,  followed  closely 
upon  Turchin,  and  I  posted  him  on  the  road  leading  through 
the  ridge  to  hold  the  ground  whilst  the  troops  on  our  right  and 
left  passed  by.  In  a  few  moments,  Gen.  Willich,  commanding 
a  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division,  reported  to  me  that  his  brigade 
was  in  position  on  a  commanding  piece  of  ground  to  the  right 
of  the  ridge  road.  I  directed  him  to  report  to  Gen.  Reynolds, 
and  assist  in  covering  the  retirement  of  the  troops.  Turchin’s 
brigade,  after  driving  the  enemy  a  mile  and  a-half,  was  reas¬ 
sembled,  and  took  its  position  on  the  ridge  road,  with  Robinson 
and  Willich.  These  dispositions  being  made,  I  sent  orders  to 
Gens.  Wood,  Brannan,  and  Granger  to  withdraw  from  their 
positions.  Johnson’s  and  Baird’s  divisions  were  attacked  at 
the  moment  of  retiring,  but  by  being  prepared,  retired  without 
confusion,  or  any  serious  losses.  Gen.  Palmer  was  also  attacked 
whilst  retiring.  Grose’s  brigade  was  thrown  into  some  confusion, 
but  Cruft’s  brigade  came  of  in  good  style,  both,  however,  with 
little  loss.  I  then  proceeded  to  Rossville,  accompanied  by 
Gens.  Garfield  and  Gordon  Granger,  and  immediately  prepared 
to  place  the  troops  in  position  at  that  point.  *  *  * 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Geo.  H.  Thomas, 
Maj.-Gen.  U.-S.  Vols.,  Commanding. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  A.  Garfield, 

Chief  of  Staff,  Department  of  Cumberland. 


APrENDIX. 


201 


EXTRACT  FROM  THE  REPORT  OF 

MAJ.-GEN.  WM.  S.  ROSECRANS: 

“  The  fury  of  the  conflict  was  nearly  as  great  on  the  fronts 
of  Brannan  and  Wood,  being  less  furious  toward  the  left.  But 
a  column  of  the  enemy  had  made  its  way  to  near  our  left  and 
to  the  right  of  Col.  McCook’s  position.  Apprised  of  this,  Gen. 
Thomas  directed  Reynolds  to  move  his  division  from  its  posi¬ 
tion,  and  pointing  out  the  rebels,  told  him  to  go  in  there. 

To  save  time,  the  troops  of  Reynolds  were  faced  by  the  rear 
rank  and  moved  with  the  bayonet  at  a  double-quick,  and  with 
a  shout  walked  over  the  rebels,  capturing  some  500.*  This 
closed  the  battle  on  the  20th.”  *  *  * 

REPORT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  JAMES  B.  STEEDMAN  :f 

Headquarters  First  Division  Reserve  Corps, 
Chattanooga,  Sept.  26,  1863. 

MAJOR: — I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  part  taken  by  my 
command  in  the  late  battle  of  Chickamauga  Hills. 

In  obedience  to  the  order  of  the  major-general  commanding 
the  corps,  my  command,  consisting  of  the  first  and  second 
brigades  of  the  first  division  of  the  reserve  corps,  the  Twenty- 
second  regiment  Michigan  volunteers,  and  the  Eighty- ninth 
regiment,  Ohio  volunters,  serving  temporarily  under  my  com¬ 
mand,  and  the  Eighteenth  Ohio  battery,  and  company  M, 
Illinois  artillery,  marched  from  Bridgeport,  Tenn.,  at  7  o’clock 
a.m.,  on  the  13th,  and  reached  Rossville,  Ga.,  a  distance  of 
nearly  forty  miles,  at  1 1  o’clock  a.m.  on  the  14th.  *  *  * 

At  half-past  eleven  o’clock  [on  the  20th],  Gen.  Granger 
becoming  satisfied,  from  the  heavy  and  receding  sounds  of 
artillery,  that  the  enemy  was  pressing  the  left  of  our  line 
severely,  ordered  me  to  move  to  the  battle-field  v  as  rapidly  as 
possible  with  two  brigades  of  my  command,  Gen.  Whittaker’s 
and  Col.  Mitchell’s.  I  moved  at  once,  and  after  marching  five 

*  It  is  a  mistake  in  the  number.  It  was  between  250  and  300  prisoners. 

+  These  extracts  from  Gen.  Steedman’s  report  refer  to  the  troops  under  his  com¬ 
mand,  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  including  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio,  temporarily 
detached  from  Turchin’s  brigade. 

14 


202 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


miles  with  the  enemy’s  cavalry  on  my  left  flank,  and  shelling 
my  troops  for  two  miles  of  the  distance,  reached  Maj.-Gen. 
Thomas  and  reported  to  him  at  half-past  one  o’clock,  p.m. 

Immediately  after  reaching  Gen.  Thomas,  I  received  orders 
to  move  on  the  enemy  on  the  left  of  Gen.  Wood’s  division. 
After  getting  into  position  to  execute  this  order,  Maj.-Gen. 
Granger  ordered  me  to  move  to  the  right  of  Gen.  Brannan’s 
division,  which  order  was  promptly  executed,  and  the  moment 
my  troops  were  in  position  they  moved  on  the  enemy,  and  after 
a  severe  fight  of  about  twenty- five  minutes  the  enemy  was 
driven  from  his  position  and  my  troops  occupied  the  ridge  from 
which  they  had  forced  the  enemy.  Slight  skirmishing  was 
kept  up  for  about  three-quarters  of  an  hour,  when  the  enemy 
attacked  us  furiously,  and  after  severe  fighting  for  about  half  an 
hour,  we  repulsed  him.  In  a  few  moments  he  renewed  the 
attack  with  increased  force,  and  was  again  repulsed.  Deter¬ 
mined  to  get  possession  of  the  ridge,  he  immediately  attacked 
us  again,  and  for  about  an  hour  fought  desperately,  my  troops 
maintaining  their  position  against  superior  numbers  until  6 
o’clock,  when,  having  expended  our  ammunition,  the  extra 
ammunition  which  I  had  with  my  command,  95,000  rounds, 
having  been  taken  to  supply  Gen.  Brannan’s  troops,  who  were 
out,  my  troops  fell  back  under  orders,  slowly  and  in  good  order,, 
after  retiring  to  the  second  ridge  in  rear  of  the  one  on  which 
they  had  fought,  and  resting  half  an  hour.  Finding  the  enemy 
did  not  attempt  pursuit,  all  firing  having  ceased  on  both  sides,, 
they  retired  under  orders  to  Rossville  and  occupied  their  former 
camp.  The  officers  and  men  of  my  command  behaved  well,, 
fought  bravely,  and  I  am  proud  to  say  did  all  that  could  have 
been  expected  of  them  to  insure  the  success  of  our  arms,  to 
win  and  hold  the  bloody  ground  on  which  they  fought.  I  beg 
leave  to  reassure  the  major-general  commanding  the  corps  of 
my  confidence  in  the  willingness  and  ability  of  the  division  to 
meet  his  highest  expectations.  Under  other  circumstances  it 
might  be  proper  for  me  to  make  a  more  elaborate  and  detailed 
report  of  the  part  taken  by  my  command  in  the  terrible  conflict 
of  Sunday,  but  as  my  troops  fought  under  the  eye  of  the 
major-general  commanding  the  corps,  I  have  deemed  it  proper 
to  just  briefly  state  in  general  terms  the  prominent  features 


APPENDIX. 


203 


of  the  engagement.  I  respectfully  }submit  herewith  a  tabular 
statement  of  the  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  in  my  command, 
together  with  statements  of  the  losses  in  the  quartermaster’s 
and  ordnance  departments. 

With  esteem,  respectfully  submitted: 

James  B.  Steedman, 

Brig.-Gen.  Commanding  First  Division  Reserve  Corps. 

Maj.  J.  S.  Fullerton, 

Asst.-Adjt.-Gen. 

True  copy:  S.  C.  KELLOGG, 

Brevet-Major  and  Aide-de-Camp. 


Anent  the  Capture  of  Three  Regiments: — Twenty-first 
and  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  and  Twenty-second  Michigan. 

REFERRING  to  the  statement  made  in  the  recital  of  the 
second  day’s  battle  (pages  153-5),  regarding  the  capture 
of  the  Eighty-ninth  and  Twenty-first  Ohio  and  Twenty-second 
Michigan  regiments,  which  occurred  late  in  the  evening  of 
September  20,  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  in  which  it  was  stated  that 
it  was  a  needless  sacrifice  of  those  fine  regiments,  who  so 
bravely  stood  their  ground,  and  could  have  been  withdrawn 
from  the  position  as  well  as  the  other  troops  who  occupied 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  had  they  received  timely  orders;  that  such, 
orders  never  had  been  sent  to  them;  and,  through  the  derelic¬ 
tion  of  duty  by  others,  they  were  captured  and  underwent  the 
horrible  treatment  of  the  Southern  prisons. 

Such  a  statement  is  too  serious  to  be  made  unsupported  by 
substantial  evidence,  and,  as  the  pages  of  the  narrative  should 
not  be  encumbered  with  such  documents,  they  are  herein 
appended : 

Extracts  from  Letters  to  the  Author: 

From  Col.  Caleb  H.  Carlton,  late  commander  Eighty-ninth 
Ohio,  dated  “Fort  Elliott,  Texas,  May  18,  1887”: 

*  *  “Col.  LeFavor  of  the  Twenty-second  Michigan  was 

senior  to  me  in  rank  and  commanded  his  regiment  and  mine  as 
a  brigade  from  the  time  I  reported  to  [Gen.]  Gordon  Granger 


204 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


on  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River  until  we  were  cap¬ 
tured.  [Gen.]  Steedman  told  me,  when  I  met  him  at  Chatta¬ 
nooga  after  I  was  exchanged,  that  he  had  claimed,  and  that 
Granger  had  admitted  it,  that  the  only  order  Granger  gave  to 
the  division  after  it  went  in,  ‘caused  Carlton  and  LeFavor  to 
be  captured.’  We  had  sent  Lieut.  Drake,  adjutant  of  Twenty- 
second  to  [Gen.]  Granger  for  ammunition.  Granger  said  he 
had  no  ammunition  and  to  ‘tell  Carlton  and  LeFavor  they 
must  use  bayonet  and  hold  their  position  at  all  hazards.’  This 
was  the  last  order  we  received.  Drake,  on  returning  to  us,  was 
fired  on  from  both  sides,  that  is,  the  rebels  had  a  crossfire  in 
our  rear.  That  was  about  half-past  four.  I  mention  my  name 
first  as  it  was  mentioned  first  in  the  message.”  *  *  * 

From  Lieut.-Col.  W.  H.  Glenn,  late  of  the  Eighty-Ninth  Ohio, 
dated  “Hillsboro,  Ohio,  June  io,  1887”: 

*  *  “  Our  forces  were  surrendered  about  dark — twilight — 

Eighty-ninth  and  Twenty-first  Ohio  and  Twenty-second  Mich¬ 
igan.  We  were  in  Whittaker’s  brigade  and,  I  suppose,  subject 
to  his  orders.  We  had  been  out  of  ammunition,  and,  sending 
order  for  ammunition,  received  instead  word,  as  was  then  under¬ 
stood  by  at  least  some  of  us,  as  coming  from  ‘Gen.  Thomas” 
command,  that  ammunition  would  be  sent  if  possible,  but  to 
hold  the  point  we  occupied  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  We 
understood  at  that  time  our  forces  were  falling  back  and  sup¬ 
posed  that  Gen.  Whittaker  had  orders  to  hold  that  point,  and, 
to  do  so,  took  his  own  brigade  out  and  kept  the  three  regiments 
that  did  not  properly  belong  to  him  to  fill  the  order.*  We 
received  no  orders  after  the  one  to  stay. 

“There  were  captured  of  the  Eighty-ninth  thirteen  commis¬ 
sioned  officers  and  170  men.  I  don’t  know  how  many  in  the 
other  two  regiments.  The  rebels  had  repeatedly  charged  us, 
I  think  three  times  that  Sunday  evening.  After  those  three 
charges  they  put  in  their  work  at  a  more  respectful  dis¬ 
tance,  finding,  as  they  stated  to  us  after  our  surrender,  that  the 

*  The  Twenty-first  Ohio  was  put  by  Gen.  Negley  under  Gen.  Brannan’s  com¬ 
mand,  but,  having  been  placed  on  the  extreme  right  of  Brannan’s  troops,  it 
apparently,  by  its  own  volition,  joined  in  the  action  the  Eighty-ninth  and  Twenty- 
second. 


APPENDIX. 


205 


Western  Yankees  did  not  run  as  well  as  those  they  had  been 
used  to  charging-  in  the  East.  At  the  time  of  our  surrender  we 
were  ordered  to  fall  in  and  report  to  Gen.  Kelly, *  a  short  dis¬ 
tance  from  where  we  surrendered.  As  we  approached  Kelly, 
surrounded  with  his  staff,  he  called  to  Col.  Carlton  (he  and  I 
were  mounted):  ‘Carlton,  I  am  glad  to  see  you;  but  you  have 
no  cause  to  be  ashamed  of  your  work.  Two-thirds  of  my  bri¬ 
gade  lie  yonder  dead,  the  result  of  those  charges  made  on  your 
command.’  Col.  Carlton  did  not  recognize  the  man  who  was 
addressing  him  and  so  advised  him.  He  then  made  himself 
known  as  Kelly  of  Arkansas,  who  graduated  in  the  same  class 
at  West  Point  with  Carlton.  *  *  *  It  was  an  unfortunate 

thing  for  us  that  we  did  not  reach  our  brigade  in  time  for  the 
fight,  at  least  so  I  feel.”  *  *  "x* 

It  is  evident  from  the  above  two  letters  that  after  receiving 
the  order  to  use  bayonet  and  hold  their  position  at  all  hazards, 
no  order  for  withdrawal  came  to  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio  and 
Twenty-second  Michigan.  Col.  Glenn’s  letter  also  shows  how 
gallantly  those  regiments  fought,  as  one  of  the  commanders  of 
the  rebel  brigades  which  effected  that  capture  conspicuously 
testified  thereto.  It  says  also  that  the  forces  were  surrendered 
about  dark. 

From  Rev.  E.  S.  Scott,  late  second-lieutenant  Company  G, 
and  subsequently  adjutant  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio,  dated 
“Logansport,  Ind.,  June  9,  1887”: 

After  describing  the  preliminary  movements  before  Steed- 
man’s  division  reached  the  extreme  right  of  Brannan’s  forces  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  Lieut.  Scott  continues:  “Soon  the  division 
was  put  in  motion,  and  our  regiment  kept  moving  to  the  right 
with  what  seemed  to  me  a  great  many  changes  of  direction,  till 
at  length  we  ascended  a  hill  in-line  of  battle,  supporting  another 
line  in  front.  The  line  in  front  went  over  the  crest  and  down 
on  the  other  side  and  immediately  became  heavily  engaged; 
we  stopped  on  the  crest  and  laid  down.  In  a  few  minutes  the 
line  in  front,  being,  as  I  understand,  the  One-hundred-and-fif- 
teenth  Illinois,  came  falling  back  and  retired  over  the  Eighty- 

*  Col.  J.  H.  Kelly,  Eighth  Arkansas  Infantry,  commanding  Third  brigade, 
Preston’s  Division. 


20  6 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


ninth.  As  soon  as  they  were  passed  we,  of  course,  opened  on 
the  enemy,  and  the  pursuit  was  checked.  Gen.  Steedman  pres¬ 
ently  came  along  the  front  of  the  line  on  foot,  calling  to  us  to 
cease  firing.  Twenty-five  were  wounded  in  this  part  of  the 
engagement  in  the  regiment ;  the  Colonel’s  horse  was  shot 
under  him.  Capt.  Russel,  Gen.  Granger’s  adjutant-general,  was 
killed  just  to  the  right  of  our  regiment.  Not  three  minutes 
before,  he  had  delivered  an  order  to  Col.  Carlton,  saying  ‘that 
he  thought  Gen.  Steedman  had  asked  for  us  to  hold  that  pos¬ 
ition,  and  that  he  had  better  stay  there.’* 

“  The  line  that  had  fallen  back  over  our  regiment  soon  rallied 
and  was  moved  off  somewhere  else,  leaving  us  without  any 
support  in  rear.  Before  long  there  was  tremendous  firing  on 
our  right  and  it  was  soon  evident  that  the  troops  on  our  right 
were  giving  way.  Soon  the  tide  of  battle  swept  over  us  again. 
We  were,  perhaps,  a  little  too  far  back  on  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
and,  through  the  thick  underbrush  in  front,  could  not  see  the 
enemy  till  they  were  quite  near  us.  The  troops  on  our  imme¬ 
diate  right  gave  way,  exposing  our  flank,  so  that  our  regiment 
changed  front  slightly  to  meet  this  enfilading  fire  on  our  right 
and  rear.  This  was  the  last  we  saw  of  any  of  our  troops  on 
our  right. 

“We  held  this  position  for  some  time,  when  the  rebels  came 
with  such  force  that  we  were  obliged  to  retire  still  further,  fall¬ 
ing  back  slowly,  till  we  reached  a  sort  of  hollow,  where  we 
stopped,  our  line  now  being  at  right  angles  with  the  crest  of  the 
hill  and  the  right  (my  company)  being,  perhaps,  half-way  down 
the  hill.  The  Twenty-second  Michigan  was  on  our  left,  more 
toward  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  on  their 
left  (I  suppose).  At  last  it  soon  became  apparent  that  these 
three  regiments  were  there  together,  apparently  isolated  from 
all  other  troops.  By  this  time,  half  the  Eighty-ninth  was  dis¬ 
abled  or  killed,  and  our  ammunition  gone.  Several  attempts 
were  made  to  regain  our  position  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  but 
without  success. 

“The  sun  had  now  set.'f*  A  column  of  men  had  been  seen 

*  This  part  of  the  narrtive  evidently  relates  to  the  first  attack  of  the  division 
made  upon  the  turning  troops  of  the  enemy  and  their  repulse,  while  the  next 
part  describes  the  action  during  the  rebel  assaults  of  Preston’s  division. 

t  The  sun  in  that  region  on  September  20,  sets  at  6  o’clock  and  a  few  minutes. 


APPENDIX. 


207 


to  move  along  the  hollow  at  the  bottom  of  the  hill  we  were  on, 
but  through  the  gathering  darkness  and  smoke  of  battle  we 
could  not  tell  who  they  were.  By  this  time,  the  firing  had 
pretty  nearly  ceased.*  Soon  the  column  in  the  hollow  came 
to  a  halt  and  we  could  hear  the  order  ‘front.’  Just  at  this 
moment,  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  came  down  the  hill  and  Col. 
Carlton  told  the  major  in  command  to  go  to  our  right,  as  he 
was  afraid  they  were  trying  to  flank  us.  They  had  no  more 
than  gotten  in  position  when  the  column  at  the  foot  of  the  hill 
moved  forward.  It  was  impossible  to  tell  who  they  were  till 
they  were  within  ten  feet  of  us,*f*  when,  through  the  gloom,  we 
could  see  that  their  uniforms  were  gray.  It  was  too  late  then 
to  do  anything,  even  if  we  had  had  any  ammunition  (though  we 
had  ‘fixed  bayonets’),  and  in  a  moment  Kelly’s  brigade  had 
enveloped  us. 

“  I  have  thus  given  you  the  story  of  the  Eighty-ninth’s  share 
in  that  engagement  from  my  point  of  view.  It  may  possibly 
throw  a  little  light  upon  the  matter  too.  If  so,  I  will  be  very 
glad.  There  was  blundering  or  criminal  negligence  somewhere, 
and  I  am  glad  you  are  going  to  throw  light  on  it.  I  have 
always  been  of  the  opinion  that  we  were  deliberately  left  there, 
since  we  were  ‘orphans,’  away  from  our  regular  commands,  in 
order  to  facilitate  the  withdrawal  of  other  troops.  I  am  con¬ 
vinced  from  what  others  have  told  me  (e.  g.,  Capt.  McConnell 
of  the  Ninth  Indiana,  a  resident  of  this  place,  at  that  time  in 
Brannan’s  division, )J  that  that  division  was  within  pistol  shot 
of  our  left  when  we  were  taken. §  Some  body  ought  certainly 
to  have  known  that.  I  have  never  ceased  to  regret  that  we 
were  absent  from  our  old  brigade  in  that  engagement.”  *  * 

This  is  a  description  of  an  intelligent  and  observing  man,  and 
its  circumstantial  account  of  that  unfortunate  capture  bears 
*  truth  upon  its  face.  It  shows  that  the  surrender  was  made 
long  after  the  sun  set,  and  that  at  the  time  the  action  along  the 
whole  line  of  the  army  was  over. 

*  This  clearly  proves  that  at  this  time  the  action  of  the  day  was  over  and  most 
of  our  troops  had  retired.  +  Must  have  been  dark  enough. 

X  The  Ninth  Indiana  was  sent  to  Brannan  toward  evening  by  Gen.  Hazen  to 
whose  brigade  it  belonged. 

§  It  was  stated  in  the  narrative  that  Brannan’s  troops  had  not  retired  at  the 
time  of  the  capture  of  the  three  regiments. 


208 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


From  Gen.  John  C.  Smith,  lieutenant-governor  of  Illinois, 
formerly  major  of  the  Ninty-sixth  Illinois  and  on  the  staff  of 
Gen.  Steedman  during  the  campaign  and  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  dated  “Springfield,  Ill.,  June  25,  1887”: 

*  *  *  “Col.  LeFavor,  with  Twenty-second  Michigan  and 

Eighty- ninth  Ohio  was  attached  to  Whittaker’s  brigade,  and 
acting  under  his  orders.  Gen.  Whittaker  having  been  wounded 
early  in  the  afternoon,  Col.  Champion,  Ninety-sixth  Illinois,  was 
commanding.  The  line,  no  part  of  Gen.  Steedman’s  division, 
had  not  been  withdrawn;  neither  did  any  of  the  commanders  of 
the  brigades,  Col.  Champion,  Col.  Mitchell,  or  Col.  LeFavor, 
have  any  orders  to  withdraw  at  the  time  LeFavor  made  the 
bayonet  charge  and  was  captured.  Capt.  Moe,  A.A.G.,  and 
myself  had  the  order  ‘  to  hold  position  occupied  until  all  troops 
on  the  left  had  passed  to  the  rear,’  etc.,  which  order  was  fully 
complied  with,  as  we  did  not  fall  back  for  one  hour  or  more 
after  that  event. 

“  I  remember  as  though  but  yesterday,  that,  as  I  was  riding 
along  the  line  encouraging  the  men,  Col.  LeFavor  rode  up  to 
me,  saying;  ‘Major,  the  enemy  is  pressing  my  line,  and  I  am 
out  of  ammunition.  What  are  your  orders?’  I  answered:  ‘Fix 
bayonets,  Colonel,  and  give  them  cold  steel.’  Looking  me 
earnestly  in  the  face,  he  replied:  ‘Are  those  your  orders,  sir?’ 
I  answered:  ‘  They  are.’  This,  as  I  have  said,  was  about  sun¬ 
down.  I  saw  LeFavor  fix  his  bayonets  and  charge  with  the 
Twenty-second  Michigan  and  Eighty-ninth,  drive  the  enemy 
until  enveloped  by  them,  when  he  was  captured.  The  charge 
was  a  gallant  one  and  saved  us  from  any  more  serious  attack 
that  evening.  I  thought  the  order  a  right  one;  Gen.  Steedman 
thought  so,  when  informed  of  it,  and  subsequent  events  prove 
that  it  was.”  *  *  * 

This  letter  looks  positive  in  its  tone  and  contradicts  the 
statements  of  the  officers  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Ohio,  and  there¬ 
fore  requires  some  consideration.  Under  the  circumstances  the 
order  given  by  Maj.  Smith  on  his  own  responsibility  to  Col. 
LeFavor  was  correct,  otherwise  there  would  have  been  nothing 
to  do  for  those  regiments  but  to  withdraw,  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  the  major  “saw  LeFavor  fix  his  bayonets 
and  charge  with  the  Twenty-second  Michigan  and  Eighty-ninth 


APPENDIX. 


209 


Ohio  ”  after  he  gave  the  order,  but  did  he  stay  on  that  part  of 
the  field  long  enough  to  see  them  enveloped  and  captured  ? 
And  if  not,  how  does  he  know  that  the  capture  was  made  dur¬ 
ing  that  identical  charge  ?  Admitting  Gen.  Smith’s  statement 
as  being  correct,  we  should  acknowledge,  then,  that  as  the  order 
for  withdrawal  was  not  yet  given  to  any  of  the  brigades  of 
Steedman’s  division  before  LeFavor’s  command  was  captured, 
hence  nobody  is  responsible  for  that  capture,  and,  consequently, 
nobody  has  a  right  to  grumble.  But  we  refuse  to  admit  it. 

Gen.  Smith  says  the  charge  he  witnessed  was  made  about 
sundown,  while  Col.  Glenn  says  the  surrender  was  made  at 
about  dark — twilight,  and  Lieut.  Scott  says  it  was  so  dark  that 
at  ten  feet  distance  they  could  not  recognize  whether  the  troops 
surrounding  them  were  Union  or  rebel.  The  order  for  with¬ 
drawal  of  our  troops  had  been  sent  by  Gen  Thomas*  to  division 
commanders  at  5.30  p.m.,  and  the  withdrawal  ordered  to  com¬ 
mence  from  the  center  by  Reynold’s  division,  to  which  the 
writer  of  this  belonged,  and  to  continue  successively  toward  the 
extreme  flanks  of  our  wings,  which  at  that  time  stood  nearly  at 
a  right  angle  to  each  other.  The  time  that  order  was  sent  was 
about  sundown,  yet  it  was  daylight.  But  when  the  time  came 
about  dark — twilight,  then  most  of  our  troops  had  been  already 
withdrawn  from  the  position  and  the  firing  ceased,  except  some 
occasional  shots.  But  let  us  see  what  our  enemies  said  in 
regard  to  that  capture. 

We  mentioned  in  the  narrative  that  Gen.  B.  R.  Johnson  was 
one  of  the  best,  if  not  the  best,  officer  in  Bragg’s  army.  His 
report  of  the  action  of  his  own  troops  and  even  that  of  his 
opponent’s  is  remarkably  clear,  acurate,  and  impartial.  After 
the  attack  of  Steedman’s  division  upon  five  rebel  brigades  being 
on  the  point  of  turning  Brannan’s  position  on  Horseshoe  Ridge 
and  resulting  in  the  breaking  up  of  two  brigades  of  Hindman’s 
division  and  their  withdrawal  to  the  rear,  B.  R.  Johnson,  with 
his  own,  McNair’s,  and  Gregg’s  brigades,  supported  on  the  right 
by  Anderson’s  brigade  of  Hindman’s  division,  was  opposing 
and  fighting  Whittaker’s  and  Mitchell’s  brigades  of  Steedman 
during  the  rest  of  the  afternoon  of  September  20  until  our 
troops  withdrew.  The  time  of  the  enemy’s  attack,  made  tow- 

*  Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas’  report,  Sept.  30,  1863. 


210 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


arc!  evening  on  our  left  wing,  coincided  with  the  time  of  our 
withdrawal,  hence  the  rebel  officers  thought  at  the  time  that 
they  had  driven  us  out  of  our  positions,  while  we  were  with¬ 
drawing  from  them  voluntarily.  When  the  rebel  right  wing 
assaulted  our  left  wing,  their  left  wing  also  pressed  forward  on 
the  whole  line  of  our  right  wing  on  Horseshoe  Ridge.  In  his 
report*  of  this  action,  Gen.  Johnson  says:  “Over  three  hours 
passed  in  this  conflict,  in  which  officers  and  men  toiled  on  and 
manifested  more  perseverance,  determination,  and  endurance 
than  I  have  ever  before  witnessed  on  any  field.  We  had  now 
slowly  driven  the  enemy  on  the  left  up  the  gradual  ascent 
about  half  a  mile  to  the  coveted  crest  of  the  ridge,  where  they 
made  the  last  desperate  resistance,  and  our  lines  gradually  grew 
stronger  and  stronger  under  the  animating  hope  of  victory  so 
nearly  within  our  grasp.  It  was  finally  nearly  sunset  when  a 
simultaneous  advance  swept  along  our  whole  lines,  and  with  a 
shout  we  drove  the  enemy  from  the  ridge  and  pursued  them  far 
down  the  northern  slope  to  the  bottom  of  the  deep  hollow 
beyond.  We  had  now  completely  flanked  and  passed  to  the 
rear  of  the  position  of  the  enemy  on  the  ridge  to  our  right,  and 
I  am  convinced  we  thus  aided  in  finally  carrying  the  heights 
south  of  Snodgrass’  house.” 

It  is  evident  from  the  above  that,  at  nearly  sunset,  the  rebels 
under  Gen,  B.  R.  Johnson  pressed  Whittaker’s  and  Mitchell’s 
brigades  of  Steedman’s,  which  were  withdrawing,  thinking  they 
were  driving  them  out  of  their  position.  But  where  at  that 
time  were  the  regiments  under  Col.  LeFavor?  Were  they  not 
captured?  No.  Here  is  what  the  same  Johnson  continues  to 
say:  “About  the  time  the  ridge  was  carried,  Col.  Trigg  of  Pres¬ 
ton’s  division,  reported  to  me  with  a  part  of  his  brigade.  I  sent 
Capt.  [F.  B.]  Ferry  of  the  Seventeenth  Tennessee  regiment,  who 
was  wounded,  on  horseback  to  place  Trigg’s  command  on  our 
right,  and  it  relieved  Gregg’s  brigade,  which  was  out  of  ammu¬ 
nition. 

“  I  now  proceeded  to  reform  my  line,J*  which  in  the  pursuit,  I 

*  Report  of  Brig.- Gen.  Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  C.-S.  Army,  commanding  provi¬ 
sional  division,  Oct.  24,  1863. 

+  Gen.  Johnson  was  doing  this  beyond,  or  on  the  north  side  of  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
in  the  bottom. 


APPENDIX. 


2 1 1 


regret  to  say,  was  entirely  broken,  owing  in  part  to  the  peculiar 
conformation  of  the  ground  over  which  we  passed.  I  still 
hoped  to  follow  up  the  retreating  foe.  After  I  ordered  Mc¬ 
Nair’s  and  Johnson’s  brigades  to  form  on  Trigg’s,  this  brigade 
suddenly  disappeared — called  away,  no  doubt,  to  cooperate  with 
Kelly’s  brigade  in  capturing  the  two  regiments  of  Gen.  Granger’s 
corps,  which  surrendered  to  them  about  dark.  I  felt  now  that 
it  would  be  unsafe  to  advance,  disconnected  as  my  command 
was,  and  it  being  now  dark  (nearly  8  p.m.),  I  withdrew  it  some 
250  yards  to  a  good  position  near  the  top  of  the  ridge.”  *  * 

Now,  here  is  a  positive  official  statement  of  the  rebel  general 
officer  who  opposed  Steedman’s  brigades,  that  at  nearly  sunset 
those  brigades  left  their  position  and  he  occupied  the  ridge,  and 
that  the  two  regiments  of  Gen.  Granger’s  corps  surrendered  to 
Cols.  Kelly  and  Trigg  about  dark,  adding:  “it  being  now  dark, 
(nearly  8  p.m.)” 

Where  was  Gen.  Steedman  at  the  time  of  that  surrender  ? 
He  answers  it  himself  in  his  report,  dated  Chattanooga,  Sept. 
26,  1863,  in  the  following  words:  “Determined  to  get  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  Ridge,  he  [the  enemy]  immediately  attacked  us 
again,  and  for  about  an  hour  fought  desperately,  my  troops 
maintaining  their  position  against  superior  numbers  until  6 
o’clock,  when,  having  expended  our  ammunition,  the  extra 
ammunition  which  I  had  with  my  command,  95,000  rounds, 
having  been  taken  to  supply  Gen.  Brannan’s  troops,  who  were 
out,  my  troops  fell  back  under  orders,  after  retiring  to  the 
second  ridge  in  rear  of  the  one  on  which  they  had  fought,  and 
resting  half  an  hour.  Finding  the  enemy  did  not  attempt  pur¬ 
suit,  all  firing  having  ceased  on  both  sides,  they  retired  under 
orders  to  Rossville  and  occupied  their  former  camp.”  *■  * 

Now,  then,  at  6  p.m.,  Gen.  Steedman  withdrew  his  division 
to  the  second  ridge  in  rear  of  the  one  on  which  he  fought,  and 
was  resting  there  half  an  hour  before  moving  farther,  while  the 
Eighty-ninth  Ohio  and  Twenty-second  Michigan,,  who  were 
temporarily  attached  to  his  division,  were  left  behind  without 
any  orders  to  retire,  facing  with  “fixed  bayonets,”  but  empty 
barrels,  the  two  rebel  brigades  of  Kelly  and  Trigg,  surrounding 
them  with  their  muskets  loaded.  The  above  plainly  shows  that 
the  order  to  withdraw  was  given  to  Whittaker’s  and  Mitchell’s 


212 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


brigades  before  the  surrender  of  LeFavor’s  command  and  not 
after  it,  as  Gen.  Smith  asserts.  There  were  no  orders  sent  to 
LeFavor  to  withdraw.  Gen.  Wood  withdrew  at  7  p.m.,*  and 
Col.  Vanderveer  states  in  his  report  of  Sept.  25,  1863,  that 
Brannan’s  troops  withdrew  also  at  7  p.m.,  while  Gen.  Steedman 
withdrew  one  hour  earlier,  although  his  position  was  on  the 
extreme  right,  being  the  farthest  from  the  center,  which  was 
contrary  to  the  order  of  withdrawal;  and  it  is  difficult  to  per¬ 
ceive  the  justness  of  Gen.  Smith’s  assertion  that  the  order  of 
withdrawal  was  fully  complied  by  Gen.  Steedman.  The  early 
withdrawal  of  Steedman’s  brigades  brought  disaster  on  the  regi¬ 
ments  under  Col.  LeFavor,  and  might  have  brought  disaster  to 
Brannan’s  and  Wood’s  troops  still  remaining  on  the  ridge,  as 
was  clearly  intimated  in  the  report  of  the  rebel  Col.  Trigg,  who 
participated  in  that  capture.")* 

Having  thus  abundantly  demonstrated  that  the  Eighty-ninth 
Ohio  and  Twenty-second  Michigan,  afjer  asking  for  the  ammu¬ 
nition  and  receiving  an  order  to  defend  the  position  with  bayo¬ 
net,  remained  and  fought  on  that  position  until  dark;  that  at 
the  time  Gen.  Steedman’s  brigades  of  Whittaker  and  Mitchell 
were  ordered  to  withdraw,  no  orders  had  been  sent  to  Col. 
LeFavor  to  withdraw;  that  at  the  time,  between  4  and  5  p.m., 
when  other  troops  were  supplied  with  the  ammunition,  these 
regiments  were  entirely  neglected  and  no  information  was  given 
them  that  there  was  ammunition  at  hand;  that  as  these  two 
regiments  have  been  neglected  by  the  authorities  under  whose 
command  they  were  temporarily  serving,  that  the  same  neglect 
was  shown  to  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  by  the  authorities  under 
whose  orders  that  regiment  served;  that  failing  to  supply  the 
command  with  the  ammunition  during  the  battle,  when  there 
was  plenty  of  it,  and  failing  to  give  orders  to  withdraw  when 
other  troops  of  the  same  command  were  withdrawing  was  a 
criminal  neglect  of  duty;  that  at  the  time  of  Gen.  Steedman’s 
withdrawal  there  was  not  the  slightest  hindrance  to  those  three 
regiments  to  also  withdraw;  that  these  regiments  have  done 
their  duty  to  their  government  and  their  country  faithfully  and 

*  Report  of  Brig. -Gen.  T.  J.  Wood,  Sept.  29,  1863. 

t  Report  of  R.  C.  Trigg,  colonel  commanding  brigade,  Preston’s  Division,  Buck¬ 
ner’s  Corps. 


APPENDIX. 


213 


well;  that  the  horrors  of  the  Southern  prisons  were  the  reward 
to  the  captured  men  for  their  unexampled  devotion,  bravery, 
and  patriotism ;  and  that  those  who  were  in  authority  over  them 
at  the  time  are  responsible  for  their  capture  and  amenable  to 
the  charge  of  criminal  neglect  of  duty,  be  they  high  or  low, 
major-generals  or  privates. 

Having  produced  the  witnesses  and  all  the  facts  bearing  upon 
that  unfortunate  capture,  which  never  has  been  investigated, 
and  having  preferred  the  charge,  we  leave  it  to  the  public  to 
pronounce  the  verdict. 

John  B.  Turchin, 
Late  Brig.-Gen.  U.-S.  Vols. 

July  30,  1887. 


APPENDIX. 


215 


Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Organization  of,  during  the 
Battle  of  Chickamauga,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20,  1863. 

Gen.  WM.  STARK  ROSECRANS,  Commanding. 

Department  Headquarters. 

1st  Battalion  Ohio  Sharpshooters,  Capt.  Gershom  M.  Barber. 

Provost  Guard ,  10th  Ohio  Infantry,  Col.  Jos.  W.  Burke  and  Lt.-Col.  Wtn.  M.  Ward. 
Escort ,  15th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Col.  Wm.  J.  Palmer. 

FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

Maj.-Gen.  GEORGE  HENRY  THOMAS,  Commanding. 

Provost  Guard,  9th  Michigan  Infantry,*  Col.  John  G.  Parkhurst. 

Escort,  1st  Ohio  Cavalry,  Company  L,  Capt.  John  D.  Barker. 

First  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  Absalom  Baird,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  Benjamin  F.  Scribner,  Commanding. 

•38th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  Daniel  F.  Griffin. 

94th  Ohio,  Maj.  Rue  P.  Hutchins. 

2d  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Obadiah  C.  Maxwell,  Maj.  Wm.  T.  Beatty,  and  Capt. 
James  Warnock. 

33d  Ohio,  Col.  Oscar  F.  Moore. 

10th  Wisconsin,  Lieut. -Col.  John  H.  Ely  and  Capt.  Jacob  W.  Roby. 

Second  Brigade, — Brig. -Gen.  John  C.  Starkweather,  Commanding. 

1st  Wisconsin,  Lieut. -Col.  Geo.  B.  Bingham. 

21st  Wisconsin,  Lieut.-Col.  Harrison  C.  Plobart  and  Capt.  Chas.  H.  Walker. 

24th  Illinois,  Col.  Geza  Mihalotzy,+  Maj.  George  A.  Guenther, J  and  Capt. 
August  MaufF. 

79th  Pennsylvania,  Col.  Henry  A.  Hambright. 

Third  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  John  H.  King,  Commanding. 

15th  U.S.,  1st  Battalion,  Capt.  Albert  B.  Dod. 

16th  U.S.,  1st  Battalion,  Maj.  Sidney  Coolidge  and  Capt.  Robert  E.  A. 
Crofton. 

18th  U.  S.,  1st  Battalion,  Capt.  George  W.  Smith. 

18th  U.S.,  2d  Battalion,  Capt.  Henry  Haymond. . 

19th  U.  S.,  1st  Battalion,  Maj.  Samuel  K.  Dawson  and  Capt.  Edmund  L. 
Smith. 

Artillery. — 1st  Michigan  Light,  Battery  A  (1st  brigade),  Lieuts.  Geo.  W.  Van  Pelt 
and  Almerick  W.  Wilber. 

Indiana  Light,  4th  Battery  (2d  brigade),  Lieuts.  David  Flansburg  and  Henry 
J.  Willits. 

5th  U.S.,  Battery  H  (3d  brigade),  Lieuts.  Ploward  M.  Burnham  and  Joshua 
A.  Fessenden. 


% 


♦Not  engaged,  on  provost  duty  and  train-guard. 
1  Wounded  on  the  19th. 


J  Wounded  on  the  20th. 


21 6 


CHICIvAMAUGA. 


Second  Division. 

Maj.-Gen.  James  S.  Negley,  Commanding 

First  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  John  Beatty,  Commanding. 

42d  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  T.  B.  Mclntire. 

88th  Indiana,  Col.  George  Humphrey. 

104th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Douglas  Hapeman. 

15th  Kentucky,  Col.  Marion  C.  Taylor. 

3d  Ohio,*  Capt.  Leroy  S.  Bell. 

Second  Brigade. — Cols.  Timothy  R.  StanleyJ  and  Wm.  I,.  Stoughton. 

18th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Charles  H.  Grosvenor. 

19th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Alex.  W.  Raffen  and  Capt.  Presley  Neville  Guthrie. 
11th  Michigan,  Col.  Wm.  L.  Stoughton  and  Lieut. -Col.  Melvin  Mudge. 
69th  Ohio,*  Col.  Marshall  T.  Moore. 

Third  Brigade. — Col.  William  Sir  well,  Commanding. 

78th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Col.  Archibald  Blakeley. 

21st  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Dwella  M.  Stoughton,  Maj.  Arnold  McMahan,  and 
Capt.  Chas.  H.  Vantine. 

74th  Ohio,  Col.  Josiah  Given  and  Capt.  Joseph  Fisher. 

37th  Indiana,  Col.  James  S.  Hull  and  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  D.  Ward. 

Artillery. — Illinois  Light,  Bridges’  Battery:}:  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  Lyman  Bridges. 
1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  M  (2d  brigade),  Capt.  Frederick  Schultz. 

1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  G  (3d  brigade),  Capt.  Alex.  Marshall. 

Third  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  John  M.  Brannan,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  John  M.  Connell,  Commanding. 

17th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Durbin  Ward. 

31st  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Frederick  W.  Lister. 

38th  Ohio,§  Col.  Edward  H.  Phelps. 

82d  Indiana,  Col.  Morton  C.  Hunter. 

Second  Brigade. — Cols.  John  T.  CroxtonJ  and  Wm.  H.  Hays,  Commanding. 
4th  Kentucky,  Lieut. -Col.  P.  Burgess  Hunt  and  Maj.  Robert  M.  Kelly. 
10th  Kentucky,  Col.  Wm.  H.  Hays  and  Maj.  Gabriel  C.  Wharton. 

10th  Indiana,  Col.  Wm.  B.  Carroll  and  Lieut. -Col.  Marsh  B.  Taylor. 

74th  Indiana,  Col.  Charles  W.  Chapman  and  Lieut. -Col.  Myron  Baker. 
14th  Ohio,  Col.  Henry  D.  Kingsbury. 

Third  Brigade. — Col.  Ferdinand  Vanderveer,  Commanding. 

9th  Ohio,  Col.  Gustave  Kaemmerling. 

35th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Henry  V.  N.  Boynton. 

2d  Minnesota,  Col.  James  George. 

87th  Indiana,  Col.  Newell  Gleason. 

Artillery. — 1st  Michigan  Light,  Battery  D  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  Josiah  W.  Church. 
1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  C  (2d  brigade),  Lieut.  Marco  B.  Gary. 

4th  U.S.,  Battery  I  (3d  brigade),  Lieut.  Frank  G.  Smith. 

*  Not  in  the  battle.  t  Wounded  on  the  20th.  §  Not  in  the  battle,  train-guard. 

+  Bridges’  Battery  was  organized  from  Co.  G  of  the  19th  Illinois  Volunteers,  with  additions 
of  recruits;  the  officers  of  that  company  became  those  of  the  battery. 


APPENDIX. 


217 


Fourth  Division. 

Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  J.  Reynolds,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade.* — Col.  John  T.  Wilder,  Commanding. 

17th  Indiana,  Maj.  Wm.  T.  Jones. 

72d  Indiana,  Col.  Abram  O.  Miller. 

92d  Illinois,  Col.  Smith  D.  Atkins. 

98th  Illinois,  Col.  John  J.  Funkhouser  and  Lieut. -Col,  Edward  Kitchell. 
123d  Illinois,  Col.  James  Monroe. 

Second  Brigade. — Cols.  Edward  A.  KingJ  and  Milton  S.  Robinson. 

68th  Indiana,  Capt.  Harvey  J.  Espy. 

75th  Indiana,  Col.  Milton  S.  Robinson  and  Lieut.-Col.  Wm.  O’Brien. 

101st  Indiana,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  Doan. 

80th  Illinois,  J  Col.  Andrew  F.  Rogers. 

105th  Ohio,  Maj.  Geo.  T.  Perkins. 

Third  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  John  Basil  Turchin,  Commanding. 

11th  Ohio,  Col.  Philander  P.  Lane. 

36th  Ohio,  Col.  Wm.  G.  Jones§  and  Lieut.-Col.  Hiram  F.  Devol. 

89th  Ohio,  ||  Col.  Caleb  H.  Carlton. 

92d  Ohio,  Col.  Benjamin  D.  FearingH  and  Lieut.-Col.  Douglas  Putnam,  jr. 

18th  Kentucky,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  Ivavanaugh  Milward  and  Capt.  John  B. 
Heltemes. 

Artillery. — Indiana  Light,  18th  Battery**  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  Eli  Lilly. 

Indiana  Light,  19th  Battery  (2d  brigade),  Capt.  Samuel  J.  Harris  and  Lieut. 
Robert  G.  Lackey. 

Indiana  Light,  21st  Battery  (3d  brigade),  Capt.  Wm.  W.  Andrew. 

TWENTIETH  ARMY  CORPS. 

Maj.-Gen.  ALEXANDER  McDOWELL  McCOOK,  Commanding. 

General  Headquarters. 

Provost  Guard ,  81st  Indiana  Infantry,  Co.  H,  Capt.  Wm.  J.  Richards. 
Escort ,  2d  Kentucky  Cavalry,  Co.  I.  Lieut.  George  W.  L.  Batman. 

I 

First  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  Jefferson  C.  Davis,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. +t — Col.  P.  Sidney  Post,  Commanding. 

22d  Indiana,  Col.  Michael  Gooding. 

59th  Illinois,  Lieut.-Col.  Joshua  C.  Winters. 

74th  Illinois,  Col.  Jason  Marsh. 

75th  Illinois,  Col.  John  E.  Bennett  and  Lieut.-Col.  Wm.  M.  Kilgour. 

*  Mounted  brigade,  was  always  on  detached  duty. 

t  Killed  on  the  20th,  afternoon;  Col.  Milton  S.  Robinson  of  the  75th  Indiana  succeeding. 
t  On  duty  in  Nashville,  Tenn. 

§  Killed  on  the  19th;  Lieut.-Col.  Hiram  F.  Devol  succeeding. 

II  Was  detached,  and  acted  with  Steedman's  division  of  the  Reserve  Corps. 

1  Wounded  on  the  19th;  Lieut.-Col.  Douglas  Putnam,  jr.,  succeeding. 

**  Acted  with  Wilder’s  mounted  brigade. 

ft  Was  left  at  Stevens’  gap  with  trains.  On  Sept.  20,  acted  with  cavalry  on  the  right. 

15 


21 8 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Second  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Wm.  P.  Carlin,  Commanding. 

21st  Illinois,  Col.  John  W.  S.  Alexander  and  Capt.  Chester  K.  Knight. 
38th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Daniel  H.  Gilme#and  Capt.  Willis  G.  Whitehurst. 
81st  Indiana,  Capt.  Nevil  B.  Boone* * * §  and  Maj.  Jas.  E.  Calloway. 

101st  Ohio,  Lieut.- Col.  John  Messer,  Maj.  Bedan  B.  McDonald,  and  Capt. 
Leonard  D.  Smith. 

Third  Brigade. — Col.  Hans  C.  HegJ  and  Col.  John  A.  Martin,  Commanding. 
15th  Wisconsin,  Lieut. -Col.  Ole  C.  Johnson. 

25th  Illinois,  Maj.  Samuel  D.  Wall  and  Capt.  Wesford  Taggart. 

35th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  William  P.  Chandler. 

8th  Kansas,  Col.  John  A.  Martin  and  Lieut. -Col.  James  L.  Abernethy. 

Artillery. — Wisconsin  Light,  5th  Battery^  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  George  Q.  Gardner. 

Minnesota  Light,  2d  Battery§  (2d  brigade),  Lieuts.  Albert  Woodbury  and 
Richard  L.  Dawley. 

Wisconsin  Light,  8th  Battery  (3d  brigade),  Lieut.  John  D.  McLean. 

Second  Division. 

Brig.-Gen.  Richard  W.  Johnson,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Brig.-Gen.  August  Willich||  and  Col.  C.  T.  Hotchkiss. 

49th  Ohio,  Maj.  Samuel  F.  Gray  and  Capt.  Luther  M.  Strong. 

39th  Indiana,  IF  Col.  Thomas  J.  Harrison. 

32d  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  Francis  Erdelmeyer. 

15th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Frank  Askew. 

89th  Illinois,  Col.  Chas.  Truman  Hotchkiss,  Lieut. -Col.  Duncan  J.  Plall,** 
and  Maj.  Wm.  D.  Williams. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  Joseph  B.  Dodge,  Commanding. 

77th  Pennsylvania,  Col.  Thomas  E.  Rose  and  Capt.  Joseph  J.  Lawson. 

29th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  David  M.  Dunn. 

30th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  Orrin  D.  Hurd. 

79th  Illinois,  Col.  Allen  Buckner. 

34th  Illinois,  Lieut.-Col.  Oscar  VanTassell. 

Third  Brigade.— Cols.  Philemon  P.  BaldwinJJ  and  Wm.  W.  Berry,  Com’d’g. 
6th  Indiana,  Lieut.-Col.  llagerman  Tripp  and  Maj.  Calvin  D.  Campbell. 
1st  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  Bassett  Langdon. 

93d  Ohio,  Col.  Hiram  Strong  and  Lieut.-Col.  Wm.  H.  Martin. 

5th  Kentucky,  Col.  William  W.  Berry  and  Capt.  John  M.  Huston. 

Artillery. — 1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  A  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  Wilber  F.  Goodspeed, 
Ohio  Light,  20th  Battery  (2d  brigade),  Capt.  John  T.  E.  Grosskopff. 
Indiana  Light,  5th  Battery  (3d  brigade),  Capt.  Peter  Simonson. 

*  Superseded  on  the  19th  by  Maj.  James  E.  Callowav  of  the  21st  Illinois, 

t  Killed  on  the  19th;  succeeded  by  Col.  John  A.  Martin  of  the  8th  Kansas. 

J  Was  left  at  Stevens’  gap  with  trains.  On  Sept.  20,  acted  with  cavalry  on  the  right. 

§  Capt.  Wm.  A.  Hotchkiss,  chief  of  division  artillery.  ||  Wounded  on  Sept.  20. 

*1  Mounted  and  detached  from  the  brigade.  **  Killed  on  Sept.  20. 

tt  Killed  on  the  19th;  Col.  W.  W.  Berry  of  the  5th  Kentucky  succeeding. 


APPENDIX. 


'  219 


Third  Division. 

Maj.-Gen,  Philip  Henry  Sheridan,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  William  H.  Lytle* * * §  and  Col.  Silas  Miller. 

88th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Alex.  S.  Chadbourne. 

36th  Illinois,  Col.  Silas  Miller  and  Lieut. -Col.  Porter  C.  Olson. 

24th  Wisconsin,  Lieut. -Col.  Theodore  S.  West  and  Maj.  Carl  von  Baumbach. 
21st  Michigan,  Col.  Wm.  B.  McCreery  and  Maj.  Seymour  Chase. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  Bernard  Laiboldt,  Commanding. 

2d  Missouri,  Lieut. -Col.  Arnold  Beck. 

15th  Missouri,  Col.  Joseph  Conrad. 

44th  Illinois,  Col.  Wallace  W.  Barrett. 

73d  Illinois,  Col.  James  F.  Jaquess. 

Third  Brigade. — Cols.  Luther  P.  Bradley+  and  Nathan  H.  Walworth, 

22d  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Francis  Swanwick.  Com’d’g 

27th  Illinois,  Col.  Jonathan  R.  Miles. 

42d  Illinois,  Col.  Nathan  Id.  Walworth  and  Lieut. -Col.  John  A.  Hottenstine. 
51st  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Samuel  B.  Raymond. 

Artillery. — Indiana  Light,  11th  Battery  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  Arnuld  Sutermeister. 
1st  Missouri  Light,  Battery  GJ  (2d  brigade),  Lieut.  Gustavus  Schueler. 

1st  Illinois  Light,  Battery  C  (3d  brigade),  Capt.  Mark  H.  Prescott. 


TWENTY-FIRST  ARMY  CORPS. 

Maj.-Gen.  THOMAS  L.  CRITTENDEN,  Commanding. 

Escort ,  15th  Illinois  Cavalry,  Company  K,  Capt.  Samuel  B.  Sheren. 

First  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  Thomas  J.  Wood,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  George  P.  Buell,  Commanding. 

26th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  H.  Young. 

58th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  James  T.  Embree. 

13th  Michigan,  Col.  Joshua  B.  Culver  and  Maj.  Willard  G.  Eaton. 

100th  Illinois,  Col.  Frederick  A.  Bartleson  and  Maj.  Chas.  M.  Llammond. 

Second  Brigade. § — Brig. -Gen.  George  D.  Wagner,  Commanding. 

15th  Indiana,  Col.  Gustavus  A.  Wood. 

40th  Indiana,  Col.  John  W.  Blake. 

51st  Indiana, |1  Col.  Abel  D.  Streight. 

57th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  Geo.  W.  Lennard. 

97th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Milton  Barnes. 

*  Killed  on  the  20th;  Col.  Silas  Miller  of  the  36th  Illinois  succeeding, 

t  Wounded  on  the  19th;  Col.  Nathan  H.  Walworth  of  the  42d  Illinois  succeeding, 

t  Capt.  Henry  Hescock,  chief  of  division  artillery. 

§  During  the  battle  occupied  Chattanooga.  11  On  duty  in  Nashville,  Tenn. 


/ 


220 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Third  Brigade. — Col.  Charles  G.  Harker,  Commanding. 

3d  Kentucky,  Col.  Henry  C.  Dunlap. 

64th  Ohio,  Col.  Alex.  Mcllvane. 

65th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Horatio  N.  Whitbeck,  Maj.  Samuel  C.  Brown,  and 
Capt.  Thomas  Powell. 

125th  Ohio,  Col.  Emerson  Opdycke. 

73d  Indiana,*  Col.  Ivin  N.  Walker. 

Artillery. — Indiana  Light,  8th  Battery  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  George  Estep. 

Indiana  Light,  10th  Batteryt  (2d  brigade),  Lieut.  Wm.  A.  Naylor. 

Ohio  Light,  6th  Battery  (3d  brigade),  Capt.  Cullen  S.  Bradley. 

Second  Division. 

Maj. -Gen.  John  McAuley  Palmer,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Charles  Cruft,  Commanding. 

1st  Kentucky, £  Lieut. -Col.  Alva  R.  Hadlock. 

2d  Kentucky,  Col.  Thomas  D.  Sedgewick. 

31st  Indiana,  Col.  John  T.  Smith. 

90th  Ohio,  Col.  Charles  H.  Ripley. 

Second  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  William  B.  PIazen,  Commanding. 

41st  Ohio,  Col.  Aquila  Wiley. 

124th  Ohio,  Col.  Oliver  H.  Payne  and  Maj.  James  B.  Plampson. 

6th  Kentucky,  Col  Geo.  T.  Shackelford,  Lieut.  Richard  Rockingham,  and 
Maj.  Richard  T.  Whitaker. 

9th  Indiana,  Col.  Isaac  C.  B.  Suman. 

110th  Illinois§  (battalion),  Lieut. -Col.  Ebenezer  H.  Topping. 

Third  Brigade. — Col.  William  Grose,  Commanding. 

36th  Indiana,  Col.  Oliver  H.  P.  Carey  and  Maj.  Gilbert  Trusler. 

24th  Ohio,  Col.  David  J.  Higgins. 

6th  Ohio,  Col.  Nicholas  L.  Anderson  and  Maj.  Samuel  C.  Erwin. 

23d  Kentucky,  Lieut. -Col.  James  C.  Foy. 

84th  Illinois,  Col.  Louis  H.  Waters. 

Artillery.il — 1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  B  (1st  brigade),  Lieut.  Norman  A.  Baldwin. 
1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  F  (2d  brigade),  Lieut.  Giles  J.  Cockerill,  jr. 

4th  U.  S.,  Battery  H,  (3d  brigade),  Lieut.  Harry  C.  Cushing. 

4th  U.S.,  Battery  M,  (3d  brigade),  Lieut.  Francis  D.  L.  Russell. 

Third  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  Horatio  P.  VanCleve,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Samuel  Beatty,  Commanding. 

9th  Kentucky,  Col.  Geo.  H.  Cram. 

17th  Kentucky,  Col.  Alex.  M.  Stout. 

19th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Henry  G.  Stratton. 

79th  Indiana,  Col.  Frederick  Knefler. 

*  On  duty  in  Nashville,  Tenn.  f  During  the  battle  occupied  Chattanooga. 

J  Five  companies  attached  as  wagon-guard.  §  Unattached,  not  engaged. 

||  Capt.  Wm.  E.  Standart,  chief  of  artillery. 


/  . 


APPENDIX. 


221 


Second  Brigade. — Col.  Geo.  F.  Dick,  Commanding. 

44th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  Simeon  C.  Aldrich. 

86th  Indiana,  Maj.  Jacob  C.  Dick. 

I3th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Elkanan  M.  Mast  and  Capt.  Horatio  G.  Cosgrove. 
59th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Granville  A.  Frambes. 

Third  Brigade. — Col.  Sidney  M.  Barnes,  Commanding. 

51st  Ohio,  Col.  Richard  W.  McLain  and  Lieut. -Col.  Charles  H.  Wood. 
99th  Ohio,  Col.  Peter  T.  Svvaine. 

35th  Indiana,  Maj.  John  P.  Dufficy. 

8th  Kentucky,  Lieut. -Col.  James  D.  Mayhew  and  Maj.  John  S.  Clark. 

21st  Kentucky,*  Col.  S.  Woodson  Price. 

Artillery. — Indiana  Light,  7th  Battery,  Capt.  George  R.  Swallow. 

Pennsylvania  Light,  26th  Battery,  Capt.  Alanson  J.  Stevens  and  Lieut.  Samuel 
M.  McDowell. 

Wisconsin  Light,  3d  Battery,  Lieut.  Courtland  Livingston. 

RESERVE  CORPS.f 

Maj. -Gen.  GORDON  GRANGER,  Commanding. 

Escort ,  1st  Missouri  Cavalry,  Company  F. 

First  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  James  Blair  Steedman,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Walter  C.  Whittaker,  Commanding. 

40th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  William  Jones. 

89th  Ohio,:}:  Col.  Caleb  H.  Carlton  and  Capt.  Isaac  C.  Nelson. 

84th  Indiana,  Col.  Nelson  Trusler. 

96th  Illinois,  Col.  Thomas  E.  Champion. 

115th  Illinois,  Col.  Jesse  H.  Moore. 

22d  Michigan,  £  Col.  Heber  Le  Favour,  Lieut. -Col.  William  Sanborn,  and 
Capt.  Alonzo  M.  Keeler. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  John  G.  Mitchell,  Commanding. 

98th  Ohio,  Capts.  Moses  A.  Urquhart  and  Armstrong  J.  Thomas. 

113th  Oh;o,  Lieut. -Col.  Darius  B.  Warner. 

121st  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Henry  B.  Banning. 

78th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  Carter  VanVleck  and  Lieut.  George  Green. 

Third  Brigade. § — Col.  John  Coburn,  Commanding. 

33d  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  James  M.  Henderson. 

85th  Indiana,  Col.  John  P.  Baird. 

22d  Wisconsin,  Lieut. -Col.  Edward  Bloodgood. 

19th  Michigan,  Col.  Henry  C.  Gilbert. 

Artillery. — Ohio  Light,  18th  Battery,  (1st  brigade),  Capt.  Charles  C.  Aleshire. 

1st  Illinois  Light,  Battery  M  (2d  brigade),  Lieut.  Thomas  Burton. 

Ohio  Light,  9th  Battery§  (3d  brigade),  Capt.  Harrison  B.  York. 

*  Not  engaged,  stationed  at  Whitesides. 

t  The  corps  consisted  of  three  divisions,  but  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  only  three  brigades 
participated,  the  balance  remained  stationed  at  different  points  in  the  rear. 

1  Temporarily  attached.  §  Not  in  battle. 


222 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Second  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  James  I).  Morgan,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade.* — Col.  Robert  F.  Smith,  Commanding. 

10th  Illinois,  Col.  John  Tilson. 

16th  Illinois,  Col.  Robert  F.  Smith. 

60th  Illinois,  Col.  William  B.  Anderson. 

10th  Michigan,  Lieut. -Col.  Christopher  J;  Dickerson. 

14th  Michigan,  Col.  Henry  R.  Mizner. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  Daniel  M.  McCook,  Commanding. 

85th  Illinois,  Col.  Caleb  J.  Dilworth. 

86th  Illinois,  Lieut. -Col.  David  W.  Magee. 

125th  Illinois,  Col.  Oscar  F.  Harmon. 

52d  Ohio,  Maj.  James  T.  Holmes. 

69th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Joseph  H.  Brigham. 

Third  Brigade.* — Col.  Charles  C.  Doolittle,  Commanding. 

18th  Michigan,  Col.  Charles  C.  Doolittle. 

22d  Michigan,  Col.  Heber  LeFavour  (with  1st  division,  1st  brigade). 
106th  Ohio,  Col.  Geo.  B.  Wright. 

108th  Ohio,  Col.  Geo.  T.  Limberg. 

10th  Tennessee  (detached),  Col.  James  W.  Scully. 

Artillery. — Wisconsin  Light,  10th  Battery,*  Lieut.  P.  M.  H.  Groesbeck. 

2d  Illinois  Light,  Battery  I  (2d  brigade),  Capt.  Chas.  M.  Barnett. 

1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  E,*  Lieut.  Andrew  Berwick. 

Third  Division.* 

Brig. -Gen.  Robert  S.  Granger,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  S.  D.  Bruce,  Commanding. 

83d  Illinois,  Col.  Arthur  A.  Smith. 

13th  Wisconsin,  Col.  W.  P.  Lyon. 

71st  Ohio,  Col.  Henry  K.  McConnell. 

102d  Ohio,  Col.  Wm.  Given. 

28th  Kentucky,  Col.  Wm.  P.  Boone. 

Second  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  T.  D.  Ward,  Commanding. 

70th  Indiana,  Col.  Benjamin  Harrison. 

79th  Ohio,  Col.  Henry  G.  Ivennett. 

102d  Illinois,  Col.  Franklin  C.  Smith. 

105th  Illinois,  Col.  Daniel  Dustan. 

129th  Illinois,  Col.  Henry  Case. 

Third  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  J.  G.  Spears,  Commanding. 

3d  Tennessee,  Col.  Wm.  Cross. 

5th  Tennessee,  Maj.  Joseph  D.  Turner. 

6th  Tennessee,  Col.  Joseph  A.  Cooper. 

Artillery. — Battery  H,  2d  Illinois  Artillery,  Capt.  Henry  C.  Whitemore. 
5th  Michigan  Battery,  Capt.  John  G.  Ely. 

1st  Tennessee  Battery. 

*  Not  in  battle. 


APPENDIX. 


223 


CAVALRY.* 

Brig. -Gen.  ROBERT  B.  MITCHELL,  Commanding. 

First  Division. 

Col.  Edward  M.  McCook,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  Archibald  P.  Campbell,  Commanding. 

2d  Michigan,  Maj.  Leonidas  S.  Scranton. 

9th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Col.  Roswell  M.  Russell. 

1st  Tennessee,  Lieut. -Col.  Jas.  P.  Brownlow. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  Daniel  M.  Ray,  Commanding. 

2d  Indiana,  Maj.  Joseph  B.  Presdee. 

4th  Indiana,  Lieut. -Col.  John  T.  Deweese. 

2d  Tennessee,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  R.  Cook. 

1st  Wisconsin,  Col.  Oscar  H.  LaGrange. 

Third  Brigade. — Col.  Louis  D,  Watkins,  Commanding. 

4th  Kentucky,  Col.  Wickliffe  Cooper. 

5th  Kentucky,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  T.  Hoblitzell. 

6th  Kentucky,  Maj.  Louis  A.  Gratz. 

Artillery. — 1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  D,  section  (2d  brigade),  Lieut.  Nathaniel  M. 
Newell. 

Second  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  George  Crook,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  Robert  H.  G.  Minty,  Commanding. 

7th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Col.  James  J.  Seibert. 

4th  Michigan,  Maj.  Horace  Gray. 

4th  United  States,  Capt.  James  B.  McIntyre. 

3d  Indiana  (detachment),  Lieut. -Col.  Robert  Klein. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  Eli  Long,  Commanding. 

1st  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Valentine  Cupp  and  Maj.  Thomas  J.  Patten. 

3d  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Charles  B.  Seidel. 

4th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Oliver  P.  Robie.  1 

2d  Kentucky,  Col.  Thomas  P.  Nicholas. 

Third  Brigade. t — Col.  William  W.  Lowe,  Commanding. 

5th  Iowa,  Lieut. -Col.  Matthewson  T.  Patrick. 

10th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  William  E.  Haynes. 

5th  Tennessee,  Col.  Wm.  B.  Stokes. 

Artillery. — Chicago  (Ill.)  “ Board-of-Trade”  Battery,  Capt.  James  H.  Stokes. 

Unassigned  Troops. 

Pioneer  Brigade  (Mich.) — Brig.-Gen.  James  .St.Clair  Morton,  Commanding. 

(Three  battalions.) 


*  Maj. -Gen.  David  S.  Stanley,  the  chief  of  cavalry,  was  absent. 


t  Not  in  battle. 


224 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Army  of  Tennessee,  Organization  of,  at  the  Battle  of 
Chickamauga,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20,  1863.* 

Gen.  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  C.-S.  Army,  Commanding. 

RIGHT  WING. 

Lieut. -Gen.  LEONIDAS  POLK,  Commanding. 

Cheatham’s  Division.!* 

Maj.-Gen.  Benjamin  F.  Cheatham,  Commanding. 

Escort. — 2d  Georgia  Cavalry,  Company  G,  Capt.  T.  M.  Merritt. 

Jackson’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  John  K.  Jackson,  Commanding. 

1st  Georgia  (Confederate),  2d  Georgia  Battalion,  Maj.  J.  C.  Gordon. 

5th  Georgia,  Col.  C.  P.  Daniel. 

2d  Georgia  Battalion  (S.  S. ),  Maj.  R.  H.  Whiteley. 

5th  Mississippi,  Lieut. -Col.  W.  L.  Sykes  and  Maj.  J.  B.  Herring. 

8th  Mississippi,  Col.  J.  C.  Wilkinson. 

Smith’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Preston  Smith  and  Col.  A.  J.  Vaughan,  Jr., 
11th  Tennessee,  Col.  G.  W.  Gordon.  Commanding. 

12th  and  47th  Tennessee,  Col.  W.  M.  Watkins. 

13th  and  154th  Tennessee,  Col.  A.  J.  Vaughan,  jr.,  and  Lt.-Col.  R.  W.  Pitman. 
29th  Tennessee,  Col.  Horace  Rice. 

Dawson’s  Battalion^  Sharpshooters,  Maj.  J.  W.  Dawson  and  Maj.  Wm.  Green. 

Maney’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  George  Maney,  Commanding. 

1st  and  27th  Tennessee,  Col.  H.  R.  Feild. 

4th§  Tennessee  (Prov.  Army),  Col.  J.  A.  McMurry,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  N.  Lewis, 
Maj.  O.  A.  Bradshaw,  and  Capt.  J.  Bostick. 

6th  and  9th  Tennessee,  Col.  George  C.  Porter. 

24th  Tennessee  Battalion  (S.  S. ),  Maj.  Frank  Maney. 

Wright’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Marcus  J.  Wright,  Commanding. 

8th  Tennessee,  Col.  John  PI.  Anderson. 

16th  Tennessee,  Col.  D.  M.  Donnell. 

28th  Tennessee,  Col.  S.  S.  Stanton. 

38th  Tennessee  and  Murray’s  (Tennessee)  Battalion,  Col.  J.  C.  Carter. 

51st  and  52d  Tennessee,  Lieut.-Col.  John  G.  Hall. 

Strahl’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  O.  F.  Strahl,  Commanding. 

4th  §  and  5th  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  J.  Lamb. 

19th  Tennessee,  Col.  F.  M.  Walker. 

24th  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  A.  Wilson. 

31st  Tennessee,  Col.  E.  E.  Tansil. 

33d  Tennessee, - . 

*  Compiled  from  the  reports  when  not  otherwise  indicated.  t  Of  Polk’s  corps. 

J  Composed  of  two  companies  from  the  11th  Tennessee,  two  from  the  12th  and  47th  Tennessee 
(consolidated),  and  one  from  the  154th  Senior  Tennessee. 

§  Two  regiments  of  same  designation. 


APPENDIX. 


225 


Artillery. — Maj.  Melanchton  Smith,  Commanding. 

Jackson’s  brigade,  Scogin’s  (Georgia)  Battery,  Capt.  John  Scogin. 

Maney’s  brigade,  Smith’s  (Mississippi)  Battery,  Lieut.  William  B.  Turner. 

Smith’s  brigade,  Scott’s  (Tennessee)  Battery,  Lieuts.  J.  H.  Marsh  and  A. 
T.  Watson. 

Strahl’s  brigade,  Stanford’s  Battery,  Capt.  T.  J.  Stanford. 

Wright’s  brigade,  Carnes’  (Tennessee)  Battery,  Capt.  W.  W.  Carnes. 

HILL’S  CORPS. 

Lieut.-Gen.  DANIEL  HARVEY  LULL,  Commanding. 

Cleburne’s  Division. 

Maj. -Gen.  P.  R.  Cleburne,  Commanding. 

Wood’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  S.  A.  M.  Wood,  Commanding. 

16th  Alabama,  Maj.  J.  H.  McGaughy  and  Capt.  F.  A.  Ashford. 

33d  Alabama,  Col.  Samuel  Adams. 

45th  Alabama,  Col.  E.  B.  Breedlove. 

I8th  Alabama  Battalion,  Maj.  J.  H.  Gibson  and  Col.  Samuel  Adams.* 

32d  and  45th  Mississippi,  Col.  M.  P.  Lowrey. 

Sharpshooters,  Maj.  A.  T.  Hawkins  and  Capt.  Daniel  Coleman. 

Polk’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  L.  E.  Polk,  Commanding. 

1st  Arkansas,  Col.  J.  W.  Colquitt. 

3d  and  5th  Confederate,  Col.  J.  A.  Smith. 

2d  Tennessee,  Col.  W.  D.  Robison. 

35th  Tennessee,  Col.  B.  J.  Hill. 

48th  Tennessee,  Col.  G.  H.  Nixon. 

Deshler’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  James  Deshler  and  Col.  R.  Q.  Mills,  Com’d’g. 
19th  and  24th  Arkansas,  Lieut. -Col.  A.  S.  Hutchinson. 

6th,  10th,  and  15th*  Texas,  Col.  R.  Q.  Mills  and  Lt.-Col.  T.  Scott  Anderson. 

17th,  18th,  24th,  and  25th  Texas, +  Col.  F.  C.  Wilkes,  Lieut. -Col.  John  T. 
Coit,  and  Maj.  W.  A.  Taylor. 

Artillery. — Maj.  T.  R.  Hotchkiss  and  Capt.  H.  C.  Semple,  Commanding. 
Deshler’s  brigade,  Douglas’  (Texas)  Battery,  Capt.  J.  P.  Douglas. 

Polk’s  brigade,  Calvert’s  (Tennessee)  Battery,  Lieut.  Thomas  J.  Key. 

Wood’s  brigade,  Semple’s  (Alabama)  Battery,  Capt.  H.  C.  Semple  and 
Lieut.  R.  W.  Goldthwaite. 

Breckinridge’s  Division. 

Maj. -Gen.  John  C.  Breckinridge,  Commanding. 

Helm’s  Brigade.— Brig. -Gen.  Benj.  Hardin  Helm  and  Col.  J.  H.  Lewis,  Cmdg. 
41st  Alabama,  Col.  M.  L.  Stansel. 

2d  Kentucky,  Col.  J.  W.  Hewitt  and  Lieut.  J.  W.  Moss. 

4th  Kentucky,  Col.  Joseph  P.  Nuckols,  jr.,  and  Maj.  T.  W.  Thompson. 

6th  Kentucky,  Col.  J.  H.  Lewis  and  Lieut. -Col.  M.  H.  Cofer. 

9th  Kentucky,  Col.  J.  W.  Caldwell  and  Lieut. -Col.  J.  C.  Wickliffe. 

7  Dismounted  cavalry. 


*  33d  Alabama. 


226 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Adams’  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Daniel  W.  Adams  and  Col.  R.  L.  Gibson, 

32d  Alabama,  Maj.  J.  C.  Kimbell.  Commanding. 

13th  and  20th  Louisiana,  Cols.  R.  L.  Gibson  and  Leon  von  Zinken  and 
Capt.  E.  M.  Dubroca. 

16th  and  25th  Louisiana,  Col.  D.  Gober. 

19th  Louisiana,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  W.  Turner,  Maj.  L.  Butler,  and  Capt.  H. 
A.  Kennedy. 

14th  Louisiana  (Sharpshooters)  Battalion,  Maj.  J.  E.  Austin. 

Stovall’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  M.  A.  Stovall,  Commanding. 

1st  and  3d  Florida,  Col.  W.  S.  Dilworth. 

4th  Florida,  Col.  W.  L.  L.  Bowen. 

47th  Georgia,  Capts.  William  S.  Phillips  and  Joseph  S.  Cone. 

60th  North  Carolina,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  M.  Ray  and  Capt.  J.  T.  Weaver. 

Artillery. — Maj.  R.  E.  Graves,  Commanding. 

Adams’  brigade,  Slocomb’s  (Louisiana)  Battery,  Capt.  C.  H.  Slocomb. 
Helm’s  brigade,  Cobb’s  (Kentucky)  Battery,  Capt.  Robert  Cobb. 

Stovall’s  brigade,  Mebane’s  (Tennessee)  Battery,  Capt.  John  W.  Mebane. 

RESERVE  CORPS. 

Maj. -Gen.  W.  H.  T.  WALKER,  Commanding. 

Walker’s  Division.* 

Brig. -Gen.  S.  R.  Gist,  Commanding. 

Gist’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  S.  R.  Gist,  Col.  P.  H.  Colquitt, 

and  Lieut.-Col.  L.  Napier,  Commanding. 

46th  Georgia,  Col.  P.  H.  Colquitt  and  Maj.  A.  M.  Speer. 

8th  Georgia  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  L.  Napier. 

16th  South  Carolina, +  Col.  J.  McCullough. 

24th  South  Carolina,  Col.  C.  H.  Stevens  and  Lieut.-Col.  E.  Capers. 

Wilson’s  Brigade. — Col.  C.  C.  Wilson,  Commanding. 

25th  Georgia,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  J.  Williams. 

29th  Georgia,  Lieut.  G.  R.  McRae. 

30th  Georgia,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  S.  Boynton. 

1st  Georgia  Battalion  (S.  S. ), - . 

4th  Louisiana  Battalion,  - 1 - . 

Ector’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  M.  D.  Ector,  Commanding. 

Stone’s  Alabama  Battalion. 

Pound’s  Mississippi  Battalion. 

29th  North  Carolina. 

9th  Texas. 

10th,  14th,  and  32d  Texas  Cavalry.^ 

Artillery.§ — Gist’s  brigade,  Ferguson’s  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Lieut.  R.  T.  Beauregard. 
Martin’s  Battery, - . 

*  Walker’s  and  Liddell’s  divisions  constituted  a  “Reserve  Corps”  under  Walker’s  command. 
Gist  commanding  meanwhile  Walker’s  division. 

t  Not  engaged;  at  Rome.  +  Serving  as  infantry. 

Walker  reports  five  batteries  in  the  “Reserve  Corps,”  but  those  with  Ector’s  and  Wilson's 
brigades  are  not  named  in  the  reports. 


APPENDIX. 


227 


Liddell’s  Division.* 

Brig. -Gen.  St.John  R.  Liddell,  Commanding. 

Liddell’s  Brigade  . — Col.  D.  C.  Govan,  Commanding. 

2d  and  15th  Arkansas,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  T.  Harvey  and  Capt.  A.  T.  Meek. 

5th  and  13th  Arkansas,  Col.  L.  Featherston  and  Lieut.-Col.  John  E.  Murray. 
6th  and  7th  Arkansas,  Col.  D.  A.  Gillespie  and  Lieut.-Col.  P.  Snyder. 

Sth  Arkansas,  Lieut.-Col.  G.  F.  Baucum  and  Maj.  A.  Watkins. 

1st  Louisiana,  Lieut.-Col.  G.  F.  Baucum  and  Maj.  A.  Watkins. 

Walthall’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  E.  C.  Walthall,  Commanding. 

24th  Mississippi,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  P.  McKelvaine,  Maj.  W.  C.  Staples,  and 
Capts.  B.  F.  Toomer  and  J.  D.  Smith. 

27th  Mississippi,  Col.  James  A.  Campbell. 

29th  Mississippi,  Col.  W.  F.  Brantly. 

30th  Mississippi,  Col.  Junius  I.  Scales,  Lieut.-Col.  Hugh  A.  Reynolds,  and 
Maj.  J.  M.  Johnson. 

34th  Mississippi, +  Maj.  W.  G.  Pegram,  Capt.  H.  J.  Bowen,  Lieut.-Col. 
Ii.  A.  Reynolds, 7  and  -  - - .  (?) 

« 

Artillery. — Capt.  Charles  Swett,  Commanding. 

Walthall’s  brigade,  Fowler’s  (Alabama)  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Fowler. 
Warren  Light  Artillery,  Lieut.  II.  Shannon. 

Liddell’s  brigade,  Swett’s  (Mississippi)  Battery. 

LEFT  WING. 

Lieut. -Gen.  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Commanding. 

McLaws’  Division.§ 

Brig. -Gen.  J.  B.  Kershaw  and  Maj. -Gen.  Lafayette  McLaws,  Commanding. 

Kershaw’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Commanding. 

2d  South  Carolina,  Lieut.-Col.  F.  Gaillard. 

3d  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  D.  Nance. 

7th  South  Carolina,  Lieut.-Col.  Elbert  Bland,  Maj.  J.  S.  Hard,  and  Capt. 
E.  J.  Goggans. 

Sth  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  W.  Henagan. 

15th  South  Carolina,  Col.  Joseph  F.  Gist. 

3d  South  Carolina  Battalion,  Capt.  J.  M.  Townsend. 

Humphreys’  Brigade.— Brig. -Gen.  B.  G.  Humphreys,  Commanding. 

13th  Mississippi.  18th  Mississippi. 

17th  Mississippi.  21st  Mississippi. 

Wofford’s  Brigade.H— Brig. -Gen.  W.  T.  Wofford,  Commanding. 

16th  Georgia.  3d  Georgia  Battalion  (sharpshooters). 

18th  Georgia.  Cobb’s  (Georgia)  Legion. 

24th  Georgia.  Phillips’  (Georgia)  Legion. 

*  Walker’s  and  Liddell’s  divisions  constituted  a  “Reserve  Corps”  under  Walker’s  command. 
Gist  commanding  meanwhile  Walker’s  division. 

t  34th  Mississippi  had  four  commanders  at  Chickamauga.  t  30th  Mississippi. 

§  Of  Longstreet’s  corps.  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Organization  taken  fiom  return  of  that 
army  for  Aug.  31,  1803.  Pickett’s  division  was  left  in  V  irginia. 

||  Longstreet’s  report  indicates  that  this  brigade  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  pai  t  in  the  battle. 


228 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Bryan’s  Brigade.* — Brig. -Gen.  Goode  Bryan,  Commanding. 

10th  Georgia.  50th  Georgia.  51st  Georgia.  53d  Georgia. 

Hood’s  Division.  + 

Maj.-Gen.  John  B.  Hood  and  Brig. -Gen.  E.  M.  Law,  Commanding. 

Jenkins’  Brigade.^ — Brig.-Gen.  M.  Jenkins,  Commanding. 

1st  South  Carolina.  6th  South  Carolina. 

2d  South  Carolina  Rifles.  Hampton  Legion. 

5th  South  Carolina.  Palmetto  Sharpshooters. 

Robertson’s  Brigade. § — Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Robertson  and  Col.  Van  H.  Manning, 
3d  Arkansas,  Col.  Van  H.  Manning.  Commanding. 

1st  Texas,  Capt.  R.  J.  Harding. 

4th  Texas,  Col.  John  P.  Bane  and  Capt.  R.  H.  Bassett. 

5th  Texas,  Maj.  J.  C.  Rogers  and  Capts.  J.  S.  Cleveland  and  T.  T.  Clay. 

Law’s  Brigade. § — Brig.-Gen.  E.  M.  Law  and  Col.  J.  L.  Sheffield,  Com’ding. 
4tli  Alabama.  47th  Alabama. 

15th  Alabama,  Col.  W.  C.  Oates.  4Sth  Alabama. 

44th  Alabama. 

Anderson’s  Brigade. J — Brig.-Gen.  George  T.  Anderson,  Commanding. 

7th  Georgia.  11th  Georgia. 

8th  Georgia.  9th  Georgia.  59th  Georgia. 

Benning’s  Brigade. § — Brig.-Gen.  H.  L.  Benning,  Commanding. 

2d  Georgia,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  S.  Shepherd  and  Maj.  W.  W.  Charlton. 

15th  Georgia,  Col.  D.  M.  DuBose  and  Maj.  P.  J.  Shannon. 

17th  Georgia,  Lieut. -Col.  Charles  W.  Matthews. 

20th  Georgia,  Col.  J.  D.  Waddell. 

Artillery,  Longstreet’s  Corps. || — Col.  E.  Porter  Alexander  and  Maj.  Frank 
Huger,  Commanding. 

Tickling’s  (South  Carolina)  Battery.  Parker’s  (Virginia)  Battery. 

Jordan’s  (Virginia)  Battery.  Taylor’s  (Virginia)  Battery. 

Moody’s  (Louisiana)  Battery.  Woolfolk’s  (Virginia)  Battery. 

Hindman’s  Division.il 

Maj.-Gen.  Thos.  C.  Hindman  and  Brig.-Gen.  James  Patton  Anderson,  Comdg. 

Anderson’s  Brigade. — Brig.-Gen.  J.  Patton  Anderson  and  Col.  J.  IL.  Sharp, 
7th  Mississippi,  Col.  W.  H.  Bishop.  Commanding. 

9th  Mississippi,  Maj.  T.  H.  Lynam. 

10th  Mississippi,  Lieut. -Col.  James  Barr. 

41st  Mississippi,  Col.  W.  F.  Tucker. 

44th  Mississippi,  Col.  J.  H.  Sharp  and  Lieut. -Col.  R.  G.  Kelsey. 

9th  Mississippi  Battalion  (S.  S. ),  Maj.  W.  C.  Richards. 

Garrity’s  (Alabama)  Battery,  Capt.  J.  Garrity. 

*  Longstreet’s  report  indicates  that  this  brigade  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle, 
t  Of  Longstreet’s  corps.  Organ’tion  taken  from  Army  of  North.  Virginia  returns,  Aug.  31,  1863. 

1  Did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle.  Jenkins’  brigade  assigned  to  the  division 
Sept.  11,  1863. 

§  Served  part  of  the  time  in  Johnson’s  provisional  division. 

||  As  organized  Aug.  31,  1863.  Not  mentioned  in  reports  of  the  battle.  H  Of  Polk’s  corps. 


APPENDIX. 


229 


Deas’  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  Zac.  C.  Deas,  Commanding. 

19th  Alabama,  Col.  S.  K.  McSpadden. 

22d  Alabama,  Lieut. -Col.  John  Weedon  and  Capt.  H.  T.  Toulmin. 

25th  Alabama,  Col.  Geo.  D.  Johnston. 

39th  Alabama,  Col.  W.  Clark. 

50th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  G.  Coltart. 

17th  Alabama  Battalion  (S.  S.),  Capt.  Jas.  F.  Nabers. 

Robertson’s  (Alabama)  Battery,  Lieut.  S.  H.  Dent. 

Manigault’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  A.  M.  Manigault,  Commanding. 

24th  Alabama,  Col.  N.  N.  Davis. 

28th  Alabama,  Col.  John  C.  Reid. 

34th  Alabama,  Maj.  J.  N.  Slaughter. 

10th  and  19th  South  Carolina,  Col.  James  F.  Pressley. 

Water’s  (Alabama)  Battery,  Lieuts.  Chas.  W.  Watkins  and  Geo.  D.  Turner. 


BUCKNER’S  CORPS. 

Maj. -Gen.  SIMON  BOLIVAR  BUCKNER,  Commanding. 

Stewart’s  Division. 

Maj. -Gen.  Alexander  P.  Stewart,  Commanding. 

Johnson’s  Brigade.* — Brig. -Gen.  Bushrod  R.  Johnson  and  Col.  J.  S.  Fulton. 
17th  Tennessee,  Lieut. -Col.  Watt  W.  Floyd. 

23d  Tennessee,  Col.  R.  IT.  Keeble. 

25th  Tennessee,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  B.  Snowden. 

44th  Tennessee,  Lieut. -Col.  J.  L.  McEwen,  jr.,  and  Maj.  G.  M.  Crawford. 

Brown’s  Brigade. — Brig.-Gen.  J.  C.  Brown  and  Col.  E.  C.  Cook,  Commanding. 

18th  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  B.  Palmer,  Lieut. -Col.  W.  R.  Butler,  and  Capt. 
Gideon  H.  Lowe. 

26th  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  M.  Lillard  and  Maj.  R.  M.  Saffell. 

32d  Tennessee,  Col.  Edmund  C.  Cook  and  Capt.  C.  G.  Tucker. 

45th  Tennessee,  Col.  A.  Searcy. 

23d  Tennessee  Battalion,  Maj.  T.  W.  Newman  and  Capt.  W.  P.  Simpson. 

Bate’s  Brigade.— Brig.-Gen.  W.  B.  Bate,  Commanding. 

58th  Alabama,  Col.  Bushrod  Jones. 

37th  Georgia,  Col.  A*  F.  Rudler  and  Lieut. -Col.  J.  T.  Smith. 

4th  Georgia  Battalion  (sharpshooters),  Maj.  T.  D.  Caswell,  Capt.  B.  M. 
Turner,  and  Lieut.  Joel  Towers.. 

15th  and  37th  Tennessee,  Col.  R.  C.  Tyler,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  D.  Frayser,  and 
Capt.  R.  M.  Tankesley. 

20th  Tennessee,  Col.  T.  B.  Smith  and  Maj.  W.  M.  Shy. 

Clayton’s  Brigade.— Brig.-Gen.  H.  D.  Clayton,  Commanding. 

18th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  T.  Holtzclaw,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  F.  Inge,  and  Maj. 

P.  F.  Hunley. 

36th  Alabama,  Col.  L.  T.  Woodruff. 

38th  Alabama,  Lieut. -Col.  A.  R.  Lankford. 

*  Part  of  Johnson’s  provisional  division. 


230 


CHICIvAMAUGA. 


Artillery. — Maj.  J.  W.  Eldridge,  Commanding. 

Bates’  brigade,  9th  Georgia  Artillery  Battal’n,  Battery  E,  Lieut.  W.  S.  Everett. 
Brown’s  brigade,  T.  H.  Dawson’s  (Georgia)  Battery,  Lieut.  R.  W.  Anderson. 
Clayton’s  brigade,  1st  Arkansas  Battery,  Capt.  J.  T.  Humphreys. 

Johnson’s  brigade,  Eufaula  (Alabama)  Artillery,  Capt.  McD.  Oliver. 

Preston’s  Division. 

Brig. -Gen.  William  Preston,  Commanding. 

Gracie’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  A.  Gracie,  Jr.,  Commanding. 

43d  Alabama,  Col.  Y.  M.  Moody. 

1st  Alabama  Battalion,*  Lieut. -Col.  J.  PI.  Holt  and  Capt.  G.  W.  Huguley. 
2d  Alabama  Battalion,*  Lieut. -Col.  B.  Plall,  jr.,  and  Capt.  W.  D.  Walden. 
3d  Alabama  Battalion,*  Maj.  J.  W.  A.  Sanford. 

4th  Alabama  Battalion, +  Maj.  J.  D.  McLennan. 

63d  Tennessee,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  Fulkerson  and  Maj.  John  A.  Aiken. 

Trigg’s  Brigade. — Col.  R.  C.  Trigg,  Commanding. 

1st  Florida  Cavalry,  J  Col.  G.  T.  Maxwell. 

6th  Florida,  Col.  J.  J.  Finley. 

7th  Florida,  Col.  R.  Bullock. 

54th  Virginia,  Lieut.-Col.  John  J.  Wade. 

Third  (Kelley’s)  Brigade. — Col.  J.  PL  Kelly,  Commanding. 

65th  Georgia,  Col.  R.  H.  Moore. 

5th  Kentucky,  Col.  H.  Hawkins. 

58th  North  Carolina,  Col.  J.  B.  Palmer. 

63d  Virginia,  Maj.  J.  M.  French. 

Leyden’s  Artillery  Battalion. — Maj.  A.  Leyden,  Commanding. 

Jeffress’  (Virginia)  Battery.  Wolihin’s  (Georgia)  Battery. 

Peeples’  (Georgia)  Battery.  York’s  Battery. 

Reserve  Corps  Artillery. — Maj.  S.  C.  Williams,  Commanding. 

Baxter’s  (Tennessee)  Battery. §  Kolb’s  Battery. 

Darden’s  Battery.  McCants’  (Florida)  Battery. § 

Johnson’s  Division. ]| 

Brig. -Gen.  Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  Commanding. 

McNair’s  Brigade. — Brig.-Gen.  E.  McNair  and  Col.  D.  Coleman,  Commanding. 
1st  Arkansas  Mounted  Rifles,  Col.  Robert  W.  Harper. 

2d  Arkansas  Mounted  Rifles,  Col.  James  A.  Williamson. 

25  Arkansas,  Lieut.-Col.  Eli  Hufstedler. 

4th  and  31st  Arkansas  Infantry  and  4th  Arkansas  Battery  (consolidated), 
Maj.  J.  A.  Ross. 

39th  North  Carolina,  Col.  D.  Coleman. 

Culpeper’s  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  J.  F.  Culpeper. 

*  Hilliard’s  legion.  t  Artillery  battalion,  Hilliard’s  legion.  {  Dismounted. 

§  Williams’  battalion. 

||  A  provisional  organization,  embracing  Johnson’s  and  part  of  the  time  Robertson’s  brigades,  as 
well  as  Gregg's  and  McNair’s.  Sept.  19th  attached  to  Longstreet’s  corps,  under  Maj. -Gen.  Hood. 


APPENDIX.  231 

Gregg’s  Brigade. — Brig.-Gen.  John  Gregg  and  Col.  C.  A.  Sugg,  Commanding. 
3d  Tennessee,  Col.  C.  H.  Walker. 

10th  Tennessee,  Col.  William  Grace. 

30th  Tennessee. 

41st  Tennessee,  Lieut. -Col.  J.  E.  Tillman. 

50th  Tennessee,  Col.  C.  A.  Sugg,  Lieut. -Col.  T.  W.  Beaumont,  Mai.  C.  W. 
Robertson,  and  Col.  C.  Id.  Walker.* 

1st  Tennessee  Battalion,  Majs.  S.  PI.  Colms  and  C.  W.  Robertson. t 
7th  Texas,  Maj.  K.  M.  Vanzandt. 

Bledsoe’s  (Missouri)  Battery,  Lieut.  R.  L.  Wood. 


CAVALRY.:* 

Maj. -Gen.  JOSEPH  WHEELER,  Commanding. 

Wharton’s  Division. 

Brig.-Gen.  John  A.  Wharton,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  C.  C.  Crews,  Commanding. 

7th  Alabama.  3d  Georgia. 

2d  Georgia.  4th  Georgia,  Col.  I.  W.  Avery. 

Second  Brigade. — Col.  T.  Harrison,  Commanding. 

3d  Confederate,  Col.  W.  N.  Estes.  8th  Texas. 

1st  Kentucky,  Lt.-Col.  J.  W.  Griffith.  11th  Texas. 

4th  Tennessee,  Col.  Paul  F.  Anderson.  White’s  (Georgia)  Battery. 

Martin’s  Division. 

Brig.-Gen.  Wm.  T.  Martin,  Commanding. 

First  Brigade. — Col.  J.  T.  Morgan,  Commanding. 

1st  Alabama.  51st  Alabama. 

3d  Alabama,  Lt.-Col.  T.  H.  Mauldin.  8th  Confederate. 

Second  Brigade.— Col.  A.  A.  Russell,  Commanding. 

4th  Alabama. §  Wiggins’  (Arkansas)  Battery. 

1st  Confederate,  Col.  W.  B.  Wade. 

Roddey’s  Brigade. — Brig.-Gen.  P.  D.  Roddey,  Commanding. 

4th  Alabama, §  Lieut. -Col.  William  A.  Johnson. 

5th  Alabama. 

53d  Alabama. 

Forrest’s  (Tennessee)  Regiment. 

Ferrell’s  (Georgia)  Battery. 

'k 

*  3d  Tennessee.  t  50th  Tennessee. 

I  From  return  of  Aug.  31,  1863,  and  reports. 

§  Two  regiments  of  the  same  designation.  Lieut. -Col.  Johnson  commanded  that  in  Roddey’s 
brigade. 


232 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


FORREST’S  CORPS. 

Maj.-Gen.  NATHAN  BEDFORD  FORREST,  Commanding. 

Armstrong’s  Division.* 

Brig. -Gen.  Francis  C.  Armstrong,  Commanding. 

Armstrong’s  Brigade. — Col.  J.  T.  Wheeler,  Commanding. 

3d  Arkansas.  1st  Tennessee.  2d  Tennessee. 

18th  Tennessee  Battalion,  Maj.  Charles  McDonald. 

Forrest’s  Brigade. — Col.  G.  G.  Dibrell,  Commanding. 

4th  Tennessee,  Col.  W.  S.  McLemore. 

8th  Tennessee,  Capt.  Hamilton  McGinnis. 

9th  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  B.  Biffle. 

10th  Tennessee,  Col.  N.  N.  Cox. 

11th  Tennessee,  Col.  D.  W.  Holman. 

Shaw’s  (or  Hamilton’s)  Battalion  (?),  Maj.  J.  Shaw. 

Freeman’s  (Tennessee)  Battery,  Capt.  A.  L.  Huggins. 

Marion’s  (Tennessee)  Battery,  Capt.  John  W.  Morton. 

Pegram’s  Division.t 
Brig. -Gen.  John  Pegram,  Commanding. 

Davidson’s  Brigade. — Brig. -Gen.  H.  B.  Davidson,  Commanding. 

1st  Georgia.  Rucker’s  Legion. 

6th  Georgia,  Col.  John  R.  Hart.  Huwald’s  (Tennessee)  Battery. 

Cth  North  Carolina. 

Scott’s  Brigade. — Col.  J.  S.  Scott,  Commanding. 

10th  Confederate,  CoL  C.  T.  Goode. 

Detachment  of  Morgan’s  command,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  M.  Martin. 

1st  Louisiana. 

5th  Tennessee. 

12th  Tennessee  Battalion. 

16th  Tennessee  Battalion,  Capt.  J.  Q.  Arnold. 

Louisiana  Battery  (1  section). 


RESERVE  ARTILLERY.  J— Maj.  FELIX  H.  ROBERTSON,  Commanding. 

Barrett’s  (Missouri)  Battery.  Lumsden’s  (Alabama)  Battery. 

LeGardeur’s  (Louisiana)  Battery. §  Massenburg’s  (Georgia)  Battery. 

Havis’  (Alabama)  Battery.  Darden’s  (Mississippi)  Battery. || 

*  From  return  for  Aug.  31,  1863,  and  reports. 

+  Taken  from  Pegram’s  and  Scott’s  reports  and  assignments,  but  the  composition  of  this 
division  is  uncertain. 

J  With  exception  of  Darden’s  battery  taken  from  return  for  Aug.  31,  1863.  On  that  return 
this  battery  appears  as  of  Johnson’s  brigade. 

§  Not  mentioned  in  the  reports,  but  in  Reserve  Artillery,  Aug..  31st,  and  Capt.  LeGardeur, 
&c.,  relieved  from  duty  in  Army  of  Tennessee,  Nov.  1,  1863. 

11  Williams’  battalion. 


APPENDIX. 


233 


Return  of  Casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
commanded  by  Maj.-Gen.  Wm.  S.  Roscrans,  at  the 
Battle  of  Chickamauga,  Ga.,  Sept.  19  and  20.  1863  :* 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre- 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

gate. 

General  ^  10th  Ohio  Infantry 

1 

1 

Headquarters  :  j  15th  Penn.  Cavalry 

O 

jLi 

— 

3 

5 

Total  General  Headquarters. 

2 

— 

4 

6 

14th  Corps: — Thomas’:  Staff. 

1 

1 

1st  Division — Baird’s: 

1st  Brigade — Scribner’s : 

38th  Indiana _ 

1 

12 

3 

54 

.... 

39 

109 

2d  Ohio _ 

1 

8 

3 

47 

6 

116 

181 

33d  Ohio _ _ 

2 

12 

4 

59 

4 

79 

160 

04th  Ohio _ 

2 

1 

21 

1 

21 

46 

10th  Wisconsin . . . 

2 

9 

3 

52 

13 

132 

211 

Artillery,  1st  Mich.  Light,  Battery  A 

1 

5 

— 

7 

— 

12 

25 

Total  1st  Brigade.. . 

~T 

48 

14 

240 

24 

399 

732 

p//  Rri crn rf p  8tarh’Wf‘nthpr,s  •  Staff 

1 

1 

24th  Illinois _ 

1 

18 

9 

67 

3 

53 

151 

79th  Pennsylvania - 

1 

15 

5 

62 

1 

41 

125 

1st  Wisconsin - - 

4 

23 

,  5 

79 

4 

73 

188 

21st  Wisconsin _  _ 

2 

4 

39 

9 

67 

121 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  4th  Battery 

_____ 

1 

14 

1 

4 

20- 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

~~6~ 

59 

~24~ 

261 

18 

238 

606 

3d  Brigade — King’s: 

15th  U.-S.,  A,  C,  E,  F,  G,  and  H, 

1st  Battalion,  and  E,  2d  Battalion. 

_  _  _  _ 

9 

2 

47 

6 

96 

160 

16th  U.-S.,  A,  B,  D,  F,  and  IT,  1st 

Batt.,  and  B,  C,  and  D,  2d  Batt. . 

1 

2 

3 

16 

10 

164 

196 

18th  U.-S.,  B,  D,  E,  F,  G,  and  H, 

1st  Batt.,  and  G  and  H,  3d  Batt.. 

.... 

19 

4 

67 

2 

66 

158 

18th  U.-S.,  2d  Battalion - 

1 

13 

3 

78 

0 

48 

145 

19th  U.-S.,  A,  B,  C,  E,  F,  G,  and 

H,  1st  Batt.,  and  A,  2d  Batt - 

1 

2 

4 

13 

6 

110 

136 

Artillery,  5th  U.-S.,  Battery  H - 

1 

12 

2 

16 

— 

13 

44 

Total  3d  Brigade - 

~r 

57 

15 

237 

26 

497 

839 

Total  1st  Division . . 

Tr 

164 

56 

738 

68 

1134 

2177 

2d  Division — Negley’s: 

1st  Brigade — Beatty’s: 

104th  Illinois  _ 

2 

6 

40 

_____ 

16 

64 

42d  Indiana  _ 

1 

3 

49 

3 

50 

106 

88th  Indiana  _  _ 

3 

4 

29 

2 

14 

52 

1 5th  TCpntnrkv  _  _ 

5 

42 

1 

14 

62 

Artillery,  Bridges’  Illinois  Battery.. 

1 

5 

— 

16 

— 

3 

26 

Total  1st  Brigade — . 

1 

16 

13 

176 

6 

98 

310 

*  Losses  sustained  l)y  the  troops  engaged  at  Chickamauga.  in  the  skirmishes  at  Rossville, 
Lookout  Church,  and  Dry  Valley,  Georgia,  Sept.  21st,  and  at  Missionary  Ridge  and  Shallow- 


Ford  Gap,  Tennessee,  Sept.  22d,  are  also  included. 

16 


234 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre- 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

gate. 

sd  Brigade — Stanley  and  Stoughton  : 

19th  Illinois _ _ - _ 

10 

4 

41 

1 

15 

71 

11th  Michigan  . . . 

1 

4 

4 

38 

19 

66 

18th  Ohio _ 

5 

6 

49 

14 

74 

Artillery,  1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  M_ 

4 

4 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

1 

19 

14 

132 

1 

48 

215 

jd  Brigade — Sirwell’s: 

37th  Indiana _ 

7 

2 

9 

21st  Ohio _ 

28 

4 

80 

11 

120 

243 

74th  Ohio _ 

1 

2 

6 

9 

78th  Pennsylvania _ 

2 

- - 

3 

5 

Total  3d  Brigade _ 

29 

4 

91 

11 

131 

266 

Total  2d  Division . ... 

2 

64 

31 

399 

18 

277 

791 

3d  Division — Brannan’s:  Staff. 

1 

1 

jst  Brigade — Connell’s : 

82d  Indiana _ 

1 

19 

1 

67 

2 

21 

111 

17th  Ohio . . 

1 

15 

11 

103 

3 

18 

151 

31st  Ohio _ 

13 

7 

127 

22 

169 

Artillery,  1st  Mich.  Light,  Batt’y  D_ 

1 

6 

— 

4 

11 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

2 

47 

20 

303 

5 

65 

442 

2d  Brigade — Croxton  and  Hays: 

10th  Indiana _ 

2 

00 

6 

130 

1 

5 

166 

74th  Indiana _ 

2 

20 

11 

114 

_ 

10 

157 

4th  Kentucky _ 

25 

13 

144 

9 

191 

10th  Kentucky _ 

1 

20 

9 

125 

1 

10 

166 

14th  Ohio _ 

35 

8 

159 

43 

245 

Artillery,  1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  C. 

— 

4 

9 

13 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

5 

126 

47 

681 

O 

77 

938 

3d  Brigade — Vanderveer’s : 

87th  Indiana _ 

7 

33 

4 

138 

8 

190 

2d  Minnesota _ 

34 

6 

101 

2 

49 

192 

9th  Ohio . . . 

2 

46 

9 

176 

1 

15 

249 

35th  Ohio _ 

2 

19 

7 

132 

1 

26 

187 

Artillery,  4th  U.-S.,  Battery  I _ 

1 

1 

20 

22 

Total  3d  Brigade _ 

11 

133 

27 

567 

4 

98 

840 

Total  3d  Division _ 

18 

306 

94 

1552 

11 

240 

2221 

4th  Division — Reynolds’:  Staff. 

1 

1 

2 

1st  Brigade — Wilder’s: 

92d  Illinois _ 

2 

2 

20 

2 

26 

98th  Illinois _ 

2 

2 

29 

2 

35 

123d  Illinois _ 

1 

2 

11 

1 

9 

24 

17th  Indiana _ _ _ 

4 

2 

8 

2 

16 

72d  Indiana _ 

3 

1 

15 

2 

21 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  18th  Batt’y 

— 

1 

2 

3 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

13 

9 

85 

1 

17 

125 

2d  Brigade — King  and  Robinson  : 

68th  Indiana _ 

2 

15 

5 

103 

1 

11 

137 

75th  Indiana _ 

17 

4 

104 

2 

11 

138 

101st  Indiana _ 

11 

5 

85 

1 

17 

119 

105th  Ohio _ _ 

3 

4 

37 

0 

04 

70 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  19th  Batt’y 

— 

0 

1 

15 

_ _ 

2 

20 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

0 

w 

48 

19 

344 

6 

65 

484 

APPENDIX. 


235 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre- 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

gate. 

jd  Brigade — Turchin’s: 

18th  Kentucky _ 

7 

8 

38 

4 

29 

86 

11th  Ohio _ 

5 

1 

35 

2 

20 

63 

36th  Ohio _ 

1 

11 

3 

62 

14 

91 

9 2d  Ohio _ 

6 

6 

62 

17 

91 

12 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  21st  Batt’y 

12 

Total  3d  Brigade _ 

1 

29 

18 

209 

6 

80 

343 

Total  4th  Division. . . 

3 

90 

47 

638 

14 

162 

954 

Total  14th  Army  Corps _ 

40 

624 

228 

3327 

112 

1813 

6144 

20th  Corps — McCook’s: 

1st  Division — Davis’: 

2d  Brigade * — Carlin’s: 

21st  Illinois _ . _ 

2 

20 

6 

64 

8 

13S 

238 

38th  Illinois _ 

2 

13 

8 

79 

2 

76 

180 

81st  Indiana  .  _  _ 

4 

4 

56 

2 

21 

87 

101st  Ohio _ 

3 

10 

6 

76 

51 

146 

Artillery,  Minn.  Light,  2d  Battery.. 

1 

1 

9 

JmU 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

7 

47 

25 

276 

12 

286 

653 

jd  Brigade — Heg  and  Martin: 

25th  Illinois _ 

10 

11 

160 

1 

23 

205 

35th  Illinois _ 

3 

14 

5 

125 

13 

160 

8th  Kansas _ 

2 

28 

9 

156 

25 

220 

15th  Wisconsin _ _ _ 

4 

9 

6 

47 

2 

43 

111 

Total  3d  Brigade _ 

9 

61 

31 

488 

O 

O 

104 

696 

Total  1st  Division _ 

16 

108 

56 

764 

15 

390 

1349 

2d  Division — Johnson’s:  Staff. 

ist  Brigade — Willich’s :  Staff. 

89th  Illinois _ _ _ _ _ 

1 

0 

3 

1 

1 

2 

4 

10 

5 

83 

2 

28 

132 

32d  Indiana _ _ _ 

1 

20 

4 

77 

_____ 

20 

122 

39th  Indiana  (detached  and  mounted) 
15th  Ohio _ - _ 

5 

3 

32 

40' 

1 

9 

2 

75 

33 

120 

49th  Ohio _ 

10 

2 

57 

0 

JmJ 

28 

99 

Artillerv,  1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  A 

_  _  _  _ 

2 

1 

13 

— 

4 

20 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

“7' 

56 

17 

338 

4 

113 

535 

2d  Brigade — Dodge’s :  Staff. 

79th  Illinois 

1 

1 

2 

5 

9 

3 

1 

•  20 

6 

91 

121 

29th  Indiana _ 

2 

9 

5 

87 

7 

62 

172 

30th  Indiana _ _ _ 

2 

8 

5 

50 

4 

57 

126 

77th  Ponnsvl vania 

O 

O 

4 

24 

9 

64 

104 

Artillery,  Ohio  Light,  20th  Battery. 

2 

_  _  _  _ 

2 

4 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

4' 

23 

16 

184 

~2S~ 

281 

536 

jd  Brigade — Baldwin  and  Berry: 

Staff 

1 

1 

0 

Jmi 

6th  Indiana _ 

0 

11 

6 

110 

31 

160 

5th  Kentucky _ 

2 

12 

6 

73 

2 

30 

125 

1st  Ohio _ _ - _ 

1 

12 

3 

93 

33 

142 

93d  Ohio  _ 

15 

*  3 

83 

0 

27 

130 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  5th  Battery 

_ _ 

1 

1 

6 

— 

1 

9 

Total  3d  Brigade - 

5 

52 

20 

305 

4 

122 

568 

Total  2d  Division . 

17 

131 

53 

887 

36 

518 

1642 

CHICKAMAUGA. 


236 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre¬ 

gate. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

3d  Division — Sheridan’s: 

isl  Brigade — Lytle  and  Miller: 

Staff  _  _ 

1 

1 

36th  Illinois _ _ _ 

3 

17 

6 

95 

_  _  _  _ 

20 

141 

88th  Illinois _ 

12 

7 

55 

14 

88 

21st  Michigan _ _ 

1 

15 

4 

69 

2 

15 

106 

24th  Wisconsin _ _ _ 

3 

4 

69 

29 

105 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  11th  Batt’y 

_ _ 

3 

1 

11 

— 

4 

19 

Total  1st  Brigade _ _ 

5 

50 

22 

299 

2 

82 

460 

2d  Brigade — Laiboldt’s : 

44th  Illinois _ _ 

6 

5 

55 

1 

33 

100 

73d  Illinois _ 

2 

11 

4 

53 

3 

19 

92 

2d  Missouri _ _ _ 

1 

6 

2 

54 

1 

28 

92 

15th  Missouri - - 

2 

9 

5 

62 

_  _  _  _ 

22 

100 

Artillery,  1st  Mo.  Light,  Battery  G_ 

— 

1 

— 

3 

1 

5 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

5 

33 

16 

227 

6 

102 

389 

jd  Brigade — Bradley  and  Walworth: 

22d  Illinois _ 

23 

5 

71 

2 

29 

130 

27th  Illinois _ 

1 

1 

4 

75 

10 

91 

42d  Illinois. _ _ 

3 

12 

4 

119 

I 

4 

143 

51st  Illinois . . . . 

2 

16 

3 

89 

2 

16 

128 

Artillery,  1st  Illinois  Light,  Batt’y  C 

4 

4 

Total  3d  Brigade _ 

6 

52 

16 

358 

5 

59 

496 

Total  3d  Division . . 

16 

135 

54 

884 

13 

243 

1345 

Total  20th  Army  Corps. 

49 

374 

163 

2535 

64 

1151 

4336 

21st  Corps — Crittenden’s  :  Escort 

3 

3 

1st  Division — Wood’s:  Staff. 

1 

1 

1  si  Brigade — Buell’s : 

100th  Illinois _ 

23 

6 

111 

2 

22 

164 

58th  Indiana _ _ _ _ 

0 

14 

5 

114 

3 

31 

169 

26th  Ohio  . . — . . 

4 

23 

6 

134 

9 

43 

212 

13th  Michigan - - 

2 

11 

6 

61 

O 

W 

24 

106 

Artillery,  Indiana  Light,  8th  Battery 

— 

1 

— 

9 

— 

7 

17 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

8 

72 

23 

429 

9 

127 

668 

jd  Brigade — Iiarker’s: 

3d  Kentucky  — . 

1 

12 

8 

70 

_ 

22 

113 

64th  Ohio _ _ 

1 

7 

2 

48 

_  _  _  _ 

13 

71 

65th  Ohio . . . 

2 

12 

6 

65 

_  _  _  _ 

18 

103 

125th  Ohio _  _ 

16 

3 

81 

5 

105 

Artillery,  Ohio  Light,  6th  Battery.. 

1 

1 

7 

9 

Total  3d  Brigade . . . 

4 

48 

20 

271 

58 

401 

Total  1st  Division . . 

12 

120 

44 

700 

9 

185 

1070 

2d  Division — Palmer’s :  Staff. 

1 

2 

2 

1 

6 

1  si  Brigade — Cruft’s : 

31st  Indiana.  _ _ _ 

1 

4 

2 

59 

_____ 

17 

83 

1st  Kentucky  (battalion) . . 

0 

1 

25 

_____ 

3 

31 

2d  Kentucky _ 

1 

9 

5 

59 

_ 

18 

92 

90th  Ohio . . . 

2 

5 

2 

60 

1 

14 

84 

Artillery,  1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  B_ 

1 

— 

S 

— 

4 

13 

Total  1st  Brigade . . 

4 

21 

10 

211 

1 

56 

303 

APPENDIX. 


237 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre- 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

gate. 

2d  Brigade — Hazen’s: 

9th  Indiana _ 

2 

11 

8 

83 

1 

21 

126 

6th  Kentucky _ 

3 

9 

7 

88 

1 

10 

118 

41st  Ohio _ _ 

6 

5 

95 

9 

115 

124th  Ohio _ 

15 

5 

87 

34 

141 

Artillery,  1st  Ohio  Light,  Battery  F_ 

1 

1 

8 

_ 

9 

12 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

6 

42 

25 

361 

0 

76 

512 

jd  Brigade — Grose’s:  Staff. 

3 

O 

O 

S4th  Illinois _ 

1 

12 

2 

81 

9 

105 

36th  Indiana _ 

13 

10 

89 

17 

129 

23d  Kentucky _ 

1 

10 

3 

49 

6 

69 

6th  Ohio _ 

13 

8 

94 

1 

16 

132 

24th  Ohio  _  _  _ 

3 

3 

57 

16 

79 

.  ...  1  4th  U.-S..  Batterv  H 

5 

1 

16 

90 

Artillery,  j  4th  Battery  M... 

2 

6 

8 

Total  3d  Brigade.. . . 

2 

58 

27 

395 

“l 

64 

547 

Total  2d  Division _ 

12 

122 

64 

967 

6 

197 

1368 

3n  Dtvtston  VanCleve’s:  Staff 

1 

1 

1st  B?'igade — Beatty’s:  79th  Indiana. 

1 

2 

42 

1 

9 

55 

9th  Kentucky _ _ 

2 

4 

41 

1 

12 

60 

17th  Kentucky _ 

1 

5 

2 

103 

15 

126 

19th  Ohio _ _ 

7 

9 

58 

_ 

23 

90 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

1 

15 

10 

244“ 

2~ 

59 

331 

2d  Brigade — Dick’s :  44th  Indiana. 

1 

2 

9 

52 

10 

74 

86th  Indiana _ 

1 

3 

28 

21 

53 

13th  Ohio _ 

2 

3 

4 

43 

22 

74 

59th  Ohio . 

2 

5 

1 

40 

0 

28 

78 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

5 

11 

17 

163 

2 

81 

279 

gd  Brigade — Barnes’:  35th  Indiana. 

5 

3 

20 

2 

35 

65 

8th  Kentucky _ 

4 

2 

45 

1 

27 

79 

51st  Ohio  _ _ 

8 

1 

34 

4 

51 

98 

99th  Ohio . 

3 

2 

28 

_  _  _  _ 

24 

57 

Total  3d  Brigade _ 

20 

8 

127 

7 

137 

299 

Artillery — Indiana  Light,  7th  Battery. 

8 

1 

9 

1 

17 

Pennsylvania  Light,  26th  Battery — 

1 

1 

1 

13 

— 

Wisconsin  Light,  3d  Battery . 

2 

— 

13 

— 

11 

26 

Total  Artillery - - 

1 

O 

O 

1 

34 

1 

12 

52 

Total  3d  Division . . 

7 

49 

36 

568 

13 

289 

962 

Total  21st  Army  Corps . 

31 

291 

144 

2238 

28 

671 

3403 

Reserve  Corps— Granger’s  :  Staff. 

1 

1 

1st  Division — Steedman’s: 

1st  Brigade — Whitaker’s :  Staff. 

96th  Illinois.. _  - 

1 

I 

39 

9 

125 

2 

50 

225 

115th  Illinois _ 

2 

20 

9 

142 

1 

9 

183 

84th  Indiana  _  _  _ 

3 

20 

6 

91 

_____ 

13 

133 

22d  Michigan  (temporarily  attached) 

32 

3 

8 

93 

14 

247 

389 

40th  Ohio _ 

2 

17 

94 

_ 

11 

132 

89th  Ohio  (temporarily  attached).. 

2 

17 

2 

61 

13 

158 

253 

io- 

Artillery,  Ohio  Light,  18th  Battery. 
Total  1st  Brigade . 

O 

8 

9 

145 

~40~ 

614 

30 

488 

1326 

238 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre- 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

gate. 

2 d  Brigade — Mitchell’s: 

78th  Illinois _ 

1 

16 

8 

69 

4 

58 

156 

98th  Ohio _ 

o 

7 

3 

38 

1 

12 

63 

113th  Ohio _ 

1 

20 

8 

90 

_  —  —  — 

12 

131 

121st  Ohio _ 

2 

7 

7 

76 

_  _  —  — 

7 

99 

Artillery,  1st  Illinois  Light,  Batt’y  M 

— 

o 

— 

9 

— 

1 

12 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

6 

52 

26 

282 

5 

90 

461 

Total  1st  Division _ 

15 

197 

66 

896 

35 

578 

1787 

2d  Division — Morgan’s: 

2d  Brigade — McCook’s: 

85th  Illinois _ 

86th  Illinois _ 

125th  Illinois _ 

52d  Ohio . 

69th  Ohio _ 

Artillery,  2d  Illinois  Light,  Batt’y  I 

Total  2d  Brig,  (detailed  losses  not  filed) 

— 

9 

— 

14 

_ _ 

18 

34 

Total  Reserve  Corps _ 

16 

199 

66 

910 

35 

596 

1822 

Cavalry  Corps — Mitchell’s: 

1st  Division — McCook’s: 

1st  Brigade — Campbell’s  : 

2d  Michigan _ 

1 

1 

— 

6 

1 

2 

11 

9th  Pennsylvania _ 

o 

3 

1st  Tennessee _ 

1 

1 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

~1 

1 

— 

~r 

6 

15 

2d  Brigade — Ray’s:  2d  Indiana.. 

1 

4 

5 

4th  Indiana _ 

2 

7 

9 

2d  Tennessee _ 

1 

2 

3 

1st  Wisconsin _ 

2 

— 

4 

6 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

O 

10 

11 

23 

jd  Brigade — Watkin’s:  4th  Kentucky 

1 

4 

90 

95 

5th  Kentucky _ 

2 

18 

°0 

6th  Kentucky _ _ 

2 

1 

6 

9 

120 

131 

Total  3d  Brigade . . 

2 

1 

7 

8 

228 

246 

Total  1st  Division . . 

1 

5 

1 

23 

9 

245 

284 

2d  Division — Crook’s: 

ist  Brigade — Minty’s: 

3d  Indiana  (detachment) _ 

3 

3 

4th  Michigan _ 

1 

1 

11 

(3 

19 

7th  Pennsylvania _ 

1 

4 

13 

1 

19 

4th  United  States _ 

1 

— 

5 

— 

1 

r* 

/ 

Total  1st  Brigade _ 

1 

6 

1 

32 

— 

8 

48 

2d  Brigade — Long’s:  2d  Kentucky. 

11 

5 

45 

2 

63 

1st  Ohio _  . 

1 

1 

13 

7 

22 

3d  Ohio _ 

2 

7 

8 

17 

4th  Ohio _ 

1 

3 

— 

9 

2 

19 

34 

Total  2d  Brigade _ 

2 

17 

5 

74 

2 

36 

136 

Total  2d  Division _ 

O 

O 

23 

6 

106 

2 

44 

184 

Total  Cavalrv  Corps _ 

4  I 

28 

7 

129 

11 

289 

468 

APPENDIX. 


239 


Detail  aggregate  Strength  and  Loss  of  the  various  Corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland: 


Command. 

Aggregate  Str’gth. 

Aggregate  Loss. 

34th  Corps — Thomas’: 

1st  Division — Baird’s _ 

2d  11  Negley’s _ 

3d  11  Brannan’s _ 

4th  ti  Reynolds’ _ 

*5541 

2755 

+5400 

76461  20,157 

2177 

791 

2221 

954  6144 

20th  Corps — McCook’s: 

1st  Division — Davis’ _ about 

2d  n  Johnson’s _ 

3d  ti  Sheridan’s _ 

§3900 

114200 

^14200  12,300 

1349 

1642 

1345  4336 

21  st  Corps — Crittenden’s: 

1st  Division — Wood’s _ 

2d  11  Palmer’s _ _ _ 

3d  11  VanCleve’s _ 

**2965 

5005 

1+4000  11,970 

1070 

1368 

962  3403 

Reserve  Corps — Granger’s: 

1st  Division — Steedman’s _ 

2d  ti  Morgan’s _ 

773913 

§§1500  5,413 

1780 

34  1822 

Cavalry  Corps — Mitchell’s: 

1st  Division — McCook’s _ _ _ 

2d  11  Crook’s _ 

j  11118,000  1 

284 

184  468 

Total  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

57,840 

16,173 

Aggregate  Strength  and  Loss  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland — Recapitulation : 


Command. 

j  Aggre¬ 
gate 
strength 

Killed. 

W  ounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre¬ 

gate 

loss. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

Off. 

Men. 

General  Headquarters _ 

14th  Corps,  Thomas’ _ 

20,157 

40 

624 

288 

2 

3327 

.112 

4 

1813 

6 

6144 

20th  Corps,  McCook’s _ 

12,300 

49 

374 

163 

2535 

64 

1151 

4336 

21st  Corps,  Crittenden’s 

11,970 

31 

291 

144 

2238 

28 

671 

3403 

Reserve,  Granger _ 

Cavalry,  Mitchell _ about 

5,413 

16 

199 

66 

910 

35 

596 

1822 

8,000 

4 

28 

7 

129 

11 

289 

468 

Total  Army  of  Cumberland 

57,840 

140 

1516 

608 

9141 

250 

4524 

16,179 

Artillery,  192  guns. 

*  Letter  from  Gen.  Baird,  dated  June  25,  1887;  figures  from  records  of  Sept. 
15,  1863.  +  Brannan’s  report,  war  records. 

7  Including  Wilder’s  mounted -infantry  brigade,  without  3040;  letter  of  T.  T. 
Knox,  in  charge  of  war-records  office,  August  4,  1887. 

§  Including  Post’s  brigade;  Carlin  and  Heg’s  aggregate  2433. 

||  Letter  from  Gen.  Johnson,  dated  June  29,  1887. 

•[  Sheridan  reports  “4000  bayonets,  ”  war  records,  adding  say  200  officers. 

**  Wood’s  report — two  brigades,  war  records. 

++  Approximate;  Dick’s  and  S.  Beatty’s  strength  2506,  from  war  records,  and 
Barnes’  brigade  assumed. 

++  Granger’s  report — two  brigades  of  Steedman’s  division,  including  LeFavor’s 
demi-brigade,  temporarily  attached. 

§§  Dan.  McCook’s  brigade,  Morgan’s  division,  approximate.  ||||  Estimated. 


240 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Aggregate  Strength  and  Loss  of  the  Army  of  the 

Tennessee: 

From  Reports,  except  as  stated  below. 


Command. 

Aggregate 

Strength. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggregate 

Loss. 

Right  Wing  : — Polk. 

1 

Hill’s  Corps: — Breckinridge’s  Division. 

3769 

166 

909 

165 

1450 

Cleburne’s  Division  .  _ _ 

5115 

204 

1539 

6 

1749 

Walker’s* * * §  and  Liddell’s  div. 

6534 

341 

1949 

733 

3023 

Polk’s  Corps: — Cheatham’s  Divisionf. 

6454 

218 

1624 

118 

1973 

Total  Right  Wing _ 

21,872 

929 

6021 

1022 

8195 

Left  Wing: — Longstreet. 

Stewart’s  Division _ 

4358 

205 

1499 

29 

1707 

Hood’s^  it  _ 

5500 

2919 

McLaw’s§  n  _ 

2500 

640 

Johnson’s  n  . . . . 

3428 

188 

1081 

180 

1449 

Hindman’s  n  _ 

6122 

272 

1480 

98 

1850 

Preston’s  u  . . . 

4809 

198 

1077 

61 

1336 

Total  Left  Wing _ 

26,717 

861 

5137 

368 

9901 

Cavalry,  Wheeler _ about 

||  12,000 

Total  Army  of  Tennessee 

60,589 

1790 

11,158 

1380 

18,096 

Artillery,  200  guns. 


*  On  the  20th  September,  Gen.  Gist  commanded  Walker’s  division. 

+  Gen.  Cheatham’s  report  does  not  state  the  strength  of  his  division.  The 
strength  of  Preston  Smith’s  brigade  is  assumed;  the  strength  of  other  brigades  are 
taken  from  the  ordnance  report. 

J  Gen.  Longstreet  states  that  the  loss  on  September  20,  of  Hood’s  brigades — 
Robertson’s,  Benning’s,  and  Law’s — was  1448  men;  now,  assuming  this  to  be  one- 
third,  on  the  morning  of  the  20th  the  division  had  4344;  again  assuming  that  its 
loss  on  the  19th  was  one-quarter,  its  strength  on  that  morning  would  be  5815. 
Gen.  Bragg,  in  one  of  his  reports,  incidentally  mentions  it  as  being  about  5000 
strong;  so  we  may  safely  place  its  strength  at  5500. 

§  Gen.  Kershaw,  who  commanded  his  own  and  Humphrey’s  brigades,  on  Sept. 
20,  reports  the  loss  of  his  brigade  as  448  and  Humphrey’s  as  152;  but  does  not 
mention  their  strength.  Assuming  that  the  loss  of  Kershaw’s  brigade  was  the 
same  as  that  of  Gracie’s — thirty  per  cent,  its  strength  would  be  1680;  and  as 
Humphrey’s  did  not  do  much  fighting,  we  will  assume  that  its  loss  was  twenty 
per  cent,  then  its  strength  would  be  760,  or  say  2500  for  the  two  brigades. 

H  Gen.  Bragg,  Oct.  7,  1863,  reports  as  present  for  duty: 

Infantry _ Officers,  4664  Men,  46,447  =  51,111 

Artillery _  n  157  n  3480  =  3,637 

Cavalry  (returns  imperfect)  h  and  n  13,620 

68,368 

Hence  we  may  safely  assume  the  aggregate  strength  of  rebel  cavalry  in  the  Battle 
of  Chickamauga  was  about  12,000. 


BATTLE  OF  CIIICKAMAUGA. 


INDEX. 


A 

Abernethy,  Lt.-Col.  Jas.  L.,  8th  Kan.,  218 

Academies,  Military,  desirability  of  estab¬ 
lishing  two  additional;  proper  distribu¬ 
tion  of  appointments  to,  among  States, 
178;  see  also  West-Point. 

Adams,  Brig. -Gen.  Daniel  W.,  wounded 
and  captured,  108,  131,  193;  carried  off 
field  by  105th  Ohio,  193;  com.  Adams’ 
brigade,  226. 

Adams’  (D.  W. )  brigade,  forms  Breckin¬ 
ridge’s  right,  104;  drives  Beatty’s  left, 
105;  brushes  away  Beatty’s  line;  crosses 
Chattanooga  road  at  Glenn’s  farm ;  or¬ 
dered  to  attack;  pushes  toward  Kelley’s 
house;  advance  of  checked,  107;  with¬ 
drawn  behind  Walker,  108;  successfully 
attacked  by  Stanley,  123;  attached  to 
Cleburne’s  division,  226. 

Adams,  Col.  Samuel,  com.  18th  and  33d 
Alabama,  225. 

Adney,  Maj.  William  Ii.  G.,  36th  Ohio, 
wounded,  189. 

Aiken,  Maj.  John  A.,  63d  Tenn.,  230. 

Alabama,  Halleck  will  instruct  Rosecrans 
whether  to  advance  farther  into,  48,  49. 

Alabama  battalions,  1st  and  2d,  com.  by 
Lieut. -Col.  Holt;  attached  to  Gracie’s 
brigade,  143. 

Alabama  regiments,  1st,  230,  23 1;  2d,  its 
colors  presented  to  rebel  president,  143, 
230;  3d,  231,  233;  4th,  228,  230,  231; 
5th,  23 1;  7th,  231;  15th,  joins  Ker¬ 
shaw,  133,  228;  16th,  225;  17th,  229; 
18th,  225,  229;  19th,  229;  22d,  229; 
24th,  attached  to  Manigault’s  brigade, 
1 1 7,  229;  loses  its  colors,  1 1 7 ;  25th, 
229;  28th,  229;  32d,  226;  33d,  225; 
34th,  229;  36th,  229;  38th,  229;  39th, 
229;  41st,  225;  43d,  143,  230;  44th, 
228;  45th,  225;  47th,  228;  48th,  228; 
50th,  pursues  Union  forces,  83,  229; 
51st,  231;  53d,  231;  58th,  engaged  with 
Hazen,  82,  83,  229. 

Alabama  road,  Wilder  advances  by,  42. 

Aldrich,  Lt.-Col.  Simeon  C.,  commands 
44th  Indiana,  124;  rallies  part  of  Dick’s 
brigade;  goes  to  support  of  Wood;  es¬ 
pecially  mentioned  by  latter,  13 1,  221. 

Aleshire,  Capt.  Chas.  C. ,  com.  18th  Ohio 
Light  Battery,  221. 


Alexander,  Col.  E.  Porter,  com.  Artillery, 
Longstreet’s  corps,  228. 

Alexander,  Col.  J ohn  W.  S. ,  21st  Ill.  ,218. 

Alexander’s  bridge,  Walker’s  corps  forms 
opposite,  54;  direction  of  roads  from, 
57;  Wilder’s  brigade  stationed  at,  59; 
rebels  advance  toward,  60,  61 ;  Walker’s 
corps  bivouacs  at;  defended  by  Wilder; 
captured  by  Liddell;  planks  removed 
from  stringers  of,  62;  Walker’s  division 
should  have  crossed  at,  63;  Dan.  Mc¬ 
Cook  learns  of  rebel  movement  toward, 
68;  Brannan  to  post  brigade  on  road 
to;  the  orders  not  followed,  69;  Union 
position  covers  road  leading  from,  99. 

Alma,  battle  of,  gained  by  Bosquet’s 
division,  115. 

Alpine,  Ga.,  cavalry  to  reconnoitre  tow¬ 
ard;  McCook  pushes  advance  toward, 
27;  McCook  ordered  to  move  on,  29, 
31 ;  McCook’s  corps  near,  40;  Crook’s 
cavalry  opposite,  52. 

Ambulances,  captured  by  rebels,  119. 

“American  Conflict”  (Greeley),  cited,  84m 

Ammunition,  captured  by  rebels,  119; 
Union  forces  on  Plorseshoe  Ridge  in 
want  of,  143,  144;  Steedman’s  brigade 
brings  extra  to  the  Ridge,  144,  199; 
same  distributed  to  Brannan’s  troops, 
144;  Granger  unable  to  send  to  Le- 
Favorand  Carlton,  155;  Palmer’s  divis¬ 
ion  in  want  of,  19 1,  196;  Reynolds’ 
division  in  want  of,  193. 

Ammunition-train,  moves  toward  Chatta¬ 
nooga,  65;  Gen.  Thomas’  brought  to 
Union  lines,  144,  199;  rebels  between 
Reynolds’  and  Union;  Chattanooga 
reached  by  Union,  193. 

Anderson,  Brig. -Gen.  Geo.  T.,  commands 
Anderson’s  brigade  of  Hood’s  div.,  228. 

Anderson’s  (Gen.  G.  T. )  brigade,  attached 
to  Hood’s  division,  228. 

Anderson,  Brig. -Gen.  Jas.  Patton,  report 
of,  cited,  13611;  commands  Hindman’s 
division,  37,  22S;  manoeuvres  around 
Pigeon  Mountain  by;  ordered  to  inter¬ 
cept  Union  retreat;  Hindman  consults 
with,  37;  promises  to  support  B.  R. 
Johnson,  134. 

Anderson’s  (Gen.  J.  P.)  brigade,  in  Hind¬ 
man’s  second  line;  to  participate  in  the 
attack,  1 15, 1 16;  attached  to  Hindman’s 


241 


242  CHICKAMAUGA. 


division,  1 1 7,  209,  228;  aids  in  driving 
Sheridan  to  the  Cove  road,  1 1 7 ;  fills 
space  between  Johnson  and  Kershaw, 
134,  135;  advances  simultaneously  with 
Johnson,  135;  compelled  to  fall  back, 
136;  position  of,  in  line  of  advance; 
portion  of  posted  on  spur  of  Horseshoe 
Ridge,  136;  to  attack  to  the  front,  137; 
pursued  by  Union  troops;  Kershaw’s 
force  rushes  to  rescue  of;  rallies  and 
opens  fire,  138;  part  of  in  centre  of 
rebel  assaulting  line;  Kelly’s  next  to, 
142;  7th  Mississippi  attached  to;  part  of 
supports  Kelly,  143;  opposes  Mitchell 
and  Whittaker,  209. 

Anderson,  Col.  John  H.,  8th  Tenn.,  224. 

Anderson,  Col.  Nicholas  L. ,  6th  Ohio, 
197,  220. 

Anderson,  Col.  Paul  F.,  4th  Tenn.,  231. 

Anderson,  Lieut.  R.  W.,  T.  H.  Dawson’s 
Ga.  Battery,  230. 

Anderson,  Lieut. -Col.  T.  Scott,  6th,  10th, 
and  15th  Texas,  225. 

Anderson,  Col.  Wm.  B. ,  60th  Ill.,  222. 

Anderson,  Tenn.,  Baird’s  division  to  halt 
at;  Negley  to  halt  between  Stevenson 
and,  24. 

Anderson’s  house,  Ga. ,  Hindman  moves 
by  way  of,  35;  Polk  to  remain  at,  to 
cover  Hindman’s  rear,  37;  rebel  troops 
bivouac  at,  59;  Cleburne’s  division  sta¬ 
tioned  at,  63;  Cleburne’s  divis.  ordered 
from,  92. 

Andrew,  Capt.  Wm.  W.,  21st  Indiana 
Light  Battery,  217. 

Andrew’s  (Wm.  W. )  battery,  on  Turchin’s 
right,  186;  does  fine  execution;  losses 
by,  189,  194. 

Appointments,  to  West  Point,  proper  dis¬ 
tribution  of  among  States,  178;  to  com¬ 
mand  troops,  should  be  made  by  presi¬ 
dent  and  senate,  181. 

Arkansas  regiments,  1st,  225;  2d,  227; 
3d,  228;  4th,  230;  6th,  227;  7th,  227; 
8th,  com.  by  Col.  J.  H.  Kelly,  205,  227; 
13th,  227;  15th,  227,  232;  19th,  225; 
21th,  225;  25th,  230;  31st,  230;  1st 
Battery,  230;  1st  Mounted  Rifles,  230; 
2d  Mounted  Rifles,  230. 

Armstrong,  Brig. -Gen.  Francis  C.,  divis¬ 
ion  commander,  Army  of  Tenn.,  232. 

Armstrong’s  (Gen.  F.  C. )  brigade,  attached 
to  Armstrong’s  division,  232. 

Armstrong’s  (Gen.  F.  C. )  division,  For¬ 
rest  asks  Polk  to  send,  as  reenforce¬ 
ment,  71;  roster  of,  232. 

Armstrong,  Lieut.  J.  W. ,  of  17th  Indiana, 
Reynolds’  ordnance  officer,  195. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  operations  of 
in  1863;  retrieves  ground  previously 
lost,  10;  how  aided;  basis  of  supplies; 
draws  supplies  from  rebels;  corps  com¬ 


posing,  12,  13,  14;  numerical  strength 
of,  13;  to  take  Chattanooga,  15;  Hal- 
leck  might  and  should  have  reen¬ 
forced,  15,  16;  nearness  of  Burnside’s 
force  to,  16;  who  responsible  for  suffer¬ 
ings  of,  17;  prospective  difficulties  con¬ 
fronting,  17,  18;  odds  encountered  by, 
18;  constitution  of  centre  and  wings  of, 
24;  moves  toward  Chattanooga,  24; 
Bragg  describes  movements  of,  26;  date 
of  crossing  Tennessee  River  by,  27;  its 
front  dangerously  lengthened,  30,  31, 
34;  successfully  crosses  Sand  and  Look¬ 
out  Mts. ,  31;  easily  defeated  in  detail, 
34;  Rosecrans  concentrates  around  Lee- 
and-Gordon’s  mill,  41;  Halleck’s  mis¬ 
conception  of  position  of,  48,  49;  Rose¬ 
crans  describes  position  of,  50;  concen¬ 
tration  of,  considered,  51;  should  have 
been  reenforced,  58;  its  mettle  tested, 
1 12;  placed  on  pinnacle  of  fame  by 
Chickamauga,  162,  163;  Grant’s  low 
estimate  of;  sweeps  Missionary  Ridge, 
163;  Thomas’  high  rank  in,  164,  165; 
appropriate  monument  for,  165;  roster 
of,  215-23;  casualties  in,  233  et  seq.\ 
strength  and  losses  of,  239. 

Army  of  the  Mississippi,  commanded  by 
Johnston, 49;  to  reenforce  Bragg,  49,  50. 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  evacuation  of  territory 
by;  afterward  called  Army  of  the  Cum¬ 
berland,  10. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  retreat  of,  after 
Chancellorsville,  9;  Sheridan’s  activity 
and  energy  in,  130. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee  (Union),  opera¬ 
tions  of  in  1862-3,  9;  capture  of  Jack- 
son,  Miss.,  by;  assault  on  Vicksburg 
by,  10. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee  (rebel),  congratu¬ 
lated  by  Bragg  and  Jeff  Davis  upon 
result  of  Chickamauga,  157;  battle  of 
Chickamauga  the  ruin  of,  158,  160; 
finally  dispersed  by  Thomas  at  Nash¬ 
ville,  160;  roster  of,  224  et  seq.\  strength 
and  losses  of,  240. 

Army  of  Virginia,  invasion  of  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  by,  9;  ruined  by  battle  of  Gettys¬ 
burg,  160. 

Arnold,  Capt.  J.  L.,  16th  Tenn.,  232. 

Artillery,  difficult  to  cross  mountains  with, 
31;  covers  Union  position  at  Chicka¬ 
mauga  Creek,  38;  Union,  sent  toward 
Pea-Vine  church,  42;  Cheatham  loses 
four  pieces  of;  Jackson  claims  capture 
of  three  pieces  of,  74;  Hazen  attempts 
to  concentrate  Palmer’s,  79;  Reynolds’ 
division  does  effective  execution  by,  80, 
81 ;  Hazen  supported  by  forty  pieces  of, 
83;  rebels  deficient  in,  86;  captured 
from  Gregg  by  Union  forces;  Tennessee 
reg’ts  capture  Union,  88;  four  pieces  of 


INDEX. 


243 


Union  brought  into  position;  Union 
reserve  of  disabled,  101;  Negley  expects 
to  be  followed  by;  Negley  ordered  to 
mass  on  Missionary  Ridge,  102;  Wood 
advises  Crittenden  not  to  take  into  the 
woods,  1 13,  1 14;  battery  of  Union 
stampeded  through  Sam  Beatty’s  bri¬ 
gade,  1 16,  1 1 7;  rebels  capture  Union; 
posted  by  Negley  near  Dyer’s  house, 
and  supported  by  Sirwell,  118;  Union, 
posted  near  Vidito’s  house,  119;  dispo¬ 
sition  of  by  Negley,  124;  Turchin’s  bri¬ 
gade  captures  rebel,  148;  Bragg  com¬ 
plains  of  want  of;  same  reports  loss  of 
one-third  of  horses  attached  to  rebel, 
159;  when  of  little  use,  174;  Palmer 
finds  difficulty  in  employing,  196;  Steed- 
man  takes  to  Rossville,  201. 

Artillery,  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  at¬ 
tached  to  14th  corps,  215,  216,  217; 
casualties  in,  233;  20th  corps,  217,  218, 
219;  21st  corps,  220,  221;  reserve  corps, 
221,  222;  cavalry  corps,  223. 

Artillery,  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  attached 
to  Cheatham’s  division,  225;  Cleburne’s 
division,  225 ;  Liddell’s  division,  reserve 
corps,  227;  Walker’s  division,  reserve 
corps,  227;  Longstreet’s  corps,  228; 
Stewart’s  division,  230;  Preston’s  divis¬ 
ion,  230;  reserve  of,  of  what  batteries 
composed;  officer  commanding,  232. 

Artillery,  see  also  Andrew’s  Vattery,  Bat¬ 
tery  H,  Battery  I,  Bradley’s,  Bridges’, 
Carnes’,  Cockerill’s,  Cushing’s,  Dent’s, 
Estep’s,  Everett’s,  Goodspeed’s,  Harris’, 
21st  Indiana,  King’s,  Marshall’s,  2d 
Minn.,  18th  Ohio,  Russell’s,  Schultz’s, 
Scribner’s,  Semple’s,  Standart’s,  Swal¬ 
low’s,  Swett’s. 

Ashford,  Capt.  F.  A.,  16th  Ala.,  225. 

Askew,  Lt.-Col.  Frank,  15th  Ohio,  218. 

Atkins,  Col.  Smith  D.,  92d  Illinois,  217. 

Athens,  Ga.,  Mitchell’s  cavalry  to  advance 
by,  24;  Union  cavalry  moving  toward, 
48. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  the  next  objective  point  after 
Chattanooga,  15;  Longstreet  reenforces 
Bragg  by  way  of,  49,  5°>  Hindman 
dates  report  from,  118. 

Atlanta  campaign,  numerical  strength  of 
Sherman’s  army  at  beginning  of,  160. 

Auerstadt,  results  of  battle  of,  158. 

Austin,  Maj.  J.  E.,  14th  Louisiana,  225. 

Austrians,  forced  by  McMahon  to  retreat 
at  Magenta,  1 15 ;  defeated  at  Marengo 
and  Sadowa,  158. 

Avery,  Col.  I.  W.,  4th  Georgia,  231. 

B 

Bailey’s  Cross-roads,  Ga.,  Negley  sends 
out  skirmishing  parties  from,  32;  Union 


trains  to  be  protected  against  cavalry  at; 
Union  forces  withdraw  to,  33;  Bran- 
nan’s  division  posted  at,  50. 

Bainbridge,  Lieut.  W.  P.,  101st  Indiana, 
Reynolds’  aide-de-camp,  wounded,  195. 

Baird,  Gen.  Absalom,  Negley  asks  sup¬ 
port  from;  arrives  at  Stevens’  Gap;  joins 
Negley,  32;  his  skilfully-managed  re¬ 
treat,  38;  Gen.  Thomas  meets  Dan. 
McCook  at  headquarters  of,  69;  learns 
of  rebel  force  to  his  right;  disposition 
of  troops  by;  posts  Scribner’s  brigade, 
72;  posts  King’s  brigade  toward  Reed’s 
bridge,  76;  Thomas  points  out  position 
to,  9 3;  encourages  troops  to  rally,  107; 
Gen.  Dick  not  mentioned  in  report  of, 
13 1;  commands  1st  Div.,  14th  Corps, 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  215. 

Baird’s  (Gen.  Absalom)  division,  attached 
to  14th  Corps;  follows  Negley ’s  divis¬ 
ion;  to  halt  at  Anderson,  24,  172;  to 
cross  the  Tennessee  at  Bridgeport,  26; 
arrives  at  Stevens’  Gap,  32;  joins  and 
relieves  Negley,  32,  33;  is  posted  at 
Bailey’s  Cross-roads;  Brannan’s  division 
to  left  of;  l'econnoitres  around  Davis’ 
Cross-roads,  50;  between  Gowen’s  Ford 
and  Bird’s  mill,  53;  how  to  move,  65; 
near  Crawfish  Spring;  delayed  in  reach¬ 
ing  same,  65;  its  head  reaches  Kelley’s 
farm;  followed  by  Brannan’s;  its  posi¬ 
tion  in  Thomas’  line  of  formation,  66; 
Brannan  to  support,  69;  sent  to  reen¬ 
force  Brannan;  Johnson’s  sent  to  right 
of,  70;  advances  to  Croxton’s  left;  how 
disposed;  defeats  rebels,  71;  arrange¬ 
ment  of;  connects  with  Brannan’s;  is 
joined  by  4th  Kentucky;  suffers  severe- 
ly,  72;  Johnson’s  division  advances  to 
right  of,  73;  relieved  by  Johnson’s  and 
Palmer’s,  74;  joins  Johnson,  76;  Scrib¬ 
ner’s  and  Starkweather’s  brigades  at¬ 
tached  to;  in  front  of  Cleburne,  93; 
reaches  Kelley’s  farm;  separated  from 
main  command,  94;  on  extreme  Union 
left,  95,  99,  roi;  rebel  divisions  oppos- 
ing,  95;  position  with  regard  to  other 
divisions,  99;  Negley  to  move  to  left 
and  rear  of,  99,  102;  no  change  in  lo¬ 
cation  of  on  morning  of  battle,  100; 
posted  around  northeast  corner  of  Kel¬ 
ley’s  field;  character  of  ground  occupied 
by,  101;  Beatty’s  brigade  forms  to  left 
of,  102;  Thomas  wants  Negley  to  pro¬ 
tect  left  of,  with  artillery,  103;  behind 
barricades;  attacked  by  Helm,  105,  106; 
Grose’s  brigade  forms  in  rear  of;  driven 
from  barricades;  drives  back  and  pur¬ 
sues  Stovall’s  brigade,  107;  repulses 
Gist  with  heavy  loss,  108;  Thomas  or¬ 
ders  Wood  to  support;  Barnes’  brigade 
sent  to,  12 1;  Stanley  to  left  of;  reen- 


244 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


forced  by  Barnes,  123;  a  part  of  Union 
left  wing;  Union  front  line  runs  in  front 
of,  140,  141;  Turchin  drives  rebels  to 
left  of,  150,  200;  Liddell  and  Gist  might 
have  annihilated,  150;  the  last  to  leave 
the  field,  15c,  153;  meets  serious  losses 
in  crossing  Kelley’s  field,  153;  Hind¬ 
man  not  the  man  to  attack,  168;  near 
Johnson’s  on  Union  left,  172;  retires 
without  confusion,  200;  roster  of,  215; 
casualties  in,  233;  strength  and  losses 
of,  239. 

Baird,  Col.  John  P.,  85th  Indiana,  221. 

Baker,  Lt.-Col.  Myron,  74th  Ind. ,  216. 

Baldwin,  Lieut.  Norman  A.,  1st  Ohio  L’t 
Artillery,  Battery  B;  commands  Stand- 
art’s  battery;  complimented  by  Hazen, 
82,  220. 

Baldwin,  Col.  Philemon  P.,  3d  Brigade, 
2d  Division,  20th  Corps;  killed,  94,  218. 

Baldwin’s  (Col.  P.  P. )  brigade,  on  John¬ 
son’s  left,  73;  individual  members  of, 
surrender;  Col.  Berry,  senior  officer  of, 
94;  roster  of,  218;  casualties  in,  235; 
see  also  Berry’s  brigade. 

Bane,  Col.  John  P. ,  4th  Texas,  228. 

Banning,  Lt.-Col.  Henry  B.,  121st  Ohio, 
221. 

Barber,  Capt.  Gershom  M.,  1st  Ohio 
Sharpshooters,  215. 

Barker,  Capt.  John  D.,  attached  to  Gen. 
Thomas’  staff;  conveys  orders  to  Reyn¬ 
olds;  sent  for  ammunition,  147,  199; 
commands  Co.  I,  1st  Ohio  Cav. ,  215. 

Barnes,  Lt.-Col.  Milton,  97th  Ohio,  219. 

Barnes,  Col.  Sidney  M.,  3d  Brigade,  3d 
Division,  21st  Corps,  53,  221. 

Barnes’  (Col.  S.  M.)  brigade,  attached  to 
VanCleve’s  division,  53,  64,  no;  sta¬ 
tioned  at  Glenn’s  Ford;  reenforces 
Wood,  53;  relieved  by  Grose,  64;  Van 
Cleve  leaves  with  Wood’s  division,  85, 
88;  Crittenden  orders  to  support  Van 
Cleve,  88;  on  Carlin’s  right;  pressed 
back  by  Trigg  and  Robertson,  89;  forms 
to  right  of  Davis;  contributes  to  rebel 
retreat,  90;  takes  place  of  Sirwell’s,  no; 
led  by  Wood;  sent  to  support  Baird, 
12 1 ;  reenforces  Baird,  123;  roster  of, 
221;  casualties  in,  237. 

Barnett,  Capt.  Chas.  M.,  2d  Illinois  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  I,  222. 

Barrett’s  (Mo.)  Battery,  232. 

Barrett,  Col.  Wallace  W.,  44th  Illi¬ 
nois,  219. 

Barricades,  Union  position  strengthened 
by,  99;  Union  left  wing  well  protected 
by;  right  wing  has  no  continuous;  Union 
erected  near  Kelley’s  field,  101;  Baird 
fights,  behind,  105;  Baird’s  div’n  driven 
from,  107;  Davis  occupies  line  of,  no; 
put  up  in  front  of  Brown’s  brigade,  1 1 5 ; 


Union  front  line  protected  by,  141; 
Union  left  lying  behind,  145;  under 
what  circumstances  of  value,  173,  174; 
Reynolds  erects  temporary,  193. 

Barr,  Lt.-Col.  James,  10th  Miss.,  228. 

Bartleson,  Col.  Frederick  A.,  Wood  re¬ 
ports  shooting  of,  1 1 3 ;  commands  100th 
Illinois,  219. 

Bassett,  Capt.  R.  H.,  4th  Texas,  228. 

Bate,  Brig. -Gen.  W.  B.,  report  of,  cited, 
82  n;  commands  Bate’s  brigade,  229. 

Bate’s  (Gen.  W.  B.)  brigade,  at  Tedford’s 
Ford,  62;  attached  to  Stewart’s  div’n, 
75,  106,  229;  posted  on  Clayton's  left, 
75;  ordered  to  form  and  attack,  78,  79; 
Clayton’s  to  form  on  left  of;  attacks 
Grose  and  King;  chasing  Union  fugi¬ 
tives,  79 ;  regiments  composing,  82 ; 
Clayton  ordered  to  support;  right  line 
of  repulsed;  left  line  of  successful,  83; 
passed  over  by  part  of  Wood’s,  106; 
forms  Stewart’s  right;  Cleburne  far  be¬ 
hind,  1 1 5. 

Batman,  Lieut.  Geo.  W.  L.,  Co.  I,  2d 
Kentucky  Cavalry,  217. 

Battalions,  should  be  1000  strong;  should 
consist  of  four  regiments;  who  should 
command,  182. 

Batteries,  stragglers  rallied  to  support  of, 
79- 

Battery  H,  4th  U.-S.  Artillery,  see  Rus¬ 
sel’s  battery. 

Battery  H,  5th  U.-S.  Artillery,  formerly 
Loomis’  Michigan  battery;  afterward 
known  as  King’s  battery,  72. 

Battery  I,  4th  U.-S.  Artillery;  between 
Brannan  and  Wood,  123,  124;  strength 
of;  commanded  by  Lieut.  Smith;  re¬ 
mains  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  124;  sup¬ 
ported  by  Stanley’s  brigade,  125. 

Battery  Hill,  Ga.,  Battery  I  placed  on, 
125;  Preston’s  forces  face,  142. 

Battle  Creek,  Tenn. ,  Reynolds’  division 
advances  by  way  of,  24;  Brannan’s  div’n 
to  cross  the  Tennessee  at,  26;  Critten¬ 
den  to  advance  by,  27. 

Battle  Springs,  Ga.,  Steedman’s  troops 
bivouac  at,  59. 

Baucum,  Lieut. -Col.  G.  F.,  8th  Alabama 
and  1st  Louisiana,  227. 

Baumbach,  Maj.  Carl  von,  24th  Wis.,  219. 

Baxter’s  (Tenn.)  battery,  Reserve  Corps, 
Army  of  Tennessee,  230. 

Bayonet-charge,  by  Turchin’s  brigade,  7  7. 

Beatty,  Brig. -Gen.  John,  complains  of  and 
accuses  Gen.  Negley,  127;  loses  his  bri- 
brigade;  joins  Stanley’s  command;  en¬ 
courages  defenders  of  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
132;  commands  1st  Brigade,  2d  Div’n, 
14th  Corps,  216. 

Beatty’s  (Gen.  John)  brigade,  a  portion  of 
drives  in  rebel  pickets,  27;  ordered  to 


INDEX. 


protect  trains  against  rebel  cavalry,  33; 
wants  to  relieve  Hazen,  65;  attackecfby 
Helm;  a  portion  of  driven  back,  91 ; 
forms  to  left  of  Baird;  ordered  to  Mc- 
Dannel’s;  places  two  regiments  there; 
attacked  by  rebels,  102;  hard  pressed 
by  Helm,  Stovall,  and  Adams,  105; 
rebels  brush  away  line  of;  two  regiments 
of  become  separated  from;  remainder  of 
joins  Stanley’s  brigade;  checks  Adams’ 
advance;  forms  regiments  to  support 
Stanley,  108;  of  Negley’s  division;  at 
McFarland’s  Gap  and  Rossville,  129; 
roster  of,  216;  casualties  in,  233. 

Beatty,  Brig. -Gen.  Samuel,  1st  Brigade, 
3d  Division,  21st  Corps,  220. 

Beatty’s  (Gen.  Samuel)  brigade,  ordered 
to  reconnoitre  around  Lafayette  road, 
42;  forms  on  King’s  right,  85 ;  attacks 
Johnson  and  Gregg,  86;  to  the  left  of 
Dick;  attacked  by  Johnson,  87,  88;  run 
over  by  stampeded  battery,  116,  1 1 7; 
9th  and  17th  Kentucky  attached  to,  123; 
stragglers  from  join  Wood,  124;  Dick 
to  left  of;  moves  close  to  Brannan’s 
lines,  130;  stragglers  from  join  Bran- 
nan,  133;  roster  of,  220;  casualties,  237. 

Beatty,  Maj.  Wm.  T.,  2d  Ohio,  215. 

Beaumont,  Lt.-Col.  T.  W.,  50th  Tenn.,  231 

Beauregard,  Lieut.  R.  T.,  Ferguson’s  (S. 
C. )  battery,  226. 

Beck,  Lt.-Col.  Arnold,  2d  Missouri,  219. 

Bell,  Capt.  Leroy  S.,  3d  Ohio,  216. 

Bellefont,  Ala.,  Johnson’s  div’n  advances 
toward,  24. 

Benning,  Brig. -Gen.  H.  L.,  report  of  cited, 
87;  commands  Benning’s  brigade,  228. 

Benning’s  (Gen.  H.  L. )  brigade,  left  at 
Ringgold,  60,  69;  attached  to  Long- 
street’s  command,  60,  1 1 5 ;  a  part  of 
Hood’s  division,  61,  69,  87,  115,  133; 
reenforces  Robertson,  69,  87;  in  B.  R. 
Johnson’s  rear,  1 1 5 ;  supports  Law  and 
Robertson,  1 1 5,  133;  captures  Union 
battery,  133;  attached  to  Hood’s  divis¬ 
ion,  228. 

Bennett,  Col.  John  E.,  75th  Illinois,  217. 

Berry,  Col.  William  W.,  senior  officer  in 
Baldwin’s  brigade;  remains  too  long  at 
the  front,  94;  commands  5th  Kentucky 
and  3d  Brig,,  2d  Div’n,  20th  Corps,  218.. 

Berry’s  (Col.  W.  W. )  brigade,  regiments 
connected  with,  109. 

Berwick,  Lieut.  Andrew,  1st  Ohio  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  E,  222. 

Bififle,  Col.  J.  B.,  9th  Tennessee,  232. 

Bingham,  Lt.-Col.  Geo.  B.,  1st  Wis.,  215. 

Bird’s  mill,  Ga.,  Baird’s  and  Negley’s 
divisions  near,  53. 

Bishop,  Lieut.  Wm.,  attached  to  Bridges’ 
battery,  killed;  his  section  of  guns  cap¬ 
tured,  105. 


Bishop,  Col.  W.  H.,  7th  Mississippi,  228. 

Blackmore,  Capt.  W.  T.,  aide  to  B.  R. 
Johnson,  reforms  Tenn.  regiments,  92. 

Blake,  Col.  John  W. ,  40th  Indiana,  219. 

Blakeley,  Lt.-Col.  Archibald,  78th  Penn¬ 
sylvania,  216. 

Bland,  Lt.-Col.  Elbert,  7th  S.  C.,  227. 

Bledsoe’s  (Mo.)  battery,  231. 

Bloodgood,  Lt.-Col.  Edw.,  22d  Wis.,  221. 

Bluebird  Gap,  Ga.,  location  of;  Wilder’s 
brigade  reconnoitres  to,  53. 

Bond,  Maj.  Frank  S.,  Rosecrans’  aide-de- 
camp;  issues  latter’s  order  to  Wood,  1 12 

Boone,  Capt.  Nevil  B.,  81st  Indiana,  218. 

Boone,  Col.  Wm.  P.,  28th  Kentucky,  222. 

Borodino,  Russia,  movements  of  French 
and  Russians  around;  analogy  between 
position  at  and  Chickamauga,  ico. 

Bosquet  (Gen.  Pierre-Fr.-Jos. ),  gains  bat¬ 
tle  of  Alma;  saves  British  from  destruc¬ 
tion  at  Inkerman,  1 1 5. 

Bostick,  Capt.  J.,  4th  Tennessee,  224. 

Bowen,  Capt.  li.  J.,  34th  Mississippi,  227. 

Bowen,  Col.  W.  L.  L.,  4th  Florida,  226. 

Boynton,  Lieut. -Col.  Henry  V.  N.,  35th 
Ohio,  216. 

Boynton,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  S.,  30th  Ga.,  226. 

Bradley,  Capt.  Cullen  S. ,  6th  Ohio  Light 
Battery,  220. 

Bradley’s  (Capt.  C.  S.,  6th  Ohio  Light) 
battery,  forces  rebels  to  retreat,  89. 

Bradley,  Col.  Luther  P.,  3d  Brigade,  3d 
Division,  20th  Corps,  219. 

Bradley’s  (Col.  L.  P.)  brigade,  attached 
to  Sheridan’s  division;  aids  in  repulsing 
Trigg  and  Robertson,  90;  commanded 
by  Col.  Walworth;  driven  back  to  the 
Cove  road,  1 1 7 ;  roster  of,  219;  casual¬ 
ties  in,  236. 

Bradshaw,  Maj.  O.  A.,  4th  Tenn.,  224. 

Bragg,  Gen.  Braxton,  retreats  to  Chatta¬ 
nooga,  10,  12;  defeats  Buell,  11;  to  be 
reenforced  by  troops  from  Knoxville, 
17;  in  command  at  Chattanooga;  forces 
under;  difficulties  in  the  way  of  Buck¬ 
ner’s  joining,  24;  commands  rebels  be¬ 
fore  and  during  battle  of  Chickamauga; 
deceived  by  Hazen,  25;  extracts  from 
reports  of,  25,  29,  30,  45,  54,  103,  145, 
159;  conjectures  by  as  to  movements  of 
Union  troops,  26;.  proper  line  of  retreat 
for,  28;  Rosecrans’ surmises  as  to  move¬ 
ments  of,  28,  no;  Garfield  ordered  to 
attack  in  flank  at  Lafayette;  McCook 
at  Alpine  and  Summerville,  29;  appar¬ 
ent  necessity  and  reasons  for  evacuating 
Chattanooga;  subsequent  movement  of 
forces  under,  29,  30 ;  withdraws  from 
Chattanooga,  30;  Rosecrans  ignorant 
as  to  reenforcements  of;  Rosecrans  be¬ 
lieves  in  disposition  of  to  evade  battle, 
3 1 ;  Thomas’  ignorance  as  to  movements 


246 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


of;  opportunity  offered  to  defeat  Rose- 
crans  in  detail ;  numerical  strength ; 
orders  issued  by  to  Hindman  and  Hill, 
34;  orders  Cleburne’s  division  to  join 
Hindman;  has  headquarters  near  Lee- 
and-Gordon’s  mill;  receives  dispatches 
from  Hill;  orders  Buckner  to  join  Hind¬ 
man,  35;  receives  report  of  Hindman’s 
council  of  war,  36;  reiterates  orders  to 
attack;  dispatch  sent  to  Hindman  by, 
36,  37;  his  military  ability  criticised, 
36,  39,  40,  46,  47,  63,  64,  67,  68,  95, 
96,  100,  104,  145,  160,  168;  contrasted 
with  Napoleon,  39,  100;  orders  Hill  to 
halt,  38;  review  of  measures  taken  by 
to  annihilate  Thomas,  39;  negro  team¬ 
sters  report  location  of  to  Gen.  Wood; 
prepares  to  strike  Crittenden,  40;  Rose- 
crans’  conjectures  as  to  movements  of, 
41 ;  withdraws  from  Dug  Gap;  disposi¬ 
tion  of  forces  by  thereafter,  42;  extracts 
from  Polk’s  dispatches  to,  43;  dispatches 
sent  to  Polk  by,  43,  44;  urges  Polk  to 
attack,  43,  45;  promises  to  reenforce 
Polk,  44;  learns  movements  of  Union 
troops;  visits  Polk’s  quarters,  45;  con¬ 
centrates  six  divisions  south  of  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill;  returns  to  Lafayette; 
incomprehensible  inactivity  of;  should 
have  attacked  Crittenden,  46;  medioc¬ 
rity  of  as  general;  relinquishes  attempts 
to  defeat  Rosecrans  in  detail,  47;  Hal- 
leck  learns  of  retreat  of;  Plalleck  dis¬ 
cusses  Buckner’s  junction  with;  Hal- 
leck’s  ignorance  of  movements  of,  48; 
rebel  deserters  report  Lee  as  reenforc¬ 
ing,  49;  to  be  reenforced  by  Johnston, 
49,  50;  anticipates  junction  between 
Thomas  and  McCook;  endeavors  to  out¬ 
flank  Union  left;  orders  issued  by,  54; 
aims  to  flank  Union  left,  58,  60;  move¬ 
ments  of  army  of  in  detail;  reenforced 
by  Gregg’s  and  McNair’s  brigades,  58, 
59,  n;  orders  Walker’s  corps  to  Alex¬ 
ander’s  bridge,  62;  throws  four  divisions 
over  the  Chickamauga,  63;  orders  re- 
connoissance  toward  Reed’s  bridge,  69; 
orders  Walker  to  attack  at  once,  72; 
disconcerted  by  battle  on  the  left;  dis¬ 
position  of  forces  by  detailed,  73;  orders 
Stewart  to  take  position  between  Cheat¬ 
ham  and  Hood,  74;  unexpectedly  at¬ 
tacked  on  extreme  right;  delays  order¬ 
ing  Hood  to  attack,  85;  Hill  ordered 
to  report  in  person  to,  92;  concentrates 
eight  divisions  to  fall  upon  Union  left; 
intended  to  attack  Rosecrans  on  Sept. 
19th;  alarmed  by  reports  from  Reed’s 
bridge,  94;  precipitates  battle;  describes 
battle  as  skirmishing,  95;  foiled  in  his 
combinations;  destitute  of  a  plan;  pris¬ 
oners  report  Longstreet’s  reenforcement 


of,  96;  to  what  extent  reenforced  by 
Longstreet,  97;  analogy  between  Napo¬ 
leon  at  Borodino  and;  anxious  to  fight; 
might  have  compelled  Union  army  to 
fall  back,  100;  orders  Hindman  and 
Breckinridge  to  cross  river;  logical  in¬ 
terpretation  of  order  by,  103;  why  his 
order  was  advantageous  to  Union  forces, 
103,  104;  should  have  commenced  bat¬ 
tle  at  daylight  of  Sept.  20th,  104;  re¬ 
moves  Polk  and  Hill  for  disobedience, 
104  n;  might  have  concentrated  his 
army  beyond  Union  left,  hi,  112;  or¬ 
ders  Polk  to  assault  Union  left,  145; 
sends  staff-officer  to  Polk,  urging  imme¬ 
diate  action,  145,  146;  issues  congratu¬ 
latory  order  to  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
157;  consults  Longstreet  as  to  future 
movements,  158;  denounces  Longstreet 
as  an  impracticable  dreamer,  159;  swept 
from  heights  of  Missionary  Ridge,  160; 
knew  Union  troops  were  constructing 
barricades;  his  communications  and  line 
of  retreat,  174;  commands  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  224. 

Brannan,  Brig. -Gen.  John  M.,  Thomas 
issues  orders  to  on  mistaken  informa¬ 
tion;  how  same  were  executed,  69; 
sends  to  Thomas  for  reenforcements, 
69,  70;  Croxton  asks  reenforcements 
from;  sends  reenforcements  to  Croxton, 
71 ;  sends  two  brigades  to  support  Reyn¬ 
olds;  action  ordered  by  Thomas,  82; 
takes  up  stragglers,  117;  leads  miscel¬ 
laneous  force  to  and  makes  stand  at 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  120;  detailed  state¬ 
ment  of  his  force  on  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
122,  123;  report  of,  cited,  122  n;  com¬ 
mands  forces  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  123; 
his  report  of  conference  with  Negley; 
his  criticism  of  Negley;  solicits  support 
from  Sirwell,  125;  solicits  support  from 
Negley,  125,  126;  complains  of  and 
accuses  Negley,  127;  Dick  not  men¬ 
tioned  in  report  of,  13 1;  Col.  M.  B. 
Walker  serves  on  staff  of,  132;  Hazen 
sends  9th  Indiana  to,  144,  207  n;  21st 
Ohio  entrusted  to  and  remains  with, 
1 53 ;  gives  orders  to  Vanderveer  as  to 
posting  35th  Ohio,  154;  leads  shattered 
commands  to  Horseshoe  Ridge;  honor 
of  making  stand  at  Horseshoe  Ridge 
belongs  to,  162;  his  forces  compelled 
to  fall  back,  140;  part  of  King’s  brigade 
with  him,  140,  195;  ordered  by  Thomas 
to  withdraw,  200;  Negley  places  21st 
Ohio  under,  204n;  commands  3d  Divis¬ 
ion,  14th  Corps,  Army  of  the  Cumber¬ 
land,  216. 

Brannan’s  (Gen.  J.  M.)  division,  follows 
Reynolds’,  24;  builds  rafts;  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  at  Battle  Creek,  26;  remains 


INDEX. 


in  camp  near  Trenton,  27;  posted  at 
Bailey’s  Cross-roads;  reconnoitres  about 
Davis’  Cross-roads,  50;  position  of  in 
respect  of  Reynolds;  one  brigade  ad¬ 
vances  to  Chickamauga  Creek,  53;  to 
move  toward  Kelley’s  farm,  65 ;  follows 
Baird’s,  66;  its  position  in  Thomas’  line 
of  formation,  66,  67;  drives  rebel  cav¬ 
alry,  71 ;  repulses  Ector’s  brigade,  71, 
72;  Vanderveer’s  and  Connel’s  divisions 
attached  to;  connects  with  Baird’s;  sup¬ 
ports  King;  King’s  brigade  driven  back 
upon,  72;  withdraws  to  Kelley’s  farm, 
76;  Thomas  orders  brigades  from  to 
support  Reynolds;  forces  rebels  to  with¬ 
draw,  79;  detachment  of  ignored  by 
Hazen;  Thomas  orders  to  support  Reyn¬ 
olds,  82;  Hazen  reenforced  by  two  bri¬ 
gades  of,  83;  reaches  Kelley’s  farm; 
separated  from  main  command,  94;  on 
extreme  Union  left;  rebel  divisions  op¬ 
posing,  95;  bivouacs  toward  Missionary 
Ridge,  99;  forms  on  Reynold’s  right, 
100, 10 1 ;  Vanderveer  commands  reserve 
brigade  of;  reserve  of  moves  to  left,  107; 
Wood’s  to  right  of,  no;  Capt.  Kellogg 
reports  to  Rosecrans  as  out  of  line; 
Wood  describes  position  of,  1 1 2 ;  be¬ 
tween  Wood  and  Reynolds,  112,  1 1 3 ; 
Stewart’s  faces  part  of,  1 1 5 ;  its  right 
forced  to  bend  to  rear;  forces  Brown’s 
back  in  confusion,  116;  Sam.  Beatty’s 
brigade  lying  near;  forced  back;  holds 
rebels  in  check;  moves  to  rear;  carries 
with  it  half  of  King’s  brigade,  1 1 7 ; 
crowded  by  rebels,  118;  Wood  leads 
Harker’s  brigade  toward,  12 1;  Vander¬ 
veer’s  brigade  attached  to,  123;  Battery 
I  attached  to,  123,  124;  Gen.  B.  R. 
Johnson  orders  assault  on  right  of;  Sir- 
well  detaches  regiment  to  support,  126; 
Negley  would  have  remained  on  ridge 
to  support,  if  ordered,  127;  Thomas 
wants  Davis  and  Sheridan  to  support; 
Dick  and  Beatty  move  close  to,  130; 
portion  of  Dick’s  brigade  goes  to  sup¬ 
port  of,  13 1 ;  driven  by  Kershaw;  joined 
bv  straggling  commands;  occupies  mid¬ 
dle  of  Horseshoe  Ridge,  133;  Thomas 
orders  Steedman  to  support,  137;  re¬ 
ceives  fresh  ammunition,  144,  202,  21 1; 
attached  to  14th  Corps;  near  Johnson’s 
on  Union  left,  172;  character  of  assault 
upon,  185;  two  brigades  of  on  Reyn¬ 
olds’  right,  188,  192;  Steedman’s  ordered 
to  right  of,  198;  furious  conflict  in  front 
of,  201;  Steedman  moves  to  right  of; 
Steedman  furnishes  ammunition  to,  202; 
21st  Ohio  withdraws  from,  2040;  Steed¬ 
man  comes  to  rescue  of  his  position, 
209;  hour  of  withdrawal  by;  Steedman’s 
withdrawal  disastrous  to,  212;  roster 


247 

of,  216;  casualties  in,  234;  strength  and 
losses  of,  239. 

Brantly,  Col.  W.  F.,  29th  Mississippi,  227. 

Breckinridge,  Maj.-Gen.  John  C.,  forms 
his  division,  how,  104;  orders  Stovall 
and  Adams  to  attack;  cooperates  with 
Hill;  decides  to  move  to  rear  of  Union 
left,  107;  withdraws  Adams’  and  Stov¬ 
all’s  brigades,  108;  criticism  on  skill  of, 
109 ;  his  line  of  attack  weaker  than 
Longstreet’s,  1 1 6 ;  claims  to  have  cai*- 
ried  left  wing  of  Union  works,  156; 
why  his  assault  failed,  174;  commands 
division,  Army  of  Tennessee,  225. 

Breckinridge’s  (Maj.-Gen.  J.  C.)  division, 
Stovall’s  brigade  attached  to,  26,  149; 
within  supporting  distance  of  Hill,  32; 
occupies  Catlett’s  Gap,  53  n;  attached 
to  Hill’s  corps;  remains  at  gaps  of  Pig¬ 
eon  Mt. ,  59;  at  Glass’  mill,  63 ;  oppo¬ 
site  Negley;  PI  elm’s  brigade  attached 
to,  91;  to  occupy  Hindman’s  position, 
92;  fresh  for  action  on  Sept.  20th,  97; 
ordered  to  cross  river;  takes  position  in 
Cleburne’s  rear;  forms  part  of  rebel 
right,  103;  forms  on  Cleburne’s  right; 
Polk  orders  early  attack  by;  Plill  delays 
movement  of,  104;  formed  in  straight 
line  with  Cleburne’s;  advances;  Cle¬ 
burne’s  line  becomes  confused  with; 
Walker’s  corps  to  form  in  rear  of,  105; 
sustains  heavy  losses,  109;  attacks  rear 
of  Union  left,  124;  to  attack  extreme 
Union  left;  Cheatham  fills  space  be¬ 
tween  Cleburne  and,  146;  roster  of,  225, 
226;  strength  and  losses  of,  240. 

Breedlove,  Col.  E.  B.,  45th  Alabama,  225. 

Brent,  Geo.  W.,  signs  dispatch  to  Hind¬ 
man,  37;  signs  Bragg’s  order  as  assist¬ 
ant  adjutant-general,  55. 

Bridgeport,  Ala.,  railroad  crosses  Tennes¬ 
see  River  at,  21;  part  of  Sheridan’s 
division  to  remain  at,  24;  Sheridan  con¬ 
structs  trestles  for  bridge  at;  Baird’s 
division  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at,  26; 
Crittenden  to  advance  by,  27;  under 
what  circumstances  a  necessary  base  of 
supplies;  railway  communications  be¬ 
tween  Chattanooga  and,  58;  Steedman 
makes  forced  march  from,  201. 

Bridges,  Capt.  Lyman,  Illinois  Light  Bat¬ 
tery,  216. 

Bridges’  (Capt.  L.)  battery,  losses  by,  91; 
on  Beatty’s  right;  section  of  captured 
by  rebels,  105;  how  posted  by  Negley; 
supports  Marshall  and  Schultz,  124; 
attached  to  Negley’s  division,  124,  216; 

Brigadier-general,  the  rank  abolished  in 
European  continental  armies,  182. 

Brigham,  Lieut. -Col.  Joseph  II.,  sent  to 
destroy  bridge,  69;  com.  G9th  Ohio,  222. 

British  army,  saved  by  Cen.  Bosquet  from 


248 


CHICK  AM  AU  G  A. 


destruction  at  Inkerman,  1 1 5 ;  to  what 
extent  armed  with  rifle  during  Crimean 
war,  175. 

Broomstown  Valley,  Ga.,  Winston’s  Gap 
leads  into,  27;  part  of  Davis’  division 
descends  into,  28;  why  Union  troops 
descend  into,  51. 

Brotherton’s  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  57. 

Brown,  Brig. -Gen.  J.  C.,  of  Stewart’s 
division;  unconsciously  rebukes  Palmer; 
extract  from  report  of,  78;  commands 
Brown’s  brigade,  229. 

Brown’s  ( Brig. -Gen.  J.  C.)  brigade,  posted 
on  Clayton’s  left,  75;  of  Stewart’s  divis¬ 
ion,  75,  78,  87,  229;  ordered  by  Stew¬ 
art  to  attack,  76,  78;  forces  Grose  and 
Cruft  to  retreat,  76;  regiments  compos¬ 
ing,  78;  Bate’s  to  form  on  left  of,  79; 
forms  Stewart’s  left;  in  front  of  Clay¬ 
ton;  barricades  thrown  up  before,  1 1 5 ; 
falls  back  in  confusion,  1 16;  routed  by 
Turchin  and  Cruft,  187. 

Brown,  Maj.  Samuel  C.,  65th  Ohio,  220. 

Brownlow,  Lt.-Col.  Jas.  P.,  lstTenn.,223 

Bruce,  Col.  S.  D.,  com.  1st  Brigade,  3d 
Division,  Reserve  Corps,  222. 

Bruce’s  (Col.  S.  D. )  brigade,  roster  of,  222. 

Bryan,  Brig. -Gen.  Goode,  com.  Bryan’s 
brigade,  228. 

Bryan’s  (Brig-Gen.  Goode)  brigade,  of 
McLaw’s  division,  228. 

Buckner,  Col.  Allen,  79th  Illinois,  218. 

Buckner,  Maj. -Gen.  Simon  Bolivar,  occu¬ 
pying  East  Tennessee;  anticipates  en¬ 
gagement  with  Burnside;  difficulties  in 
way  of,  in  joining  Bragg,  24;  Bragg 
expects  Crittenden  to  attack  in  flank; 
Bragg  orders  retreat  by;  disposition  of 
troops  by,  26;  reported  falling  back  on 
Chattanooga,  27;  moves  toward  Neg- 
ley’s  left,  32;  ordered  to  join  Plindman, 
35;  Hindman  has  consultation  with; 
manoeuvres  around  Pigeon  Mountain 
by;  ordered  to  intercept  Union  retreat, 
37;  Hill  expects  him  to  attack  Union 
forces;  has  personal  interview  with  Hill, 
38;  vacillating  orders  given  to,  45;  Hal- 
leck  discusses  Bragg’s  junction  with; 
Halleck’s  ignorance  of  movements  of, 
48;  directed  by  Longstreet  to  order 
Preston  to  advance,  141 ;  Preston  leaves 
Trigg’s  brigade  with,  142;  com.  Buck¬ 
ner’s  corps,  229. 

Buckner’s  (Maj. -Gen.  S.  B.)  corps,  com¬ 
posed  of  eight  brigades;  moves  toward 
Negley’s  left,  32;  joins  Hindman  near 
Davis’  Cross  -  roads,  36  ;  manoeuvres 
around  Pigeon  Mountain  by,  37;  to 
reenforce  Polk,  43,  44;  on  the  way  to 
concentrate  with  Polk,  46;  on  the  way 
to  Chattanooga,  48;  to  cross  the  Chicka- 
mauga  at  Bedford’s  Ford,  54;  of  what 


divisions  composed,  58, 103;  moves  from 
Lafayette;  bivouacs  near  Rock-Spring 
church,  58,  59;  order  of  advance  of; 
follows  Walker’s  corps,  62;  should  have 
crossed  behind  Walker,  64;  crosses  the 
river,  67;  Preston’s  division  attached  to, 
68,  1 1 6,  212 n;  opposite  Union  centre 
and  right,  73;  Hood  calls  for  reenforce¬ 
ments  from,  86;  two  divisions  of  with 
Longstreet,  173;  roster  of,  229. 

Buell,  Gen.  Don  Carlos,  advocate  of  the 
“  guarding-potato-patches  policy,”  10; 
defeated  by  Bragg,  II;  court-martials 
commanders  for  drawing  subsistence 
from  rebels,  12;  disastrous  character  of 
his  campaign;  succeeded  by  Rosecrans, 
163. 

Buell,  Col.  Geo.  P.,  leads  force  to  join 
Brannan,  123;  com.  1st  Brig.,  1st  Div., 
21st  Corps,  219. 

Buell’s  ((Jol.  G.  P.)  brigade,  attached  to 
Wood’s  div’n,  89,  1 1 6,  121,  123;  forms 
in  rear  of  Carlin’s;  swept  away  by  re¬ 
treating  troops;  supported  by  Carlin, 
89;  routed  by  Hood,  1 1 6,  12 1;  Brannan 
joined  by,  123;  roster  of,  219;  casual¬ 
ties  in,  236. 

Bullock,  Col.  R.,  7th  Florida,  230. 

Bull  Run,  Chickamauga  compared  to  first 
battle  of,  157. 

Burke,  Col.  Jos.  W.,  10th  Ohio,  215. 

Burnham,  Lieut.  Howard  M.,  5th  U.-S. 
Artillery,  Battery  H,  215. 

Burnside,  Gen.  Ambrose  Everett,  in  com¬ 
mand  in  East  Tennessee;  independent 
of  Grant  and  Rosecrans,  14;  led  force 
of  20,000  into  East  Tennessee,  16;  re¬ 
ception  at  Knoxville;  should  have  coop¬ 
erated  with  Rosecrans;  criticised,  16, 
17;  failed  to  cooperate  with  Rosecrans, 
16;  ignorant  of  rebel  strength  and 
movements;  dependent  on  Rosecrans; 
deficient  in  talent;  jointly  responsible 
with  Halleck  for  sufferings  of  Army  of 
Cumberland,  17;  about  to  enter  East 
Tennessee;  expectation  that  Buckner 
would  have  to  meet,  24;  in  front  of 
Buckner,  26;  regarded  by  Bragg  as  a 
menace  to  his  right,  29;  scattering  his 
forces  through  East  Tennessee;  receives 
surrender  of  2000  rebels  at  Cumberland 
Gap ;  Halleck  hypothetically  advises 
union  between  Rosecrans  and;  Halleck 
anxious  to  hear  from;  about  to  cross 
Cumberland  Mountains;  reports  that  he 
holds  all  E.  Tennessee,  48;  instructed  to 
connect  with  Rosecrans,  48,  49;  Long¬ 
street  suggests  plan  for  destroying  army 
of,  159;  failure  of  Longstreet’s  attempt 
“to  destroy,”  160. 

Burton,  Lieut.  Thomas,  com.  1st  Illinois 
Light  Artillery,  Battery  M,  221. 


INDEX. 


249 


Bush,  Sergt.  Daniel,  of  101st  Indiana; 
orderly  to  Reynolds;  dies,  195. 

Butler,  Maj.  L. ,  19th  Louisiana,  226. 

Butler,  Lt.-Col.  W.  R.,  18th  Tenn.,  229. 

Butterfield,  Maj.  Benjamin  F.,  17th  Ohio, 
collects  stragglers,  122. 

Buzzard’s  Roost,  Ga.,  a  strong  position 
for  Bragg,  28. 

Byron’s  Ford,  Ga.,  location  of,  56;  Walk¬ 
er’s  corps  crosses  river  at,  62. 

C 

Caldwell,  Col.  J.  W.,  9th  Kentucky,  106, 
225;  severely  wounded,  106. 

Calloway,  Maj. 'James  E.,  81st  Ind.,  218. 

Calvert’s  (Tenn.)  battery,  225. 

Campbell,  Col.  Archibald  P.,  com.  1st 
Brigade,  1st  Division  of  Cavalry  of  Re¬ 
serve  Corps,  223. 

Campbell’s  (Col.  A.  P. )  brigade,  roster  of, 
223;  casualties  in,  238. 

Campbell,  Maj.  Calvin  D.,  6th  Ind.,  218. 

Campbell,  Col.  James  A.,  27th  Miss.,  227. 

Camp  Nelson,  Ky.,  Burnside  organizes 
force  at,  16. 

Capers,  Lt.-Col.  E.,  24th  S.  Carolina,  226. 

Caperton’s  Ferry,  Ala.,  Davis  builds  pon¬ 
toons  at;  Davis’,  Negley’s,  and  lohn- 
son’s  divisions  to  cross  the  Tennessee 
at,  26;  reconnoitring  cavalry  to  cross 
Tennessee  River  at,  27. 

Carey,  Col.  Oliver  H.  P.,  36th  Ind.,  220. 

Carlin,  Brig.-Gen.  Wm.  P.,  com.  2d  Bri¬ 
gade,  1st  Division,  20th  Corps,  218. 

Carlin’s  (Brig.-Gen.  Wm.  P.)  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Davis’  division;  on  VanCleve’s 
right,  85;  assailed  by  Trigg;  falls  back, 
87;  Buell’s  brigade  forms  in  rear  of; 
hard  pressed  by  Trigg  and  Robertson; 
Barnes’  brigade  forms  on  right  of;  Buell 
supported  by  portion  of,  89;  roster  of, 
218;  casualties  in,  235. 

Carlton,  Col.  Caleb  H.,  89th  Ohio,  155, 
217,  221;  asks  for  ammunition;  ordered 
to  “fix  bayonets,”  155,  203,  204,  208; 
extract  from  letter  of,  155,  203;  Gran¬ 
ger’s  order  results  in  capture  of,  204; 
a  classmate  of  Gen.  Kelly ;  compli¬ 
mented  by  Kelly  after  capture,  205;  has 
horse  killed  under  him,  206;  orders 
21st  Ohio  to  his  right,  207. 

Carnes,  Capt.W.  W.,  com.  Carnes’ (Tenn.) 
battery,  225. 

Carnes’  (Capt.  W.  W.,  Tenn)  battery,  capt¬ 
ured  from  Wright’s  brigade,  74,  225. 

Carroll,  Col.  Wm.  B.,  10th  Indiana,  216. 

Carter,  Col.  J.  C.,  38th  Tennessee  and 
Murray’s  Battalion,  224. 

Case,  Col.  Henry,  129th  Illinois,  222. 

Casualties  in  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
return  of,  233  et  seq. 

17 


Caswell,  Maj.  T.  D.,  4th  Georgia,  229. 

Catlett’s  Gap,  Ga.,  Buckner’s  corps  moves 
from;  Negley  reconnoitres  toward,  32; 
Hindman  halts  near,  35;  Hindman  or¬ 
ders  retreat  through,  37,  39;  Reynolds’ 
division  concentrates  on  road  leading  to, 
50;  reconnoissance  around,  52,  53;  Tur- 
chin’s  brigade  remains  at,  53;  Hill  and 
Breckinridge  occupy,  53 n;  held  by  Tur- 
chin,  185. 

Cavalry  divisions  (of  Army  of  the  Cum¬ 
berland),  number  of;  by  whom  com¬ 
manded,  13;  disposition  of  Mitchell’s 
force  of;  movements  of  Col.  Minty’s 
brigade  of;  Buckner’s  occupying  East 
Tennessee,  24;  three  brigades  of  to  re¬ 
connoitre  toward  Alpine  and  Rome; 
McCook  pushes  advance  of,  27;  Mc¬ 
Cook’s  to  move  toward  Resaca,  31 ; 
rebel,  capture  of  a  few,  32;  rebel,  Scrib¬ 
ner  and  Beatty  to  protect  trains  against; 
rebel,  Harrison  encounters,  33;  rebel, 
gaps  obstructed  by,  35;  rebel,  attacks 
Union  rear  near  Dug  Gap,  38;  rebel, 
1st  Kentucky  surprised  by,  40;  rebel, 
driven  out  of  Ringgold;  pursued  toward 
Tunnell  Hill;  blockade  fords  at,  but 
retreat  from,  Pea-Vine  Creek,  41 ;  rebel, 
Wilder  engaged  Scott’s  and  Pegram’s; 
4th  U.-S.  reports  for  duty  to  Critten¬ 
den;  reconnoitres  in  McLamore’s  Cove, 
42;  Wheeler’s  rebel  to  attack  Wilder, 
43;  Union,  moves  toward  Athens,  to 
connect  with  Rosecrans,  48;  Crook’s 
Union  watches  gaps  of  Lookout;  Mc¬ 
Cook’s  Union  bivouacking  in  Lookout 
Valley;  might  have  joined  Thomas,  52; 
Forrest’s  and  Pegram’s  cover  rebel 
movements,  54;  obstructions  to  Union 
near  Vineyard’s  farm,  61 ;  rebel,  driven 
by  Union  troops,  71;  Ector  supported 
by,  72;  numerical  superiority  of  rebel, 
97;  all  in  right  wing  under  McCook,  99; 
Willich  meets  with,  109;  operations  of 
rebel  around  Chattanooga ;  thorough 
rout  of  same,  160;  corps,  roster  of,  223; 
casualties  in,  238;  attached  to  reserve 
corps,  223;  attached  to  Army  of  Ten¬ 
nessee,  roster  of,  231;  see  also  Forrest’s 
cavalry,  Minty’s  cavalry,  Forrest’s  bri¬ 
gade,  Wheeler’s  cavalry,  Wilder’s  bri¬ 
gade. 

Chadbourne,  Lt.-Col.  Alex.  S.,  88th  Illi¬ 
nois,  219. 

Champion,  Col.  Thos.  E.,  succeeds  Whit¬ 
taker  in  command  of  brigade;  not  or¬ 
dered  to  withdraw,  208;  com.  96th  Illi¬ 
nois,  208,  221. 

Chandler,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  P.,  35th  Illi¬ 
nois,  218. 

Chapman,  Col.  Chas.  W.,  report  of  cited, 
122  n;  com.  74th  Indiana,  216. 


250 


CHICK  AMAUGA. 


Charleston,  Va.,  Halleck  believes  Lee  to 
be  detaching  troops  from,  48. 

Charlton,  Maj.  W.  W.,  2d  Georgia,  228. 

Chase,  Maj.  Seymour,  21st  Michigan,  219. 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Bragg  falls  back  up¬ 
on,  10,  12;  an  objective  point,  12,  15, 
51,  95>  J58;  the  gate  °f  Georgia,  15, 
23;  to  be  used  as  a  basis  of  operation 
against  Atlanta;  reenforcements  neces¬ 
sary  when  captured,  15;  Rosecrans  is 
directed  to  attack;  should  have  been 
attacked  by  Rosecrans  and  Burnside 
jointly,  16;  retreat  of  rebels  from  Knox¬ 
ville  toward,  17;  efforts  to  make  rebels 
evacuate,  18;  army  had  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  below,  22,  23;  character  of 
country  surrounding;  how  successfully 
assailable;  advantages  and  disadvan¬ 
tages  of  as  a  strategic  point;  more  easily 
defended  by  Union  than  by  rebel  forces; 
the  necessity  for  making  demonstration 
above,  23;  strength  of  rebel  forces  at; 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  Buckner  join¬ 
ing  Bragg  at,  24;  Hazen’s  manoeuvres 
around;  reconnoitring  opposite  to,  25; 
Crittenden  to  advance  on;  Buckner  re¬ 
ported  falling  back  upon,  27;  evacuated 
by  rebels,  28,  30;  Wagner’s  brigade 
about  to  occupy;  Union  forces  within 
forty-two  miles  of,  28;  why  Bragg  evac¬ 
uated,  29,  30;  tactics  necessary  to  com¬ 
pel  evacuation  of;  campaign  for  posses¬ 
sion  of  virtually  over;  rebels  hold  road 
leading  south  from;  occupied  by  Union 
forces ;  McCook  and  Thomas  might 
have  marched  from,  30;  should  have 
been  fortified,  31;  Crittenden’s  advance 
from  reported  to  Hindman,  36,  37 ; 
occupied  by  Crittenden’s  corps;  Wood’s 
division  remains  in;  Wagner’s  brigade 
left  at,  40;  4th  U. -S.  cavalry  advances 
from,  42;  Polk  believes  Crittenden  re¬ 
enforced  from,  43;  Crittenden  retires 
toward;  Wood  slowly  to  retreat  upon; 
disposition  of  brigades  around,  46;  Hal¬ 
leck  learns  of  evacuation  of;  Buckner’s 
corps  on  the  way  to,  48;  Thomas  and 
McCook  should  have  been  withdrawn 
to;  position  of  troops  in  reference  to, 
5 1 ;  Bragg  seeks  to  cut  off  Rosecrans 
from,  54;  how  best  defended;  topogra¬ 
phy  of  country  around,  58;  Bragg  might 
have  barred  Union  retreat  to,  63;  am¬ 
munition  and  supply-trains  sent  toward, 
65;  Union  troops  block  access  to,  96; 
how  best  to  cover  approaches  to,  98; 
Union  position  as  regards  roads  leading 
to,  98,  ioo;  difficult  for  Union  troops 
to  go  to;  Bragg  fails  to  capture,  100; 
Rosecrans  fears  Bragg  may  be  moving 
toward,  no;  Rosecrans’  headquarters 
connected  by  telegraph  with,  1 19;  Union 


skulkers  hurry  toward,  120;  Rosecrans 
contemplates  sending  Garfield  to,  128, 
169;  Rosecrans  to  superintend  defence 
of  in  person,  128, 165, 169;  Dick  directed 
to  march  to,  13 1;  of  interest  to  soldiers 
to  know  how  to  reach,  152;  Union  forces 
withdraw  to,  156,  157;  McCook’s  corps 
placed  across  the  valley  of;  bloody  char¬ 
acter  of  campaign  for  possession  of,  157; 
not  retaken  by  the  rebels  after  Chicka- 
mauga;  Longstreet  suggests  crossing  the 
river  above,  158;  of  paramount  import¬ 
ance  to  Union  army,  98, 158;  Longstreet 
suggests  plan  to  force  evacuation  of, 
158,  159;  Bragg  encamps  on  heights 
around;  Bragg’s  strength  there;  Bragg 
fails  to  force  abandonment  of;  Union 
reenforcements  moving  toward,  160;. 
Bragg  might  have  prevented  capture  of, 
168;  possibility  of  Bragg’s  retaking, 
168,  174;  positions  between  Chicka- 
mauga  and,  faulty;  three  roads  of  re¬ 
treat  to,  1 7 1 ;  road  on  Union  left  open 
to  rebels,  1 71,  172;  Union  ammunition- 
train  safely  reaches,  193;  Palmer  dates 
report  from,  196;  Thomas  dates  report 
from,  198;  unorganized  Union  forces 
sent  to;  Rosecrans  to  examine  ground 
at,  199;  Steedman  dates  report  from, 
201,  211. 

Chattanooga  Creek,  location  of,  22. 

Chattanooga  road,  reconnoissance  along 
by  Grose’s  brigade,  73;  fighting  in  the 
woods  east  of,  89;  VanCleve  driven  west 
of,  91 ;  Negley  occupies  east  side  of,  99; 
King’s  brigade  faces,  100;  Stovall  stops 
at;  Adams  crosses,  107;  B.  R.  Johnson 
advances  through  woods  west  of,  118; 
Dick’s  brigade  marches  along,  132; 
Reynolds’  force  stands  east  of,  140; 
Walker’s  corps  to  take  possession  of, 
146,  147;  Liddell’s  div’n  assumes  posi¬ 
tion  across,  147,  148;  Turchin  moves 
his  brigade  along,  147;  Turchin  drives 
rebels  to  right  of,  148. 

Chattanooga  Valley,  situation  of;  how 
formed  and  drained,  22;  Crittenden  to 
cover,  46,  50. 

Chattanooga-and- Atlanta  Railroad,  passes 
through  Taylor’s  Ridge,  22;  Rosecrans 
believes  Bragg  retreating  by,  28;  forms 
Bragg’s  line  of  communication,  174. 

Chattanooga- and -Lafayette  road,  rebel 
line  covers,  43;  Thomas  to  march  to, 
65;  Reynolds  remains  near,  to  organize 
reserve,  75. 

Chattanooga-and- Ringgold  road,  Union 
reserve  corps  posted  on,  137. 

Chattanooga -Valley  road,  supply -trains 
sent  by,  65. 

Cheatham,  Maj. -Gen.  Benj.  F.,  Plindman 
wants  cooperation  of  in  crushing  Crit- 


INDEX. 


251 


tenden,  36;  takes  position  near  Dr. 
Anderson’s,  43;  Hindman  on  right  of, 
43,  45;  com.  Cheatham’s  div’n,  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  224. 

Cheatham’s  (Maj.-Gen.  B.  F.)  division,  to 
take  position  at  Rock  Spring,  42;  dis¬ 
position  of;  Strahl  commands  brigade 
in;  Strahl  tries  to  draw  enemy  to  attack, 
45;  includes  five  brigades;  attached  to 
Polk’s  corps;  bivouacs  at  Anderson’s, 
59;  bivouacs  near  Dalton’s  Ford,  62, 
63;  should  have  crossed  behind  Walker, 
64;  crosses  at  Dalton’s  Ford;  in  Buck¬ 
ner’s  rear,  67;  sent  against  Union  left, 
73;  suffers  severely;  loses  artillery;  ad¬ 
vances  to  relieve  Walker’s  corps;  Stew¬ 
art  posted  between  Hood  and,  74;  needs 
support;  supported  by  Stewart,  74,  75; 
Johnson  drives  skirmishers  of;  Johnson 
halts  in  front  of,  76;  on  extreme  rebel 
right;  Hill  reaches  rear  of,  92;  Cleburne 
passes  through;  supports  Cleburne,  92; 
Preston  Smith’s  brigade  attached  to,  93; 
by  what  Union  divisions  opposed,  95; 
forms  part  of  rebel  right  wing,  103; 
ordered  to  participate  in  attack;  Walker 
to  support;  finds  Stewart  in  his  front; 
placed  in  the  reserve,  105;  heavy  losses 
by;  does  not  participate  in  assault  on 
left,  109;  comparative  freshness  of;  how 
Longstreet  might  have  used,  142;  be¬ 
tween  Cleburne  and  Breckinridge;  Jack- 
son’s  and  Maney’s  brigades  attached  to, 
146;  with  Longstreet  on  the  left,  173; 
roster  of,  224,  225;  strength  and  losses 
of,  240. 

Chicago  “Board -of- Trade”  Battery,  see 
Illinois  regiments. 

Chickahominy  swamps,  ill-suited  to  mili¬ 
tary  manoeuvres,  13. 

Chickamauga,  Ga. ,  Thomas  desires  to  re¬ 
connoitre  ground  toward,  69. 

Chickamauga,  Battle  of,  why  public  has 
not  appreciated,  18;  why  author  quali¬ 
fied  to  write  history  of,  19;  Bragg  com¬ 
mands  rebels  at,  25 ;  enumeration  of 
farms  conspicuous  in,  57;  Greeley’s  gar¬ 
bled  account  of,  84;  salient  features  of, 
sketched,  95;  gallant  action  of  Steed- 
man’s  division  at,  1 1 5 ;  Negley  com¬ 
mended  for  conduct  at,  127;  shameful 
occurrence  of,  155;  rebels  claim  victory 
at,  156,  157;  preposterous  character  of 
such  claim  shown,  156  et  seq. ;  Bragg 
and  Jeff.  Davis  issue  congratulatory  ad¬ 
dresses  upon  results  of,  157;  the  ruin 
of  the  rebel  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
158,  160;  its  results  contrasted  with 
other  great  battles,  158;  a  drawn  battle 
or  negative  victory;  of  more  ultimate 
advantage  to  Union  forces  than  to 
rebels,  160;  general  review  of,  161  et 


seq. ;  heroism  of  Army  of  the  Cumber¬ 
land  at,  162,  163;  Grant’s  failure  to 
study;  a  furnace  to  harden  Union  bra¬ 
very,  163;  Union  army  in  good  condi¬ 
tion  before;  Thomas’  distinguished  ser¬ 
vices  at,  164;  lessons  to  be  learned  from, 
167  et  seq.;  too  much  mixing  up  of 
commands  in,  172;  distinguished  ser¬ 
vices  of  Turchin’s  brigade  at.  185;  Gen. 
Reynolds’ report  on,  190-5;  Steedman’s 
report  of,  201-3;  return  of  casualties 
in,  233  et  seq , 

Chickamauga,  campaign  of,  salient  feat¬ 
ures  of,  18. 

Chickamauga,  Rock  of,  see  “  Rock  of 
Chickamauga.  ” 

Chickamauga  Creek,  Union  troops  with¬ 
draw  beyond,  33;  Lafayette-and-Chat- 
tanooga  road  crosses,  34;  retreating 
Union  troops  make  a  stand  at,  38; 
Bragg  halts  at;  Bragg  should  have  at¬ 
tacked  Thomas  at,  39;  20th  corps  to 
move  toward;  Reynolds’  division  posted 
near,  50;  skirmishing  near,  52;  14th 
corps  takes  position  on;  Brannan  ad¬ 
vances  one  brigade  to,  53 ;  see  also 
North  Chickamauga  Creek. 

Chickamauga  River,  formed  of  three 
branches;  empties  into  the  Tennessee, 
22;  Bragg  learns  Union  forces  have  re¬ 
crossed,  45;  reason  of  Union  advance 
toward,  5 1 ;  Bragg  issues  orders  to  cross, 
54;  slope  of  land  in  valley  of;  forms 
one  valley  with  Pea -Vine  Creek,  56;, 
East,  Steedman  crosses,  59;  rebels  cross 
at  Reed’s  bridge,  61,  85;  Bragg  throws 
four  divisions  across,  61;  see  also  West 
Chickamauga  River. 

Chickamauga  Valley,  fog  hangs  over  on 
morning  of  battle,  100. 

Chickamauga-Cove  road,  Reynolds’  divis¬ 
ion  moves  by,  186. 

Church,  Capt.  Josiah  W.,  1st  Michigan 
Light  Artillery,  Battery  D,  216. 

Clark,  Maj.  John  S.,  8th  Kentucky,  221. 

Clark,  Col.  W.,  39th  Alabama,  229. 

Clay,  Capt.  T.  T.,  5th  Texas,  228. 

Clayton,  Brig. -Gen.  H.  D.,  report  of, 
cited,  76,  83;  ordered  to  support  Bate, 
83;  reports  that  he  fell  back  leisurely, 
84;  com.  Clayton’s  brigade,  229. 

Clayton’s  (Brig. -Gen.  H.  D.)  brigade, 
crosses  at  Tedford’s  Ford,  62;  attached 
to  Stewart’s  division,  74,  229;  supports 
Wright,  74,  75;  Brown  and  Bate  posted 
to  left  of,  75;  attacks  Hazen;  suffers 
severely;  retires,  75,  76;  to  form  on 
Bate’s  left;  attacks  Grose  and  King, 
79;  pursues  Union  fugitives,  79,  83; 
strength  of;  losses  by,  83;  in  rear  of 
Brown’s,  1 1 5- 

Cleburne,  Maj.-Gen.  P.  R.,  ordered  to 


252 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Davis’  Cross-roads;  detained  by  sick¬ 
ness,  35;  extracts  from  report  of,  93, 
106;  orders  Wood  to  the  rear;  orders 
Polk  to  fall  back,  106;  his  line  of  at¬ 
tack  weaker  than  Longstreet’s,  1 1 6;  his 
claims  for  Polk’s  achievements,  156; 
com.  Cleburne’s  division,  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  225. 

Cleburne’s  (Maj. -Gen.  P.  R.)  division,  at¬ 
tached  to  Hill’s  corps,  26,  59,  73;  dis¬ 
tribution  of,  26;  ordered  to  join  Hind¬ 
man,  34;  ordered  by  Hill  to  Dug  Gap, 
35;  to  attack  Union  forces  in  front,  37, 
38;  marches  on  Dug  Gap,  38;  remains 
at  gaps  of  Pigeon  Mts.,  59;  stationed 
at  Anderson’s,  63;  ordered  to  extreme 
right,  73 ;  at  Anderson’s ;  ordered  to 
cross  at  Tedford’s  Ford;  advances  to 
attack ;  how  formed ;  passes  through 
Liddell’s  and  Cheatham’s ;  supported 
by  Cheatham,  92;  Jackson’s  brigade  to 
left  of;  Wood’s  and  Polk’s  brigades  at¬ 
tached  to;  makes  night-assault  on  John¬ 
son,  93;  by  what  Union  div’ns  opposed, 
95;  Hindman’s  reaches  position  in  rear 
of;  a  part  of  rebel  right  wing,  103; 
Breckinridge  forms  on  right  of;  Polk 
orders  an  early  attack  by;  Hill  delays 
movement  of,  104;  formed  in  straight 
line  with  Breckinridge’s;  Cheatham 
tries  to  form  to  left  of;  ordered  to  ad¬ 
vance;  line  of  becomes  confused  with 
Breckinridge’s,  105;  outline  of  advance 
of,  106;  advance  of,  mentioned,  107; 
sustains  heavy  losses,  109;  Stewart’s 
right  rests  near  left  of;  is  far  behind 
Bate’s  brigade,  1 1 5 ;  Cheatham  between 
Breckinridge  and;  to  attack  Union  left 
in  front;  to  be  supported  by  Jackson 
and  Maney;  Stewart  to  attack  to  the 
left  of,  146;  failure  of  night-attack  by, 
168;  roster  of,  225;  strength  and  losses 
of,  240. 

Cleveland,  Capt.  J.  S.,  5th  Texas,  228. 

Cleveland, Tenn.,  railroad  bridges  between 
Knoxville  and,  destroyed,  159. 

Cloud’s  (Col.)  farm,  location  of,  57. 

Cobb,  Capt.  Robert,  Cobb’s  (Ky.)  Bat¬ 
tery,  226. 

Cobb’s  (Capt.  R.,  Ky.)  battery,  226. 

Cobb’s  (Ga. )  Legion,  227. 

Coburn,  Col.  John,  com.  3d  Brigade,  1st 
Division,  Reserve  Corps,  221. 

Coburn’s  (Col.  J.)  brigade,  roster  of,  221. 

Cockerill,  Lieut.  Giles  J.  jr. ,  complimented 
by  Hazen,  82;  1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery, 
Battery  F,  82,  220. 

Cockerili’s  (Lt.  G.  J.  jr.)  battery,  Hazen 
tries  to  get  into  position,  81. 

Cofer,  Lt.-Col.  M.  H.,  6th  Kentucky,  225. 

Coit,  Lt.-Col.  John  T.,  com.  17th,  18th, 
24th,  and  25th  Texas,  225. 


Colman,  Col.  D.,  39th  N.  C.;  takes  com¬ 
mand  of  McNair’s  brigade,  1 19,  230. 

Coleman,  Capt.  Daniel,  attached  to  sharp¬ 
shooters  of  Wood’s  brigade,  225. 

Colins,  Maj.  S.  H.,  1st  Tennessee,  231. 

Coltart,  Col.  J.  G.,  50th  Alabama,  229, 

Colquitt,  Col.  J.  W.,  1st  Arkansas,  225. 

Colquitt,  Col.  P.  H.,  leads  Gist’s  brigade, 
106,  108,  226;  mortally  wounded,  108; 
com.  46th  Georgia,  226. 

Colquitt’s  (Col.  P.  H.)  brigade,  repulsed 
by  Baird  with  heavy  loss;  Walthall  to 
right  of;  poorly  supported  by  Wilson 
and  Ector,  108. 

Color-bearers,  rebel,  daring  of,  143. 

Commander-in-chief,  should  superintend 
execution  of  his  own  plans,  168. 

Concentration,  should  have  followed  dem¬ 
onstrations,  30;  of  rebel  troops  at  La¬ 
fayette,  33,  34;  against  Thomas  of 
rebels,  discussed,  38;  of  Union  army 
around  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  41;  of 
six  rebel  divisions  south  of  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  46;  of  Reynolds’  div’n 
between  Cooper’s  and  Catlett’s  gaps, 
50;  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
considered ;  of  rebels  around  Pigeon 
Mts.,  51;  plan  adopted  by  R.osecrans 
for,  52. 

Cone,  Capt.  Joseph  S.,  47th  Georgia,  225. 

Confederate  regiments,  1st,  23 1;  3d,  225, 
231;  5th,  225;  8th,  231 ;  10th,  232. 

Conley’s  house,  Ga.,  Hindman  halts  at,  35. 

Connell,  Col.  John  M.,  report  of,  cited, 
122;  Brannan  cites  report  of;  why  re¬ 
port  of  should  be  questioned,  125;  com¬ 
mands  force  at  McFarland’s  Gap,  129; 
com.  1st  Brigade,  3d  Division,  14th 
Corps,  216. 

Connell’s  (Col.  J.  M  )  brigade,  moves  tow¬ 
ard  Union  left,  69;  31st  Ohio  attached 
to;  part  of  ordered  to  reenforce  Crox- 
ton;  drives  rebel  cavalry,  71;  attached 
to  Brannan’s  division;  attacks  Liddell’s 
right,  72;  breaks  under  rebel  attack; 
subsequently  rallies,  1 1 7 ;  reg’ts  com¬ 
posing;  the  stragglers  from  collected; 
strength  and  losses  of,  122;  roster  of, 
216;  casualties  in,  234. 

Conrad,  Col.  Joseph,  15th  Missouri,  219. 

Conscription  system  (French),  its  adapta¬ 
bility  to  the  U.  S.,  180,  18 1. 

Cook,  Col.  Edmund  C.,  32d  Tenn.,  229. 

Cook,  Col.  E.  C.,  Brown’s  brigade,  229. 

Cook,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  R.,  2d  Tenn.,  223. 

Coolidge,  Maj.  Sidney,  com.  1st  Battal’n, 
16th  U.  S.,  215. 

Cooper,  Col.  Joseph  O.,  6th  Tenn.,  222. 

Cooper,  Col.  Wickliffe,  4th  Kentucky,  223. 

Cooper’s  Gap,  Ga.,  location  of;  to  be  occu¬ 
pied  by  advance  of  Reynolds’  division, 
26;  Negley  occupies  road  leading  to; 


INDEX. 


253 


Negley  dispatches  two  regiments  to 
occupy,  27;  Reynolds’  division  concen¬ 
trates  on  road  from;  Turchin’s  brigade 
to  seize,  50. 

Coosa  Station,  Ga.,  reenforcements  for 
Bragg  arrive  at,  59. 

Corinth,  Miss.,  siege  of  conducted  by  Iial- 
leck,  13,  14;  evacuated  by  the  rebels,  14. 

Cosgrove,  Capt.  Horatio  G.,  13th  Ohio, 
221. 

Cowan,  Tenn.,  the  railroad  branch  starts 
from,  24. 

Coup-de-main ,  qualifications  of  command¬ 
er  for,  1 68. 

Cove  road,  Hindman  drives  Sheridan  tow¬ 
ard,  1 1 7. 

Cox,  Col.  N.  N.,  10th  Tennessee,  232. 

Crab  Orchard,  Ky.,  Burnside’s  forces  con¬ 
centrate  around,  16. 

Cram,  Col.  Geo.  H.,  9th  Ky.,  123,  220. 

Crawford,  Maj.  G.  M.,  44th  Tenn.,  229. 

Crawfish  Spring,  Ga. ,  VanCleve’s  division 
at,  50;  Glenn’s  farm  near,  57;  Negley 
to  send  brigade  to,  64;  Grose  to  await 
orders  at;  Baird’s  division  near;  same 
delayed  in  reaching;  Thomas  receives 
orders  at,  65;  Reynolds  passes  beyond, 
66;  McCook’s  corps  posted  as  reserve 
at,  67;  bulk  of  Union  army  at  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill  and,  94;  Reynolds’  div’n 
halts  north  of,  186. 

Crawfish-Spring  road,  the  only  escape  for 
Thomas  and  McCook,  63;  Union  posi¬ 
tion  covers,  98;  Union  artillery  aban¬ 
doned  near,  1 18;  leads  to  McFarland’s 
Gap  and  Rossville,  119;  B.  R.  John¬ 
son’s  brigade  to  form  near;  Union  forces 
west  of,  134;  crosses  Missionary  Ridge 
through  gorge ;  Deas’  brigade  com¬ 
mands,  136. 

Crews,  Col.  C.  C.,  com.  1st  Brig.,  Whar¬ 
ton’s  Division,  Army  of  Tenn.,  231. 

Crews’  (Col.  C.  C. )  brigade,  231. 

Crimean  War,  a  few  troops  armed  with 
rifles  during,  175; -McClellan  witnesses 
operations  during;  see  McClellan. 

Crittenden,  Maj. -Gen.  Thomas  L.,  com. 
21st  Corps,  Army  of  Cumber.,  13,  219; 
advances  on  Chattanooga;  Minty’s  cav¬ 
alry  to  cover  left  of,  24;  to  dispatch 
reconnoitring  force,  24,  25;  where  Bragg 
expected  Tennessee  to  be  crossed  by; 
in  upper  part  of  Sequatchie  Valley,  26; 
orders  issued  to,  regarding  crossing  the 
Tennessee  River,  27;  directed  to  hold 
Chattanooga,  28;  ordered  to  pursue 
rebels  by  Ringgold  and  Dalton,  31;  at 
Ringgold;  twenty-five  miles  away  from 
Thomas,  34,  40;  Hindman  wants  to 
attack,  36;  Bragg  notifies  Hindman  of 
advance  by,  36,  37;  crosses  Lookout 
Mountain  to  Chattanooga;  subsequent 


movements  of,  40  et  seq.;  Bragg  prepar¬ 
ing  to  strike,  40;  orders  Wood  to  ad¬ 
vance;  ordered  to  move  to  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill;  orders  Wilder  to  protect 
his  left,  41;  4th  U.-S.  cavalry  reports 
for  duty  to;  orders  issued  by  to  division 
and  brigade  commanders,  42 ;  Bragg 
wants  Polk  to  strike  in  detail,  43;  Bragg 
has  double  the  force  of;  Bragg  should 
have  attacked;  Polk  afraid  to  attack; 
covers  Chattanooga;  'lhomas  can  not 
help,  46;  to  take  position  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  46,  50;  might  have  been  sup¬ 
ported  by  Granger,  52;  Thomas  to  con¬ 
nect  with,  65;  Bragg  might  have  fallen 
upon,  68;  orders  a  reconnoissance  on 
Chattanooga  road,  73;  orders  Palmer’s 
division  to  report  to  Thomas;  order 
approved  by  Rosecrans,  74;  at  Widow 
Glenn’s  house ;  sends  officers  to  com¬ 
municate  with  Palmer,  84;  fears  that 
Palmer  is  surrounded;  asks  leave  of 
Rosecrans  to  support  same,  85;  report 
of,  cited,  85  n;  orders  Wood  to  support 
VanCleve,  88;  his  divisions  connect 
with  Davis’  left,  101;  directed  to  relieve 
Negley’s  division  with  Wood’s,  102; 
sends  VanCleve’s  division  to  Thomas; 
report  of,  cited,  hi,  113;  receives  in¬ 
formation  and  advice  from  Wood,  113; 
Negley  informed  that  field  is  left  by, 
126;  orders  retreat  toward  Chattanooga; 
orders  opposed  by  Negley,  128,  129; 
Lt.-Col.  Loder  attached  to  staff  of,  13 1; 
Polk  not  the  man  to  attack;  why  Bragg 
failed  to  attack  at  Lee -and -Gordon’s 
mill,  168;  mention,  199;  see  also  21st 
Corps. 

Crofton,  Capt.  Rob.  E.  A.,  1st  Battalion, 
16th  U.  S.,  215. 

Crook,  Brig. -Gen.  Geo.,  com.  2d  Division, 
Cavalry  of  Reserve  Corps,  223. 

Crook’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Geo.)  division  of  cav¬ 
alry,  watch  gaps  of  Lookout,  52;  roster 
of,  223;  casualties  in,  238;  strength  and 
losses  of,  239. 

Cross,  Col.  Wm.,  3d  Tennessee,  222. 

Crow  Creek,  Davis’  division  to  advance 
by  way  of;  Negley’s  to  advance  tow¬ 
ard,  24. 

Croxton,  Col.  John  T.,  sends  to  Thomas 
and  Brannan  for  reenforcements,  71; 
sends  regiment  to  Baird,  72>  com.  10th 
Ky.,  82,  192;  leads  Reynolds’  front 
line,  82;  Reynolds’  orders  to,  192;  re¬ 
ports  to  Reynolds,  193;  commands  2d 
Brigade,  3d  Division,  14th  Corps,  216. 

Croxton’s  (Col.  J.  T.)  brigade,  on  road  to 
Reed’s  bridge;  advances  toward  Jay’s 
steam-mill,  69;  Thomas  orders  Baird’s 
division  to  support;  drives  Pegram’s 
cavalry;  overpowered  by  Wilson’s,  71; 


254 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


sent  to  rear  for  ammunition,  72;  sus¬ 
tains  heavy  loss,  7 3;  regiments  compos¬ 
ing;  becomes  divided;  strength  and 
losses  of,  122;  Reynolds  with;  King 
reenforced  by  stragglers  from,  140;  ros¬ 
ter  of,  216;  casualties  in,  234. 

Cruft,  Brig. -Gen.  Chas.,  ignorance  of  as 
to  rebel  location,  42;  to  supervise  move¬ 
ment  toward  VanCleve’s  left,  65;  com¬ 
plimented  by  Palmer,  77,  197,  198; 
Turchin  consults  with,  187;  com.  1st 
Brigade,  2d  Division,  21st  Corps,  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  220. 

Cruft’s  (Brig. -Gen.  C. )  brigade,  attached 
to  Palmer’s  division,  42,  186;  supports 
Wilder’s;  reconnoitres  through  Pea- 
Vine  Valley,  42;  to  follow  Grose’s,  65; 
in  Palmer’s  centre,  74;  Turchin  to  left 
of,  76,  186,  197;  attacked  by  Brown, 
76;  wavers  and  starts  to  run;  Palmer 
wishes  Grose  supported  by,  76,  77; 
charges  with  Turchin’s,  77,  187;  ordered 
by  Palmer  to  support  Hazen,  196;  at¬ 
tacked  by  heavy  rebel  force,  197;  retires 
with  little  loss,  200;  roster  of,  220; 
casualties  in,  236. 

Culpeper,  Capt.  J.  F.,  com.  Culpeper’s 
(S.  C. )  battery,  230. 

Culpeper’s  (Capt.  J.  F.,  S.C.)  battery,  230. 

Culver,  Col.  Joshua  B.,  13th  Mich.,  219. 

Cumberland,  see  Army  of  the 

Cumberland  Gap,  Tenn.,  2000  rebels  sur¬ 
render  to  Burnside  at,  48, 

Cumberland  Mountains,  Burnside’s  army 
crosses,  16;  location  and  description  of, 
21;  character  of  country  surrounding, 
23;  Burnside  on  the  point  of  crossing,  48 

Cumberland  River,  Gen.  Reynolds’  divis¬ 
ion  crosses,  24. 

Cupp,  Lt.-Col.  Valentine,  1st  Ohio,  223. 

Curtis,  Capt.  Wm.  Buckingham,  sent  with 
message  to  Turchin,  75;  brings  informa¬ 
tion  to  Turchin;  to  lead  part  of  third 
brigade  to  the  front,  186;  on  Turchin’s 
staff,  186,  189;  complimented  by  Tur¬ 
chin,  189. 

Cushing,  Lieut.  Harry  C.,  4th  U.-S.  Artil¬ 
lery,  Battery  H,  82,  220;  complimented 
by  Hazen,  82. 

Cushing’s  (Lieut.  H.  C.)  battery,  Hazen 
tries  to  geAnto  position,  81. 

D 

Dalton,  Ga.,  Bragg  should  have  retreated 
by,  28;  Rosecrans  believed  rebels  to 
have  retired  by;  Bragg  believes  Rose¬ 
crans  advancing  toward,  29;  cavalry  to 
cut  railway  communication  with,  31; 
Crittenden  to  pursue  rebels  by  way  of, 
31,  40;  Halleck  says  Union  cavalry  will 
hold,  38;  circumstances  under  which 


Bragg  might  have  moved  to,  51;  Bragg 
orders  rebel  teams  toward,  55. 

Dalton’s  Ford,  Ga.,  Polk  to  cross  the 
Chickamauga  at,  55;  near  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  56;  rebels  halt  near,  61 ; 
Preston’s  div’n  to  cross  at,  62;  Cheat¬ 
ham’s  division  bivouacs  near,  62,  63; 
Cheatham  crosses  at,  67. 

Daniel,  Col.  C.  P.,  5th  Georgia,  224. 

Darden’s  (Miss.)  battery,  232,  233. 

Davidson,  Brig. -Gen.  H.  B.,  com.  David¬ 
son’s  brigade,  232. 

Davidson’s  (Brig. -Gen.  H.  B.)  brigade, 
attached  to  Pegram’s  division,  232. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  colors  of  2d  Alabama 
presented  to,  143;  issues  congratulatory 
address  upon  the  results  of  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  157. 

Davis,  Brig. -Gen.  Jefferson  C.,  leads  divis¬ 
ion  toward  Stevenson,  24;  builds  pon¬ 
toons  at  Caperton’s  Ferry,  26;  sends 
two  brigades  into  Broomtown  Valley, 
28;  holds  conference  with  Wood,  89; 
posts  two  brigades  on  Sheridan’s  left 
and  rear  as  reserves,  10 1;  Negley  holds 
consultation  with ;  number  of  troops 
under  at  McFarland’s  Gap,  129;  re¬ 
quested  by  Thomas  to  support  Brannan’s 
right;  arrives  too  late,  130;  consults 
with  Reynolds,  19 1;  com.  1st  Division, 
20th  Corps,  217. 

Davis’  (Brig.-Gen.  J.  C.)  division,  to  pro¬ 
ceed  toward  Stevenson,  24;  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  by  Caperton’s  bridge;  to 
enter  Lookout  Valley  by  way  of  Sand 
Mountain;  to  concentrate  with  John¬ 
son’s  near  Valley  Head,  26;  occupies 
Winston’s  Gap,  27;  two  brigades  of 
sent  into  Broomtown  Valley,  28;  ordered 
to  support  VanCleve;  forms  on  right  of 
same;  Pleg’s  and  Carlin’s  brigades  at¬ 
tached  to,  85 ;  advances  in  echelons; 
meets  Robertson’s  brigade;  stands  its 
ground,  86;  hard-pressed  by  rebels,  87, 
88;  makes  stand  at  Vineyard’s  farm,  87; 
Barnes’  brigade  forms  to  right  of,  90; 
in  Union  right  wing;  bivouacs  west  of 
Widow  Glenn’s  house,  99;  Wood’s  to 
left  of;  occupies  line  of  barricades;  sup¬ 
ported  by  Laiboldt,  no;  is  routed  by 
Hood,  1 16;  separated  with  Sheridan’s 
from  balance  of  army,  118,  120;  Rose¬ 
crans  standing  behind,  128;  strength  of 
at  McFarland’s  Gap,  129;  moves  to 
Reynolds’  right,  19 1;  roster  of,  217, 
218;  casualties  in,  235;  strength  and 
losses  of,  239. 

Davis’  Cross-roads,  Ga.,  Hindman  and 
Hill  to  unite  at,  34,  35;  Hindman  ad¬ 
vances  toward,  35;  dilatory  movements 
of  Hindman  around;  Hindman  wants 
Hill  to  join  him  at,  36;  Bragg’s  strength 


INDEX. 


255 


not  known  by  Union  forces  at,  39;  Baird 
and  Brannan  reconnoitre  around,  50. 

Davis,  Col.  N.  N.,  ‘24th  Alabama,  229. 

Dawley,  Lieut.  Richard  L.,  2d  Minnesota 
Light  Battery,  218. 

Dawson,  Maj.  J.  W.,  com.  Dawson’s  bat¬ 
talion,  224. 

Dawson’s  (Maj.  J.  W.)  battalion,  224. 

Dawson,  Maj.  Samuel  K.,  1st  Battalion, 
19th  U.  S.,  215. 

Dawson’s  (T.  H.,  Ga. )  battery,  230. 

Deas,  Brig. -Gen.  Zac.  C.,  B.  R.  Johnson 
wants  support  from;  reports  to  Johnson 
his  consultation  with  Manigault,  139; 
com.  Deas’  brigade,  229. 

Deas’  (Brig. -Gen.  Z.  C.)  brigade,  in  Hind¬ 
man’s  front  line;  to  participate  in  at¬ 
tack,  1 15;  attached  to  Hindman’s  div’n, 
117,  134,  229;  aids  in  driving  Sheridan 
to  the  Cove  road,  1 1 7 ;  to  support  B.  R. 
Johnson;  to  form  to  left  of  Johnson’s 
brigade,  134;  sweeps  part  of  Horseshoe 
Ridge;  position  of  in  line,  136;  to  at¬ 
tack  Brannan’s  right ;  supported  by 
Johnson,  Gregg,  and  McNair,  137; 
charged  by  Whittaker,  138;  completely 
broken;  unable  to  support  B.  R.  John¬ 
son,  139;  roster  of,  229. 

Decatur,  Ala.,  rebel  cavalry  swim  Ten¬ 
nessee  River  below,  160. 

Dent,  Lieut.  S.  H.,  com.  Robertson’s 
(Ala. )  battery,  229. 

Dent’s  (Lieut.  S.  H.)  battery,  attached  to 
Hindman’s  division;  posted  in  Vidito’s 
field;  to  fire  on  Union  rear,  134;  to 
what  position  subsequently  changed, 
135;  placed  in  readiness  for  movement 
toward  Horseshoe  Ridge,  137. 

Desaix  de  Voygoux,  Gen.  Louis  Charles 
Antoine,  wins  battle  of  Marengo,  1 1 5. 

Deserters,  Halleck  cites  reports  of  rebel; 
purposely  sent  to  Halleck,  48,  49. 

Deshler,  Brig.-Gen.  Jas.,  killed,  106;  com. 
Deshler’s  brigade,  225. 

Deshler’s  (Brig.-Gen.  Jas.)  brigade,  reen¬ 
forced  by  Hill,  53  n;  forms  Cleburne’s 
left,  92,  105,  106;  participates  in  night 
attack  on  Johnson;  moves  too  far  to 
left;  Smith  moves  in  rear  of,  93;  moved 
to  right;  can  not  connect  with  Polk’s, 
106;  attached  to  Cleburne’s  div’n,  225.. 

Deval,  Lieut. -Col.  Hiram  F.,  36th  Ohio, 
189,  217. 

Deweese,  Lt.-Col.  John  T.,  4th  Ind..  223. 

Diary,  extracts  from  Lt.  Richmond’s,  45. 

Dibrell,  Col.  G.  G.,  Forrest’s  brigade,  232. 

Dibrell’s  (Col.  G.  G. )  brigade,  sent  to  re¬ 
enforce  Forrest,  71. 

Dick,  Col.  Geo.  F.,  report  of,  cited,  108, 
130 n;  discrepancies  between  his  report 
and  those  of  other  officers,  130,  13 1 ; 
rallies  his  brigade;  ordered  to  Chatta¬ 


nooga;  reports  to  VanCleve  at  Ross- 
ville,  1 3 1 ;  com.  2d  Brigade,  3d  Divis¬ 
ion,  21st  Corps,  221. 

Dick’s  (Col.  Geo.  F. )  brigade,  ordered  to 
reconnoitre  on  Lafayette  road,  42;  forms 
on  King’s  right,  85;  engages  Gregg,  86; 
driven  by  Gregg  and  McNair;  Beatty 
to  left  of,  87;  defection  of  causes  retreat, 
88;  attached  to  VanCleve’s  division; 
supports  Stanley;  obliged  to  withdraw, 
108;  moves  close  to  Brannan’s  lines; 
forms  in  rear  of  Vanderveer;  moves  to 
Stanley’s  support,  130;  Stanley’s  line 
retreats  over;  gives  rebels  galling  fire; 
falls  back  in  disorder,  130,  13 1 ;  rallied 
by  Dick  and  Aldrich;  goes  to  support 
Wood  and  Brannan;  again  falls  back; 
goes  into  camp,  13 1;  roster  of,  221; 
casualties  in,  237. 

Dick,  Maj.  Jacob  C.,  86th  Indiana,  221. 

Dickerson,  Lt.-Col.  Christopher  J.,  10th 
Michigan,  222. 

Dilworth,  Col.  Caleb  J.,  85th  Illinois,  222. 

Dilworth,  Col.  W.  S.,  com.  1st  and  3d 
Florida,  226. 

Disparity  between  Union  and  rebel  forces, 
actual  and  conjectural,  97. 

Divisions,  should  consist  of  16,000  men, 
182. 

Division -commanders,  should  sometimes 
exercise  discretion;  have  often  averted 
defeat,  114,  1 1 5 ;  Union,  lack  real  as¬ 
sistants,  169. 

Division-flags,  desirable,  183. 

Doan,  Lt.-Col.  Thos.,  101st  Ind.,  195, 217. 

Dod,  Capt.  Albert  B.,  com.  1st  Battalion, 
15th  U.  S.,  215. 

Dodge,  Col.  Joseph  B.,  com.  2d  Brigade, 
2d  Division,  20th  Corps,  218. 

Dodge’s  (Col.  J.  B.)  brigade,  forms  John¬ 
son’s  reserve,  73;  attached  to  Johnson’s 
division;  engages  Wright’s  brigade,  74; 
roster  of,  218;  casualties  in,  235. 

Donelson,  Capt.  - ,  strays  into  Union 

lines  and  killed,  93. 

Donnell,  Col.  D.  M.,  16th  Tennessee,  224. 

Doolittle,  Col.  Chas.  C.,  18th  Michigan; 
com.  3d  Brigade,  2d  Division,  Reserve 
Corps,  222. 

Doolittle’s  (Col.  Chas.  C.)  brigade,  22d 
Michigan  attached  to,  138;  roster,  222. 

Douglas,  Capt.  J.  P.,  com.  Douglas’ (Tex.) 
battery,  225. 

Douglas’  (Capt.  J.  P.,  Tex.)  battery,  225. 

Drafting  system,  unjust,  181. 

Drake,  Lieut.  Lewis,  adjt.  of  22d  Michi¬ 
gan;  dispatched  to  Granger  for  ammu¬ 
nition  ;  fired  on  from  both  sides  on 
returning,  155,  204. 

Dry- Valley  road,  Ga.,  leads  from  Ross- 
ville  to,  57- 

DuBose,  Col.  D.  M.,  15th  Georgia,  228. 


256 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Dubroca,  Capt.  E.  M.,  com.  13th  and  20th 
Louisiana,  226. 

Ducat,  Col.  Arthur  Chas.,  inspector-gen. 
of  the  army;  Negley  holds  consultation 
with,  129. 

Dufficy,  Maj.  John  P.,  35th  Indiana,  221. 

Dug  Gap,  Ga.,  Negley  moves  in  direction 
of,  32;  outline  of  engagement  at,  33; 
Wood  communicates  with  Hindman 
from;  Hindman  wants  Hill  to  move 
through,  36;  dispatch  sent  to  Hindman 
from,  37;  Cleburne  and  Walker  advance 
toward;  Hill  describes  engagement  at, 
38;  Bragg  withdraws  from,  42. 

Dunlap,  Tenn.,  Palmer’s  division  to  ad¬ 
vance  toward,  24. 

Dunlap,  Col.  Henry  C.,  3d  Kentucky,  220. 

Dunn,  Lt.-Col.  David  M.,  29th  Ind.,  218. 

Dunstan,  Col.  Daniel,  105th  Illinois,  222. 

Dyer’s  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  575  Walk¬ 
er’s  division  should  have  moved  toward, 
63;  desirability  for  Union  reserves  at, 
171- 

Dyer’s  field,  Ga.,  Preston  to  support  Ker¬ 
shaw  at,  142. 

Dyer’s  house,- Ga.,  Negley  between  Wid. 
Glenn’s  and,  99;  B.  R.  Johnson’s  divis¬ 
ion  advances  by,  118;  Gregg  captures 
Union  artillery  near,  119;  Wood  sees 
rebels  advancing  through  field  north  of, 
12 1 ;  rebels  push  west  beyond;  Law  and 
Robertson  cross  field  north  of,  133. 

E 

Eaton,  Maj.  Willard  G.,  13th  Mich.,  219. 

Echelon,  Palmer  advances  in,  74,/  196; 
Davis  advances  in,  86;  King’s  brigade 
put  in,  100,  106;  Turchin’s  brigade 
posted  in,  106;  Reynolds’  division  in, 
112,  192. 

Ector,  Brig. -Gen.  M.  D.,  com.  Ector’s 
brigade,  226. 

Ector’s  (Brig. -Gen.  M.  D.)  brigade,  or¬ 
dered  to  right  and  rear  of  Wilson;  en¬ 
counters  Brannan’s  force,  71;  attached 
to  Walker’s  division,  71,  226;  reenforces 
Forrest,  71;  repulsed  by  Brannan,  71, 
72;  sustains  severe  losses,  73;  led  by 
Gist;  to  support  Colquitt,  107,  108;  un¬ 
able  to  support  Colquitt;  ordered  to 
attack  Union  left,  108. 

Eldridge,  Maj.J.W.,  com.  artillery,  Stew¬ 
art’s  division,  230. 

Ely,  Capt.  John  G. ,  5th  Mich.  Batt’y,  222. 

Ely,  Lt.-Col.  John  H.,  10th  Wis.,  215. 

Emancipation  proclamation,  a  blow  to  the 
rebellion,  11. 

Embree,  Lieut. -Col.  James  T.,  58th  Indi¬ 
ana,  123,  219. 

Erdelmeyer,  Lt.-Col.  Francis,  32d  Indi¬ 
ana,  218. 


Erwin,  Maj.  Samuel  C.,  Gth  Ohio,  220. 

Escort,  at  headquarters :  of  14th  Corps, 
215;  of  2<  th  Corps,  217;  casualties  in, 
236;  of  21st  Corps,  219;  of  Reserve 
Corps,  221;  of  Cheatham's  div’n,  224. 

Espy,  Capt.  Harvey  J.,  6Sth  Indiana,  195, 
217;  wounded,  195. 

Estep,  Capt.  George,  8th  Indiana  Light 
Battery,  220. 

Estep’s  (Capt.  Geo.)  battery,  forces  rebels 
to  fall  back,  89. 

Estes,  Col.  W.  N.,  3d  Confederate,  231. 

Eufaula  (Ala.)  battery,  23O; 

Everett,  Lieut.  W.  S.,  9th  Georgia  Artil¬ 
lery  Battalion,  Battery  E,  230. 

Everett’s  (Lieut.  W.  S. )  battery,  opens  fire 
on  Union  train,  119;  how  posted  by 
Johnson,  135. 

F 

Farms,  around  Chickamauga  and  Mission¬ 
ary  Ridge;  play  conspicuous  part  in  bat- 

'  tie,  57;  see  also  Brotherton’s,  Cloud’s, 
Dyer’s,  Glenn’s,  Kelley’s,  McDaniel’s, 
Poe’s,  Snodgrass’,  Vidito’s,  Vineyard’s. 

Fatigue-caps,  inferior  to  hats,  183. 

Fayetteville,  Tenn.,  Mitchell’s  cavalry  to 
advance  by,  24. 

Fearing,  Col.  Benjamin  D.,  92d  Ohio,  189, 
217;  wounded,  189. 

Featherston,  Col.  L.,  com.  5th  and  13th 
Arkansas,  227. 

Ferguson’s  (S.  C. )  battery,  226. 

Ferrell’s  (Ga. )  battery,  231. 

Ferry,  Capt.  F.  P.,  17th  Tenn.;  wounded; 
places  Trigg’s  command  on  B.  R.  John¬ 
son’s  right,  2 10. 

Fessenden,  Lieut.  Joshua  A.,  5th  U.-S. 
Artillery,  Battery  H,  215. 

Fickling’s  (S.  C. )  battery,  of  Longstreet’s 
corps,  228. 

Feild,  Col.  H.  R.,  com.  1st  and  27th  Ten¬ 
nessee,  224. 

Finley,  Col.  J.  J.,  6th  Florida,  230. 

Fisher,  Capt.  Jos.,  74th  Ohio,  216. 

Flansburg,  Lt.  David,  4th  Indiana  Light 
Battery,  215. 

Florida  regiments,  1st,  226,  230;  3d,  226; 
4th,  226;  6th,  230;  7th,  colors  of  21st 
Ohio  captured  by,  154,  230. 

Flynt,  Lt.-Col.  G.  E.,  chief  of  Reynolds’ 
staff,  195. 

Floyd,  Capt.  J.  F.,  101st  Ohio;  aide-de- 
camp  to  Reynolds,  195. 

Floyd,  Lt.-Col.  Watt  W. ,  17th  Tennes¬ 
see,  229. 

Forrest,  Maj. -Gen.  Nathan  Bedford,  joins 
B.  R.  Johnson,  60;  asks  and  receives 
reenforcements  from  Polk;  orders  Ector 
to  Wilson’s  right,  71;  claims  to  have 
terminated  battle  of  Chickamauga,  156; 


INDEX.  257 


report  of,  cited,  15611;  com.  Forrest’s 
corps,  232. 

Forrest’s  (Maj.-Gen.  N.  B.)  brigade,  biv¬ 
ouacs  behind  Hood’s  line,  61 ;  recon¬ 
noitres  toward  Reed’s  bridge,  69;  nearly 
capture  Reynolds,  152;  attached  to 
Armstrong’s  division,  232. 

Forrest’s  (Maj.-Gen.  N.  B. )  corps,  covers 
rebel  movements,  54;  roster  of,  232. 

Forrest’s  (Tenn. )  regiment,  231. 

Fort  Elliott,  Texas,  Col.  Carlton  writes 
letter  from,  203. 

Fort  Malakoff,  attack  on,  mentioned,  108. 

Fourteenth  Corps,  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas, 
comm’d’g,  13,  185;  a  part  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland;  composed  of  four 
divisions,  12;  concentrated  around  Win¬ 
chester,  Tenn.,  13;  divisions  of;  forms 
the  centre;  advance  on  Chattanooga  by, 
24;  disposition  of  in  crossing  the  Ten¬ 
nessee,  26;  in  neighborhood  of  Trenton 
and  Valley  Head;  operations  of  around 
Lookout  Mountain,  27;  climbs  over 
Lookout,  30;  ordered  to  move  to  Lafay¬ 
ette;  time  spent  by  in  crossing  Sand 
Mountain,  31 ;  Hill  describes  position 
of,  38;  Bragg’s  opportunity  to  destroy; 
review  of  Bragg’s  efforts  to  annihilate, 
39;  to  join  20th,  41;  at  Steven’s  Gap, 
46 ;  should  have  been  withdrawn  to 
Chattanooga,  5 1 ;  movement  possible  by; 
McCook’s  cavalry  might  have  joined, 
52;  moves  down  Chickamauga  Creek; 
20th  corps  takes  positions  vacated  by, 
53;  its  only  road  of  escape,  63;  to  pass 
beyond  Crittenden  toward  Kelley’s,  64; 
divisions  of,  how  posted  around  Kelley’s 
farm;  Negley’s  division  attached  to,  99; 
character  of  ground  occupied  by,  101; 
criticism  on  ax'rangement  of  as  Union 
left,  101,  102,  103;  Reynolds  near  field 
hospital  of,  152,  194;  occupies  Rossville 
Gap  and  adjacent  heights,  157;  Baird’s, 
Brannarr’s,  Negley’s,  and  Reynolds’  di¬ 
visions  attached  to,  172;  divisions  of 
mixed  with  other  corps,  172,  173;  Mc¬ 
Cook  might  have  been  placed  between 
Crittenden  and,  173;  roster  of,  215-7; 
casualties  in,  233-5;  see  also  Thomas’ 
Corps. 

Fowler,  Capt.  W.  H.,  Swett’s  battery; 
loses  gun,  149;  com.  Fowler’s  (Ala.) 
battery,  227. 

Fowler’s  (Capt.  W.  H.,  Ala. )  battery,  227. 

Foy,  Lt.-Col.  Jas.  C.,  23d  Kentucky,  220. 

Frambes,  Lieut. -Col.  Granville  A.,  59th 
Ohio,  221. 

Franz  Joseph,  forced  to  sue  for  peace 
through  battle  of  Sadowa,  158. 

Frayser,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  D.,  com.  15th  and 
37th  Tennessee,  229. 

Freeman’s  (Tenn.)  battery,  232. 


Frederick  the  Great,  military  tactics  at 
time  of,  169,  170. 

Fremont,  Maj.-Gen.  John  Charles,  under 
a  cloud,  14. 

French,  Maj.  J.  M.,  63d  Virginia,  230. 

French  troops,  attack  on  Fort  Malakoff 
by,  mentioned,  109;  captured  at  Sedan 
and  isolated  at  Metz,  158;  a  few  armed 
with  rifle  during  the  Crimean  war,  175. 

Fulkerson,  Lt.-Col.  A.,  63d  Tennessee; 
severely  wounded,  143,  230. 

Fullerton,  Maj.  J.  S.,  assistant  adjutant- 
general  to  Steedman,  203. 

Fulton,  Col.  J.  S.,  com.  Johnson’s  brigade, 
87,  229. 

Funkhouser,  Col.  John  J.,  98th  Ill.,  217. 

G 

Gaillard,  Lieut. -Col.  F.,  leads  2d  South 
Carolina,  138,  227. 

Gardner,  Capt.  George  Q.,  5th  Wisconsin 
Light  Battery,  218. 

Garfield,  Brig. -Gen.  Jas.  Abram,  communi¬ 
cates  orders  to  Thomas  from  Rosecrans, 
29 ;  signs  orders  from  Rosecrans  to 
McCook,  ill;  Rosecrans  contemplates 
assigning  to  defence  of  Chattanooga; 
professes  inability  for  task,  128,  169; 
sent  by  Rosecrans  to  Rossville;  to  en¬ 
deavor  to  communicate  with  Thomas, 
128;  succeeds  in  reaching  Thomas;  wit¬ 
nesses  assault  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  144; 
chief  of  Rosecrans’  staff;  brings  infor¬ 
mation  to  Thomas,  199;  accompanies 
Thomas  to  Rossville;  signs  report,  200. 

Garrity,  Capt.  J.,  com.  Garrity’s  (Ala.) 
battery,  228. 

Garrity’s  (Capt.  J.,  Ala.)  battery,  228. 

Gary,  Lieut.  Marco  B.,  1st  Ohio  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  C,  216. 

Gaw,  Capt.  W.  B.,  chief  topographer,  102; 
on  Thomas’  staff,  102,  199;  carries  or¬ 
ders  to  Beatty,  102;  carries  orders  to 
Negley,  102,  124;  Negley’s  construction 
of  orders  from,  124;  sent  for  ammuni¬ 
tion,  199. 

Geodetical  surveys,  U.S.  should  make,  167 

George,  Col.  James,  2d  Minnesota,  216. 

Georgia,  Chattanooga  the  gate  of,  15,  23; 
Halleck  will  instruct  Rosecrans  whether 
to  advance  farther  into,  48,  49. 

Georgia  regiments,  1st,  224,  226,  232;  2d, 
224,  228,  231;  3d,  227,  231;  4th,  83, 
229;  5th,  224;  6th,  surprises  1st  Ivy., 
40,  232;  7th,  228;  8th,  226,  228;  9th, 
228;  10th,  228;  11th,  228;  15th,  228; 

16th,  227;  17th,  228;  18th,  227;  20th, 

228;  24th,  227;  25th,  226;  29th,  226; 

30th,  226;  37th,  engaged  with  Hazen, 

82,  83,  229;  46th,  226;  47th,  225;  50th, 
228;  51st,  228;  53d,  228;  59th,  2285 


258 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


65th,  230;  2d  Cavalry,  Company  G  of 
detailed  as  escort,  224;  9th  Artillery 
Battalion,  Battery  E,  230. 

Gettysburg,  battle  of,  its  importance,  9; 
Army  of  Virginia  ruined  by,  1 60. 

Gibson,  Maj.  J.  H.,  18th  Alabama,  225. 

Gibson,  Col.  R.  L.,  13th  and  20th  Louisi¬ 
ana,  226;  com.  Adams’  brigade,  226. 

Gilbert,  Col.  Henry  C.,  19th  Mich.,  221. 

Gilbert’s  (Judge)  house,  Palmer  and  Van 
Cleve  move  by  way  of,  41. 

Gilmer,  Lt.-Col.  Daniel  Id.,  38th  Ill.,  218. 

Gillespie,  Col.  D.  A.,  com.  6th  and  7th 
Arkansas,  227. 

Gist,  Col.  Jos.  F.,  15th  S.  Carolina,  227. 

Gist,  Brig. -Gen.  S.  R. ,  com.  brigade,  59, 
226;  should  have  commanded  Walker’s 
division,  7m;  leads  Wilson’s  and  Ector’s 
brigades,  106,  107,  108;  com.  Walker’s 
division,  reserve  corps,  226. 

Gist’s  (Brig. -Gen.  S.  R. )  brigade,  detached 
to  Rome,  59,  7111;  participates  in  bat¬ 
tle,  59 n;  attached  to  Walker’s  corp,  97, 
226;  fresh  for  action  on  Sept.  20,  97; 
convoys  ammunition-train  from  Ring- 
gold;  joins  Walker;  forms  part  of  rebel 
right,  103;  Walthall’s  brigade,  to  sup¬ 
port,  107;  led  by  Col.  Colquitt;  ordered 
to  advance,  106,  108;  to  be  supported 
by  Wilson’s  and  Ector’s  brigades,  106, 
107,  108;  details  of  attack  by,  108. 

Gist’s  (Brig. -Gen.  S.  R.)  division  (form¬ 
erly  Walker’s),  posted  to  Liddell’s  left, 
146;  to  cooperate  in  latter’s  attack,  146, 
150;  might  have  annihilated  Baird,  had 
plan  succeeded,  150;  see  also  Walker’s 
division. 

Given,  Col.  Josiah,  74th  Ohio,  216. 

Given,  Col.  Wm.,  102d  Ohio,  222. 

Glass’  mill,  Ga.,  Breckinridge’s  division 
at,  63;  Helm’s  brigade  makes  demon¬ 
stration  at,  91. 

Gleason,  Col.  Newell,  87th  Indiana,  216. 

Glenn,  Lt.-Col.  W.  H.,  89th  Ohio,  204; 
describes  capture  of  three  regiments, 
204,  205 ;  inferences  from  his  letter, 
205 ;  his  statements  contrasted  with 
Gen.  Smith’s,  209. 

Glenn’s  Ford,  Ga.,  Barnes’  brigade  sta¬ 
tioned  at;  Grose’s  brigade  transferred 
to,  53;  VanCleve  stationed  at,  64. 

Glenn’s  (Wid.)  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  57. 

Glenn’s  (Widow)  house,  Ga.,  Thomas  to 
march  on  cross-road  by,  65;  Wilder 
occupies  heights  east  of,  66;  Rosecrans 
makes  headquarters  at;  Crittenden  near, 
84;  Negley  moves  beyond,  91;  Union 
right  rests  at;  Union  troops  cover  road 
passing  by,  98;  Negley  between  Dyer’s 
and;  Sheridan  and  Davis  bivouac  west 
of,  99;  Lytle  strongly  posted  to  rear 
of,  101;  Reynolds  moves  toward,  186; 


Reynolds  takes  position  northeast  of, 
190. 

Gober,  Col.  D.,  com.  16th  and  25th  Lou¬ 
isiana,  226. 

Goggans,  Capt.  E.  J.,  7th  S.  Carolina,  227. 

Golden,  Maj.  Elmer,  92d  Ohio;  gallant 
conduct  of,  189. 

Goldwaithe,  Lieut.  R.  W.,  com.  Semple’s 
battery,  225. 

Goode,  Col.  C.  T.,  10th  Confederate,  232. 

Goodspeed,  Capt.  Wilber  F.,  1st  Ohio 
Light  Artillery,  Battery  A,  218. 

Goodspeed’s  (Capt.  W.  F. )  battery,  at¬ 
tached  to  Willich’s  brigade;  supports 
Vanderveer,  109. 

Gooding,  Col.  Michael,  22d  Indiana,  217. 

Gordon,  Col.  G.  W.,  11th  Tennessee,  224. 

Gordon,  Maj.  J.  C.,  com.  1st  and  2d  Ga., 
224.  > 

Gordon’s  mill,  see  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill. 

Gordon’s-mill  road,  Pegram  reports  the 
enemy  moving  toward,  45. 

Govan,  Col.  D.  C.,  com.  Liddell’s  brigade, 
108,  227;  Liddell  draws  inference  from 
attack  by,  147;  com.  brigade  in  Lid¬ 
dell’s  division;  reticent  as  to  rout  by 
Turchin,  149. 

Govan’s  (Col.  D.  C. )  brigade,  moves  to 
Union  rear,  108;  driven  by  Vanderveer, 
123;  attached  to  Liddell’s  div’n;  holds, 
Liddell’s  right,  assumes  position  across 
Chattanooga  road,  147;  driven  by  Tur¬ 
chin  to  right  of  Chattanooga  road,  148. 

Gowen’s  Ford,  Ga.,  Palmer’s  division  at, 
50,  53;  Brannan’s  and  Baird’s  divisions 
extend  to,  53. 

Grace,  Col.  Wm.,  10th  Tennessee,  231. 

Grade,  Brig. -Gen.  A.  jr.,  com.  Grade's 
brigade,  230. 

Gracie’s  (A.  jr. )  brigade,  crosses  at  Dal¬ 
ton’s  Ford,  62;  attached  to  Preston’s 
division,  116,  230;  held  in  reserve,  116; 
composition  of,  142,  143;  guards  trains 
at  Chickamauga;  participates  in  attack 
on  Horseshoe  Ridge;  covers  Preston’s 
right;  supported  by  Kershaw;  moves 
through  Kershaw’s  ranks,  142;  gallant 
conduct  of,  142,  143;  severe  losses  by; 
South- Carolina  regiments  participate 
with,  143;  to  right  of  Kelley’s;  sup¬ 
ported  by  part  of  Trigg’s,  153. 

Granger,  Maj. -Gen.  Gordon,  com.  Reserve 
Corps,  Army  of  Cumberland,  52,  137, 
155,  204,  221;  arrival  at  Rossville  of 
three  brigades  under;  possible  move¬ 
ment  of  brigades  under,  52;  sends  Gen. 
Steedman  to  reconnoitre,  59 ;  Minty 
reports  reverse  to ;  orders  McCook’s 
brigade  toward  Reed’s  bridge,  61,  68; 
alarmed  by  fierceness  of  conflict;  orders 
Steedman  to  report  to  Thomas;  reports 
to  Thomas;  directed  to  support  Bran- 


INDEX. 


259 


nan,  137;  extract  from  report  of,  138; 
unable  to  send  ammunition  to  LeFavor 
and  Carlton;  orders  latter  to  hold  posi¬ 
tion  with  bayonets,  155,  204;  ordered 
by  Thomas  to  withdraw;  accompanies 
Thomas  to  Rossville,  200 ;  orders  to 
Steedman  by,  201,  202;  Col.  Carlton 
reports  to,  203;  admits  his  orders  result 
in  capture  of  LeFavor  and  Carlton,  204; 
his  adjutant-general  killed,  206. 

Granger’s  (Maj.-Gen.  G. )  corps,  Steed- 
man’s  division  attached  to,  1 15;  appears 
on  Thomas’  left,  198. 

Granger,  Brig. -Gen.  Robert  S.,  com.  3d 
Division,  Reserve  Corps,  222. 

Granger’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Rob’t  S.)  division, 
roster  of,  222. 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  Simpson,  defeated  at 
Shiloh;  in  command  on  the  Mississippi; 
independent  of  Rosecrans  and  Burnside, 
14;  strength  of  his  command  after  fall 
of  Vicksburg,  15;  Halleck  instructs,  by 
telegraph,  to  send  troops  to  Rosecrans, 
49;  criticism  on  tactics  of  in  Virginia 
campaign  suggested,  95;  never  studied 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga;  considered 
Union  army  demoralized  by  defeat  in; 
anxious  for  Sherman  to  come,  163. 

Gratz,  Maj.  Louis  A.,  6th  Kentucky,  223. 

Graves,  Maj.  R.  E.,  com.  artillery  attached 
to  Cleburne’s  division,  226. 

Gray,  Maj.  Horace,  4th  Michigan,  223. 

Gray,  Maj.  Sam.  F. ,  49th  Ohio,  218. 

Graysville  road,  Palmer’s  division  on,  43. 

Graysvilie-and-Lafayette  road,  Palmer  and 
VanCleve  pass  over,  41;  rebel  line  cov¬ 
ers,  43;  operations  by  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
command  along,  60. 

Greeley,  Horace,  charged  with  unfairness; 
“American  Conflict”  by,  cited,  84. 

Green,  Lieut.  George,  78th  Illinois,  221. 

Green,  Maj.  Wm.,  Dawson’s  brigade,  224. 

Gregg,  Brig. -Gen.  John,  shot  and  capt¬ 
ured;  recaptured  by  Robertson’s  men, 
87;  com.  Gregg’s  brigade,  231. 

Gregg’s  (Gen.  John,  Miss.)  brigade,  reen¬ 
forces  Bragg,  58,  59  n;  under  command 
of  B.  R.  Johnson,  58,  59 n,  1 1 5,  209; 
moves  toward  Leet’s  tan-yard,  60;  ad¬ 
vances  toward  Alexander’s  bridge,  60, 
61;  deploys  on  Lafayette -and -Chatta¬ 
nooga  road,  61;  regiments  attached  to, 
86,  87,  92,  135;  attacked  by  VanCleve; 
repulses  Beatty  and  Dick;  larger  than 
Johnson’s;  McNair  comes  in  middle  of; 
becomes  separated  from  Johnson’s,  86; 
drives  Dick,  87;  forms  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
right,  1 18,  134;  advances  to  right  of 
Dyer’s  house,  1 1 8;  captures  Union  artil¬ 
lery  near  Dyer’s  house,  1 1 9 ;  portion  of 
attached  to  Johnson’s  command;  the 
remainder  of  led  by  Col.  Sugg;  forms 


Longstreet’s  second  line,  1 1 5  ;  drives 
Union  force;  subsequently  forced  to  fall 
back;  supported  by  part  of  Dent’s  bat¬ 
tery,  135;  position  of  in  line  of  advance; 
occupies  spur  of  Horseshoe  Ridge;  is 
formed  on  left  of  Anderson,  136;  sup¬ 
ports  Deas’  and  Manigault’s,  137;  op¬ 
poses  Whittaker  and  Mitchell,  209;  out 
of  ammunition;  relieved  by  a  part  of 
Trigg’s,  210;  attached  to  Johnson’s 
division,  213. 

Griffin,  Lt.-Col.  Daniel  F.,  38th  Ind.,215. 

Griffith,  Lt. -Col.  J.W.,  1st  Kentucky,  231. 

Groesbeck,  Lieut.  P.  M.  H.,  10th  Wiscon¬ 
sin  Light  Battery,  222. 

Grose,  Col.  Wm.,  to  march  to  Crawfish 
Spring  and  await  orders,  64,  65;  com¬ 
municates  with  Thomas;  rejoins  his 
division,  74;  com.  Palmer's  reserve,  107; 
collects  scattered  troops;  complimented 
by  Palmer,  198;  com.  3d  Brigade,  2d 
Division,  21st  Corps,  220. 

Grose’s  (Col.  Wm.)  brigade,  transferred 
to  Glenn’s  Ford,  53;  relieves  Barnes’, 
64;  to  be  followed  by  Hazen’s  and 
Cruft’s;  controversy  as  to  relieving;  fin¬ 
ally  relieved,  65;  attached  to  Palmer’s 
division,  73,  79;  ordered  to  reconnoitre 
on  Chattanooga  road,  73;  in  Palmer’s 
right,  74;  ordered  to  the  right;  attacked 
by  Brown;  compelled  to  withdraw,  76; 
Palmer  intends  Cruft’s  to  support,  76, 
77;  withstands  attack  by  Bate  and  Clay¬ 
ton,  79;  met  by  Palmer;  placed  in  re¬ 
serve,  196;  ordered  by  Palmer  to  move 
to  right,  197;  thrown  into  confusion; 
retires  with  slight  loss,  200;  roster  of, 
220;  casualties  in,  237. 

Grosskopff,  Capt.  John  T.  E.,  20th  Ohio 
Light  Battery,  218. 

Grosvenor,  Lt.-Col.  Chas.  H.,  18th  Ohio, 
216. 

“  Guarding  -potato  -patches  policy,”  re¬ 
viewed,  10. 

Guenther,  Maj.  Geo.  A.,  24th  Ill.,  215. 

Gunsenhauser,  Capt.  John,  44th  Indiana; 
killed,  1 3 1. 

Guthrie,  Capt.  Jas.  V.,  Gen.  Adams  sur¬ 
renders  to,  108,  193;  com.  company  in 
19th  Illinois,  193. 

Guthrie,  Capt.  Presley  Neville,  19th  Illi¬ 
nois,  216. 

H 

Hadlock,  Lt.-Col.  Alva  R.,  1st  Ky.,  220. 

Hall,  Lt.-Col.  Duncan  J.,  89th  Ill.,  218. 

Hall,  Lt.-Col.  John  G.,  com,  51st  and  52d 
Tennessee,  224. 

Hall,  Lt.-Col.  B.  jr.,  2d  Alabama  Battal¬ 
ion,  143,  230;  severely  wounded,  143. 

Halleck,  Maj.-Gen.  Henry  Wager,  gradu- 


26o 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


ated  with  honor  from  West  Point;  com¬ 
piled  works  of  Gen.  Jomini;  considered 
a  military  scientist,  13;  criticised,  13  et 
seq.;  of  mediocre  ability,  13;  treated 
officers  arbitrarily;  unwisely  created  de¬ 
partments,  14;  made  Burnside  inde¬ 
pendent  of  Rosecrans,  14,  16;  treated 
Rosecrans  cavalierly,  15;  refused  to 
reenforce  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  15, 
16;  primarily  responsible  for  sufferings 
of  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  17;  con¬ 
ducted  campaign  against  Corinth;  made 
commander-in-chief,  13,  14;  why  made 
commander-in-chief,  14;  peremptorily 
orders  Rosecrans  to  advance,  15;  ex¬ 
tracts  from  dispatches  to  Rosecrans  by; 
directs  Burnside  to  unite  with  Rose¬ 
crans;  advises  Rosecrans  of  Burnside’s 
orders;  ignorant  of  rebel  movements, 
48;  criticised  for  not  supporting  Rose¬ 
crans,  48,  49;  deceived  by  pretended 
deserters;  informed  that  Longstreet  and 
Johnston  will  reenforce  Bragg;  change 
of  attitude  by  in  view  of  prospective 
defeat;  telegraphs  that  troops  be  sent 
to  Rosecrans,  49;  demonstrates  his  own 
fearfulness  and  incompetency,  50;  re¬ 
fuses  to  reenforce  Rosecrans,  58;  his 
failure  to  support  Gen.  Rosecrans  con¬ 
demned,  164. 

Hambright,  Col.  Henry  A.,  79th  Penn¬ 
sylvania,  215. 

Hammond,  Maj.  Chas.  M.,  100th  Ill.,  219. 

Hampson,  Maj.  Jas.  B.,  124th  Ohio,  220. 

Hampton  Legion,  228. 

Hanna,  Capt.  P.  B.,  72d  Indiana;  Reyn¬ 
olds’  provost-marshal;  wounded,  195. 

Hapeman,  Lt.-Col.  Douglas,  104th  Illi¬ 
nois,  216. 

Hard,  Maj.  J.  S.,  7th  South  Carolina,  227. 

Harding,  Capt.  R.  J.,  1st  Texas,  228. 

Harker,  Col.  Chas.  G.,  ordered  to  move 
on  Lee -and -Gordon’s  mill;  supported 
by  Wood;  has  heavy  skirmishing,  41; 
com.  brigade  in  Wood’s  div’n,  89,  220. 

Harker’s  (Col.  C.  G. )  brigade,  ordered  to 
move  on  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill;  sup¬ 
ported  by  Wood’s,  41;  engages  rebels 
in  front  of  Heg,  89;  attached  to  Wood’s 
division,  89,  123,  220;  opens  fire  on 
advancing  rebels;  retreats  (underWood) 
to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  12 1;  reg’ts  com¬ 
posing,  123,  220;  on  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
123;  led  by  Gen.  Wood;  attacked  by 
Kershaw  and  Humphrey,  133;  roster 
of,  220;  casualties  in,  236. 

Harmon,  Col.  Oscar  F.,  125th  Ill.,  222. 

Harper,  Col.  Robert  W.,  1st  Arkansas 
Mounted  Rifles,  230. 

Harris,  Capt.  Sam.  J.,  19th  Indiana  Light 
Battery,  194,  217;  wounded;  succeeded 
by  Lieut.  Lackey,  194. 


Harris’  (Capt.  Sam.  J.)  battery,  remains 
near  Chattanooga-and-Lafayette  road, 
75 ;  used  by  Reynolds  to  rally  stragglers, 
79;  attached  to  Reynolds’  second  bri¬ 
gade;  Turchin  wants  to  support,  187; 
position  of;  how  supported,  191;  Bat¬ 
tery  H  ordered  to  left  of,  192;  does  fine 
execution;  Lackey  succeeds  Harris  in 
command  of;  losses  by,  194. 

Harrison,  Col.  Benjamin,  directed  by  Mc¬ 
Cook  to  communicate  with  Thomas,  33; 
com.  70th  Indiana,  222. 

Harrison,  Col.  T.,  com.  2d  Brigade,  Whar¬ 
ton’s  Division,  Army  of  Tenn.,  231. 

Harrison’s  (Col.  T. )  brigade,  231. 

Harrison,  Col.  Thomas  J.,  39th  Ind.,  218. 

Harrison’s  Landing,  Tenn.,  Wilder  to  re¬ 
connoitre  from,  25. 

Hart,  Col.  John  R.,  6  th  Georgia,  232. 

Harvey,  Lt.-Col.  R.  T.,  com.  2d  and  15th 
Arkansas,  227. 

Hats,  should  be  substituted  for  fatigue- 
caps,  183. 

Havis’  (Ala.)  battery,  attached  to  reserve 
artillery,  Army  of  Tennessee,  232. 

Hawkin’s,  Maj.  A.  T.,  leads  advance  of 
rebel  sharpshooters,  38;  com.  Sharp¬ 
shooters,  225. 

Hawkins,  Col.  H.,  5th  Kentucky,  154, 
230;  captures  Union  prisoners,  154. 

Haymond,  Capt.  Henry,  com.  2d  Battal¬ 
ion,  18th  U.  S.,  215. 

Haynes,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  E.,  10th  Ohio,  223. 

Hays,  Col.  Wm.  H.,  10th  Kentucky;  com. 
2d  Brigade,  3d  Div’n,  14th  Corps,  216. 

Hazen,  Brig. -Gen.  Wm.  B.,  assumes  com¬ 
mand  in  valley  opposite  Chattanooga; 
forces  under;  ordered  to  reconnoitre 
around  Poe’s  Cross-roads;  to  make  a 
feint  to  cross  the  Tennessee;  tactics  em¬ 
ployed  by  to  deceive  rebels;  constructs 
pontoons  on  North  Chickamauga  Creek, 
25;  demonstrations  of  watched  by  Gen. 
Bragg;  occasions  activity  among  rebels, 
26;  Sam.  Beatty  wants  to  relieve;  his 
refusal,  65 ;  endeavors  to  concentrate 
artillery  and  rally  stragglers,  79,  81 ; 
describes  oblique  withdrawal  of  his  bri¬ 
gade,  80;  synopsis  of  report  by,  80,  Son; 
supports  Reynolds,  80;  extracts  from 
report  by,  81 ;  review  of  conduct  of; 
conflict  between  his  report  and  Reyn¬ 
olds’;  contrast  drawn  between  Reynolds 
and,  81,  82;  ignores  and  is  ignored  by 
Reynolds;  afterward  mentions  same,  82; 
routs  the  enemy,  81 ;  compliments  artil¬ 
lery,  82;  reports  his  centre  as  broken, 
82,  83;  criticism  on,  83,  84;  hard  pressed 
by  rebels;  losses  self-possession;  magni¬ 
fies  his  own  services;  complimented  by 
Horace  Greeley,  84;  sends  regiment  to 
Brannan,  144;  requests  relief  from  Tur- 


INDEX. 


26l 


chin,  186;  complimented  by  Palmer, 
198;  com.  2d  Brigade,  2d  Division,  21st 
Corps,  220. 

Hazen’s  (Brig. -Gen.  W.  B. )  brigade,  or¬ 
dered  to  move  toward  Lee-and-Gor- 
don’s  mill,  42;  to  follow  Grose’s,  65;  in 
left  of  Palmer’s  division,  74;  attached 
to  Palmer’s  division,  74,  186,  237;  en¬ 
gages  Wright’s  brigade,  74;  attacked 
by  Clayton;  supported  by  part  of  Tur- 
chin’s,  75;  withdrawn  for  want  of  am¬ 
munition;  relieved  by  Turchin,  76,  80, 
186,  197;  resupplied  with  ammunition; 
supports  King’s;  falls  back,  79;  Hazen 
describes  movements  of,  80,  81 ;  mus¬ 
ketry  firing  by,  81 ;  approximate  strength 
of,  83;  41st  Ohio  attached  to,  84;  well 
supplied  with  ammunition;  ordered  to 
the  ridge;  moves  at  double-quick,  144; 
ordered  to  the  front,  186,  196;  Palmer 
apprehensive  about,  197;  successfully 
resists  rebel  attack,  198;  roster  of,  220; 
casualties  in,  237. 

Heg,  Col.  Hans  C.,  killed  at  Vineyard’s 
farm,  87;  com.  3d  Brigade,  1st  Divis¬ 
ion,  20th  Corps,  218. 

Heg’s  (Col.  Hans  C. )  brigade,  attached  to 
Davis’  division;  on  VanCleve’s  right, 
85;  presses  Robertson,  87;  commanded 
by  Col.  Martin;  fugitives  from;  Harker 

•  engages  enemy  in  front  of,  89;  roster 
of,  218;  casualties  in,  235. 

Helm,  Brig. -Gen.  Benj.  H.,  killed,  106; 
com.  Helm’s  brigade,  225. 

Helm’s  (Brig.-Gen.  Benj.  H. )  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Breckinridge’s  division,  91, 
225;  makes  a  demonstration  at  Glass’ 
mill;  attacks  Beatty,  91;  forms  Breck¬ 
inridge’s  left,  104;  opposite  Baird,  105, 
106;  opens  battle;  heroic  conduct  of, 
105;  heavy  losses  by,  105,  106;  right  of 
falls  on  Beatty’s  right;  captures  section 
of  Bridges’  battery,  105 ;  withdrawn, 
106;  disaster  of,  mentioned,  10 7. 

Helmet,  a  bad  head-covering,  184. 

Heltemes,  Capt.  John  B.,  leads  18th  Ky. , 
189,  217;  captures  battery,  189. 

Henagan,  Col.  J.  W.,  8th  S.  Carolina,  227. 

Henderson,  Lt.-Col.  James  M.,  33d  Indi¬ 
ana,  221. 

Herrick,  Maj.  O.  O.,  Reynolds’  medical 
director;  captured,  195. 

Herring,  Maj.  J.  B.,  5th  Mississippi,  224. 

Hewitt,  Col.  J.  W.,  2d  Kentucky,  106, 
225;  killed,  106. 

Higgins,  Maj.  Asa,  11th  Ohio;  gallant 
conduct  of,  189. 

Higgins,  Col.  David  J. ,  24th  Ohio,  220. 

Hill,  Col.  B.  J.,  35th  Tennessee,  225. 

Hill,  Lt.-Gen.  Daniel  Harvey,  in  com¬ 
mand,  under  Bragg,  at  Chattanooga,  24; 
to  send  column  to  join  Hindman  at 


Davis’  Cross-roads,  34,  35;  stationed  at 
Lafayette;  receives  and  replies  to  orders 
from  Bragg;  considers  a  junction  with 
Hindman  impossible,  35;  informs  Hind¬ 
man  of  orders  given  Cleburne;  Hind¬ 
man  wants  cooperation  from,  36;  ex¬ 
tract  from  report  by,  on  engagement  at 
Dug  Gap,  38;  reports  Yankees  at  Cat¬ 
lett’s  Gap;  reenforces  Deshler;  occupies 
the  gap,  53  n;  his  sarcastic  criticism  on 
Bragg,  68 ;  orders  demonstration  by 
Helm  at  Glass’  mill,  91 ;  ordered  to  re¬ 
port  in  person  to  Bragg,  92 ;  delays 
movements  by  Breckinridge  and  Cle¬ 
burne;  his  reasons  therefor  stated  by 
himself;  disobeys  Bragg’s  orders,  104; 
criticism  on  military  skill  of,  104,  109; 
report  of,  cited ;  removal  by  Bragg, 
I04n;  orders  advance,  105;  orders  Gist 
to  advance,  106;  his  plan  for  out-flank¬ 
ing  the  Union  forces;  cooperates  with 
Breckinridge;  to  move  to  rear  of  Union 
left,  107;  orders  Gist  and  Liddell  to 
attack,  108;  inferior  to  Longstreet  as 
a  military  commander,  116;  forming 
rebel  troops  for  assault;  orders  Liddell 
to  occupy  Chattanooga  road,  146;  prom¬ 
ises  support  to  Liddell,  147;  com.  Hill’s 
corps,  225. 

Hill’s  (Lt.-Gen.  D.  H.)  corps,  Cleburne’s 
division  attached  to,  26,  73 ;  Negley 
confronted  by,  32;  ordered  by  Bragg  to 
halt,  38;  on  rebel  left,  54;  Wheeler’s 
cavalry  occupy  positions  vacated  by,  54; 
to  cover  rebel  left  flank;  to  attack  un¬ 
der  certain  conditions,  55;  composition 
of;  remains  at  gaps  of  Pigeon  Mts.,  59; 
ordered  to  cross  river  at  Tedford’s  Ford; 
joins  Liddell  and  Cheatham,  92;  two 
divisions  of  with  Longstreet,  173;  roster 
of,  225,  226;  strength  and  losses  of,  240. 

Hillsboro,  Tenn.,  Wood’s  div’n  advances 
from,  24. 

Hindman,  Maj. -Gen.  Thos.  C.,  reenforces 
Cleburne  and  Stovall,  26;  at  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  34;  to  be  joined  by  col¬ 
umn  at  Davis’  Cross-roads,  34,  35;  to 
move  toward  Stevens’  Gap;  Hill  to 
communicate  with  before  joining;  obeys 
orders,  35  ;  receives  fresh  news  from 
Bragg,  35,  36;  to  attack  in  rear,  joined 
by  Buckner;  his  duty  to  attack  at  once; 
holds  council  of  war;  virtually  decides 
to  disobey  orders;  orders  repeated  to, 
36;  construction  of  Bragg’s  orders  by; 
Hill  to  cooperate  with;  orders  advance; 
receives  dispatch  as  to  Union  strength; 
vacillating  conduct  of;  issues  and  re¬ 
verses  orders  to  retreat ;  attempts  to 
intercept  retreating  Union  forces,  37; 
orders  retreat  through  Catlett’s  Gap; 
informed  by  scouts,  37,  39;  Hill  sup- 


262 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


poses  attack  will  be  made  by;  imperfect 
communication  between  Hill  and;  Hill 
sends  aide  to;  Hill  waits  for,  to  get  in 
“Yankee”  rear,  38;  alarmed  by  Bragg’s 
dispatches;  unfit  for  independent  action, 
39;  responsibility  of  for  rebel  fiasco,  40; 
takes  a  position  on  Cheatham’s  right; 
Walker  on  right  of,  43,  45;  reports  at 
headquarters,  near  Rock  Spring,  45; 
report  of,  cited,  n8n;  promises  to  send 
reenforcements  to  B.  R.  Johnson,  134; 
slightly  wounded;  places  B.  R.  Johnson 
in  command,  136;  not  the  man  to  attack 
Thomas,  Negley,  and  Baird,  168;  com. 
division,  Army  of  Tennessee,  228. 

Hindman’s  (Maj.-Gen.  Thos.  C. )  division, 
ordered  to  join  Hill,  34;  moves  toward 
J  ee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  42;  disposition 
of,  45;  includes  three  brigades;  attached 
to  Polk’s  corps;  bivouacs  at  Anderson’s, 
59;  presses  toward  Lee-and-Gordon’s 
mill,  63;  Breckinridge  to  occupy  posi¬ 
tion  of,  92;  fresh  for  action  on  Sept.  20, 
97;  ordered  to  cross  river;  joins  Hood’s 
forces;  a  part  of  rebel  left  wing,  103; 
forms  to  left  of  Hood’s  column;  how 
arranged,  1 1 5 ;  drives  Sheridan  toward 
the  Cove  road ;  brigades  composing, 
1 1 7;  captures  artillery,  prisoners,  and 
ammunition,  118;  B.  R.  Johnson  reen¬ 
forced  by  a  brigade  from;  Dent’s  batt’y 
attached  to,  134;  Anderson’s  brigade 
attached  to,  135,  209;  sustains  heavy 
losses,  138;  extends  rebel  left;  entirely 
broken,  161;  withdrawal  of  two  bri¬ 
gades  of,  209;  roster  of,  228;  strength 
and  losses  of,  240. 

Hirth,  Rob’t  W. ,  color-bearer  of  2d  Ala. ; 
promoted  by  Davis  for  courage,  143. 

History,  Macauley’s  Essay  on,  cited,  18; 
true  value  of,  explained,  19,  20. 

Histories,  war,  useless  unless  founded  on 
official  records,  175. 

Hiwassee  River,  Tenn.,  Buckner  with¬ 
draws  toward;  Bragg  expects  Crittenden 
to  cross  Tennessee  above  mouth  of,  26. 

Hobart,  Lt.-Col.  Harrison  C.,  21st  Wis¬ 
consin,  215. 

Hoblitzell,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  T.,  5th  Ken¬ 
tucky,  223. 

Holman,  Col.  D.  W.,  11th  Tenn.,  232. 

Holmes,  Maj.  James  T.,  52d  Ohio,  222. 

Holt,  Lt.-Col.  J.  H.,  1st  Alabama  Battal¬ 
ion;  severely  wounded,  143,  230. 

Holtzclaw,  Col.  J.  T.,  18th  Ala.,  229. 

Honaker,  O.  F.,  private  of  Co.  F,  54th 
Virginia,  captures  colors  of  22d  Michi¬ 
gan,  154- 

Hood,  Brig. -Gen.  John  B.,  assumes  com¬ 
mand  of  B.  R.  Johnson’s  force,  60; 
Walker  should  have  joined,  63;  his 
ability  to  execute  orders;  his  line  shifted 


to  rear;  position  of  his  right  flank,  64; 
stations  pickets  near  Lafayette  road,  66; 
his  disposition  of  his  forces,  67;  com¬ 
mands  forces  facing  Palmer  and  Reyn¬ 
olds,  85;  orders  attack  by  B.  R.  John¬ 
son;  calls  on  Buckner  for  reenforce¬ 
ments,  86;  Preston  ordered  to  reenforce; 
Preston  sends  Trigg  to  the  relief  of,  87; 
commands  Hood’s  and  Me  Law’s  divis¬ 
ions,  103;  leads  Longstreet’s  column  of 
attack,  1 15;  severely  wounded,  117, 133; 
numerical  strength  of  rebel  army  under, 
160;  his  column  of  attack  strong,  174; 
com.  division,  Army  of  Tennessee,  228. 

Flood’s  (Brig. -Gen.  John  B. )  division,  bri¬ 
gades  composing,  60,  61,  69,  83,  85,  86, 
87,  89,  1 19;  opposes  Union  centre  and 
right,  7  5 ;  Stewart  is  posted  between 
Cheatham  and,  74;  faces  Palmer  and 
Reynolds,  85;  commanded  by  Law,  85, 
1 15;  presses  Davis,  87;  reenforced  by 
Trigg,  89;  by  what  Union  divisions  con¬ 
fronted,  96;  only  three  brigades  of  en¬ 
gaged  at  Chickamauga,  97;  joined  by 
Flindman  and  McLaw;  forms  part  of 
rebel  left,  103;  next  to  Stewart’s;  drives 
Union  forces  in  confusion,  1 1 6;  pursues 
Union  troops,  1 1 7,  133;  joined  by  Ker¬ 
shaw’s  and  Humphrey’s  brigades,  117; 
might  have  been  forced  back  under  what 
circumstances,  171;  a  strong  one,  174; 
routed  by  Turchin  and  Cruft,  187;  ros¬ 
ter  of,  228;  strength  and  losses  of,  240. 

Plooker,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph,  leads  reen¬ 
forcements  toward  Chattanooga,  160; 
would  have  been  brought  to  Rosecrans’ 
help,  164. 

Horseshoe  Ridge,  Ga. ,  description  of,  120; 
its  value  as  a  defensive  point,  120,  124, 
140,  170;  Harker  retreats  to  eastern  end 
of,  12 1 ;  estimate  of  Union  strength  on, 
122,  123,  124,  161;  Brannan  leads  shat¬ 
tered  commands  to,  122,  162;  its  con¬ 
figuration  favorable  to  use  of  artillery; 
Union  artillery  remaining  on,  124;  Neg¬ 
ley  unable  to  learn  operations  on,  127; 
unequal  struggle  at,  129,  161;  Beatty 
joins  Stanley’s  command  on,  132;  Union 
bravery  at,  132,  1 6 1 ;  Brannan  occupies 
middle  part  of,  133;  rebels  occupy  spurs 
of;  rebels  encounter  a  wall  of  adamant 
at,  136;  rebels  expect  to  sweep  Union 
forces  from,  137;  position  of  the  Union 
forces  relative  to,  140,  142;  regarded 
by  Longstreet  as  key  to  Union  position, 
141;  Preston  ordered  to  attack,  142; 
Garfield  witnesses  assault  on,  144;  the 
Union  troops  withdrawn  from,  153; 
Trigg’s  brigade  moves  rapidly  up,  154; 
rebel  inferences  from  Union  withdrawal 
from,  156;  comparative  strength  of  as¬ 
sailants  and  defenders  of,  161;  respec- 


INDEX. 


263 


tive  losses  at,  162;  character  of  rebel 
assault  upon,  185. 

Hotchkiss,  Col.  Chas.  Truman,  succeeds 
Gen.  Willich  as  brigade  commander; 
com.  89th  Illinois,  218. 

Hotchkiss,  Maj.  T.  R.,  com.  artillery, 
Cleburne’s  division,  225. 

Hottenstein,  Lieut. -Col.  John  A.,42d  Illi¬ 
nois,  219. 

Howard,  Capt.  C.  O.,  mustering  officer; 
aide-de-ca?np\.o  Reynolds;  wounded,  195 

Huger,  Maj.  Frank,  com.  artillery,  Long- 
street’s  corps,  228. 

Huggins,  Capt.  A.  L.,  Freeman’s  (Tenn.) 
battery,  232. 

Huguley.  Capt.  G.  W.,  1st  Alabama,  230. 

Hull,  Col.  James  S.,  37th  Indiana,  216. 

Humphrey,  Brig. -Gen.  B.  G.,  reports  in¬ 
ability  to  advance;  ordered  to  secure 
Kershaw’s  right  flank,  135;  com.  Hum¬ 
phrey’s  brigade,  227. 

Humphrey’s  (Brig. -Gen.  B.  G. )  brigade, 
attached  to  McLaw’s  division,  1 1 5,  227; 
added  to  column  led  by  Hood,  1 1 5 ; 
joins  Hood,  1 1 7 ;  joins  Kershaw,  133; 
on  Kershaw’s  right;  engages  Wood, 
134;  to  attack  to  the  front,  137. 

Humphrey,  Col.  Geo.,  88th  Indiana,  216. 

Humphreys,  Capt.  J.  T.,  1st  Arkansas 
battery,  230. 

Flunley,  Maj.  P.  F.,  18th  Alabama,  229. 

Hunt,  Lt.-Col.  Burgess  P.,  4th  Ivy.,  216. 

Hunter,  Adjt.  Alfred  C.,  82d  Indiana; 
collects  stragglers,  122. 

Hunter,  Col.  Morton  C.,  leads  82d  Indi¬ 
ana  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122;  com. 
82d  Indiana,  216. 

Hurd,  Lt.-Col.  Orrin  D.,  30th  Ind. ,  218. 

Hurlbut,  Maj. -Gen.  Stephen  A.,  informs 
Halleck  of  Bragg’s  reenforcement  by 
Johnston;  instructed  by  Halleck  to  re¬ 
enforce  Rosecrans,  49. 

Huston,  Capt.  John  M.,  5th  Ivy.,  218. 

Hutchins,  Maj.  Rue  P.,  94th  Ohio,  215. 

Hutchinson,  Lieut. -Col.  A.  S.,  com.  19th 
and  24th  Arkansas,  225. 

Huwald’s  (Tenn.)  battery,  232. 

Hylton,  Henderson,  private  in  Co.  A, 
54th  Virginia,  captures  colors  of  89th 
Ohio,  154. 

I 

Illinois  regiments:  10th,  officers  command¬ 
ing,  222;  16th,  off.  com.,  222;  19th,  at¬ 
tached  to  Stanley’s  brig.,  33,  123,  234; 
covers  Negley’s  retreat  at  Dug  Gap,  33; 
Gen.  Adams  captured  by,  108;  between 
Brannan  and  Wood,  123;  off.  com., 
216;  casualties  in,  234;  21st,  off.  com., 
218;  casualties  in,  235;  22d,  off.  com., 
219;  casualties  in,  236;  24th,  off.  com., 


215;  casualties  in,  233;  25th,  off.  com., 
218;  casualties  in,  235;  27th,  off.  com., 
219;  casualties  in,  236;  34th,  off.  com., 
218;  35th,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  36th,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  38th,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  42d,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  44th,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  51st,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  59th,  off.  com.,  217;  60th,  off.  com. 
222;  73d,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  74th,  off.  com., 217;  75th,  off.  com. 
217;  78th,  off.  com.,  22 1;  casualties  in, 
238;  79th,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  80th,  off.  com., 217;  83d,  off.  com., 
222;  84th,  off.  com.,  220;  casualties  in, 
237;  85th,  off.  com.,  222;  86th,  off.  com. 
222;  88th,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  89th,  off.  com.,  21S;  casualties  in, 
235;  92d,  to  what  brigade  attached,  53, 
217;  reconnoitres  and  skirmishes  around 
Catlett’s  Gap,  52;  retires  to  camp,  53; 
employed  to  rally  stragglers;  sent  to 
support  of  King,  79,  7911;  cooperates 
with  King’s  brigades,  83;  temporarily 
dismounted;  placed  in  reserve;  supports 
Harris’  battery;  sent  to  Col.  King,  191, 
192;  remains  with  Reynolds’  division, 
194;  off.  com.,  217;  casualties  in,  234; 
96th,  off.  com.,  221;  casualties  in,  208, 
237;  98th,  off.  com.,  217;  casualties  in, 
234;  100th,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  102d,  off.  com.,  222;  104th,  on 
Beatty’s  right;  Helm  and  Stovall  fall 
upon;  changes  front;  is  supported  by 
Bridges’  battery,  105;  off.  com.,  216; 
casualties  in,  233;  105th,  off.  com.,  222; 
110th,  off.  com.,  220;  115th,  retires  over 
89th  Ohio,  205;  off.  com.,  22 1;  casual¬ 
ties  in,  237;  123d,  off.  com.,  217;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  234;  125th,  off.  com.,  222; 
129th,  off.  com.,  222;  15th  Cavalry, 
Co.  K  of  detailed  as  escort;  off.  com., 
219;  Bridges’  Battery,  off.  com.,  216; 
casualties  "in,  233;  Chicago  “Board-of- 
Trade  Battery,  ’’off.  com. ,  223;  1st  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  C,  off.  com.,  219;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  236;  1st  Light,  Battery  M, 
off.  com.,  221;  casualties  in,  238;  2d 
Light,  Battery  H,  off.  com.,  222;  2d 
Light,  Battery  I,  off.  com.,  222. 

Infantry,  strength  of  rebels’  at  Chatta¬ 
nooga,  24;  at  Chickamauga,  240;  Gen. 
Wilder  commands  brigade  of  mounted, 
25;  see  also  Wilder’s  brigade. 

Inkerman,  Bosquet  saves  British  from  de¬ 
struction  at,  1 1 5- 

Indiana  regiments:  2d,  officer  command¬ 
ing,  223;  casualties  in,  238;  3d,  off.  com. 
223;  casualties  in,  238;  4th,  off.  com., 
223;  casualties  in,  238;  6th,  off.  com., 
218;  casualties  in,  235;  9th,  sent  to 


264 


CHICICAMAUGA. 


Brannan,  144,  20711;  of  Hazen’s  div’n, 
207,  222;  off.  com.,  220;  casualties  in, 
237;  10th,  attached  to  Croxton’s  bri¬ 
gade,  122,  215;  separated;  joins  Reyn¬ 
olds,  122;  off.  com.,  216;  casualties  in, 
234;  15th,  off.  com.,  219;  17th,  Lieut. 
Armstrong  attached  to,  195;  off.  com., 
217;  casualties  in,  234;  2‘2d,  off.  com., 
217;  29th,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  30th,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  31st,  off.  com.,  220;  casualties  in, 
236;  32d,  pursues  rebels,  109;  off.  com., 
218;  casualties  in,  235;  33d,  off.  com., 
221;  35th,  off.  com.,  221;  casualties  in, 
237;  36th,  off.  com.,  220;  casualties  in, 
237;  37th,  Sirwell  describes  movements 
of,  126;  off.  com.,  216;  casualties  in, 
234;  38th,  off.  com.,  215;  casualties  in, 
233;  39th,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  40th,  off.  coin.,  219;  42d,  on  Gen. 
Beatty’s  left;  driven  west  by  Adams, 
105;  separated  from  the  rest  of  Beatty’s 
division;  joins  Negley,  107;  off.  com., 
216;  casualties  in,  233;  44th,  joins  Gen. 
Wood;  strength  of,  124;  Lt.-Col.  Aid- 
rich  and  Capt.  Gunsenhauser  attached 
to,  13 1 ;  off.  com.,  124,  22 1;  casualties 
in,  237;  51st,  off.  com.,  219;  57th,  off. 
com.,  219;  58th,  attached  to  Buell’s  bri¬ 
gade,  123,  219;  led  by  Lt.-Col.  Embree; 
joins  Brannan,  123;  off  com.,  219;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  236;  68th,  attached  to  King’s 
brigade,  122,  195,  217;  accompanies 
Brannan  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122;  led 
by  Capt.  Espy,  195;  off.  com.,  217;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  234;  70th,  off.  com.,  222; 
72d,  Capt.  Hanna  attached  to,  195;  off. 
com.,  217;  casualties  in,  234;  73d,  off. 
com.,  220;  74th,  attached  to  Croxton’s 
brigade,  122,  216;  becomes  separated; 
joins  Reynolds,  122;  off.  com.,  216; 
casualties  in,  234;  75th,  remains  on  the 
Chattanooga -and -Lafayette  road,  75; 
attached  to  King’s  brigade,  122,  195, 
217;  stragglers  from  accompany  Bran¬ 
nan  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122;  remains 
with  Reynolds;  sent  to  Palmer;  King 
calls  for,  19 1 ;  com.  by  Col.  Robinson, 
195,  197,  217;  drives  rebels;  compli¬ 
mented  by  Palmer,  197;  off  com.,  217; 
casualties  in,  234;  79th,  off.  com.,  220; 
casualties  in,  237;  81st  Infty.,  provost- 
guard  of  20th  Corps;  off.  com.,  218; 
casualties  in,  235;  82d,  Adjt.  Hunter 
collects  stragglers  from,  122;  off.  com., 
122,  216;  casualties  in,  234;  84th,  off. 
com.,  221;  casualties  in,  237;  85th,  off. 
com.,  221;  86th,  off.  com.,  221;  casu¬ 
alties  in,  237;  87th,  supports  9th  Ohio; 
makes  extraordinary  dash,  72;  attached 
to  Vanderveer’s  brigade,  109,  216;  gal¬ 
lant  conduct  of,  109;  off  com.,  216; 


casualties  in,  234;  88th,  on  Beatty’s  left; 
driven  west  by  Adams,  105;  separated 
from  the  rest  of  Beatty’s  division;  joins 
Negley,  107;  off.  com.,  216;  casualties 
in,  233;  101st,  attached  to  King’s  bri¬ 
gade,  122,  195,  217;  accompanies  Bran¬ 
nan  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122,  195;  Lt. 
W.  P.  Bainbridge  and  Sergt.  Bush  at¬ 
tached  to,  195;  off.  com.,  195,  217;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  234;  2d  Cavalry,  of  Negley’s 
division,  108,  223;  Capt.  Johnson  at¬ 
tached  to,  198;  4th  Light  Battery,  off. 
com.,  215;  casualties  in,  233;  5th  Light 
Battery,  off.  com.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  7th  Light  Battery,  off.  com.,  22 1; 
casualties  in,  237;  8th  Light  Battery, 
off.  com.,  220;  casualties  in,  236;  10th 
Light  Battery,  off.  com.,  220;  11th  Light 
Battery,  off.  com.,  219;  casualties  in, 
236;  18th  Light  Battery,  off.  com.,  217; 
casualties  in,  234;  19th  Light  Battery, 
off  com.,  217;  casualties  in,  234;  see 
also  Harris’  battery;  21st  Light  Battery, 
off  com.,  217;  casualties  in,  235;  see 
also  Andrew’s  battery. 

Inness,  Col.  Wm.  P.,  com.  reg’t  of  Mich, 
engineers;  repairs  Nashville-and-Chat- 
tanooga  Railroad,  24. 

Inspector -general,  Lieut. -Col.  Loder  is 
Crittenden’s,  85. 

Iowa  regiment,  5th,  officer  com’d’g,  223. 

Island  Creek,  reconnoitring  cavalry  to 
cross  Tennessee  River  by  ford  near,  27. 

Italy,  Anstrians  compelled  to  give  up 
Upper,  158. 

Inge,  Lt.-Col.  R.  F.,  18th  Alabama,  229. 

J 

Jackson,  Brig. -Gen.  John  K.,  claims  cap¬ 
ture  of  artillery  and  knapsacks,  74;  re¬ 
port  of,  cited,  74  n;  com.  Jackson’s  bri¬ 
gade,  224. 

Jackson’s  (Brig. -Gen.  John  K.)  brigade, 
in  Cheatham’s  front  line;  relieved  by 
Maney,  74;  falls  back  for  want  of  am¬ 
munition,  75;  forms  on  Cleburne’s  left, 
92,  93;  attached  to  Cheatham’s  divis¬ 
ion,  146,  224;  to  support  Cleburne,  146. 

Jackson,  Miss.,  captured  by  Union  forces, 
10;  Johnston’s  men  in  neighborhood 
of,  16. 

James’  battalion,  attached  to  Kershaw’s 
brigade;  makes  a  dash  at  Stanley,  134; 
repulsed,  135. 

Jaquess,  Col.  James  F.,  73d  Illinois,  219. 

Jasper,  Tenn.,  Reynolds’  div’n  advances 
toward,  24. 

Jay’s  steam-mill,  situation  of;  rebels  ad¬ 
vance  to,  60;  Croxton  advances  toward, 
69;  Polk  in  front  of,  92. 

Jealousy  between  regular  army  and  volun- 


INDEX. 


teer  officers,  discussed;  a  remedy  for, 

177  et  seq. 

Jefress’  (Va. )  battery,  230. 

Jena,  results  of  battle  of,  158. 

Jenkins,  Brig. -Gen.  M.,  com.  Jenkins’  bri¬ 
gade,  228. 

Jenkins’  (Brig. -Gen.  M. )  brigade,  attached 
to  Hood's  division,  228. 

Johnson,  Brig. -Gen.  Bushrod  R.,  rebels 
under,  near  Jackson,  Miss.,  15;  provis¬ 
ional  division  made  for,  58,  59  n;  or¬ 
dered  to  Reed’s  bridge;  operations  by 
along  Graysville- and- Lafayette  road; 
skirmishes  with  Minty’s  cavalry;  sup¬ 
ports  Forrest;  Hood  assumes  command 
of  force  of,  60;  report  of,  cited,  86 n,  88; 
Capt.  Blackmore  aide  to,  92;  prepares 
to  make  assault;  tries  to  find  McNair’s 
brigade;  learns  of  Kershaw’s  prepara¬ 
tions;  promised  reenforcements  by  An¬ 
derson  and  Hindman;  orders  bombard¬ 
ment  of  Union  rear;  prepares  line  of 
attack;  throws  out  skirmishers,  134; 
Anderson’s  brigade  to  fill  gap  between 
Kershaw  and,  134,  135;  details  of  ad¬ 
vance  by,  135  et  seq.;  his  advance  north 
of  Vidito’s  house;  Anderson  moves  in 
support  of,  135;  an  able  commander; 
succeeds  Hindman  in  command  of  rebel 
left  wing;  his  column  joined  by  Mc¬ 
Nair’s  brigade,  136;  report  of,  cited, 
13811;  extract  from  report  of;  can  not 
obtain  support  of  Deas  and  Manigault, 

:  39;  his  assault  proves  futile,  140;  or- 
dcs  his  men  never  to  retreat,  143;  his 
ability  as  a  commander;  impartiality 
and  clearness  of  his  reports;  opposes 
Steedman,  209;  extracts  from  report  of; 
presses  Whittaker  and  Mitchell,  210; 
commands  provisional  division;  locality 
of  his  operations,  2 ion;  com.  Johnson’s 
brigade,  229;  com.  division,  Army  of 
Tennessee,  230. 

Johnson’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Bushrod  R. )  bri¬ 
gade,  holds  railroad  at  Ringgold;  moves 
toward  Reed’s  bridge;  on  extreme  rebel 
right;  Bragg’s  orders  to;  to  cross  the 
Chickamauga  at  Reed’s  bridge;  to  pro¬ 
ceed  toward  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  54; 
attached  to  Stewart’s  division,  5&n,  229; 
detached  to  Ringgold,  58  n;  moves  to 
to  Ringgold,  59;  moves  toward  Leet’s 
tan-yard,  60;  deploys  on  Lafayette-and- 
Chattanooga  road,  61 ;  commanded  by 
Col.  Fulton;  attacks  Beatty,  87;  west 
of  the  Lafayette-and-Chattanooga  road; 
Gregg’s  command  with,  92;  in  left  of 
B.  R.  Johnson’s  division,  1 1 5,  118,  134; 
advances  by  Dyer’s  house,  118;  Deas’ 
brigade  to  form  to  left  of,  134;  SUP* 
ported  by  Dent’s  and  Everett’s  bat¬ 
teries;  obliged  to  fall  back,  135;  posi¬ 

18 


265 

tion  of  in  line;  occupies  spur  of  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge,  136;  supports  Deas’  and 
Manigault’s  on  the  right,  137;  opposes 
Whittaker  and  Mitchell,  209. 

Johnson’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Bushrod  R. )  divis¬ 
ion,  Stewart  and  Preston  to  left  of,  67; 
leaves  Ringgold,  69;  provisional  divis¬ 
ion,  composed  of  three  brigades;  faces 
Palmer  and  Reynolds,  85;  Preston  to 
left  of;  VanCleve  attacks;  smaller  than 
Gregg’s  brigade;  Hood  orders  to  at¬ 
tack;  separated  from  Gregg,  86;  drives 
VanCleve,  91;  by  what  Union  divisions 
confronted,  96;  forms  part  of  rebel  left; 
placed  under  Longstreet,  103;  in  front 
of  Longstreet’s  column  of  attack;  how 
arranged;  Law’s  forces  in  rear  of,  1 1 5 ; 
presses  retreating  Union  forces,  1 1 7 ; 
advances  by  Dyer’s  house,  118;  moves 
forward  from  Dyer’s  house,  1 1 9 ;  takes 
position  on  spur  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
120;  pushes  toward  Negley’s  artillery, 
125;  occupies  Negley’s  former  position, 
126;  brigades  composing;  how  arranged 
in  line  of  attack,  134;  on  extreme  rebel 
left,  134,  137,  142,  143;  instructed  to 
attack;  forms  pivot  of  rebel  movement, 
137;  forced  to  yield  ground  gained,  143; 
roster  of,  230 ;  strength  and  losses,  240. 

Johnson’s  Crook,  Ga.,  Gens.  Negley’s  and 
Baird’s  divisions  reach,  27. 

Johnson,  Maj.  J.  M.,  30th  Miss.,  227. 

Johnson,  Lt.-Col.  Ole  C.,  15th  Wis.,  218. 

Johnson,  Brig. -Gen.  Richard  W. ,  leads 
division  toward  Bellefont,  24;  Thomas 
points  out  position  to,  93;  orders  bri¬ 
gade  commanders  to  fall  back,  94;  com. 
2d  Division,  20th  Corps,  218. 

Johnson’s  (Brig. -Gen.  R.  W.)  division,  to 
advance  toward  Bellefont,  24;  to  cross 
the  Tennessee  by  Caperton’s  bridge;  to 
enter  Lookout  Valley  by  way  of  Sand 
Mountain;  to  concentrate  with  Davis’ 
near  Valley  Head,  26;  marches  to 
Long’s  Spring,  28;  sent  to  Thomas  by 
Rosecrans ;  moves  to  Baird’s  right ; 
Palmer  and  Reynolds  to  right  of,  70; 
attached  to  McCook’s  corps,  70,  218; 
sent  to  Thomas  by  Rosecrans;  order  of 
advance  by;  advances  to  Baird’s  right; 
ordered  to  attack,  73;  Dodge’s  brigade 
attached  to;  attacked  by  Cheatham; 
Palmer  on  right  of;  compelled  to  re¬ 
cede,  74;  joined  by  Baird’s;  to  Palmer’s 
left;  moves  forward;  drives  Cheatham’s 
skirmishers;  quiet  in  front  of,  76;  Gen. 
Palmer’s  division  reaches,  84;  in  front 
of  Cleburne;  location  of  batteries  of, 
93;  Col.  Baldwin  commands  brigade  in, 
94;  on  extreme  Union  left;  rebel  divis¬ 
ions  opposing,  95;  relative  position  with 
regard  to  Baird;  posted  on  Lafayette- 


266 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


and-Chattanooga  road,  99;  no  change 
in  location  of  on  morning  of  battle,  100; 
Starkweather’s  brigade  next  to,  101; 
a  part  of  Union  left  wing;  Union  front 
runs  along  front  of,  140;  Willich’s  bri¬ 
gade  attached  to,  147,  186;  retires  with¬ 
out  confusion,  200;  roster  of,  218;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  235;  strength  and  losses,  239. 

Johnson,  Lt.-Col.  Wm,  A.,  4th  Ala.,  231. 

Johnson,  Capt.  Gilbert  M.  Lafayette,  2d 
Indiana  cavalry;  on  Gen.  Negley’s  staff; 
carries  orders  to  Granger,  198. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Albert  Sidney,  in  neigh¬ 
borhood  of  Jackson,  Miss.,  15;  com¬ 
mands  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  49;  to 
reenforce  Bragg,  49,  50. 

Johnston,  Col.  Geo.  D.,  25th  Ala.,  229. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E. ,  the  numerical 
strength  of  his  army,  160. 

Jolly,  Lieut. -Col.  - ,  43d  Alabama;  is 

severely  wounded,  143. 

Jomini,  Gen.  Henri,  works  of,  compiled 
by  Gen.  Halleck,  13. 

Jones,  Col.  Bushrod,  58th  Alabama,  229. 

Jones,  Lt.-Col.  Wm. ,  40th  Ohio,  221. 

Jones,  Col.  Wm.  G.,  36th  Ohio,  189,  195, 
217;  killed,  189,  195. 

Jones,  Maj.  Wm.  T. ,  17th  Indiana,  217. 

Jordan’s  (Va. )  battery,  attached  to  Long- 
street’s  corps,  228. 

K 

Kamerling,  Col.  Gustave,  9th  Ohio,  72, 
216. 

Kansas  regiment:  8th,  com’d’g  off.,  218; 
casualties,  235. 

Keeble,  Col.  R.  H.,  23d  Tennessee,  229. 

Keeler,  Capt.  Alonzo  M.,  22d  Mich.,  221. 

Kelley,  Col.  John  H.,  asks  to  be  relieved 
or  reenforced;  report,  cited,  153;  sum¬ 
moned  by  Gen.  Preston;  informs  Trigg 
of  Union  location;  learns  of  capture  of 
Union  forces,  154;  of  8th  Ark.  infty. ; 
com.  3d  brigade,  Preston’s  division ; 
Union  prisoners  ordered  to  report  to; 
a  classmate  of  Col.  Carlton;  compli¬ 
ments  latter,  205;  com.  Kelley’s  bri¬ 
gade,  230. 

Kelley’s  (Col.  J.  PI.)  brigade,  attached  to 
Preston’s  division,  116,  215,  230;  held 
in  reserve,  1 16;  consists  of  four  regi¬ 
ments;  forms  Preston’s  left;  in  centre 
of  rebel  attacking  line;  fights  by  side 
of  Anderson’s;  moves  through  Ker¬ 
shaw’s  ranks;  gallant  conduct  of,  142; 
serious  losses  by;  supported  by  part  of 
Anderson’s,  143;  storming  Horseshoe 
Ridge;  reenforced  by  part  of  Trigg’s; 
Gracie  to  right  of,  153;  Trigg  forms  to 
left  of;  5th  Kentucky  attached  to,  154; 
envelopes  Le  f  avor’s  command,  207. 


Kelsey,  Lt.-Col.  R.  G.,  44th  Miss.,  228. 

Kelly,  Maj.  Rob’t  M.,  4th  Kentucky,  216. 

Kelley’s  Cross-roads,  Ga.,  Turchin  ordered 
to  return  to,  186;  Turchin  is  ordered 
southeast  of,  190;  Reynolds’  division 
posted  at,  192. 

Kelley’s  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  57;  Gen. 
Thomas  to  take  a  position  near,  65;. 
Baird’s  division  reaches,  66;  Palmer 
forms  his  division  near,  74;  order  of 
Reynolds’  advance  toward,  75;  Bran- 
nan  takes  position  at,  76;  support  for 
Reynolds  ordered  from,  79;  Thomas 
takes  Baird  and  Johnson  toward,  937 
Baird’s  and  Brannan’s  divisions  reach, 
94;  Union  troops  take  position  on,  98; 
Thomas  looks  over  ground  around,  99; 
influence  of  shape  of  field  of  upon  for¬ 
mation  of  Union  line;  Baird’s  division 
posted  around  corner  of  field  on,  101; 
Beatty’s  brigade  forms  north  of  field 
on,  102. 

Kelley’s  field,  Ga. ,  rebel  skirmishers  in 
woods  west  of;  Willich’s  brigade  at 
the  northwest  corner  of,  147;  losses  of 
Baird’s  division  in  crossing,  153. 

Kelley’s  house,  Ga. ,  Thomas  to  pass  tow¬ 
ard,  64;  Adams  pushes  toward,  107. 

Kellogg,  Capt.  S.  C.,  an  aide-de-camp  to 
Gen.  Thomas,  112,  195,  198;  sent  ta 
Rosecrans  with  request  for  reenforce¬ 
ments,  1 12;  makes  mistaken  report  to 
Rosecrans;  serious  consequences  of  his 
action,  112,  169;  brevet-major;  attests 
reports,  195,  198,  203;  distributes  am¬ 
munition,  199. 

Kennedy,  Capt.  H.  A.,  19th  La.,  226. 

Kennett,  Col.  Henry  G.,  79th  Ohio,  222. 

Kentucky,  disastrous  character  of  Buell’s 
campaign  in,  163. 

Kentucky  regiments  (rebel):  1st,  com.  off, 
231;  2d,  com.  off,  106,  225;  4th,  com. 
off,  225;  5th,  captures  Union  prisoners, 
154;  com.  off,  154,230;  6th,  com.  off, 
225;  9th,  com.  off.,  225. 

Kentucky  regiments  (Union):  1st,  is  sur¬ 
prised  by  6th  Georgia  (rebel)  cavalry, 
40;  com.  off. ,  220;  casualties,  236;  2d, 
com.  off,  220;  casualties,  236;  3d,  at¬ 
tached  to  Harker’s  brigade,  123,  233; 
on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  123;  com.  off, 
219;  casualties,  236;  4th,  joins  Baird, 
72;  commanded  by  Col.  Nuckolls,  106; 
attached  to  Croxton’s  brigade;  accom¬ 
panies  Brannan  to  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
122;  com.  off,  216;  casualties,  234;  5th, 
attached  to  Berry’s  brigade;  gallant 
conduct  of,  109;  com.  off.,  218;  casual¬ 
ties,  235;  6th,  com.  off,  220;  casual¬ 
ties,  237;  8th,  com.  off,  221;  casual¬ 
ties,  237;  9th,  Wood  joined  by  portion 
of,  123;  com.  off,  123,  220;  casualties, 


INDEX. 


237;  10th,  com.  by  Croxton;  in  Reyn¬ 
old’s  front  line,  82;  accompanies  Bran- 
nan  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122;  com.  off., 
82,  192,  216;  casualties,  234;  15th,  on 
Beatty’s  right;  Helm  and  Stovall  fall 
upon;  changes  front,  and  supported  by 
Bridges’  battery,  105;  com.  off.,  216; 
casualties,  233;  17th,  serves  under  Gen. 
Wood,  123;  com.  off.,  123,  220;  casu¬ 
alties,  237;  18th,  attached  to  Turchin’s 
brig.,  70,  185,  217;  moves  to  Palmer’s 
left,  76;  ordered  to  the  front  by  Gen. 
Reynolds,  186;  in  Turchin’s  reserve, 
187,  188;  led  by  Milward  and  Heltimes; 
Capt.  Robbins  attached  to;  losses  by, 
189;  com.  off.,  189,  217;  casualties, 235; 
21st,  com.  off,  221;  23d,  com.  off,  220; 
casualties,  237;  28th,  com.  off,  222; 
2d  Cavalry,  Company  I  of,  detailed  as 
escort;  com.  off,  217;  com.  off,  223; 
casualties,  238;  4th  Cavalry,  com.  off, 
223;  5th  Cavalry,  com.  off,  223;  casu¬ 
alties,  238;  6th  Cavalry,  com.  off,  223; 
casualties,  238. 

Kershaw,  Brig. -Gen.  J.  B.,  com.  part  of 
McLaw’s  division;  joins  Hood,  103; 
succeeds  Hood  in  command,  117,  133; 
composition  of  force  led  by;  drives  the 
Union  forces;  attacks  Wood,  133;  pre¬ 
paring  to  make  assault;  aided  by  B.  R. 
Johnson  with  artillery,  134;  Anderson’s 
brigade  to  fill  gap  between  B.  R.  John¬ 
son  and;  details  of  assault  by,  134,  135; 
repulsed,  135;  his  column  not  connected 
with  Johnson’s,  137;  his  column  rushes 
to  support  of  Anderson;  drives  back 
Whittaker’s  troops,  138;  supported  by 
Preston;  supports  Gracie;  Gracie  moves 
through  ranks  of,  142;  com.  Kershaw’s 
brigade;  com.  division,  Army  of  Ten¬ 
nessee,  227. 

Kershaw’s  (Brig. -Gen.  J.  B.)  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Gen.  Longstreet’s  corps;  joins 
Hood,  1 15,  1 1 7;  attached  to  McLaw’s 
division,  117,  227;  of  what  composed; 
joined  by  Humphrey’s  brigade  and  15th 
Alabama,  133;  on  rebel  left;  of  what 
regiments  its  left  composed;  Stanley 
attacked  by  left  of,  134;  repulsed,  135; 
to  attack  to  the  front,  137;  part  of  sup¬ 
ports  Kelly;  losses  by,  143,  240 n. 

Key,  Lieut.  Thomas  J.,  com.  Calvert’s 
(Tenn. )  battery,  225. 

Kilgour,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.  M.,  75th  Illi¬ 
nois,  217. 

Kimbell,  Maj.  J.  C.,  32d  Alabama,  226. 

King,  Col.  Edward  A.,  commands  brigade 
in  Reynolds’  division,  53,  217;  ordered 
to  change  front;  supported  by  Brannan, 
72;  joins  Turchin,  122;  sends  for  75th 
Indiana,  191;  92d  Illinois  sent  to,  191, 
192;  complimented  by  Reynolds,  194; 


267 

killed,  147,  194,  195;  com.  2d  brigade, 
4th  division,  14th  corps,  217. 

King’s  (Col.  E.  A.)  brigade,  remains  at 
Pond  Spring,  53;  directed  by  Reynolds 
in  person,  75;  where  posted,  75,  76; 
supports  Palmer,  75,  76,  190,  191 ;  sep¬ 
arated  from  Turchin’s,  775  gives  way 
before  attack  by  Bate  and  Clayton;  92d 
Illinois  sent  to  support  of,  79;  attached 
to  Reynolds’ division,  79,  106,  117,  122, 
I4°>  15 I9°>  200>  2175  Reynolds  and 
Hazen  supported  by  stragglers  from,  81 ; 
composed  of  four  regiments;  cooperates 
with  Hazen’s,  83;  formed  on  Palmer’s 
right,  85;  forms  Reynolds’  right,  100; 
put  in  echelon,  100,  101,  106;  on  Baird’s 
left,  101;  posted  by  Poe’s  field,  106; 
portion  of  carried  away  by  Brannan, 
1 1 7,  140,  195;  regiments  composing, 
122,  195;  part  of  reenforced  by  strag¬ 
glers  and  reforms,  140;  moves  along 
Chattanooga  road  in  Turchin’s  rear, 
147;  led  by  Col.  Robinson,  147,  1 5 1, 
194,  200;  follows  close  upon  Turchin; 
to  hold  road  during  Union  retreat,  1 5 1, 
200;  faces  Rossville-and-Lafayetteroad, 
192;  takes  position  with  Turchin  and 
Willich,  200;  roster  of,  217;  casualties, 
_234* 

King,  Brig. -Gen.  John  H.,  com.  3d  bri¬ 
gade,  1st  division,  14th  corps,  215. 

King’s  (Brig.-Gen.  John  PI.)  brigade,  in 
front  line  of  Baird’s;  supports  Croxton, 
71;  routed  by  Liddell;  loses  its  rifled 
battery,  72;  same  retaken,  72,  73;  losses 
by,  73»  195;  roster,  215;  casualties,  233. 

King,  Capt.  — ,  a  volunteer  aide  to  Pres¬ 
ton  Smith;  strays  into  Union  lines  and 
is  killed,  93. 

Kingsbury,  Col.  Plenry  D.,  14th  Ohio,  216 

Kingston,  Tenn.,  reached  by  Burnside’s 
army,  16. 

Kitchell,  Lt.-Col.  Edward,  98th  Ill.,  217. 

Klein,  Lt.-Col.  Robert,  3d  Indiana,  223. 

Knapsacks,  rebels  capture  Union,  119. 

Knefler,  Col.  Frederick,  79th  Ind.,  220. 

Knight,  Capt.  Chester  K. ,  21st  Ill.,  218. 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  Burnside  occupies,  16; 
loyalty  of  inhabitants  of,  16,  17;  Hal- 
leck  telegraphs  Burnside  at  to  reenforce 
Rosecrans,  49;  Longstreet  suggests  fol¬ 
lowing  railroad  up  to,  159;  railroad 
bridges  destroyed  between  Cleveland 
and,  159. 

Kolb’s  battery,  attached  to  reserve  corps, 
Army  of  Tennessee,  230. 

L 

Lackey,  Lieut.  Robert  G.,  19th  Indiana 
Light  Battery,  194,  217. 

Lafayette,  Ga.,  why  Bragg  should  not 


268 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


have  retreated  by,  28;  Garfield  to  move 
toward;  why  Bragg  concentrated  his 
army  around,  29;  occupied  by  rebels, 
30;  Thomas  to  move  toward,  31;  Neg- 
ley  moves  in  direction  of,  32;  McCook 
supposes  Thomas  to  be  at,  33;  large 
rebel  force  concentrated  at,  33,  34;  Hill 
receives  orders  at,  35;  Bragg’s  head¬ 
quarters  at,  36,  37;  Hindman  ordered 
to  force  his  way  to,  37;  rebels  concen¬ 
trated  north  of,  40;  rebel  cavalry  retreat 
toward,  41;  Bragg  returns  to;  Polk  and 
Buckner  retire  upon,  46;  Rosecrans  re¬ 
ports  rebel  concentration  near,  50;  the 
rebels  fall  back  to;  rebels  make  a  stand 
at;  Union  troops  dare  not  attack;  cir¬ 
cumstances  under  which  rebels  would 
have  shifted  from,  51;  Buckner’s  divis¬ 
ion  moves  from,  58,  59. 

Lafayette  road,  Gen.  Bragg  retires  by,  41; 
Union  troops  make  reconnoissance  on, 
42;  Hood’s  pickets  near,  66;  desirable 
to  cover  intersection  of  Ringgold  road 
and,  98;  Sheridan  calls  the  Cove  road 
the,  1 17;  Sheridan  to  move  to  Thomas’ 
support  by  way  of,  129,  130. 

Lafayette-and- Chattanooga  road,  crosses 
Chickamauga  Creek,  34;  Union  posi¬ 
tion  should  have  intersected,  51;  crosses 
West -Chickamauga  River,  56;  rebels 
halt  on;  rebel  operations  along,  61; 
Blood’s  right  dank  near,  64;  Union  line 
of  formation  along;  rebel  position  east 
of,  67;  Union  fugitives  chased  beyond, 
79;  Davis’  line  east  of,  85,  86;  Union 
troops  take  position  west  of,  87,  88; 
Dick’s  brigade  driven  beyond;  Carlin 
falls  back  to  east  side  of,  87;  Union 
fugitives  along,  89;  VanCleve’s  division 
driven  beyond,  91 ;  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
brigade  to  left  of,  92;  Union  position 
diagonally  crosses,  98;  crossed  by  road 
from  Alexander’s  bridge;  14th  corps 
posted  along,  99;  left  open  to  rebels; 
Turchin’s  right  a  little  east  of,  100;  un¬ 
covered  beymd  Union  left,  104;  not 
the  only  road  to  Rossville,  152. 

LaGrange,  Col.  Oscar  H.,  1st  Wis.,  223. 

Laiboldt,  Col.  Bernard,  com.  2d  brigade, 
3d  division,  20th  corps,  219. 

Laiboldt’s  (Col.  B. )  brigade,  attached  to 
Sheridan’s  division,  90,  97,  no,  116, 
219;  aids  in  forcing  rebel  retreat,  90; 
comparatively  fresh  on  Sept.  20,  97; 
supports  Davis  on  right  and  rear,  no; 
routed  by  Hood,  116;  roster  of,  219; 
casualties  in,  236. 

Lamb,  Col.  J.  J.,  com.  4th  and  5th  Ten¬ 
nessee,  224. 

Lambert’s  Ford,  Ga.,  location  of,  56. 

Landwehr  system,  not  adapted  to  United 
States,  1 81. 


Lane,  Col.  Philander  P.,  lltli  Ohio,  152, 
189,  194,  217;  accompanies  Reynolds, 
152,  194;  gallant  conduct  of,  189. 

Langdon,  Lt.-Col.  E.  Bassett,  1st  Ohio, 
218. 

Lankford,  Lt.-Col.  A.  R. ,  38th  Ala.,  229. 

Larkin’s  (Fork,  Ala.),  Johnson’s  division 
to  advance  by  way  of,  24. 

Law,  Brig. -Gen.  E.  M.,  com.  Hood’s 
division,  85,  115,  228;  com.  Law’s  bri¬ 
gade,  228. 

Law’s  (Brig. -Gen.  E.  M.)  brigade,  halts  at 
Ringgold,  60;  attached  to  Hood’s  divis¬ 
ion,  60,  61,  83,  115,  133;  stragglers 
belonging  to  join  Bate,  83;  on  right 
and  in  rear  of  B.  R.  Johnson,  67,  115; 
in  same  line  with  Robertson’s  and  Ben- 
nings;  forms  part  of  Gen.  Longstreet’s 
column  of  attack,  1 1 5 ;  pursues  Union 
forces;  captures  battery;  15th  Alabama 
attached  to,  133;  routed  by  Turchin  and 
Cruft,  187. 

Lawrence,  Maj.  Walter  E.,  Thomas’  chief 
of  artillery;  notifies  commanders  of  dis¬ 
tribution  of  ammunition,  199. 

Lawson,  Capt.  Joseph  L.,  attached  to 
77th  Pennsylvania,  218. 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  Edmund,  com.  Army 
of  Virgin:a,  9;  Halleck  does  not  believe 
troops  are  being  detached  from,  48; 
rebel  deserters  report  Bragg  as  being 
reenforced  by;  sends  Longstreet  to  re¬ 
enforce  Bragg,  49. 

Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  Ga.,  occupied  by 
rebels,  30;  Hindman’s  divis’n  stationed 
at,  34;  Bragg’s  headquarters  at,  35; 
skirmishing  near;  army  concentrates 
around;  order  of  advance  upon;  Rose¬ 
crans  locates  Bragg  at,  41;  Hazen’s  bri¬ 
gade  ordered  toward;  Hindman  and 
Walker  move  toward;  Palmer’s  and 
VanCleve’s  divisions  bivouac  at,  42; 
Union  forces  bivouacked  opposite,  44; 
Bragg  concentrates  six  divisions  south 
of,  46;  Wood’s  brigade  at,  50;  distance 
from  Rossville  to,  52;  Barnes  reenforces 
Wood  at,  53;  Johnson’s  (Hood’s)  col¬ 
umn  to  move  toward;  Polk’s  corps  op¬ 
posite  to,  54;  Hill  to  investigate  Union 
reenforcement  at,  55;  situation  of,  56; 
many  clearings  around,  56,  57;  Vine¬ 
yard’s  farm  near,  57;  topography  of 
country  around,  58;  rebel  movement 
toward,  61 ;  Hindman’s  division  presses 
toward,  63;  Thomas  to  connect  with 
Crittenden  at,  65;  Crittenden  to  right 
of;  Walker’s  corps  halts  at,  67;  Bragg 
concentrates  forces  below,  67;  Union 
left  north  of,  68;  Wood’s  division  re¬ 
mains  at,  85,  88;  skirmishing  near,  86; 
Wood’s  division  leaves,  88;  reoccupied 
by  Lytle’s  brigade;  rebels  prevented 


INDEX. 


269 


from  crossing  at,  89;  bulk  of  the  Union 
army  at  Crawfish  Spring  and,  94;  value 
of  as  a  strategical  point,  98. 

Leech,  Capt.  J.  C.,  Reynold’s  commissary 
of  subsistence,  195. 

Leet’s  tan-yard,  Ga.,  Wilder  advances  in 
direction  of;  engages  Pegram’s  cavalry 
at,  42;  Bragg’s  headquarters  at;  Bragg 
issues  circular  order  from,  54;  B.  R. 
Johnson’s  brigade  moves  toward,  60. 

LeFavor,  Col.  Heber,  brigades  his  own 
regiment  and  89th  Ohio,  153,  203;  or¬ 
dered  to  hold  position  by  the  bayonet, 
155,  204,  208;  sends  Drake  for  ammu¬ 
nition,  155,  204;  com.  22d  Michigan, 
203,  221,  222;  Granger’s  orders  result 
in  capture  of,  204;  under  Whittaker; 
Gen.  Smith’s  orders  to;  Smith  witnesses 
charge  by,  208;  not  ordered  to  with¬ 
draw,  208,  212;  mention,  209. 

Left  wing,  Army  of  Tenn.,  roster  of,  227. 

Lennard,  Lt.-Col.  Geo.  W.,  57th  Indi¬ 
ana,  219. 

LeGardeur’s  (La.)  battery,  attached  to 
reserve  artillery,  Army  of  Tenn.,  232. 

Levering,  Maj.  John,  signs  report  with 
Turchin,  190;  assistant  adjutant -gen¬ 
eral,  190,  195;  sick  and  in  ambulance, 
195- 

Lewis,  Col.  J.  H.,  6th  Kentucky;  com. 
Helm’s  brigade,  225. 

Leives,  Lt.-Col.  R.  N.,  4th  Tenn.,  224. 

Leyden,  Maj.  A.,  com.  Leyden’s  battal¬ 
ion,  230. 

Leyden’s  (Maj.  A.)  artillery  battalion, 
roster  of,  230. 

Liddell,  Brig.-Gen.  St.John  R.,  extract 
from  report  of,  146,  147,  148,  149; 
acknowledges  being  forced  to  withdraw, 
149;  com.  division,  reserve  corps,  227. 

Liddell’s  (Brig.-Gen.  St.John  R. )  brigade, 
advances  to  Union  rear;  com.  by  Col. 
Go  van;  ordered  to  attack  Union  rear, 
108;  attached  to  Liddell’s  division,  227. 

Liddell’s  (Brig.-Gen.  St.John  R. )  divis¬ 
ion,  composition  of;  bivouacs  at  Rock- 
Spring  church,  59;  captures  Alexander’s 
bridge,  62;  routs  Scribner’s  and  King’s 
brigades;  attacked  by  Vanderveer  and 
Conn  el,  72;  retires  outflanked;  sustains 
heavy  losses,  73 ;  driven  toward  the 
river,  74;  Hill  reaches  rear  of;  Cleburne 
passes  through,  92;  a  part  of  rebel  right 
wing,  103;  attached  to  Walker’s  corps, 
103,  146;  Walthall’s  brigade  attached 
to,  107;  to  hold  Chattanooga  road; 
Gist’s  division  posted  to  left  of,  146; 
takes  position  across  Chattanooga  road, 
147,  148;  Willich’s  batteries  open  fire 
on;  Swett’s  battery  attached  to,  147; 
Stovall  to  support,  149;  to  cooperate  in 
attack  with  Gist’s  on  Union  flank  and 


rear,  146,  150;  might  have  annihilated 
Baird  had  plan  succeeded,  150;  roster 
of,  227;  strength  and  losses  of,  240. 

Lieutenant-colonels,  should  command  bat¬ 
talions,  182. 

Lillard,  Col.  J.  M.,  26th  Tennessee,  229. 

Lilly,  Capt.  Eli,  18th  Indiana  Light  Bat¬ 
tery,  217. 

Limberg,  Col.  Geo.  T.,  108th  Ohio,  222. 

Lincoln,  President  Abraham,  Hal  leek  the 
adviser  of,  13;  orders  McClellan  to  or¬ 
ganize  army  corps,  169;  see  also  Eman¬ 
cipation  Proclamation. 

Lister,  Lt.-Col.  Frederick  W.,  31st  Ohio, 
122,  216;  collects  stragglers,  122. 

Livingston,  Lieut.  Courtland,  3d  Wiscon¬ 
sin  Light  Battery,  221. 

Loder,  Lt.-Col. - ,  attached  to  Critten¬ 

den’s  staff,  85,  13 1 ;  sent  by  Crittenden 
to  Rosecrans,  85 ;  directs  Dick  to  march 
to  Chattanooga,  131. 

Logansport,  Ind.,  Adjt.  Scott  dates  letter 
from,  205. 

London,  Tenn.,  reached  by  Burnside’s 
army,  16;  Burnside  holds  country  north 
of,  48. 

Long,  Col.  Eli,  com.  2d  brigade,  2d  divis¬ 
ion,  cavalry  of  reserve  corps,  223. 

Long’s  (Col.  Eli)  brigade,  roster  of,  223; 
casualties  in,  238. 

Long’s  Spring,  Johnson  marches  to,  28. 

Longstreet,  Lt.-Gen.  James,  sent  to  reen¬ 
force  Bragg,  49;  Bragg’s  statements  to; 
extract  from  report  ofj  95;  commands 
rebel  left  wing,  103,  173,  227;  forms 
rebel  left  line  of  battle,  1 1 5 ;  hour  at 
which  he  begins  attack;  his  superiority 
over  Polk  and  Hill;  his  column  stronger 
than  Cleburne’s  or  Breckinridge’s,  116; 
his  lack  of  discrimination;  fails  to  detect 
weak  point  in  Union  line;  continues 
useless  assaults,  140;  holds  Preston  in 
reserve,  141;  orders  latter  to  attack  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  141,  142;  extract 
from  report  of,  141;  commits  grievous 
blunder,  141,  142;  correct  tactics  to 
have  been  adopted  by,  142;  his  claims 
to  victory,  156,  157;  extract  from  letter 
to  rebel  secretary  of  war;  consulted  by 
Bragg  as  to  future  movements,  157;  his 
suggestions,  158,  159;  his  report  cited, 
15811;  denounced  by  Bragg  as  imprac¬ 
tical,  159;  failure  of  his  attempt  “to 
destroy  Burnside,”  160;  mixed  charac¬ 
ter  of  his  command,  173. 

Longstreet’s  (Lt.-Gen.  Jas.)  corps,  Bragg 
reenforced  from,  54,  59,  97, 103;  Hood’s 
division  attached  to,  59,  97,  103,  115; 
Benning’s  brigade  attached  to,  60;  des¬ 
titute  of  artillery,  86;  prisoners  report 
Bragg’s  reenforcement  by,  96;  estimated, 
and  actual  proportion  of  sent  to  Bragg, 


2  70 


CHICK  A  MAU  GA. 


97;  McLaw’s  division  attached  to,  103; 
Kershaw  commands  five  brigades  of, 
1 17;  Sheridan  might  have  annihilated; 
force  commanded  by,  130;  character  of, 
187;  artillery  attached  to,  228. 

Lookout  Mountain,  Tenn.,  location  and 
description  of,  22;  its  strategic  import¬ 
ance  to  rebels,  24;  brigade  to  reconnoi¬ 
tre  base  of;  rebels  found  holding  point 
of;  operatious  of  Thomas’  corps  around; 
Thomas  secures  passes  of,  27;  Bragg 
thinks  Rosecrans  will  use  as  a  barrier, 
29;  might  have  screened  Union  troops 
from  the  enemy;  necessary  to  be  carried 
by  Union  forces;  McCook  and  Thomas 
climb  over;  troops  might  have  been 
withdrawn  from  east  of;  reconnoissance 
by  Union  troops  toward  nose  of;  rebels 
command  east  slope  of,  30;  difficult  to 
cross,  31,  51;  crossed  by  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  31,  40;  Gen.  Bragg  locates 
Union  forces  at,  35;  Wood  to  post  bri¬ 
gade  on  nose  of,  46;  should  not  have 
been  crossed,  5 1 J  Crook’s  cavalry  occu¬ 
py  gaps  of,  52. 

Lookout  Valley,  Ga.,  Cooper’s,  Steven’s, 
and  Winston’s  gaps  lead  from;  Davis’, 
Johnson’s,  and  Reynolds’  divisions  to 
enter,  26;  Crittenden  not  to  enter,  27; 
McCook’s  corps  encamps  in;  Thomas 
and  McCook  should  have  been  with¬ 
drawn  through,  51;  Union  troops  biv¬ 
ouacking  in,  52. 

Loomis’  (Col.  Cyrus  O.)  Mich,  battery, 
afterward  known  as  King’s  battery,  72. 

Louisiana  regiments:  1st,  com.  off,  227; 
4th,  226;  13th,  com.  off,  225;  14th, 
com.  off,  225;  16th,  com.  off,  226; 
19th,  com.  off,  226;  20th,  com.  off, 
225;  25th,  com.  off.,  226;  battery  (1 
section),  232. 

Louisville,  Ky.,  a  base  of  supplies,  12. 

Lowe,  Capt.  Gideon  H.,  18th  Tenn  ,  229. 

Lowe,  Col.  Wm.  W.,  com.  3d  brigade,  2d 
division,  cavalry  of  reserve  corps,  223. 

Lowrey,  Col.  M.  P.,  com.  32d  and  45th 
Mississippi,  225. 

Lowrie,  Maj.  James  A.,  A.  A.-G.  of  Neg- 
ley’s  div’n;  Beatty  complains  of  orders 
given  by,  132. 

Lumsden’s  (Ala.)  battery,  attached  to  re¬ 
serve  artillery,  Army  of  Tennessee,  232. 

Lynam,  Maj.  T.  H.,  9th  Mississippi,  228. 

Lyon,  Col.  W.  P. ,  13th  Wisconsin,  222. 

Lytle,  Brig. -Gen.  Wm.  H.,  prevents  rebels 
from  crossing  river,  89;  killed,  1 1 7 ; 
com.  1st  brig.,  3d  div’n,  20th  corps,  219. 

Lytle’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Wm.  H.)  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Sheridan’s  division,  20,  89, 
97,  101,  1 17,  219;  comparatively  fresh 
on  Sept.  20,  97;  reoccupies  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  89;  strongly  posted  in 


rear  of  Glenn’s  house;  other  brigades 
of  Sheridan’s  to  right  and  rear  of;  Neg- 
ley  to  left  and  front  of,  101;  moved  to 
Thomas’  support,  ill;  driven  back  to 
the  Cove  road,  1 1 7 ;  roster  of,  219;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  236. 

McAffee  church,  Ga.,  a  desirable  position 
for  Union  left,  98;  Dan  McCook’s  bri¬ 
gade  at,  137. 

McCant’s  (Florida)  battery,  attached  to 
reserve  corps,  Army  of  Tennessee,  230. 

McClellan,  Gen.  Geo.  Brinton,  indecision 
and  vacillation  of,  13;  failure  of  to  real¬ 
ize  expectations;  unpopularity  of,  14; 
studies  organization  of  Union  armies; 
fails  to  organize  army  corps,  169. 

McConnell,  Capt.  Dyer  B.,  9th  Indiana; 
serves  under  Brannan,  207. 

McCook,  Maj. -Gen.  Alexander  McDowell, 
com.  20th  corps,  13;  advances  toward 
Chattanooga,  24;  orders  issued  to,  re¬ 
garding  crossing  the  Tennessee  River, 
26;  to  occupy  Winston’s  Gap;  in  neigh¬ 
borhood  of  Trenton  and  Valley  Head, 
27;  operations  by  after  crossing  Tennes¬ 
see  River,  27,  28;  extract  from  report 
by;  learns  of  the  evacuation  of  Chatta¬ 
nooga,  29 ;  ordered  to  move  toward 
Alpine  and  Summerville,  29,  31;  climbs 
over  Lookout;  might  have  marched  to 
Chattanooga,  30;  announces  to  Thomas 
concentration  of  rebels  at  Lafayette,  33; 
forty  miles  to  Thomas’  right,  34,  40; 
crosses  Pea-Vine  Valley  with  trains,  41 ; 
ordered  to  join  Thomas,  51,  53;  en¬ 
camps  in  Lookout  Valley,  51;  Bragg 
might  have  fallen  upon,  68;  ordered  to 
send  Davis  to  support  VanCleve,  85; 
Wood’s  suggestion  to;  sends  Lytle’s 
brigade  to  reoccupy  Lee-and-Gordon’s 
mill,  89;  Negley  ordered  to  report  to, 
91;  commands  Union  right  wing,  99; 
forms  his  wing  in  line  of  battle;  Col. 
Wilder  reports  to,  101;  ordered  to  send 
reenforcements  to  Gen.  Thomas;  obeys 
orders;  ordered  to  report  in  person  at 
headquarters,  ill;  report  of  cited,  1 1 1  n; 
with  Wood  when  latter  receives  Rose- 
cran’s  order,  114;  Negley  informed  that 
field  is  left  by,  126;  Lt.-Col.  Thruston 
attached  to  staff  of,  130,  199;  commands 
right  wing  of  four  divisions,  173;  men¬ 
tion,  199;  commands  20f.h  corps,  217; 
see  also  Twentieth  Corps. 

McCook,  Col.  Dan.,  learns  of  rebel  move¬ 
ment  toward  Alexander’s  bridge,  68; 
meets  Thomas  at  Baird’s  headquarters; 
his  mistaken  idea  as  to  rebel  strength, 
69;  com.  2d  brigade,  2d  division,  re¬ 
serve  corps,  222. 

McCook’s  (Col.  Dan.)  brigade,  bivouack¬ 
ing  in  Lookout  Valley;  might  have 


INDEX. 


271 


joined  Thomas,  52 ;  ordered  toward 
Reed’s  bridge,  61,  68;  skirmishing  by; 
joined  by  Steedman  and  Mitchell,  61 ; 
posted  at  McAffee  church,  137;  attached 
to  reserve  corps,  137,  147,  188,  222; 
posted  on  heights  west  of  McDannel’s 
field,  137,  147;  Turchin’s  forms  to  left 
of;  soldiers  from  guide  Gen.  Reynolds 
from  perilous  position,  152;  to  be  joined 
by  Turchin’s,  188;  rebels  move  to  right 
of,  201;  roster  of,  222;  casualties,  238. 
McCook,  Col.  Edward  M.,  com.  cavalry 
division,  52;  com.  1st  division  of  cav¬ 
alry  of  reserve  corps,  223. 

McCook’s  (Col.  Edw.  M. )  division,  roster 
of,  223;  casualties  in,  238. 

McConnell,  Col.  Henry  K.,  71st  Ohio,  222 
McCreery,  Col.  Wm.  B.,  21st  Mich.,  219. 
McCullough,  Col.  J.,  16th  Georgia,  226. 
McDannel’s,  Ga.,  Beatty’s  brigade  or¬ 
dered  to;  portion  of  same  placed  at, 
102;  Col.  Dan.  McCook’s  brigade,  with 
artillery,  posted  to  west  of,  137,  147. 
McDannells  field,  Ga.,  rebel  skirmishers 
fill  woods  south  of,  147. 

McDannel^  house,  Ga.,  location  of,  57  > 
part  of  Swett’s  battery  captured  at,  149; 
Thomas  orders  Reynolds  to  move  to, 
186,  190. 

McDonald,  Maj.  Bedan  B.,  101st  Ohio, 
218. 

McDonald,  Maj.  Chas.,  18th  Tenn.,  232. 
McDonald,  Lieut.  W.  P.,  attached  to 
Swett’s  battery;  captured,  149. 
McDowell,  Lieut.  Samuel  M.,  com.  26th 
Penn.  Light  Battery,  221. 

McEwen,  Lieut. -Col.  J.  L.  jr.,  44th  Ten¬ 
nessee,  229. 

McFarland’s  Gap,  Ga.,  road  through  to 
Rossville,  57;  a  desirable  position  for 
Union  right,  98;  roads  leading  to,  99; 
Crawfish- Spring  road  leads  to,  119; 
Negley  withdraws  to,  126,  127;  Neg- 
ley  gathers  and  organizes  stragglers  at, 
127,  128;  cleared  of  Union  artillery  and 
transportation;  advantages  of  Rosecrans 
remaining  at,  128;  number  of  Union 
troops  at  on  afternoon  of  Sept.  20,  129. 
McGaughy,  Maj.  J.  IT. ,  16th  Ala.,  225. 
McGinnis,  Capt.  Hamilton,  8th  Tenn.,  232 
Mcllvane,  Col.  Alex.,  64th  Ohio,  220. 
Mclntire,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  T.  B.,  42d  Indi¬ 
ana,  216. 

McIntyre,  Capt.  James  B.,  4th  U.  S.,  223. 
McKelvaine,  Lt.-Col.  R.  P.,  24th  Missis¬ 
sippi,  227. 

McKibbin,  Col.  Jos.  C.,  attached  to  Rose¬ 
crans’  staff;  sent  to  communicate  with 
Palmer,  84;  halted  and  fired  upon;  sent 
by  Crittenden  to  Rosecrans,  85. 
McLain,  Col.  Richard  W.,  51st  Ohio,  221 
McLamore’s  Cove,  Ga.,  location  of;  how 


formed  and  drained,  22;  Cooper’s  and 
Steven’s  gaps  lead  into,  26;  Negley’s 
division  descends  into,  32;  cavalry  re- 
connoissance  in,  42;  why  Union  troops 
descend  into,  51;  14th  and  20th  corps 
might  have  united  in;  McCook’s  cav¬ 
alry  might  have  descended  into,  52; 
20th  corps  descends  into,  53;  Wheeler’s 
rebel  cavalry  ordered  toward,  54;  West 
Chickamauga  River  rises  in,  56;  stra¬ 
tegically  a  “bag”;  failure  of  rebels  to 
strangle  Union  army  at,  160,  161. 

McLaws,  Maj. -Gen.  Lafayette,  commands 
division,  Army  of  Tennessee,  227. 

McLaws’  (Maj. -Gen.  Lafayette)  division, 
two  brigades  of  join  Bragg,  97;  attached 
to  Longstreet’s  corps;  two  brigades  of 
under  Kershaw  join  Hood;  a  part  of 
rebel  left  wing,  103;  united  with  Ker¬ 
shaw’s  force,  1 17,  133;  roster  of,  227. 

McLemore,  Col.  W.  S.,  4th  Tenn.,  232. 

McLennan,  Maj.  J.  D.,  4th  Ala.,  230. 

McMahan,  Maj.  Arnold,  21st  Ohio,  216. 

McMahon,  Marshal  Marie-Edme-Patrice- 
Maurice,  compels  Austrian  retreat  at 
Magenta,  1 1 5. 

McMinnville,  Tenn.,  21st  corps  stationed 
around,  13;  brigade  of  Union  troops 
left  at,  24. 

McMurry,  Col.  J.  A.,  4th  Tenn.,  224. 

McNair,  Brig. -Gen.  E.,  wounded,  119; 
commands  brigade  in  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
division,  230. 

McNair’s  (Brig. -Gen.  E.)  brigade,  reen¬ 
forces  Bragg;  under  command  of  B.  R. 
Johnson,  58,  59 n;  moves  toward  Leet’s 
tan-yard,  60;  deploys  on  Lafayette-and- 
Chattanooga  road,  61 ;  divides  Gregg’s; 
presses  Dick,  86;  drives  Dick,  87;  in 
right  of  B.  R.  Johnson’s  division,  115; 
led  by  Col.  Colman;  falls  back  for  want 
of  ammunition ;  forms  to  Robertson’s 
left,  1 19;  brings  up  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
rear;  moves  to  right  of  Dyer’s  house, 
1 18;  attached  to  B.  R.  Johnson’s  div’n, 
134,  209,  230;  left  behind  for  want  of 
ammunition;  Johnson  looking  for,  134; 
joins  B.  R.  Johnson;  position  of  in  line 
of  advance;  posted  on  spur  of  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge,  136;  supports  Deas’  and 
Manigault’s,  137;  opposes  Mitchell  and 
Whittaker,  209. 

McRae,  Lieut.  G.  R.,  29th  Georgia,  226. 

McSpadden,  Col.  S.  K.,  19th  Ala.,  229. 

Macauley,  Thomas  Babington,  essay  on 
“  History,”  cited,  19. 

Mackall,  W.  W.,  sends  dispatch  to  Hind¬ 
man,  37.  ,  ,,, 

Magee,  Lt.-Col.  David  W.,  86th  Ill.,  222. 

Magenta,  MacMahon  compels  Austrian 
retreat  at,  115- 

Majors  should  command  battalions,  182. 


272 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Manassas,  Va.,  Chickamauga  compared  to 
first  battle  of,  157. 

Manchester,  Tenn.,  Palmer’s  division  ad¬ 
vances  from,  24. 

Maney,  Maj.  Frank,  24th  Tennessee,  224. 

Maney,  Brig. -Gen.  George,  com.  Maney’s 
brigade,  224. 

Maney’s  (Brig. -Gen.  George)  brigade,  in 
Cheatham’s  second  line;  relieves  Jack- 
son,  74;  attached  to  Cheatham’s  div’n, 
146,  224;  to  support  Cleburne,  146. 

Manigault,  Brig. -Gen.  A.  M.,  sends  for 
reenforcements,  118;  Johnson  wants 
support  from;  consults  with  Deas;  de¬ 
cides  not  to  attempt  to  bring  up  his 
brigade,  139;  commands  Manigault’s 
brigade,  229. 

Manigault’s  (Brig. -Gen.  A.  M.)  brigade, 
in  Hindman’s  front  line;  to  participate 
in  attack,  1 1 5 ;  attached  to  Hindman’s 
division,  1 1 5,  117,  136;  aids  in  driving 
Sheridan  to  the  Cove  road,  1 1 7;  taken 
in  flank  by  Wilder;  pressed  in  front  by 
Sheridan;  driven  back,  1 1 7,  118;  reen¬ 
forced  by  Trigg,  1 1 8 ;  advances  through 
Vidito’s  field;  position  of  in  line,  136; 
attacks  Brannan’s  right;  supported  by 
Johnson,  Gregg,  and  McNair,  137; 
charged  by  Whittaker,  138;  completely 
broken;  unable  to  support  B.  R.  John¬ 
son,  139;  attached  to  Hindman’s  divis¬ 
ion,  229. 

Manning,  Col.  VanH.,  3d  Arkansas;  com. 
Robertson’s  brigade,  228. 

Marchbanks,  Lieut.  George,  aide-de-camp 
to  B.  R.  Johnson,  carries  message  to 
Deas  and  Manigault,  139. 

Marengo,  battle  of,  saved  by  Desaix’s 
division,  1 1 5 ;  results  of  battle  of,  158. 

Marion’s  (Tenn.)  battery,  232. 

Marsh,  Lieut.  J.  H.,  com.  Scott’s  (Tenn.) 
battery,  225. 

Marshall,  Capt.  Alex.,  com.  1st  Ohio  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  G,  216. 

Marshall’s  (Capt.  Alex.)  battery,  where 
posted  by  Negley,  124. 

Martin,  Col.  John  A.,  com.  Heg’s  brigade; 
reports  inability  to  hold  position,  89; 
com.  8th  Kansas;  com.  3d  brigade,  1st 
division,  20th  corps,  218. 

Martin,  Lt.-Col.  William  H.,  93d  Ohio, 
218. 

,  Martin,  Brig. -Gen.  Wm.  T.,  com.  division, 
Army  of  Tennessee,  231. 

Martin’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Wm.  T.)  division, 
roster  of,  231. 

Martin’s  battery,  226. 

Martinetism,  has  ceased  to  win  victories, 
1 15;  a  system  ill-adapted  to  American 
volunteers,  132. 

Massenburg’s  (Ga. )  batter)'-,  attached  to 
reserve  artillery,  Army  of  Tenn.,  232. 


Mast,  Lt.-Col.  Elkanan  M.,  13th  Ohio, 
221. 

Matthews,  Lieut. -Col.  Charles  W.,  17th 
Georgia,  228. 

Mauff,  Capt.  August,  24th  Illinois,  215. 

Mauldin,  Lt.-Col.  T.  H.,  3d  Ala.,  231. 

Maxwell,  Col.  G.  T. ,  1st  Florida,  230. 

Maxwell,  Lt.-Col.  Obadiah  C.,  2d  Ohio, 
215. 

Mayhew,  Lt.-Col.  James  D.,  8th  Ky.,  221. 

Mebane,  Capt.  John  W.,  com.  Mebane’s- 
(Tenn.)  battery,  226. 

Mebane’s  (Capt.  John  W.,  Tenn.)  battery, 
226. 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  Hurlbut  sends  dispatch 
to  Halleck  from ;  Halleck  instructs 
Hurlbut  to  reenforce  Rosecrans  from, 
49;  Sherman  leading  his  corps  toward 
Chattanooga  from,  160. 

Memphis-and-Charleston  Railroad,  Stev¬ 
enson  situated  on,  22. 

Mendenhall,  Maj.  John,  Crittenden’s  chief 
of  artillery;  sent  to  communicate  with 
Palmer,  84;  halted  and  fired  upon,  85. 

Merritt,  Capt.  T.  M.,  2d  Georgia  Cavalry, 
Co.  G,  224. 

Messer,  Lt.-Col.  John,  101st  Ohio,  218. 

Metz,  French  army  isolated  at,  158. 

Michigan  regiments:  2d,  com’d’g  officer, 
223;  casualties,  238;  4th,  com.  off.,  223; 
casualties,  238;  9th,  com.  by  Col.  Park- 
hurst;  at  McFarland’s  Gap,  128,  129* 
strength  of  at  latter  point,  129;  provost 
guard  of  14th  corps;  com.  off,  215;, 
10th,  com.  off,  222;  11th,  attached  ta 
Stanley’s  brigade,  123,  234;  between 
Brannan  and  Wood,  123;  com.  off,  216; 
casualties,  234;  13th,  com.  off,  219; 
casualties,  236;  14th,  com.  off,  222; 
18th,  com.  off,  222;  19th,  com.  off, 
221;  21st,  com.  off,  219;  casualties, 
236;  22d,  attached  to  Doolittle’s  bri¬ 
gade,  138,  221;  supports  Whittaker’s, 
left,  138;  temporarily  brigaded  with 
89th  Ohio;  com.  by  Col.  LeFavor,  153, 
203;  fails  to  withdraw  with  Steedman, 
153;  captured  by  Trigg;  loses  its  regi¬ 
mental  and  State  flags,  154;  out  of  am¬ 
munition,  155,  206,  21 1 ;  temporarily 
attached  to  Steedman’s  division,  201, 
208,  21 1 ;  Lieut.  Drake  adjutant  of,  155, 
204;  remarks  on  capture  of,  155,  203 
etseq.;  Lt.-Col.  Glenn  describes  capture 
of,  204,  205;  joined  by  21st  Ohio,  204n; 
not  ordered  to  withdraw,  204,  205,  212; 
on  left  of  89th  Ohio,  206;  Gen.  Smith 
witnesses  charge  by,  208;  com.  off,  221; 
casualties,  222,  237;  Pioneer  brigade, 
unassigned;  com.  off,  223;  1st  Artil¬ 
lery,  joins  Negley,  32;  1st  Light,  Bat¬ 
tery  A,  attached  to  1st  division,  14th 
corps;  com.  off,  215;  casualties,  233 j 


INDEX. 


2/3 


1st  Light,  Battery  D,  com.  off.,  216; 
casualties,  234;  5th  Battery,  com.  off., 
222. 

Michigan  Engineers,  regiment  of,  com.  by 
Col.  Inness;  repair  the  Nashville-and- 
Chattanooga,  Railroad,  24. 

Meek,  Capt.  A.  T.,  attached  to  2d  and 
15th  Arkansas,  227. 

Mihalotzy,  Col.  Geza,  24th  Illinois,  215. 

Miles,  Col.  Jonathan  R.,  27th  Ill.,  219. 

Mill,  Col.  R.  I.,  com.  Deshler’s  brigade, 
225. 

Miller,  Col.  Abram  O.,  72d  Indiana,  217. 

Miller,  Col.  Silas,  36th  Illinois;  com.  1st 
brig.,  3d  div’n,  20th  corps;  killed,  219. 

Mills,  Col.  R.  I.,  com.  6th,  10th,  and  15th 
Texas,  225. 

Milvvard,  Lt. -Col.  H.  Kavanaugh,  com. 
18th  Kentucky,  189,  217;  is  severely 
bruised;  succeeded  by  Capt.  Heltimes, 
189. 

Minnesota  regiments :  2d,  gallant  conduct 
of,  109;  attached  to  Vanderveer’s  bri¬ 
gade,  109,  216;  com.  off,  216;  casual¬ 
ties,  234;  2d  Light  Battery,  does  effec¬ 
tive  service,  86;  com.  off,  218;  casual¬ 
ties,  235. 

Minty,  Col.  Robert  H.  G.,  com.  brigade 
of  cavalry;  to  cover  Crittenden’s  left, 
24;  subordinate  to  Hazen;  to  reconnoi¬ 
tre  from  Washington,  25;  driven  from 
Reed’s  bridge;  reports  fact  to  Granger, 
61 ;  com.  1st  brigade,  2d  division,  cav¬ 
alry  of  reserve  corps,  223. 

Minty’s  (Col.  R.  H.  G.)  brigade,  posted 
to  protect  Reed’s  bridge,  59;  disposed 
along  Pea-Vine  creek;  skirmishes  with 
B.  R.  Johnson’s  force,  60;  driven  from 
Reed’s  bridge;  in  front  of  Dan.  Mc¬ 
Cook,  68;  roster,  223;  casualties,  238. 

Missionary  Ridge,  starting-point  and  the 
description  of,  22;  Crittenden  to  take 
position  on,  46,  50 ;  conformation  of 
valley  near;  covered  with  woods,  56, 
57;  direction  of  roads  crossing;  defen¬ 
sive  positions  around,  discussed,  57; 
forms  bag  with  Pigeon  Mountain,  63; 
Union  troops  withdraw  toward,  96; 
Union  position  covers  the  roads  leading 
across,  98;  Rossville  reached  by  road 
crossing  western  slope  of;  VanCleve’s 
division  bivouacs  on  slope  of,  99;  Neg- 
ley  ordered  to  mass  artillery  on  slopes 
of,  102;  Sheridan  retreats  to  spurs  of, 

1 18;  a  range  of  runs  west  of  Vidito’s 
house;  Craw  fish- Spring  road  crosses  a 
range  of,  1 1 9 ;  Horseshoe  Ridge  a  spur 
of;  B.  R.  Johnson  takes  position  on 
spur  of,  120;  Sheridan’s  activity  and 
energy  at  battle  of,  13°;  crossed  by 
Crawfish -Spring  road  through  gorge, 
136;  Crittenden’s  corps  placed  on,  157; 


Bragg  swept  from  heights  of,  160;  bat¬ 
tle  of,  Grant  anxious  for  Sherman  be¬ 
fore;  gallant  conduct  of  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  at,  163;  considered  as  a 
tactical  position,  170. 

Mississippi,  capital  of,  captured,  10;  Gen. 
Bragg  reenforced  from,  34,  54,  58,  59, 
60. 

Mississippi  regiments:  5th,  com.  off,  224; 
7th,  attached  to  Anderson’s  brigade; 
supports  Kelly,  143;  com.  off,  228;  8th, 
com.  off,  224;  9th,  com.  off,  228;  10th, 
com.  off,  228;  13th,  227;  17th,  227; 
18th,  227;  21st,  227;  24th,  com.  off, 
227;  27th,  com.  off,  227;  29th,  drives 
Union  troops  from  Alexander’s  bridge, 
62;  com.  off,  227;  30th,  com.  off,  149, 
227;  32d,  com.  off,  225;  34th,  com.  off, 
227;  41st,  com.  off,  228;  44th,  com. 
off,  228;  45th,  com.  off,  225. 

Mississippi  River,  crossed  by  the  Union 
forces,  10. 

Missouri  regiments:  2d,  com.  off,  219; 
casualties,  236;  15th,  com.  off,  219; 
casualties,  236;  1st  Cavalry,  Co.  F  of, 
detailed  as  escort,  221;  1st  Light  Artil¬ 
lery,  Battery  G,  com.  off,  219;  casual¬ 
ties,  236. 

Mitchell,  Col.  John  G.,  not  ordered  to 
withdraw,  208;  com.  2d  brigade,  1st 
division,  reserve  corps,  221. 

Mitchell’s  (Col.  J.  G. )  brigade,  supports 
and  joins  McCook’s,  61,  68;  Dart  of 
Union  reserve  corps;  under  Steedman, 
137,  209;  at  Red- House  bridge,  137; 
joins  Whittaker  in  attacking  Deas  and 
Manigault,  138;  led  by  Steedman  to 
battlefield,  201 ;  opposed  by  B.  R.  John¬ 
son,  209,  210;  ordered  to  withdraw, 
21 1,  212;  roster,  22 1;  casualties,  238. 

Mitchell,  Brig. -Gen.  Robert  B.,  officers  of 
his  division  court-martialed,  12;  acting- 
commander  of  cavalry  divisions  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  13;  to  cover 
right  of  advance  toward  Chattanooga, 
24;  com.  cavalry  attached  to  reserve 
corps,  223. 

Mitchell’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Robert  B.)  cavalry 
corps,  roster  of,  223;  casualties  in,  238; 
strength  and  losses  of,  239. 

Mizner,  Col.  Henry  R.,  14th  Mich.,  222. 

Model  troops,  should  be  instituted  and 
stationed  at  Washington ;  how  to  be 

•  formed;  benefits  of,  1S1. 

Moe,  Capt. - ,  ordered  to  hold  position 

with  Smith,  208. 

Monroe,  Col.  James,  123d  Illinois,  217. 

Montgomery, Tenn.,  reached  by  Burnside’s 
army,  16. 

Moody,  Col.  Y.  M.,  43d  Alabama,  230. 

Moody’s  (La.)  battery,  attached  to  Long- 
street’s  corps,  228. 


274 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Moore,  Col.  Jesse  H.,  115th  Illinois,  221. 

Moore,  Col.  Marshal  T.,  69th  Ohio,  216. 

Moore,  Col.  Oscar  F. ,  33d  Ohio,  215. 

Moore,  Col.  R.  H.,  65th  Georgia,  230. 

Morale  of  Union  army,  somewhat  shaken, 
96. 

Morgan,  Brig. -Gen.  James  D.,  com.  2d 
division,  reserve  corps,  222. 

Morgan’s  (Brig. -Gen.  James  D.)  division, 
one  brigade  of  assigned  to  reserves,  13; 
roster  of,  222;  casualties,  238;  strength 
and  losses  of,  239. 

Morgan,  Col.  J.  T.,  com.  1st  brigade, 
Martin’s  division,  Army  of  Tenn.,  231. 

Morgan’s  (Col.  J.  T. )  brigade,  attached  to 
Martin’s  division,  231. 

Morgan’s,  Ga.,  Hindman  halts  at,  35. 

Morton,  Brig. -Gen.  James  St.  Clair,  com. 
Pioneer  brigade,  223. 

Morton,  Capt.  John  W.,  com.  Marion’s 
(Tenn.)  battery,  232. 

Moscow,  Russian  left  coming  to,  100. 

Moscow  River,  the  Russian  right  extends 
along,  100. 

Moss,  Lieut.  J.  W. ,  2d  Kentucky,  225. 

Mt.  Top,  Davis’  division  to  advance  by 
way  of,  24. 

Mt.  Vernon,  Gen.  Burnside’s  forces  pass 
through,  16. 

Mudge,  Lt.-Col.  Melvin,  11th  Michigan, 
216. 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  Hooker’s  reenforce¬ 
ments  between  Stevenson  and,  160. 

Murray,  Lieut. -Col.  John  E.,  attached  to 
5th  and  13th  Arkansas,  227. 

Murray’s  battalion,  with  what  regiment 
combined;  com.  off.,  224. 

N 

Nabers,  Capt.  James  F.,  17th  Ala.,  229. 

Nance,  Col.  J.  D.,  3d  S.  Carolina,  227. 

Napier,  Lieut.-Col.  L.,  8th  Georgia  Bat¬ 
talion;  com.  Gist’s  brigade,  226. 

Napoleon,  contrasted  with  Bragg,  39;  tac¬ 
tics  of  at  Borodine;  analogy  between 
position  of  and  Bragg’s,  100;  abandons 
preconceived  military  ideas,  170. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  a  base  of  supplies,  12; 
Longstreet’s  plan  to  force  Union  army 
back  upon;  same  proposes  to  threaten 
Union  communication  in  rear  of;  Bragg 
considers  it  impossible  to  move  upon, 
159;  Thomas  disperses  rebel  army  at, 
160. 

Nashville-and-Chattanooga  Railroad,  re¬ 
paired,  12,  24;  passes  through  tunnel  at 
Cowan ;  crosses  Tennnessee  River  at 
Bridgeport,  21;  character  of  country 
traversed  by,  23. 

National  guards  of  States,  considered  as 
a  substitute  for  the  regular  army,  180. 


Naylor,  Lieut.  Wm.  A.,  com.  10th  Indi¬ 
ana  Light  Battery,  220. 

Negley,  Brig. -Gen.  Jas.  S.,  to  lead  divis¬ 
ion  toward  Crow  Creek;  to  be  followed 
by  Baird,  24;  anticipates  attack;  asks 
Baird’s  support,  32;  information  col¬ 
lected  by,  38;  ordered  to  send  brigade 
to  Crawfish  Spring,  64;  surmises  by  as 
to  rebel  movements,  91;  report  cited, 
91  n;  orders  advance;  reasons  for  same, 
92;  Thomas  sends  staff-officer  to;  pre¬ 
vented  from  withdrawing  by  engage¬ 
ment  of  skirmishei's;  accompanies  Stan¬ 
ley’s  brigade;  expects  remainder  of  his 
division  to  be  relieved;  receives  orders 
from  Thomas  to  mass  artillery,  102 ; 
moves  artillery  toward  Dyer’s  house, 
1 18;  receives  orders  from  Thomas  as  to 
artillery;  his  construction  of  same;  with 
Stanley’s  brigade ;  his  disposition  of 
artillery;  falls  back,  124;  holds  confer¬ 
ence  with  Brannan;  Brannan’s  report 
of  same;  criticised  by  Brannan  for  with¬ 
drawal;  injustice  of  aspersions  on,  125; 
his  statements  and  Brannan’s  contrasted, 
125,  126,  127;  Brannan  solicits  support 
from,  125,  126;  mistaken  as  to  force 
remaining  with  him,  126;  extracts  iiom 
report  of;  unable  to  communicate  with 
Thomas,  126,  129;  apprehensive  of  the 
destruction  of  Union  left,  127;  com¬ 
plaints  and  accusations  against,  made 
by  Gens.  Beatty,  Brannan,  and  Wood, 
127  n;  gathers  and  organizes  stragglers 
at  McFarland’s  Gap,  127,  128,  129; 
opposes  Parkhurst’s  falling  back;  aided 
by  staff- officers;  learns  of  Sheridan’s 
approach ;  suggests  to  Sheridan  to  reen¬ 
force  Thomas,  128;  promises  to  cooper¬ 
ate  with  Sheridan  in  support  of  Thomas; 
consults  with  Sheridan,  Davis,  and  Col. 
Ducat,  129;  com.  2d  division,  14th 
corps,  216. 

Negley’s  (Maj.-Gen.  James  S.)  division, 
advances  toward  Ct;ow  Creek ;  to  be 
followed  by  Baird’s,  24;  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  at  Caperton’s  Ferry,  26; 
reaches  Johnson’s  Crook ;  operations 
by  around  Lookout  Mountain,  27;  de¬ 
scends  into  Stevens’  Gap;  enters  Mc- 
Lamore’s  Cove;  moves  toward  Lafay¬ 
ette;  reconnoitres  and  skirmishes;  con¬ 
fronted  by  Hill;  joined  by  Baird,  with 
artillery,  32;  attacked  by  rebels  at  Dug 
Gap;  how  supported;  withdraws  to 
Bailey’s  Cross-roads;  pursued  as  far  as 
Chickamauga  Creek,  33;  between  Bird’s 
mill  and  Owen’s  Ford,  53;  to  relieve 
Palmer’s,  64,  65;  Gen.  Beatty  attached 
to,  65;  advances  from  Widow  Glenn’s; 
relieves  Palmer  and  VanCleve;  opposite 
Breckinridge’s  division;  ordered  to  sup- 


INDEX. 


275 


port  McCook  and  Thomas,  91 ;  halts 
to  bivouac,  92;  comparatively  fresh  on 
Sept.  20,  97 ;  attached  to  Gen.  Thomas’ 
corps,  99,  172;  occupies  east  side  of 
Chattanooga  road,  99;  to  move  to  Gen. 
Baird’s  left  and  rear,  99,  102;  Wilder 
on  right  of;  still  occupies  former  posi¬ 
tion;  to  left  and  front  of  Lytle,  101; 
ordered  to  follow  and  support  Beatty’s 
brigade  when  relieved;  to  be  relieved 
by  Wood’s;  should  have  been  relieved 
earlier;  Thomas  sends  for  balance  of, 
102;  last  brigade  of,  not  relieved,  103; 
Thomas  sends  for;  joined  by  two  of 
Beatty’s,  107;  Sirwell’s  brigade  attached 
to;  Rosecrans  sends  to  Thomas,  no; 
various  troops  attached  to,  123,  124; 
B.  R.  Johnson  pushes  toward  artillery 
of,  125;  withdraws  to  McFarland’s  Gap; 
B.  R.  Johnson  occupies  former  position 
of,  126;  a  portion  of  at  McFarland’s 
Gap,  128,  129;  stops  at  Rossville,  130; 
Maj.  Lowrie,  A.  A.-G.  of,  132;  21st 
Ohio  attached  to,  153;  Hindman  not 
the  man  to  attack,  168;  separated  from 
balance  of  corps;  a  division  of  McCook’s 
corps  might  have  occupied  the  place  of, 
172;  2d  Indiana  attached  to,  198;  ros¬ 
ter  of,  216;  casualties  in,  233;  strength 
and  losses  of,  239. 

Negro  troops,  enlistment  and  number,  12. 

Nelson,  Capt.  Isaac  C.,  attached  to  89th 
Ohio,  221. 

Newell,  Lieut.  Nathaniel  M. ,  com.  1st 
Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D,  223. 

Newman,  Maj.  T.  W.,  23d  Term.,  229. 

Newman’s  (Maj.  T.  W. )  battalion,  at¬ 
tached  to  Brown’s  brigade,  78. 

New  Orleans,  La.,  Halleck  telegraphs 
Grant  to  reenforce  Rosecrans  from,  49. 

Nicholas,  Thomas  P.,  2d  Kentucky,  223. 

Night-marches,  necessarily  slow,  66. 

Nixon,  Col.  G.  H.,  48th  Tennessee,  225. 

Nocquet,  Maj.  J.  W. ,  attached  to  Buck¬ 
ner’s  staff;  carries  message  from  Hind¬ 
man  to  Bragg,  36;  conveys  to  Hindman 
orders  to  attack,  37. 

North-Carolina  Mountains,  Gen.  Burnside 
holds  gap  of,  48. 

North-Carolina  regiments:  6th,  com.  off., 
232;  29th,  226;  39th,  com.  by  Col.  Col- 
man,  1 19,  230;  58th,  how  moved  by 
Kelly,  153;  com.  off.,  230;  60th,  com. 
off.,  226. 

North-Chickamauga  Creek,  empties  into 
the  Tennessee  River;  Hazen  constructs 
pontoons  on,  25. 

Northwest,  Halleck  orders  troops  sent  to 
Rosecrans  from  the,  49. 

Nuckolls,  Col.  Joseph  P.,  jr.,  4th  Ken¬ 
tucky,  106,225;  severely  wounded,  106. 

Number,  of  negroes  in  Union  army,  12; 


of  men  and  guns  belonging  to  Army  of 
Cumberland,  13;  of  Grant’s  command 
after  fall  of  Vicksburg,  15;  of  Burnside’s 
force  in  East  Tennessee,  16;  of  Bragg’s 
forces,  34;  of  rebels  participating  in 
Brown’s  attack,  78;  of  Union  troops 
opposed  to  Bate  and  Clayton;  of  Clay¬ 
ton’s  brigade;  of  Clayton’s  losses;  of 
rebels  attacking  Hazen  and  King;  of 
Bate’s  brigade,  83;  of  rebel  troops  re¬ 
enforcing  Bragg,  97 ;  comparative  of 
rebel  and  Union  troops  engaged  at 
Chickamauga,  97,  98;  of  Union  troops 
posted  along  the  railroad,  98;  of  Union 
troops  concentrated  in  McFarland’s  Gap 
on  afternoon  of  Sept.  20,  129;  of  Union 
prisoners  captured  by  5th  Kentucky, 
154;  of  respective  losses  at  Chicka¬ 
mauga,  158;  of  Johnston’s  army;  of 
Sherman’s  army  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Atlanta  campaign;  of  Hood’s  force, 
160;  of  troops  engaged  at  Florseshoe 
Ridge,  1 6 1. 

O 

Oates,  Col.  W.  C.,  15th  Alabama,  133, 
228;  joins  Kershaw,  133. 

O’Brien,  Lt. -Col.  Wm., 75th  Indiana,  217. 

Official  reports,  examined  by  author;  the 
value  of,  19. 

Ohio,  Army  of  the,  see  Army  of  the  Cum¬ 
berland. 

Ohio  regiments:  1st,  com.  off.,  218;  cas¬ 
ualties,  235;  2d,  com.  off.,  215;  casual¬ 
ties,  233;  3d,  com.  off.,  216;  6th,  sup¬ 
ports  Harris’  battery;  ordered  away, 
1 9 1 ,  197;  com.  by  Col.  Anderson,  197; 
falls  back  for  want  of  ammunition,  196; 
com.  off,  220;  casualties,  237;  9th,  com. 
by  Col.  Kamerling;  makes  extraordin¬ 
ary  dash,  72;  recaptures  King’s  battery; 
joins  Vanderveer,  71,  72;  drives  rebels 
back  demoralized,  73;  attached  to  Van- 
derveer’s  brigade;  gallant  conduct  of, 
109;  com.  off,  216;  casualties,  234; 
10th,  provost  guard  at  headquarters; 
com.  off,  215;  casualties,  233;  11th, 
attached  to  Turchin’s  brigade,  76,  185; 
moves  to  Palmer’s  left,  76;  takes  posi¬ 
tion  in  second  line;  sent  to  front  by 
Turchin,  186;  part  of  in  Turchin’s  first 
line;  portion  in  reserve,  187;  placed  in 
first  line,  188;  Capt.  Price  attached  to, 
189;  led  by  Col.  Lane,  189,  194;  led 
by  Maj.  Higgins;  losses  by,  189;  com. 
off,  217;  casualties,  235;  13th,  com.  by 
Col.  Lane,  152;  com.  off,  221;  casual¬ 
ties,  237;  14th,  attached  to  Croxton’s 
brigade;  accompanies  Gen.  Brannan  to 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  122;  com.  off,  216; 
casualties,  234;  15th,  gallant  conduct 


276 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


of,  109;  com.  off.,  218;  casualties,  235; 
17th,  ordered  to  join  Vanderveer,  71; 
supports  9th  Ohio;  makes  extraordinary 
dash,  72;  attached  to  Connell’s  brigade; 
led  by  Lt.-Col.  Ward;  Maj.  Butterfield 
collects  stragglers  from,  122;  com.  off., 
216;  casualties,  234;  18th,  attached  to 
Stanley’s  brigade;  between  Brannan  and 
Wood,  123;  com.  off.,  216;  casualties, 
234;  19th,  com.  off,  220;  casualties, 
237;  21st,  attached  to  Negley’s  division, 
123,  153;  strength  of;  joins  Brannan, 
123;  detached  by  Sirwell  to  support 
Brannan;  strength  of,  125,  126;  sent  by 
Negley  to  Brannan’s  assistance,  126; 
entrusted  to  Brannan;  joined  by  Steed- 
man’s  brigade  on  the  right,  153;  cap¬ 
tured  by  Trigg;  loses  regimental  and 
State  flags,  154;  responsibility  for  cap¬ 
ture  of,  203  et  seq placed  by  Negley 
under  Brannan;  joins  89th  Ohio,  204; 
remarks  on  capture  of,  203,  205-7;  on 
left  of  22d  Michigan,  206;  ordered  to 
right  of  89th  Ohio,  207;  neglected  by 
by  authorities,  212;  com.  off,  216;  cas¬ 
ualties,  234;  24th,  falls  back  for  want 
of  ammunition,  196;  com.  off.,  220 ; 
casualties,  237;  26th,  com.  off,  219; 
casualties,  236;  31st,  sent  to  reenforce 
Croxton,  71;  attached  to  Connell’s  bri¬ 
gade,  71,  122,  215;  Col,  Lester  collects 
stragglers  from,  122;  com.  off.,  132, 
216;  casualties,  234;  33d,  com.  off., 
215;  casualties,  233;  35th,  attached  to 
Vanderveer’s  brigade,  109,  216;  gallant 
conduct  of,  109,  Brannan  issues  orders 
to  Vanderveer  as  to  posting,  154;  mis¬ 
taken  for  rebel  troops;  puts  rebels  to 
•flight,  154,  155;  com.  off,  216;  casual¬ 
ties,  234;  36th,  attached  to  Turchin’s 
column;  posted  on  Palmer’s  left,  75; 
member  of  brings  horse  to  T urchin,  1 5 1 , 
152;  attached  to  Turchin’s  brigade,  185; 
takes  position  in  second  line;  relieves 
92d  Ohio,  186;  in  Turchin’s  first  line, 
187,  188;  directed  to  support  battery; 
resumes  original  position,  187;  led  by 
Col.  Jones  and  Lt.-Col.  Deval;  losses 
by,  189;  commanded  by  Col.  Jones, 
195;  com.  off,  217;  casualties,  235; 
38th,  com.  off,  216;  40th,  com.  off, 
221;  casualties,  237;  41st,  attached  to 
Hazen’s  brigade;  driven  back  by  rebels, 
84;  com.  off.,  220;  casualties,  237;  49th, 
gallant  conduct  of,  109;  com.  off,,  218; 
casualties,  235;  51st,  com.  off,  221; 
casualties,  237;  52d,  com.  off,  222; 
59th,  com.  off,  221;  casualties,  237; 
64th,  attached  to  Harker’s  brigade;  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  123;  com.  off,  220; 
casualties,  236;  65th,  attached  to  Har¬ 
ker’s  brigade;  on  Horseshoe  Ridge, 


123;  com.  off,  220;  casualties,  236; 
69th,  com.  off.,  216,  222;  71st,  com.  off, 
222;  74th,  Sirwell  describes  movements 
by,  126;  com.  off,  216;  casualties,  234; 
79th,  com.  off,  222;  89th,  detached  at 
Tracy  City;  comes  to  Rossville;  fights 
under  Steedman,  76;  attached  to  Tur¬ 
chin’s  brigade,  138,  185;  supports  Whit¬ 
taker’s  left,  138;  temporarily  brigaded 
with  22d  Michigan,  153,  203;  com.  by 
Col.  LeFavor;  lails  to  withdraw  with 
Steedman,  153;  captured  by  Trigg;  loses 
regimental  colors,  154;  com.  by  Col. 
Carlton;  ordered  by  Gen.  Granger  to 
use  bayonets  instead  of  ammunition ; 
directed  to  hold  position  at  all  hazards; 
remarks  on  capture  of,  155;  temporarily 
detached  from  brigade ;  fights  under 
Steedman,  185,  189;  losses  by,  190; 
temporarily  attached  to  Steedman’s  div¬ 
ision,  201,  208,  21 1;  remarks  on  capture 
of;  responsibility  for  capture  of,  203  e t 
seq.\  com.  by  Col.  Carlton,  203;  extract 
from  letter  of  colonel  of,  relating  to  cap¬ 
ture,  203,  204;  W.  H.  Glenn,  lieut.-col. 
of;  capture  of  described  by  Glenn;  num¬ 
ber  of  captured;  joined  by  21st  Ohio  of 
latter’s  volition,  204;  not  ordered  to 
withdraw,  205,  21 1;  rebel  tribute  to 
gallantry  of,  205;  Adjt.  Scott’s  account 
of  capture  of,  205-7;  half  its  members 
killed  or  disabled,  206;  out  of  ammuni¬ 
tion,  155,  206,  21 1;  Gen.  Smith  contra¬ 
dicts  officers  of;  ordered  by  Gen.  Smith 
to  fix  bayonets,  208;  com.  off,  217,  221; 
casualties,  237;  90th,  com.  off,  220; 
casualties,  236;  92d,  attached  to  Tur¬ 
chin’s  brigade,  75,  185;  posted  on  Gen, 
Palmer’s  left,  75;  ordered  to  front  by 
Reynolds;  relieved  by  36th  Ohio,  186; 
in  Turchin’s  first  line,  187;  in  second 
line;  gallant  conduct  of,  188;  losses  by, 
189;  com.  off,  189,  217;  casualties,  235; 
93d,  com.  off.,  218;  casualties  in,  235; 
94th,  com.  off.,  215;  casualties,  233; 
97th,  com.  off,  219;  98th,  com.  off, 
221;  casualties,  238;  99th,  com.  off, 
221;  casualties,  237;  101st,  Capt.  J.  F. 
Floyd  attached  to,  195;  com.  off,  218; 
casualties,  235;  102d,  com.  off.,  222; 
105th,  attached  to  King’s  brigade,  122, 
195;  stragglers  from  accompany  Gen. 
Brannan  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122; 
led  by  Maj.  Perkins,  193,  195;  gal¬ 
lant  bayonet  charge  by;  borne  back; 
carries  off  rebel  Gen.  Adams,  193;  com. 
off,  217;  casualties,  234;  106th,  com. 
off,  222;  108th,  com.  off.,  222;  113th, 
com.  off.,  221;  casualties,  238;  121st, 
com.  off.,  221;  casualties,  238;  124th, 
com.  off,  220;  casualties,  237;  125th, 
attached  to  Harker’s  brigade;  on  Horse- 


INDEX. 


277 


shoe  Ridge,  123;  com.  off.,  220;  casu¬ 
alties,  236;  1st  Battalion  Sharpshooters, 
attached  to  department  headquarters; 
com.  off.,  215;  Cavalry,  1st,  Co.  L  of 
detailed  as  escort;  com.  off.,  215,  223; 
casualties,  238;  3d,  com.  off,  223;  cas¬ 
ualties,  238;  4th,  com.  off.,  223;  casu¬ 
alties,  238;  10th,  com.  off.,  223;  Artil¬ 
lery,  1st,  complimented  by  Hazen,  82; 
Battery  A,  com.  off,  218;  casualties, 
235;  Battery  B,  com.  off,  220;  casual¬ 
ties,  236;  Battery  C,  com.  off,  216;  cas¬ 
ualties,  234;  Battery  D,  com.  off,  223; 
Battery  E,  com.  off,  222;  Battery  F, 
com.  off,  220;  casualties,  237;  Battery 
G,  com.  off,  216;  Battery  M,  com.  off., 
216;  casualties,  234;  6th  Light  Battery, 
com.  off,  220;  casualties,  236;  9th  Light 
Battery,  com.  off,  221;  18th  Light  Bat¬ 
tery,  temporarily  attached  to  Steedman’s 
command,  201;  com.  off,  221;  casual¬ 
ties,  237;  20th  Light  Battery,  com.  off, 
218;  casualties,  235. 

Oldershaw,  Capt.  Percy  P.,  assistant  adju¬ 
tant-general  to  Palmer,  198. 

Oliver,  Capt.  McD.,  com.  Eufaula  (Ala.) 
Battery,  230. 

Olson,  Lt.-Col.  Porter  C.,  36th  Ill.,  219. 

Opdycke,  Col.  Emerson,  125th  Ohio,  220. 

Organization,  military,  how  to  make  effec¬ 
tive,  176,  177. 

Osborne’s  house,  Ga.,  Reynolds’  division 
halts  at,  66,  186,  190. 

Owen’s  Ford,  Ga.,  Negley’s  division  near; 
Palmer’s  division  opposite,  53. 

P 

Palmer,  Col.  J.  B.,  com.  58th  North  Caro¬ 
lina,  226;  com.  18th  Tennessee,  229. 

Palmer,  Maj.-Gen.  John  McAuley,  leads 
division  toward  Dunlap,  24;  orders 
Hazen  to  move  toward  Lee-and-Gor- 
don’s  mill,  42;  ordered  to  send  brigade 
to  relieve  Barnes’,  64;  his  orders  to 
Grose,  Hazen,  and  Cruft,  64,  65;  or¬ 
ders  Grose  to  support  troops  to  the 
right;  about  to  order  Cruft  to  the  right, 
76;  personally  assists  Turchin  and  Cruft; 
extract  from  report  of;  said  report  in¬ 
correct,  77;  criticism  on  same,  77,  78; 
Crittenden  sends  officers  to  communi¬ 
cate  with,  84;  asks  Reynolds  for  assist¬ 
ance,  191;  meets  Grose’s  brigade;  dis¬ 
tribution  of  brigades  by;  follows  Rose- 
crans’  orders,  196;  in  temporary  com¬ 
mand  of  Turchin’s  brigade;  brigade 
witnesses  fight,  196 n;  report  of,  196-8; 
com.  2d  division,  21st  corps,  220. 

Palmer’s  (Maj.-Gen.  John  M.)  division, 
advances  toward  Dunlap,  24;  advances 
toward  Rossville;  constantly  skirmish¬ 


ing  with  rebel  cavalry,  40 ;  halts  at 
Ringgold;  advances  toward  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill;  halts  at  Pea- Vine  Creek, 
41 ;  Cruft’s  brigade  attached  to,  42,  186; 
bivouacs  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  42; 
on  Pea- Vine  or  Graysville  road,  43;  at 
Gowen’s  Ford,  50,  53 ;  a  portion  of 
transferred  to  Glenn’s  Ford,  53;  to  be 
relieved  by  Negley’s;  to  be  sent  to  Gen. 
Wood’s  left,  64;  attached  to  Critten¬ 
den’s  corps,  64,  172;  to  form  on  Van 
Cleve’s  left,  64,  65;  delay  in  getting 
into  position;  Negley’s  left  to  relieve, 
65 ;  goes  to  Gen.  Baird’s  reenforcement; 
moves  to  Johnson’s  right,  70 ;  Grose’s 
brigade  attached  to,  73,  79;  reconnois- 
sance  by  brigade  of,  73;  ordered  to  re¬ 
port  to  Thomas;  forms  near  Kelly’s 
farm;  on  Johnson’s  right;  Cheatham 
attacks  part  of,  74;  Hazen’s  brigade 
attached  to,  74,  186;  opposed  by  Stew¬ 
art;  Reynolds  should  have  taken  post 
to  right  of;  reenforced  by  Reynolds,  75; 
quiet  in  front  of;  Johnson  to  left  of; 
Turchin  consolidates  his  brigade  to  left 
of,  76 ;  serious  struggle  by ;  reaches 
Johnson’s,  84;  Crittenden’s  anxiety  re¬ 
garding,  84,  85;  Crittenden  sends  Van 
Cleve  to  support;  arrangement  of  line 
of,  85;  in  Union  centre;  confronted  by 
Stewart,  95;  position  in  regard  to  Baird; 
posted  on  Lafayette -and -Chattanooga 
road,  99;  no  change  in  location  of  on 
morning  of  battle;  Turchin  closes  up 
on  right  of,  100 ;  reserve  brigade  of 
commanded  by  Col.  Grose;  ordered  to 
form  in  Baird’s  rear,  107;  a  part  of 
Union  left  wing;  Union  front  begins  at 
right  of,  140;  with  Reynolds’  in  Union 
centre;  separates  Reynold’s  brigades, 
172;  assisted  by  King’s  brigade,  191; 
Turchin  on  right  of,  192;  Palmer’s  re¬ 
port  of  movements  of,  196;  saved  from 
rout  by  Turchin,  198  n;  attacked  while 
retiring,  209;  roster  of,  220;  casualties 
in,  236;  strength  and  losses  of,  239. 

Palmer,  Col.  Wm.  J.,  com.  15th  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  Cavalry,  215. 

Palmetto  Sharpshooters,  228. 

Parker’s  (Va.)  battery,  attached  to  Long- 
street’s  corps,  228. 

Parkhurst,  Col.  John  G.,  provost  guard 
of  Gen.  Thomas;  found  by  Negley  at 
McFarland’s  Gap;  seeking  to  organize 
stragglers;  ordered  by  Crittenden  to 
retire  to  Chattanooga;  Negley  opposes 
orders,  128;  com.  9th  Michigan  Infan¬ 
try,  129,  215. 

Parks,  Mrs.  Susan,  Polk’s  headquarters  at 
house  of,  45. 

Patrick,  Lieut. -Col.  Matthewson  T.,  5th 
Iowa,  223. 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Patten,  Maj.  Thomas  J.,  1st  Ohio,  223. 

Payne,  Col.  Oliver  H.,  124th  Ohio,  220. 

Pea- Vine  church,  Ga.,  rebel  right  wing  at; 
Union  forces  sent  toward,  42;  Walker 
to  make  attack  at,  46;  Buckner’s  corps 
bivouacs  near,  58,  59. 

Pea- Vine  Creek,  Ga. ,  five  miles  from  Ring- 
gold;  Crittenden  waits  for  provisions  at, 
40;  bridge  over  destroyed;  rebel  cav¬ 
alry  retreat  from;  Palmer’s  division  halts 
at,  41 ;  forms  one  valley  with  Chicka- 
mauga  River,  56;  Minty’s  cavalry  dis¬ 
poses  along,  60. 

Pea-Vine  road,  Ga. ,  Palmer’s  div’n  on,  43. 

Pea -Vine  Valley,  Ga.,  VanCleve  crosses 
with  trains;  Palmer  covers  crossing  of, 
41;  Union  troops  ordered  to  reconnoi¬ 
tre  through,  42. 

Peeple’s  (Ga.)  battery,  230. 

Pegram,  Brig.-Gen.  John,  engagement  be¬ 
tween  cavalry  under  and  Wilder,  42; 
gives  information  as  to  movement  of 
Union  troops,  43,  45;  Bragg  encloses 
to  Polk  dispatch  from,  43;  com.  divis¬ 
ion,  Army  of  Tennessee,  232. 

Pegram’s  (Brig.-Gen.  J.)  division,  covers 
rebel  movements,  54;  Croxton  drives 
dismounted  cavalry  belonging  to,  71 ; 
roster  of,  232. 

Pegram,  Maj.  W.  G.,  34th  Miss.,  227. 

Pelham,  Tenn.,  Wood’s  division  to  ad¬ 
vance  by  way  of,  24. 

Pemberton,  Gen.  John  C.,  defeat  of  rebels 
under,  10. 

Pennsylvania,  rebel  invasion  of  in  1863,  9. 

Pennsylvania  regiments:  7th,  com.  off., 
223;  casualties,  238;  9th,  com.  off.,  223; 
casualties,  238;  77th,  loses  colors,  94; 
com.  off.,  218;  casualties,  235;  78th, 
attached  to  Sirwell’s  brigade;  Sirwell 
describes  movements  of;  left  with  Neg- 
ley,  126;  com.  off,  216;  casualties,  234; 
79th,  com.  off,  215;  casualties,  233; 
15th  Cavalry,  constitutes  escort  at  head¬ 
quarters;  com.  off,  215;  casualties,  233; 
26th  Light  Battery,  com.  off.,  22 1;  cas¬ 
ualties,  237. 

Perkins,  Maj.  Geo.  F.,  105th  Ohio,  193, 
195,  217;  wounded,  195. 

Phelps,  Col.  Edward  H.,  38th  Ohio,  216. 

Phillips’  (Ga. )  Legion,  227. 

Phillips,  Capt.  William  S.,  47th  Georgia, 
225. 

Pigeon  Mountains,  Ga.,  location  and  direc¬ 
tion  of,  22;  rebels  withdrawn  behind, 
40;  Rosecrans  locates  Bragg  east  of,  41 ; 
rebels  found  concentrated  around,  50, 
5 1 ;  Wheeler’s  rebel  cavalry  to  hold  gaps 
in,  55;  Hill’s  corps  remains  at  gaps  of, 
59;  forms  bag  with  Missionary  Ridge,  63 

Pikeville,  Tenn.,  VanCleve’s  div’n  moves 
toward,  24. 


Pitman,  Lt.-Col.  R.  W.,  com.  13th  and 
154th  Tennessee  (C.  S.),  224. 

Poe’s  Cross-roads,  Ga.,  to  be  occupied  by 
reconnoitring  forces,  25. 

Poe’s  field,  Ga.,  location  of,  57;  King’s 
and  Turchin’s  brigade  posted  by,  106. 

Poe’s  house,  Ga. ,  Wood  attempts  to  ad¬ 
vance  by,  106;  Brown  and  Stewart  hard 
pressed  near,  116. 

Polk,  Lieut. -Gen.  Leonidas,  in  command 
under  Bragg  at  Chattanooga,  24;  with¬ 
in  supporting  distance  of  Hill,  32;  left 
at  Anderson’s  to  cover  Hindman’s  rear, 
37;  ordered  to  take  position  at  Rock 
Spring,  42;  dispatch  from  Bragg  to; 
Bragg  wants  him  to  strike  Crittenden  in 
detail;  believes  Crittenden  reenforced, 
43;  informs  Braggasto  Union  strength; 
asks  to  be  reenforced  by  Buckner,  43, 
46;  extract  from  dispatch  by,  43;  criti¬ 
cism  on  dispatches  of;  ignorance  of  as 
to  Union  movements;  Bragg  to  send 
Buckner  to  reenforce,  44;  receives  visit 
from  Bragg;  urged  by  Bragg  to  attack 
at  once,  45,  145,  146;  incompetence  of; 
afraid  to  attack  Crittenden,  46;  Forrest 
asks  for  reenforcements  from,  71 ;  or¬ 
dered  to  send  Cheatham  to  extreme 
right,  73;  orders  issued  to  recounted  by 
Bragg,  103;  orders  an  early  attack  by 
Breckinridge  and  Cleburne ;  disobeys 
Bragg’s  orders,  104;  removed  from  com¬ 
mand  by  Bragg,  ic>4n;  inferior  to  Long- 
street  as  a  military  commander,  116; 
might  have  combined  forces  with  Long- 
street  in  successful  attack,  140;  ordered 
by  Bragg  to  assault  Union  left,  145;  not 
the  man  to  lead  impetuous  attack,  168; 
com.  right  wing,  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
103,  173,  224. 

Polk’s  (Lt.-Gen.  Leonidas)  corps,  within 
supporting  distance  of  Hill,  32;  oppo¬ 
site  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill;  to  press  to 
the  front,  54;  to  cross  the  Chickamauga 
at  Dalton’s  or  Telford’s  ford,  55;  com¬ 
position  of;  bivouacs  at  Anderson’s,  59; 
one  division  of  with  Longstreet;  por¬ 
tions  of  Hill’s  and  Walker’s  mixed  with, 
173;  strength  and  losses  of,  240. 

Polk,  Brig.-Gen.  Lucius  E.,  com.  Polk’s 
brigade,  225. 

Polk’s  (Brig.-Gen.  L.  E.)  brigade,  on  Cle¬ 
burne’s  right;  in  front  of  Jay’s  mill,  92; 
makes  night-attack  on  Johnson,  93;  at¬ 
tached  to  Cleburne’s  division,  93,  156, 
225;  forms  Cleburne’s  right;  under  a 
heavy  artillery- fire,  105;  advance  of 
checked ;  Deshler’s  can  not  connect 
with;  ordered  to  fall  back,  106. 

Pond  Spring,  Ga.,  Reynolds’  div’n  takes 
position  at,  50;.  King’s  brigade  remains 
at,  53;  Reynolds’  div’n  moves  from,  190. 


INDEX. 


279 


Pontoons,  Hazen  constructs,  on  North 
Chickamauga  Creek,  25;  Davis  builds, 
at  Caperton’s  Ferry,  26. 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  comparatively  unknown 
in  spring  of  1863,  14;  ordered  by  Hal- 
leck  to  send  troops  to  Rosecrans,  49. 

Porter,  Col.  Geo.  C.,  com.  6th  and  9th 
Tennessee,  224. 

Post,  Col.  P.  Sidney,  Rosecrans  asks  if 
McCook  has  heard  from,  ni;  com.  1st 
brigade,  1st  division,  20th  corps,  217. 

Post’s  (Col.  P.  Sidney)  brigade,  acts  with 
cavalry;  might  have  been  ordered  to 
the  front,  97,  98;  roster  of,  217. 

Potomac,  Army  of  the,  see  Army  of  the 

Potomac  River,  crossed  by  Gen.  Lee,  9. 

Pound’s  (Miss.)  battalion,  226. 

Powell,  Capt.  Thomas,  65th  Ohio,  220. 

Prescott,  Capt.  Mark  H.,  1st  Illinois  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  C,  219. 

Presdee,  Maj.  Joseph  B.,  2d  Indiana,  223. 

Pressley,  Col.  James  F.,  com.  10th  and 
19th  Alabama,  229. 

Preston,  Brig. -Gen.  Wm. ,  sends  Trigg’s 
brigade  to  relief  of  Hood,  87;  receives 
orders  to  support  Kershaw  at  Dyer’s 
field,  142;  report  of,  cited,  142  n;  com¬ 
pliments  2d  Alabama,  143;  summons 
Col.  Kelly  for  consultation,  154;  com¬ 
mands  division,  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
230. 

Preston’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Wm. )  division,  at¬ 
tached  to  Buckner’s  corps,  58,  68,  103, 

1 16,  230;  moves  from  Lafayette,  58; 
bivouacs  near  Pea- Vine  church,  59;  to 
cross  at  Dalton’s  Ford,  62;  on  Stewart’s 
left,  67;  on  extreme  rebel  left;  hemmed 
in,  68;  skirmishers  of  exchange  shots 
with  Union  troops,  86;  Trigg’s  brigade 
attached  to,  89,  1 18;  by  what  Union 
divisions  confronted,  96;  part  of  fresh 
for  action  on  Sept.  20,  97;  a  part  of 
rebel  left  wing,  103;  of  what  brigades 
composed;  held  in  reserve,  1 1 6 ;  the 
strongest  in  Bragg’s  army;  held  in  re¬ 
serve  by  Longstreet,  141;  ordered  to 
attack  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  141,  142; 
how  Gen.  Longstreet  should  have  used; 
slaughtered  through  latter’s  blunder; 
composed  of  untried  men;  gallant  con¬ 
duct  of,  142;  commences  futile  assault, 
162;  Col.  J.  II.  Kelly  commands  3d 
brigade  of,  205;  roster  of,  230. 

Price,  Capt.  Emmor  H.,  11th  Ohio;  brig, 
inspector;  complimented  by  Turchin, 
189. 

Price,  Col.  S.  Woodson,  21st  Ky. ,  221. 

Promotions,  injustice  worked  by  ill-con¬ 
sidered  system  of;  how  to  remedy  same, 
177- 

Provost  guard,  of  14th  corps,  215;  of  20th 
Corps,  217. 


Prussia,  Jena  and  Auerstiidt  lead  to  con¬ 
quest  of,  158. 

Putnam,  Lt.-Col.  Douglas,  jr. ,  wounded; 
gallant  conduct  of,  189;  com.  92d  Ohio, 
189,  217. 

R 

Racoon  Mountain,  location  of,  21. 

Raffen,  Lt.-Col.  Alex.  W.,  19th  Illinois, 
216. 

Rawlingsville,  Ala.,  where  situated;  re¬ 
connoitring  cavalry  to  go  to,  27. 

Ray,  Col.  Daniel  M.,  com.  2d  brigade, 
1st  div’n,  cavalry  of  reserve  corps,  223. 

Ray’s  (Col.  Daniel  M.)  brigade,  roster  of, 
223;  casualties  in,  238. 

Ray,  Lt.-Col.  J.  M.,  60th  N.  C.,  226. 

Raymond,  Lt.-Col.  Samuel  B.,  51st  Illi¬ 
nois,  219. 

Reconnoissance,  by  Union  troops  toward 
nose  of  Lookout,  27,  30;  around  Mc- 
Lamore’s  Cove;  toward  Catlett’s  Gap, 
32;  by  Hindman  around  Davis’  Cross¬ 
roads,  37;  made  by  Union  troops  on 
Lafayette  road;  through  Pea- Vine  Val¬ 
ley;  in  McLamore’s  Cove,  42;  by  Baird 
and  Brannan  around  Davis’ Cross-roads, 
50;  around  Catlett’s  Gap,  52,  53;  tow¬ 
ard  Blue-bird  Gap,  53;  toward  Reed’s 
bridge,  69;  by  Grose  on  Chattanooga 
road,  73. 

Records,  war,  desirable  to  publish;  inade¬ 
quate  appropriation  for  publication  of; 
contrast  between  the  United  States  and, 
Germany  in  this  respect,  175. 

Red -house  bridge,  Ga.,  Whittaker’s  brig, 
ordered  to,  61 ;  Steedman’s  two  brigades 
posted  at,  137. 

Reed’s  bridge,  Ga.,  B.  R.  Johnson’s  brig, 
moves  toward;  the  rebels  to  cross  the 
Chickamauga  at,  54;  location  of,  56; 
direction  of  roads  from,  57;  Minty’s 
cavalry  posted  to  protect,  59;  B.  R. 
Johnson’s  command  ordered  to,  60; 
Minty  driven  from;  McCook’s  brigade 
ordered  toward,  61 ;  rebels  cross  Chick- 
amauga  by,  61,  85;  Dan  McCook’s  bri¬ 
gade  ordered  toward,  68;  musketry  firing 
heard  toward;  Brannan  to  reconnoitre 
toward;  the  orders  not  followed;  For¬ 
rest’s  reconnoissance  toward,  69;  battle 
commences  near,  74;  King’s  brigade 
posted  on  road  to,  76;  Bragg  alarmed 
by  reports  of  engagement  at,  94. 

Regiments,  should  consist  of  four  battal¬ 
ions,  182. 

Regular  army,  officers,  jealousy  of  toward 
volunteer  officers;  remedy  for,  177,  178; 
analogy  between  “imperial  guards”  and, 
179;  compared  with  volunteers;  volun¬ 
teers’  contempt  for;  national  guards  of 


28o 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


States  as  a  substitute  for;  officers,  privi¬ 
leges  of,  180. 

Reid,  Col.  John  C.,  28th  Alabama,  229. 

Resaca,  Ga.,  McCook’s  cavalry  to  move 
toward,  31. 

Reserve  artillery,  attached  to  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  roster  of,  232. 

Reserve  corps,  of  Army  of  the  Cumber¬ 
land,  com.  by  Gen.  Gordon  Granger, 
13,  x37>  1 55 ;  of  what  composed;  loca¬ 
tion  of,  13;  three  brigades  of  Union 
arrive  at  Rossville,  52;  posted  in  front 
of  Rossville,  59;  Steedman  commands 
division  of,  76,  185,  189;  only  three  bri¬ 
gades  of  fresh  on  Sept.  20,  97;  compo¬ 
sition  of;  how  posted  on  Cliattanooga- 
and- Ringgold  road;  how  brought  into 
play,  137;  McCook’s  brigade  attached 
to,  188;  roster  of,  221,  222;  casualties 
in,  237,  238;  strength  and  losses  of,  239. 

Reserve  corps,  of  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
com.  by  Walker;  ordered  to  follow  Cle¬ 
burne;  to  attack  Union  forces  in  front, 
38;  roster  of,  226,  227. 

Reserves,  Turchin  finds  rebel  drawn  up  at 
Catlett’s  Gap,  53;  Union  driven  back 
by  rebel  artillery,  60;  of  what  regiments 
Bate’s  composed,  82,  83;  Davis  posts 
two  brigades  as,  for  Sheridan,  ioi;  the 
Union  army  deficient  in,  170;  why  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  corps  could  not  furnish,  170, 
1 71;  indispensable  to  force  acting  on 
defensive,  171,  174;  composition  ofTur- 
chin’s,  187;  composition  of  Reynolds’, 
191. 

Reynolds,  Lt.-Col.  H.  A.,  com.  30th  and 
34th  Mississippi,  227. 

Reynolds,  Gen.  Joseph  J. ,  captures  boats 
at  Shellmount;  to  seize  Cooper’s  and 
Stevens’  gaps,  26;  divides  his  division 
into  two  parts ;  disposition  of  same ; 
sends  message  to  Turchin;  attempts  to 
organize  reserve;  criticism  on  general¬ 
ship  of,  75,  77;  responsible  for  breaking 
of  Union  centre,  75;  report  of,  cited, 
75,  79;  seeks  support  from  Brannan; 
same  ordered  by  Thomas,  79,  82;  at¬ 
tempts  to  rally  sti'agglers,  79;  extracts 
from  report  of,  80,  150,  152;  same  criti¬ 
cised;  fugitives  and  artillery  underjwheel 
before  rebels,  80;  inconsistencies  be¬ 
tween  his  report  and  Hazen’s  pointed 
out,  81,  82;  ignores  and  is  ignored  by 
Ilazen;  afterward  mentioned  by  same, 
82;  with  Croxton’s  brigade;  reenforces 
King  with  stragglers;  joins  Turchin  with 
remnant  of  second  brigade;  takes  posi¬ 
tion  east  of  Chattanooga  road,  140;  or¬ 
dered  by  Thomas  to  commence  with¬ 
drawal,  147,  148,  193,  199,  209;  Gen. 
Thomas  points  out  to  where  to  form, 
147,  148,  199;  his  statements  incorrect, 


150,  15 1 ;  his  report  marked  by  unfair¬ 
ness,  15 1 ;  his  mssstatements  contro¬ 
verted,  150,  15 1,  152,  153;  his  ignor¬ 
ance  of  Turchin’s  movements,  15 1,  1 52, 
192;  his  ignorance  of  roads  to  Rossville; 
narrowly  escapes  capture  by  rebel  cav¬ 
alry,  152;  moves  behind  Turchin’s  ex¬ 
treme  right,  15 1,  188;  his  understanding 
of  his  orders  to  Rossville,  152,  194; 
com.  4th  division,  14th  corps,  185,  217; 
moves  two  of  Turchin’s  regiments  to 
the  front,  186;  orders  Turchin  to  change 
front,  188;  reports  in  person  to  Thomas, 
190;  report  of,  190-5;  sends  King’s  bri¬ 
gade  to  assist  Palmer;  forms  reserve 
force,  19 1 ;  reforms  retreating  forces, 
192;  asks  Palmer  for  support  of  battery, 
197 ;  Willich  ordered  to  report  to;  men¬ 
tion,  200. 

Reynolds’  (Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  J.)  division, 
advances  toward  Jasper;  followed  by 
Brannan’s,  24;  to  cross  the  Tennessee 
at  Shellmount;  to  go  into  Lookout  Val¬ 
ley  by  way  of  Sand  Mountain;  to  occu¬ 
py  Cooper’s  and  Steven’s  gaps,  26;  re¬ 
mains  in  camp  near  Trenton,  27;  2d 
brigade  of  on  Brannan’s  left;  Turchin’s 
brigade  of  to  seize  Cooper’s  Gao;  con¬ 
centrates  between  Cooper’s  and  Catlett’s 
gaps;  takes  position  at  Pond  Spring,  50; 
joined  by  Wilder’s  brigade,  52;  con¬ 
nects  with  McCook’s  left;  relative  posi¬ 
tion  to  Brannan’s  division,  53;  how  to 
move,  65;  passes  Crawfish  Spring;  halts 
at  Osborne’s,  66;  its  proposed  position 
in  Thomas’  line  of  formation,  67;  has¬ 
tens  to  Baird’s  support;  moves  to  John¬ 
son’s  right,  70;  order  of  advance  by 
toward  Kelly’s  farm,  75;  supported  by 
Hazen,  80;  destructive  artillery  firing 
by,  80,  81 ;  serious  struggle  by,  84; 
King’s  brigade  of  formed  on  Palmer’s 
right,  85;  in  Union  centre;  confronted 
by  Stewart,  95;  position  in  regard  to 
Baird;  posted  on  Lafayette-and-Chatta- 
nooga  road,  99;  Turchin  in  left,  King 
in  right  of,  100;  Brannan’s  div’n  forms 
to  right  of,  ioi;  Wood’s  left  opposite, 
106,  1 12;  two  brigades  of  posted  in 
echelon,  106;  Capt.  Kellogg  mistakenly 
reports  position  of  to  Gen.  Rosecrans; 
Wood’s  division  ordered  to  support; 
Wood  describes  position  of,  112;  Wood 
moves  in  support  of,  112,  1 13 ;  difficul¬ 
ties  in  the  way  of  Wood’s  supporting; 
under  what  circumstances  Wood  might 
have  supported,  1 1 3 ;  Wood  informs 
Crittenden  of  former’s  orders  to  support, 
1 14;  Stewart’s  faces,  1 15;  forces  Brown’s 
back  in  confusion,  116,  122,  140,  1 5 1 ; 
King’s  brigade  attached  to;  portion  of 
carried  away  by  Brannan’s  line,  117; 


INDEX. 


28l 


Wood  ordered  to  support;  orders  coun¬ 
termanded,  121 ;  joined  by  10th  and 
74th  Indiana,  122;  stragglers  from  join 
Brannan,  133;  Turchin’s  brigade  at¬ 
tached  to,  140,  185;  to  head  retreat 
toward  Rossville,  145,  147,  193,  199; 
receives  occasional  cannon  shots  in  rear, 
147;  to  cover  retreat  of  Union  left,  147, 
148,  199;  attached  to  Thomas’  corps; 
in  Union  centre  with  Palmer’s;  Palmer’s 
separates  brigades  of,  172;  movements 
of  described  byTurchin,  186;  Reynolds’ 
report  of  movements  of,  190-5;  moves 
from  Pond  Spring,  190;  formed  in  two 
lines,  192,  193;  needs  ammunition,  193; 
reaches  Rossville,  194;  losses  by,  195; 
brigade  of  goes  to  Palmer’s  right;  part 
of  supports  Hazen,  197;  to  form  per¬ 
pendicular  to  State  road,  200;  Rose- 
crans  describes  charge  by,  201;  roster 
of,  217;  casualties  in,  234;  strength  and 
losses  of,  239. 

Richards,  Maj.  W.  C.,  9th  Miss.,  228. 

Richards,  Capt.  Wm.  81st  Ind.,  217. 

Richmond,  Lieut.  W.  B. ,  aide-de-ca7np  to 
Polk;  extracts  from  diary  of,  45. 

Rifle,  first  universally  used  in  the  War  of 
Rebellion;  its  value  in  war;  to  what 
extent  used  in  the  Crimea,  175. 

Ringgold,  Ga.,  Bragg  should  have  re¬ 
treated  by,  28;  Rosecrans  believed  the 
rebels  had  retired  by,  29;  Crittenden  at, 
34,  40;  Crittenden  to  pursue  rebels  by 
way  of,  31,  40;  rebel  cavalry  driven  out 
of;  Crittenden  advances  from,  41;  Wild¬ 
er  advances  from,  41,  42;  circumstance 
under  which  Bragg  might  have  moved 
to,  51;  B.  R.  Johnson’s  brigade  holding 
railroad  at,  54;  Bragg  orders  rebel  teams 
toward,  55;  relative  position  of  as  to 
Reed’s  bridge,  56;  Johnson’s  (B.  R. ) 
brigade  detached  to;  Gregg’s  and  Mc¬ 
Nair’s  brigades  arrive  at,  58 n;  John¬ 
son’s  (B.  R.)  brigade  moves  to;  Steed- 
man  reconnoitres  toward;  drives  rebels 
out  of,  59;  Benning’s  brigade  to  protect 
depot  at;  Robertson’s  and  Law’s  bri¬ 
gades  halt  at;  B.  R.  Johnson  ordered 
to  return  to,  60;  Whittaker’s  brigade 
ordered  to,  61 ;  B.  R.  Johnson’s  forces 
leave;  Benning’s  brigade  remains  at,  69; 
Gist’s  brigade  convoys  ammunition-train 
from,  103;  railroad  bridges  destroyed 
to  point  south  of,  159;  Bragg’s  line  of 
retreat  by,  174. 

Ringgold  road,  Ga. ,  desirable  to  cover  in¬ 
tersection  of  Lafayette  road  and,  98. 

Ringgold -and -Lafayette  road,  Ga. ,  rebel 
line  covers;  Wood’s  division  on,  43; 
Pegram  reports  no  enemy,  45. 

Ripley,  Col.  Chas.  H.,  90th  Ohio,  220. 

Robbins,  Capt.  John  W.,  attached  to  18th 

19 


Kentucky;  on  Turchin’s  staff;  compli¬ 
mented  by  Turchin,  189. 

Robertson,  Maj.  C.  W.,  com.  1st  and  50th 
Tennessee,  231. 

Robertson,  Maj.  Felix  H.,  com.  reserve 
artillery,  Army  of  Tennessee,  232. 

Robertson’s  (Ala.)  battery,  com.  off.,  229. 

Robertson,  Brig. -Gen.  J.  B.,  com.  Rob¬ 
ertson’s  brigade,  228. 

Robertson’s  (Brig. -Gen.  J.  B. )  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Hood’s  div’n;  halts  at  Ring- 
gold,  60,  69,  80,  89,  1 1 5,  1 19,  133,  228; 
to  be  held  in  reserve,  60;  assigned  to 
protection  of  rebel  train,  61 ;  joined  by 
Benning’s,  69;  meets  Davis’  troops,  86; 
reports  of  regimental  commanders  in, 
cited;  recaptures  Gen.  Gregg;  pressed 
by  Heg;  reenforced  by  Benning,  87; 
attacks  Carlin  and  Barnes ;  supports 
Trigg,  89;  in  B.  R.  Johnson’s  rear;  in 
same  line  with  Law  and  Benning;  forms 
part  of  Longstreet’s  column  of  attack, 
1 15;  on  right  of  McNair,  1 19 ;  pursues 
Union  forces;  captures  battery,  133. 

Robie,  Lt. -Col.  Oliver  P. ,  4th  Ohio,  223. 

Robinson,  Col.  Milton  S.,  com.  King’s 
brigade,  147,  15 1,  194,  200;  com.  75th 
Indiana,  195,  1 97,  217;  ordered  to  meet 
rebel  advance,  197. 

Robison,  Col.  W.  D.,  2d  Tennessee,  225. 

Roby,  Capt.  Jacob  W.,  10th  Wis.,  215. 

“Rock  of  Chickamauga, ”  Gen.  Thomas 
appropriately  nicknamed,  165. 

Rock  Spring,  Ga. ,  Polk  and  Cheatham  to 
take  position  at,  42. 

Rock- Spring  church,  Ga. ,  Polk’s  head¬ 
quarters  near,  45;  rebel  divisions  biv¬ 
ouac  near,  59. 

Rockingham,  Lieut.  Richard,  6th  Ken¬ 
tucky,  220. 

Roddey,  Brig. -Gen.  P.  D.,  com.  Roddey’s 
brigade,  231. 

Roddey’s  (Brig. -Gen.  P.  D.)  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Martin’s  division,  231. 

Rogers,  Col.  Andrew  F.,  80th  Ill.,  217. 

Rogers,  Maj.  J.  C.,  5th  Texas,  228. 

Rome,  Ga.,  cavalry  to  reconnoitre  tow¬ 
ard,  27 ;  Rosecrans  supposes  Bragg  to 
be  falling  back  on;  the  intent  of  such  a 
movement,  28;  Bragg  believes  Rose¬ 
crans  advancing  toward,  29;  Gist’s  bri¬ 
gade  detached  to,  59;  Gist’s  brigade 
detached  at,  71  n. 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  Wm.  Stark,  forces  Bragg 
to  retreat,  10;  establishes  new  depots 
of  supplies,  12;  in  command  in  Middle 
Tennessee;  independent  of  Grant  and 
Burnside,  1*4;  cavalierly  treated  by  Ilal- 
leck;  peremptorily  ordered  to  advance; 
should  have  been  reenforced,  15;  not 
assisted  by  Burnside,  16;  hurries  his 
forces  across  the  Tennessee,  17;  in- 


2  82 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


formed  of  evacuation  of  Chattanooga, 
28;  extracts  from  report  of,  28,  30,  50, 
103,  no,  128,  201;  failed  to  compre¬ 
hend  Bragg’s  movements;  issues  orders 
to  pursue  the  enemy,  28;  orders  Gar¬ 
field  to  attack  Bragg’s  flank;  the  order 
discussed;  orders  to  Thomas  and  Mc¬ 
Cook  by,  discussed,  29;  ignorance  of  as 
to  Bragg’s  reenforcements;  believes  that 
Bragg  seeks  to  evade  battle;  orders  pur¬ 
suit  of  Bragg,  31;  doubts  rebel  concen¬ 
tration  at  Lafayette;  extracts  from  dis¬ 
patches  to  Thomas  from;  ignorant  as  to 
Bragg’s  movements;  orders  Thomas  to 
communicate  with  McCook,  34;  advised 
by  Wood  of  Bragg’s  location;  orders 
same  to  advance  toward  Lee-and-Gor- 
don’s  mill,  40,  41 ;  ignorant  of  Bragg’s 
movements;  orders  the  concentration  of 
army;  extracts  from  dispatches  of,  41 ; 
Bragg  abandons  his  efforts  to  defeat  in 
detail,  47;  extracts  from  Halleck’s  dis¬ 
patches  to;  Halleck  hypothetically  ad¬ 
vises  union  between  Burnside  and;  Gen. 
Burnside  instructed  to  connect  with,  48; 
Halleck  telegraphs  for  troops  to  be  sent 
to,  49;  states  location  of  Bragg’s  army; 
mentions  the  reenforcement  of  same ; 
describes  position  of  Army  of  the  Cum¬ 
berland,  50;  plan  adopted  for  concen¬ 
trating  army  by,  52;  intends  to  shift 
Union  position,  64;  sends  Johnson’s 
division  to  Thomas,  73 ;  approves  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  order,  74;  establishes  head¬ 
quarters  at  Widow  Glenn’s  house,  84; 
Crittenden  asks  leave  from  to  support 
Palmer;  orders  support  sent  to  Van 
Cleve,  85;  orders  Negley  to  support 
Thomas,  91 ;  reverses  right  and  left 
wings;  Bragg  intended  to  have  attacked 
on  Sept.  19th,  94;  his  plan  of  opera¬ 
tions  explained;  contrast  between  Bragg 
and,  94,  95;  demonstrates  his  military 
talent,  96;  orders  Beatty’s  brigade  to 
go  to  Thomas,  102;  Thomas  sends  to 
for  reenforcements,  107,  no,  112;  grows 
solicitous;  perceives  defects  in  his  posi¬ 
tion;  apprehensive  as  to  Bragg’s  move¬ 
ments,  no;  orders  reenforcements  sent 
to  Thomas;  gives  too  much  credit  to 
Bragg’s  strategical  skill;  makes  move¬ 
ment  dangerous  to  execute,  1 1 1 ;  extracts 
from  orders  of,  HI,  1 1 2 ;  report  of, 
cited;  misinformed  by  Capt.  Kellogg; 
issues  fatal  order  to  Wood,  112;  the 
order  a  puzzle,  113;  his  headquarters 
connected  with  Chattanooga  by  tele¬ 
graph,  119;  Negley  informed  that  field 
is  abandoned  by,  126;  apprehensive  of 
retreat  of  Union  left  through  Rossville, 
127, 128;  standing  behind  Davis’  troops; 
starts  too  late  to  communicate  with 


Sheridan  of  Thomas’;  carried  west  by- 
Union  fugitives;  send  Garfield  to  Ross¬ 
ville;  why  desirable  for  him  to  remain 
at  McFarland’s  Gap;  unable  to  reach 
Thomas;  he  might  have  communicated 
with  latter  had  he  remained  at  McFar¬ 
land’s  Gap,  128;  decides  to  go  to  Chat¬ 
tanooga,  128,  165,  169;  his  presence  at 
Rossville  desirable,  129;  orders  Thomas 
to  assume  command,  144,  165,  199; 
advised  by  Thomas  of  the  weakness  of 
Union  position,  157;  succeeds  Buell, 
163;  review  of  his  management  of  the 
campaign,  163,  164;  the  army’s  confi¬ 
dence  in  him;  his  plans  subsequently 
carried  out  at  Brown’s  Ferry;  ably  sup¬ 
ported  by  Thomas,  164;  his  confidence 
in  Thomas;  necessity  for  his  presence 
in  Chattanooga,  165;  his  plans  for  re¬ 
serve  force,  170,  1 7 1 ;  misled  by  rebel 
inactivity,  1 7 1,  172;  Gen.  Garfield  chief 
of  staff  of,  199;  describes  Reynolds’ 
charge,  201;  com.  Army  of  the  Cum¬ 
berland,  215;  return  of  casualties  by, 
233  et  seq. 

Rose,  Col.  Thomas  E.,  77th  Penn.,  218. 

Ross,  Maj.  J.  A.,  com.  4th  and  31st  Ar¬ 
kansas,  230. 

Rossville,  Ga.,  Wood  passes;  Palmer  and 
VanCleve  move  toward,  40;  Harker  has 
skirmishing  near,  41 ;  Granger’s  brigades 
arrive  at ;  eight  miles  from  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  52;  location  of;  many 
clearings  around,  56,  57;  direction  of 
roads  leading  to,  57;  considered  as  a 
point  of  defence,  57,  58;  Steedman  re¬ 
tires  toward;  Granger’s  reserves  posted 
in  front  of,  59;  Union  troops  move 
back  to,  69;  Steedman’s  division  of  re¬ 
serve  corps  at,  76;  Union  position  covers 
roads  leading  to,  98;  reached  by  road 
across  Missionary  Ridge,  99;  part  of 
Beatty’s  brigade  joins  Negley  near,  107;. 
Crawfish -Spring  road  leads  to,  119; 
Brannan  criticises  Negley ’s  withdrawal 
to,  125;  Negley  supposes  Union  forces 
retreating  by,  127;  Rosecrans  cherishes 
same  apprehension ;  Rosecrans  sends 
Garfield  to,  128;  part  of  Beatty’s  bri¬ 
gade  at;  Negley  reports  determination 
to  move  army  toward,  129;  Union  army 
retires  to,  129,  130;  VanCleve  estab¬ 
lishes  headquarters  at;  Dick  goes  into 
camp  at,  13 1;  Reynolds’ understanding 
of  his  orders  to  move  toward,  152,  194; 
Rosecrans  orders  withdrawal  to,  144, 
199;  Reynolds  to  initiate  retreat  tow¬ 
ard,  147,  193,  199;  Reynolds’  ignorance- 
of  roads  to,  152,  194;  Union  troops  fall 
back  upon,  153,  200;  a  faulty  strategic 
position,  157;  Gen.  Bragg  should  have 
directed  columns  on,  174;  Reynolds’ 


INDEX. 


division  reaches,  194;  Rosecrans  to  send 
rations  and  ammunition  to,  199;  Steed- 
man  makes  forced  march  to,  201 ;  Union 
troops  fall  back  to,  202. 

Rossville  Gap,  Ga. ,  strategic  value  of,  98; 
occupied  by  14th  corps,  157. 

Rossville  road,  Negley  takes  troops  to, 
126;  Reynolds  meets  Thomas  at;  Reyn¬ 
olds  to  form  line  perpendicular  to,  194; 
Palmer  hears  firing  near,  197. 

Rossville-and-Lafayette  road,  Ga.,  King’s 
brigade  faces,  192. 

Rout,  Union  retreat  so  characterized  by 
Hill,  38. 

Roster,  of  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  215- 
23;  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  224-32. 

Rucker’s  Legion,  232. 

Rudler,  Col.  A.  F.,  37th  Georgia,  229. 

Russell,  Capt.  Wm.  C. ,  Granger’s  adjutant- 
general;  carries  orders  to  Col.  Carlton; 
killed,  206. 

Russell,  Col.  A.  A.,  com.  2d  brigade, 
Martin’s  division,  Army  of  Tenn.,  231. 

Russell’s  (Col.  A.  A.)  brigade,  attached 
to  Martin’s  division,  231. 

Russell,  Lieut.  Francis  D.  L.,  com.  4th 
U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  M,  220. 

Russell’s  (Lieut.  Francis  D.  L. )  battery, 
employed  by  Reynolds  to  rally  strag¬ 
glers,  79;  Reynolds  mentions  junction 
with,  80;  Hazen  tries  to  get  in  position; 
conflicting  claims  as  to  location  of,  81. 

Russell,  Lt.-Col.  Roswell  M.,  9th  Penn¬ 
sylvania,  223. 

Russian  proverb,  cited,  177. 

Russian  troops,  movements  of  around 
Borodino  and  Moscow,  100;  night  at¬ 
tack  on  Inkerman  by,  mentioned,  1 15. 

S 

Sadowa,  results  of  battle  of,  158. 

Saffell,  Maj.  R.  M.,  26th  Tennessee,  229. 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Halleck  orders  reenforce¬ 
ments  sent  to  Rosecrans  from,  49. 

Salem,  Tenn.,  Johnson’s  division  to  ad¬ 
vance  by  way  of,  24. 

Salient  points,  desirability  of  a  number 
of,  170. 

Sanborn,  Lieut. -Col.  Wm.,  22d  Michigan, 
221. 

Sand  Mountain,  Ala. ,  situation  and  char¬ 
acter  of,  21;  to  be  crossed  by  Union 
troops,  26,  27;  reconnoitring  cavalry  to 
cross,  27;  difficult  to  cross,  31. 

Sanford,  Maj.  J.  W.  A.,  3d  Ala.,  230. 

Scales,  Col.  Junius  I.,  30th  Mississippi, 
149,  227;  captured,  149. 

Schofield,  Gen.  John  M.,  Halleck  instructs 
to  reenforce  Rosecrans,  49. 

Schueler,  Lieut.  Gustavus,  1st  Missouri 
Light  Artillery,  Battery  G,  219. 


233 

Schultz,  Capt.  Frederick,  1st  Ohio  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  M,  216. 

Schultz’  (Capt.  Frederick)  battery,  where 
posted  by  Negley,  124. 

Scogin,  Capt.  John,  com.  Scogin’s  (Ga. ) 
battery,  225. 

Scogin’s  (Capt.  John,  Ga. )  battery,  225. 

Scott  (Rev. ),  Lieut.  E.  S.,  adjutant  of  89th 
Ohio,  205;  describes  capture  of  three 
regiments,  205-7;  inferences  from  his 
account,  207;  his  statements  contrasted 
with  Gen.  Smith’s,  209. 

Scott,  Col.  J.  S.,  com.  Scott’s  brig.,  232. 

Scott’s  (Col.  J.  S.)  brigade,  com.  off.,  232. 

Scott’s  (Tenn.)  battery,  com.  off.,  225. 

Scranton,  Maj.  Leonidas  S.,  2d  Michi- 

^  gan,  223; 

Scribner,  Col.  Benj.  F.,  strength  of  his 
brigade;  joins  Negley,  32;  ordered  to 
protect  trains  against  rebel  cavalry,  33; 
Baird  personally  posts;  routed  by  Lid¬ 
dell,  72;  com.  1st  brigade,  1st  division, 
14th  corps,  215. 

Scribner’s  (Col.  Benj.  F. )  brigade,  strength 
of;  joins  Negley,  32;  to  protect  trains 
against  rebel  cavalry,  33;  in  front  line 
of  Baird’s  division;  supports  Croxton, 
71;  Starkweather  to  take  position  to 
right  of;  Liddell’s  divis’n  captures  artil¬ 
lery  from,  72;  joins  Johnson’s  division, 
76;  attached  to  Baird’s  division;  reoc¬ 
cupies  former  position,  93;  ported  at 
corner  of  Kelley’s  field;  faces  to  east 
and  north,  101;  roster  of,  215;  casual¬ 
ties  in,  233. 

Scully,  Col.  James  W.,  10th  Tenn.,  222. 

Searcy,  Col.  A.,  45th  Tennessee,  229. 

Sebastopol,  Russia,  French  attack  upon,, 
mention,  109;  Gen.  McClellan  at,  169,. 

Sedan,  results  of  battle  of,  158. 

Seddon,  J.  A.,  rebel  secretary  of  war;  ex¬ 
tract  from  Longstreet’s  letter  to,  157. 

Sedgewick,  Col.  Thomas  D.,  2d  Ky.,  220. 

Seibert,  Lt.-Col.  Jas.  J.,  7th  Penn.,  223. 

Seidel,  Lt.-Col.  Chas.  B.,  3d  Ohio,  223. 

Semple,  Capt.  H.  C.,  com.  Semple’s  (Ala. ) 
battery,  225;  com.  artillery,  Cleburne’s 
division,  225. 

Semple’s  (Capt.  H.  C.)  battery,  Hill  com¬ 
pliments  action  of,  38,  225. 

Separation  of  columns  of  troops,  advan¬ 
tages  and  disadvantages  of,  167,  168. 

Sequatchie  River,  Tenn.,  described;  forms 
Walden’s  Ridge,  21. 

Sequatchie  Valley,  Tenn.,  Crittenden’s 
corps  in  upper  part  of,  26. 

Shackelford,  Col.  Geo.  T.,  6th  Kentucky, 
220. 

Shannon,  Lieut.  H.,  com.  Swett’s  battery, 
147,  149;  extract  from  report  of,  149; 
com.  Warren  Light  Artillery,  227. 

Shannon,  Maj.  P.  J.,  15th  Georgia,  228. 


284 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Sharp,  Col.  J.  H.,  44th  Mississippi;  com. 
Anderson’s  brigade,  228. 

Sharpshooters,  rebel,  engaged  at  Dug 
Gap,  38;  com.  off.,  225. 

Shaw,  Maj.  J.,  com.  Shaw’s  battal’n,  232. 

Shaw’s  (Maj.  J.)  battalion,  com.  off,  232. 

Sheffield,  Col.  J.  L.,  com.  Law’s  brigade, 
228. 

Shelbyville,  Ky.,  evacuated  by  Bragg,  10. 

Shellmount,  Tenn  ,  Reynolds  captures 
boats  at;  same  to  cross  the  Tennessee 
at,  26;  Crittenden  to  advance  by,  27. 

Shepherd,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  S.,  2d  Georgia, 
228. 

Sherer,  Capt.  Samuel  B.,  Co.  K,  15th  Ill. 
Cavalry,  219. 

Sheridan,  Maj. -Gen.  Philip  Henry,  repairs 
railroad  bridge  at  Bridgeport,  26;  forms 
his  division  under  heavy  fire;  mistaken 
statement  in  report  of,  1 1 7 ;  Negley 
holds  consultation  with;  gallant  conduct 
of  at  Missionary  Ridge,  129;  surprising 
inaction  of,  129,  130;  requested  by  Gen. 
Thomas  to  support  Brannan’s  right; 
arrives  too  late,  130;  Rosecrans  unable 
to  direct  movements  of;  Negley  learns 
of  approach  of;  latter  advises  to  support 
Thomas,  128;  com.  3d  division,  20th 
corps,  219. 

Sheridan’s  (Maj. -Gen.  Philip  H.)  division, 
to  remain  at  Stevenson  and  Bridgeport, 
24;  within  twelve  miles  of  Winston,  28; 
Lytle’s  brigade  attached  to,  89;  Brad¬ 
ley’s  brigade  attached  to,  90;  Laiboldt’s 
brigade  attached  to,  90,  97,  no,  116; 
part  of  near  Vineyard’s  farm;  rebel 
divisions  confronting,  96;  in  right  wing; 
bivouacs  west  of  Widow  Glenn’s  house, 
99;  part  of  Wilder’s  brigade  to  right  of; 
how  posted  on  morning  of  battle,  101; 
how  disposed,  no;  two  brigades  of  sent 
to  reenforce  Thomas,  in;  Wood  knew 
to  be  moving  to  support  Thomas,  1 14; 
to  move  from  extreme  left  to  extreme 
right,  116;  brigades  composing;  at¬ 
tacked  by  Hindman;  driven  toward  the 
Cove  road,  1 1 7 ;  retreats  to  Missionary 
Ridge;  presses  Manigault;  strength  and 
losses  of,  118;  separated  (with  Davis’) 
from  balance  of  army,  118,  120;  Davis, 
Ducat,  Negley,  and  Sheridan  consult  as 
to  movements  of;  to  move  to  Thomas’ 
support,  129;  strength  of  at  McFar¬ 
land’s  Gap,  129,  130;  roster  of,  219; 
casualties  in,  236;  strength  and  losses 
of,  239. 

Sherman,  Gen.  Wm.  Tecumseh,  numerical 
strength  of  his  army  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  160;  leading 
his  corps  from  Memphis  toward  Chat¬ 
tanooga,  1 60;  Grant  anxious  for  his 
arrival  before  the  battle  of  Missionary 


Ridge;  attacks  north  end  of  ridge,  163. 

Shiloh,  Grant  defeated  at,  14. 

Shy,  Maj.  W.  M.,  20th  Tennessee,  229. 

Simonson,  Capt.  Peter,  5th  Indiana  Light 
Battery,  218. 

Simpson,  Capt.  W,  P.,  23d  Tenn.,  229. 

Sirwell,  Col.  Wm.,  report  of,  cited,  125, 
126;  detaches  regiment  to  support  Bran- 
nan’s  artillery,  125;  his  statement  differs 
from  Negley ’s,  126;  com.  3d  brigade, 
2d  division,  14th  corps,  216. 

Sirwell’s  (Col.  Wm.)  brigade,  sent  to  sup¬ 
port  VanCleve,  92;  Negley  expects  to 
be  relieved  by,  102;  attached  to  Neg- 
ley’s  division,  no,  124,  129;  withdraws, 
no;  supports  artillery,  118,  124;  regi¬ 
ments  composing,  126;  roster  of,  216; 
casualties  in,  234. 

Sivley’s  Ford,  Stovall’s  brigade  posted 
at,  26. 

Slaughter,  Maj.  J.  N.,  34th  Alabama,  229. 

Slocomb,  Capt.  C.  H.,  com.  Slocomb’s 
(La.)  battery,  226. 

Slocomb’s  (Capt.  C.  H.,  La.)  battery,  226. 

Smith,  Col.  Arthur  A.,  83d  Illinois,  222. 

Smith,  Capt.  Edmund  L.,  1st  Battalion, 
19th  U.  S.,  215. 

Smith,  Col.  Franklin  C.,  102d  Ohio,  222. 

Smith,  Lieut.  Frank  G.,  4th  U.-S.  Artil¬ 
lery,  Battery  I,  216. 

Smith,  Capt.  Geo.  W.,  1st  Battalion,  18th 
U.  S.,  215. 

Smith,  Col.  J.  A.,  com.  3d  and  5th  Con¬ 
federate,  225. 

Smith,  Gen.  John  C.,  lieut. -gov.  of  Illi¬ 
nois;  major  of  96th  Ill.;  on  Steedman’s 
staff;  extract  from  letter  of;  contradicts 
officers  of  89th  Ohio,  208;  criticism  on 
his  conduct  and  statements,  208  et  seq. 

Smith,  Capt.  J.  D.,  24th  Mississippi,  227. 

Smith,  Lt.-Col.  J.  T.,  37th  Georgia,  229. 

Smith,  Col.  John  T.,  31st  Indiana,  220. 

Smith,  Capt.  Leonard  D.,  101st  Ohio,  218. 

Smith,  Maj.  Melanchton,  com.  artillery  of 
Cheatham’s  division,  225. 

Smith,  Brig. -Gen.  Preston,  strays  into  the 
Union  line  and  killed,  93;  com.  Smith’s 
brigade,  224. 

Smith’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Preston)  brigade,  re¬ 
lieved  by  Strahl;  in  Cheatham’s  front 
line,  74;  falls  back  for  want  of  ammu¬ 
nition,  75;  a  reserve  to  Cleburne,  93; 
attached  to  Cheatham’s  div’n,  93,  224; 
at  McFarland’s  Gap,  129;  roster,  224. 

Smith,  Col.  Robert  F.,  16th  Illinois,  222; 
com.  1st  brigade,  2d  division,  reserve 
corps,  222. 

Smith’s  (Col.  R.  F. )  brigade,  roster,  222. 

Smith,  Col.  T.  B.,  20th  Tennessee,  229. 

Smith’s  (Miss.)  battery,  com.  off,  225. 

Smith’s  Cross-roads,  Tenn.,  Minty  to  take 
position  at,  25. 


INDEX. 


285 


Snodgrass’  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  57. 

Snodgrass’  house,  Ga.,  rebels  carry  heights 
south  of,  210. 

Snowden,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  B.,  25th  Tennes¬ 
see,  88,  229. 

Snyder,  Lieut. -Col.  P.,  com.  6th  and  7th 
Arkansas,  227. 

Soldiers,  qualities  of  Union,  18,  19. 

South  Carolina  regiments:  1st,  228;  2d, 
attached  to  Kershaw’s  brigade;  compels 
Union  force  to  retire,  133;  makes  dash 
at  Stanley,  134;  repulsed,  135;  led  by 
Lieut. -Col.  Gaillard;  pursues  the  Union 
troops;  forced  to  retire,  138;  partici¬ 
pates  in  attack  with  Gracie’s  brigade, 
143;  com.  off.,  227;  2d  Rifles,  228;  3d, 
attached  to  Kershaw’s  brigade,  135,  227; 
makes  dash  at  Stanley,  134;  repulsed, 
135;  5th,  228;  6th,  228;  7th,  com.  off, 
227 ;  8th,  participates  in  attack  with 
Gracie’s  brigade,  143;  com.  off,  227; 
10th,  com.  off,  229;  15th,  participates 
in  attack  with  Gracie’s  brigade,  143; 
com.  off,  227;  16th,  com.  off,  226; 
19th,  com.  off,  229;  24th,  com.  off, 
226. 

Sparta,  Tenn.,  Minty’s  cavalry  advances 
by  way  of,  24. 

Spears,  Brig. -Gen.  J.  G.,  com.  3d  brigade, 
3d  division,  reserve  corps,  222. 

Spears’  (Brig. -Gen.  J.  G. )  brigade,  roster 
of,  222. 

Speer,  Maj.  A.  M.,  46th  Georgia,  226. 

Staff-officers,  necessity  for  special  educa¬ 
tion  of,  168;  volunteer  army  deficient  in 
this  respect,  168,  169;  Turchin  compli¬ 
ments  his  own,  189;  Reynolds  compli¬ 
ments,  195. 

Standart’s  battery,  Hazen  tries  to  get  in 
position,  81;  com.  by  Lt.  Baldwin,  82. 

Stanford,  Capt.  T.  J.,  com.  Stanford’s 
battery,  225. 

Stanford’s  (Capt.  T.  J.)  battery,  com.  off, 
225. 

Stanley,  Maj. -Gen.  David  S.,  com.  cav¬ 
alry  divisions  of  Army  of  Cumberland, 
13;  absent  from  battle  of  Chattanooga, 
223. 

Stanley,  Col.  Timothy  R.,  report  of,  cited, 
108;  says  he  had  no  support;  discre¬ 
pancy  between  his  report  and  Dick’s, 
130;  Dick  not  mentioned  in  report  of, 
13 1 ;  com.  2d  brigade,  2d  division,  14th 
corps,  216. 

Stanley’s  (Col.  Timothy  R.)  brigade,  re¬ 
lieved  by  Starkweather’s;  19th  Illinois 
attached  to,  33;  sent  to  support  Van 
Cleve,  92;  moves  to  the  left;  Negley 
accompanies,  102;  directed  to  the  left; 
joined  by  part  of  Beatty’s  brigade,  107; 
checks  Adams’  advance;  pursues  rebels; 
looks  for  reenforcements;  supported  by 


Dick;  falls  back  on  support;  breaks  and 
runs,  108;  attached  to  Negley’s  division, 
123,  125,  216;  of  what  regiments  com¬ 
posed;  estimated  strength  of;  success¬ 
fully  engages  Adams’;  is  subsequently 
scattered  and  reformed;  takes  position 
between  Brannan  and  Wood,  123;  led 
by  Col.  Stoughton;  supports  Battery  I, 
125;  hard  pressed  by  rebels;  Dick’s 
moves  to  support  of;  Col.  Dick  describes 
rout  of,  130;  joined  by  Gen.  John  Beatty, 
132;  repulses  rebel  dash,  134,  135;  ros¬ 
ter  of,  216;  casualties  in,  234. 

Stansel,  Col.  M.  L.,  41st  Alabama,  225. 

Stanton,  Col.  S.  S.,  28th  Tennessee,  224. 

Staples,  Maj.  W.  C.,  24th  Miss.,  227. 

Starkweather,  Capt.  F.  F.,  Gen.  Reynolds’ 
quartermaster-general,  195. 

Starkweather,  Brig. -Gen.  John  C.,  the 
strength  of  his  brigade;  joins  Negley, 
32;  apparently  ordered  to  support  Crox- 
ton;  mistakes  direction,  71;  com.  2d 
brigade,  1st  division,  14th  corps,  215. 

Starkweather’s  (Brig. -Gen.  John  C. )  bri¬ 
gade,  strength  of;  joins  Negley,  32; 
withdraws  beyond  Chickamauga  Creek; 
checks  rebel  advance;  relieves  Stanley’s, 
33;  in  Baird’s  reserve,  71;  to  take  posi¬ 
tion  to  Scribner’s  right;  suffers  severely 
from  Liddell’s  division,  72;  joins  John¬ 
son’s  division,  76;  attached  to  Baird’s 
division;  reoccupies  former  position,  93; 
forms  Baird’s  right;  next  to  Johnson’s 
division;  faces  east,  101;  roster  of,  215; 
casualties  in,  233. 

Steedman,  Brig. -Gen.  James  Blair,  two 
brigades  of  his  division  assigned  to  the 
reserves,  13;  reconnoitres  toward  Ring- 
gold,  59;  sends  a  regiment  to  destroy 
bridge,  69;  com’ds  division  of  reserve 
corps,  76,  137,  185,  189,  221;  89th  Ohio 
fights  under,  76,  185,  189;  ordered  to 
report  to  Thomas;  difficult  march  by  to 
battlefield;  ordered  to  support  Brannan, 
137;  places  his  batteries  in  position; 
ready  for  attack;  composition  of  his 
force;  has  horse  killed  under  him;  per¬ 
sonally  leads  charge  resulting  in  rebel 
rout,  138;  leads  two  brigades  to  field, 
201;  report  of,  201-3;  reports  in  person 
to  Thomas;  ordered  to  move  to  Wood’s 
left;  moves  to  Brannan’s  right,  202; 
makes  explanation  to  Carlton,  204;  or¬ 
ders  firing  ceased;  Capt.  Russell  reports 
orders  from,  206;  Gen.  Smith  on  staff 
of ;  approves  of  Smith’s  orders,  20S ; 
extract  from  report  of,  21 1;  hour  of  his 
withdrawal,  21 1,  212;  criticism  on  his 
withdrawal,  212;  com.  1st  div’n,  reserve 
corps,  Army  of  Cumberland,  221. 

Steedman’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Jas.  B.)  division, 
drives  in  rebel  pickets;  crosses  the  East 


286 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


Chickamauga;  drives  the  rebels  out  of 
Ringgold;  withdraws  before  superior 
force,  59;  supports  and  joins  McCook’s 
brigade,  6i;  attached  to  reserve  corps; 
comes  to  Rossville,  76;  saves  Union 
right  from  grave  reverses,  1 1 5 ;  Gen. 
Granger  describes  conduct  of,  138;  gal¬ 
lantry  of  shown  by  B.  R.  Johnson’s 
report,  139;  Thomas  unable  to  send  to 
weak  spot,  141;  brings  extra  ammuni¬ 
tion  to  Horseshoe  Ridge,  144,  199;  the 
first  to  leave  Horseshoe  Ridge;  two  of 
its  regiments  remain  with  Brannan,  153; 
on  Vanderveer’s  right;  withdraws  early 
in  the  evening,  154;  gallant  service  by 
at  Horseshoe  Ridge,  16 1;  appears  on 
Thomas’  left;  fights  its  way  to  Bran- 
nan’s  right,  198;  regiments  composing; 
other  regiments  attached  to;  a  forced 
march  by,  201;  retires  to  Rossville,  202; 
its  successful  attack  upon  five  rebel  bri¬ 
gades,  209;  its  withdrawal  discussed, 
209,  210,  211,  212;  roster  of,  221;  cas¬ 
ualties  in,  23 7,  238. 

Stevens,  Col.  C.  H.,  24th  S.  Carolina,  226. 

Stevens,  Capt.  Alanson  J.,  26th  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  Light  Battery,  221. 

Stevens’  Cove,  Ga.,  Reynolds’  division  ad¬ 
vances  into,  24. 

Stevens’  Gap,  Ga.,  location  of;  to  be  occu¬ 
pied  by  Reynolds’  advance,  26;  Negley 
dispatches  regiment  to  occupy ;  found 
obstructed  with  trees;  Negley  occupies 
road  leading  to,  27;  Negley’s  division 
descends  through,  32;  retreating  Union 
troops  arrive  at,  33;  Bragg  locates  Union 
troops  at;  orders  advance  upon,  35;  Hill 
locates  Thomas  at,  38;  Hindman  wants 
information  as  to  Union  forces  at,  36; 
same  learns  of  Union  retreat  toward,  39; 
Thomas’  division  at,  46;  McCook’s  cav¬ 
alry  might  have  descended  through,  52. 

Stevenson,  Tenn.,  a  base  of  supplies,  12, 
22,  23,  58;  division  of  Union  forces  sta¬ 
tioned  at,  13;  situation  of,  22;  Davis’ 
division  to  advance  toward;  a  part  of 
Sheridan’s  to  remain  at,  24;  Hooker’s 
reenforcements  between  Murfreesboro 
and,  160. 

Stewart,  Maj..Gen.  Alex.  P.,  ordered  to 
exercise  his  own  discretion,  74;  sends 
Clayton  to  support  Wright,  75;  orders 
various  brigades  to  attack,  76,  78,  79; 
com.  division,  Army  of  Tennessee,  229. 

Stewart’s  (Maj.-Gen.  Alex.  P.)  division, 
attached  to  Buckner’s  corps,  58;  moves 
from  Lafayette;  bivouacs  near  Pea-Vine 
church,  58,  59;  disposition  of  around 
Tedford’s  Ford,  62;  forms  on  B.  R. 
Johnson’s  left;  Preston  to  left  of,  67; 
Clayton’s  brigade  attached  to;  ordered 
posted  between  Cheatham  and  Hood, 


74;  placed  in  Gen.  Palmer’s  front,  75; 
Brown’s  brigade  attached  to,  78;  by 
what  Union  divisions  opposed,  95;  at¬ 
tached  to  Buckner’s  corps;  a  part  of 
rebel  left  wing,  103,  105;  in  Cheatham’s 
front,  105;  Bate’s  brigade  attached  to, 
106;  how  disposed  on  Union  right;  main 
rebel  column  of  attack  on  left  of,  1 1 5 ; 
Hood’s  column  next  to;  moves  to  at¬ 
tack;  falls  back;  unable  farther  to  par¬ 
ticipate  in  attack,  116;  stands  opposite 
weakest  spot  in  Union  lines;  why  not 
ordered  forward  by  Longstreet,  141;  to 
attack  Union  left,  on  left  of  Cleburne, 
146;  Brown’s  brigade  attached  to,  187; 
roster  of,  229;  strength  and  losses,  240. 

Stokes,  Capt.  James  H.,  Chicago  “  Board  - 
of-Trade”  Battery,  223. 

Stokes,  Col.  Wm.  B.,  5th  Tenn.,  223. 

Stone’s  Alabama  Battalion,  226. 

Stoughton,  Lieut. -Col.  Dwella  M.,  21st 
Ohio,  216. 

Stoughton,  Col.  Wm.  L.,  11th  Michigan, 
216;  com.  2d  brigade,  2d  division,  14th 
corps,  216. 

Stout,  Col.  Alex.,  17th  Kentucky,  123, 
220. 

Stovall,  Brig. -Gen.  M.  A.,  com.  Stovall’s 
brigade  in  Breckinridge’s  division,  149, 
226;  extract  from  report  of,  149. 

Stovall’s  (Brig. -Gen.  M.  A.)  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Breckinridge’s  division;  sta¬ 
tioned  at  Sivley’s  Ford;  reenforced  by 
Hindman,  26;  in  Breckinridge’s  centre, 
104;  falls  on  Beatty’s  right;  captures 
section  of  Bridge’s  battery,  105;  brushes 
away  Beatty’s  line;  stops  at  Chattanooga 
road;  drives  Baird’s  troops  from  barri¬ 
cades;  is  driven  back  and  pursued  by 
Baird,  107;  withdrawn  behind  Walker, 
108;  to  support  Liddell,  149;  attached 
to  Cleburne’s  division,  226. 

Strahl,  Brig. -Gen.  O.  F.,  com.  brigade  in 
Cheatham’s  division,  45,  224;  tries  to 
draw  Union  forces  to  attack  Cheatham, 
45- 

Strahl’s  (Brig. -Gen.  O.  F. )  brigade,  in 
Cheatham’s  second  line;  relieves  Pres¬ 
ton  Smith,  74;  attached  to  Cheatham’s 
division,  224. 

Stratton,  Lt.-Col.  Henry  G.,  19th  Ohio, 
220. 

Streight,  Col.  Abel  D.,  51st  Indiana,  219. 

Strong,  Col.  Hiram,  93d  Ohio,  218. 

Strong,  Capt.  Luther  M.,  49th  Ohio,  218. 

Substitutes,  restrictions  should  be  placed 
on  system  of,  181. 

Sugg,  Col.  C.  A.,  com.  part  of  Gregg’s 
brigade,  1 1 5,  23 1;  com.  50th  Tenn,  231. 

Suman,  Col.  Isaac  C.  B.,  9th  Indiana,  220. 

Summerville,  Ga.,  McCook  ordered  to 
move  toward,  29,  31. 


INDEX. 


287 


Supply-trains  move  toward  Chattanooga 
65. 

Sutermeister,  Capt.  Arnuld,  11th  Indiana 
Light  Battery,  219. 

Swaine,  Col.  Peter  T.,  99th  Ohio,  221. 

Swallow,  Capt.  George  R.,  7th  Indiana 
Light  Battery,  221. 

Swallow’s  (Capt.  Geo.  R.)  battery,  em¬ 
ployed  by  Reynolds  to  rally  stragglers, 
79;  placed  by  Reynolds  in  reserve,  19 1. 

Swanwick,  Lt.-Col.  Francis,  22d  Ill.,  219. 

Swett’s  battery,  attached  to  Liddell's  div¬ 
ision;  com.  by  Lieut.  Shannon,  147, 
149;  engaged  by  Union  battery  west  of 
McDannel’s  field;  fires  occasional  shots 
at  Reynolds’  troops,  147;  a  portion  of 
captured,  149,  227. 

Sykes,  Lieut. -Col.  W.  L.,  5th  Miss.,  224. 

T 

Taggert,  Capt.  Westford,  25th  Illinois,  218 

Tankesley,  Capt.  R.  M.,  com.  15th  and 
37th  Tennessee,  229. 

Tansill,  Col.  E.  E. ,  31st  Tennessee,  224. 

Tan  talon,  Tenn.,  Negley’s  division  to  ad¬ 
vance  by  way  of,  24. 

Taylor,  Col.  Marion  C.,  15th  Ky.,  216. 

Taylor,  Lt.-Col.  Marsh  B.,  10th  Ind.,  216. 

Taylor,  Maj.  W.  A.,  com.  17th,  18th, 
24th,  and  25th  Texas,  225. 

Taylor’s  (Va. )  battery,  attached  to  Long- 
street’s  corps,  228. 

Taylor’s  Ridge,  Ga.,  where  situated;  is 
crossed  by  Chattanooga -and -Atlanta 
Railroad,  22. 

Teamsters,  stampede  of  Union,  119. 

Tedford’s  Ford,  Ga.,  Buckner’s  corps  to 
cross  the  Chickamauga  at,  54;  Polk  to 
cross  the  Chickamauga  at  if  necessary, 
55;  disposition  of  rebel  troops  around, 
62;  Hill  and  Cleburne  ordered  to  cross 
at;  Hill  to  report  to  Bragg  at,  92. 

Tennessee,  East,  Buckner’s  cavalry  occu¬ 
pying;  Burnside  about  to  enter,  24; 
Buckner  reported  to  be  evacuating,  27; 
Burnside  scattering  his  forces  through; 
Burnside  telegraphs  occupation  of  all 
of,  48;  rebel  cavalry  chased  through 
Middle,  160;  disastrous  character  of 
Buell’s  campaign  in,  163. 

Tennessee,  military  department  of  East 
created;  Burnside  in  command;  in  same 
theatre  of  war  as  Middle  Tennessee; 
military  department  of  Middle  created; 
Rosecrans  in  command;  in  same  theatre 
of  war  as  East  Tennessee;  military  de¬ 
partments  of  East  and  Middle  created; 
Rosecrans  in  command  in  Middle  and 
Burnside  in  East  Tennessee;  in  same 
theatre  of  war,  14. 

Tennessee  regiments,  rebel:  1st,  consoli¬ 


dated  with  Johnson’s  brigade;  in  Long- 
street’s  front,  1 15;  com.  off.,  224,  231, 
232;  2d,  com.  off.,  225,  232;  3d,  move¬ 
ments  by,  87,  88;  to  what  brigade  at¬ 
tached,  87,  231;  with  Johnson’s  div’n; 
confused  by  Union  volley, 92;  com.  off., 
23 1;  4th  (two  reg’ts),  com.  off.,  224, 
23B  232;  5th,  com.  off.,  224,  232;  6th, 
com.  off.,  224;  8th,  com.  off.,  224,  232; 
9ih,  com.  off,  224,  232;  10th,  com.  off, 
23E232;  Hth,  com.  off,  224, 232;  12th, 
com.  off.,  224,  232;  13th,  com.  off,  224; 
15th,  forms  part  of  Bate’s  reserve,  82, 
83;  pursues  Union  troops,  83;  com.  off, 
229;  16th,  com.  off,  224,  232;  17th, 
advances  across  Lafayette-and-Chatta- 
nooga  road,  88;  Capt.  F.  P.  Ferry  at¬ 
tached  to,  210;  com.  off.,  229;  ISth, 
attached  to  Brown’s  brigade;  retires  in 
confusion,  78;  com.  off,  229;  19th,  com. 
off,  224,  232;  20th,  attached  to  Bate’s 
brigade,  82,  229;  engaged  with  Hazen, 
82;  com.  off,  229;  23d,  effective  charge 
by,  60;  aids  in  capturing  Union  battery, 
88;  com.  off,  229;  24th,  com.  off,  224; 
25th,  com.  by  Lt.-Col.  Snowden;  aids 
in  capturing  Union  battery,  88;  com. 
off,  229;  26th,  of  Brown’s  brigade,  78, 
229;  com.  off,  229;  27th,  com.  off,  224; 
28th,  com.  off,  224;  30th,  231;  31st, 
com.  off,  224;  32d,  of  Brown’s  brigade, 
78,  229;  com.  off,  229;  33d,  224;  35th, 
com.  off,  225;  37th,  part  of  Bate’s  re¬ 
serve,  82,  83;  pursues  Union  troops,  83; 
com.  off,  229;  38th,  com.  off ,  224;  41st, 
of  Gregg’s  brigade,  87,  88,  92,  135,  23 1; 
attacks  Beatty,  87;  receives  volley  from 
Union  troops,  88;  with  Johnson’s  div’n; 
confused  by  Union  volley,  92;  com.  off, 
231;  44th,  com.  off,  229;  45th,  of 
Brown’s  brigade,  78,  229;  retires  in 
confusion,  78;  com.  off,  229;  47th, 
com.  off,  224;  48th,  com.  off,  225; 
50th,  of  Gregg’s  division;  extends  its 
front,  86;  consolidated  with  Johnson’s 
brigade;  in  Longstreet’s  front,  1 1 5 ;  com. 
off,  231;  51st,  com.  off,  224;  52d,  com. 
off,  224;  63d,  com.  off,  143, 230;  154th, 
com.  off,  224;  Forrest’s,  231. 

Tennessee  regiments,  Union:  1st,  com. 
off,  223;  2d,  com.  off,  222,  223;  5th, 
com.  off,  222,  223;  6th,  com.  off,  222; 
10th,  com.  off,  222;  1st  Battery,  222. 
Tennessee  River,  Bragg  retreats  to,  10; 
Union  lines  extended  to;  foraging  along, 
12;  crossed  by  Rosecrans’  forces,  17; 
general  course  of;  crossed  by  railroad 
at  Bridgeport,  21;  Lookout  Mountain 
situate  on,  22;  Hazen  to  make  a  feint 
to  cross  the;  North-Chickamauga  Creek 
empties  into;  bridged  by  pontoons,  25; 
preparations  for  crossing;  where  Bragg 


288 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


expected  Crittenden  to  cross,  26;  date 
of  crossing  by  Army  of  Cumberland,  27; 
operations  by  Union  troops  after  cross¬ 
ing,  27,  28;  Crittenden  to  call  Union 
forces  across,  28;  Bragg  considers  it 
impossible  to  move  to  north  of,  159; 
rebel  cavalry  save  themselves  by  swim¬ 
ming,  160;  Rosecrans  would  have  re¬ 
opened  railroad  south  of,  164;  Carlton 
reports  to  Granger  on  north  bank  of, 
203,  204. 

Tennessee,  Army  of  the,  see  Army  of  the 

Texas  regiments:  1st,  com.  off.,  228;  4th, 
com.  off.,  228;  5th,  com.  off.,  228;  6th, 
com.  off.,  225;  7th,  of  Gregg’s  brigade, 
1 1 5,  231;  consolidated  with  Johnson’s; 
in  Longstreet’s  front,  115;  com.  off., 
231 ;  8th,  to  what  brigade  attached,  231 ; 
9th,  to  what  brig,  attached,  226;  10th, 
com.  off.,  225,  226;  11th,  to  what  brig, 
attached,  231;  14th,  to  what  brigade 
attached,  226;  15th,  com.  off.,  225;  17th, 
com.  off,  225;  18th,  com.  off,  225;  24th, 
com.  off,  225;  25th,  com.  off,  225;  32d, 
to  what  brigade  attached,  226.  ' 

Thomas,  Capt.  Armstrong  J.,  98th  Ohio, 
221. 

Thomas,  Maj.-Gen.  George  Henry,  com. 
14th  corps,  12,  185,  215;  com.  centre 
corps;  advances  on  Chattanooga,  24;  to 
be  followed  by  Crittenden,  27 ;  orders 
issued  to  as  to  crossing  Tenn.  River,  26; 
disposition  of  his  corps  after  crossing 
the  Tennessee;  secures  passes  of  Look¬ 
out  Mountain;  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Trenton  and  Valley  Head,  27;  Garfield 
communicates  Rosecrans’  orders  to,  29; 
might  have  marched  to  Chattanooga; 
climbs  over  Lookout,  30;  ordered  to 
move  to  Lafayette;  finds  it  difficult  to 
cross  Sand  Mountain,  31;  receives  dis¬ 
patch  from  McCook;  supposed  to  beat 
Lafayette,  33;  extracts  from  Rosecrans’ 
dispatch  to;  ordered  to  call  up  McCook, 
34;  opposite  Bragg;  forty  miles  from 
McCook;  twenty-five  miles  from  Crit¬ 
tenden,  34,  40;  ordered  to  instruct  Mc¬ 
Cook  to  join  him,  41;  unable  to  help 
Crittenden,  46;  posts  Brannan’s  division 
at  Bailey’s  Cross-roads,  50;  McCook 
ordered  to  join,  51,  53;  McCook’s  cav¬ 
alry  might  have  joined,  52 ;  to  take 
position  near  Kelley’s  farm;  to  connect 
with  Crittenden;  extract  from  report  of, 
65;  his  advance  not  observed;  learns 
Wilder’s  position,  66;  his  proposed  line 
of  formation,  66,  67;  Bragg  might  have 
isolated,  68;  met  by  Dan  McCook;  mis¬ 
led  by  latter  as  to  rebel  movements;  his 
consequent  orders;  his  report  thereupon 
cited,  69;  Rosecrans  sends  Johnson’s 
division  to;  asked  by  Brannan  for  reen¬ 


forcements,  70;  Croxton  asks  and  re¬ 
ceives  reenforcements  from,  71 ;  Rose¬ 
crans  sends  Johnson’s  division  to,  73; 
Palmer’s  division  to  report  to;  Grose 
communicates  with,  74;  orders  two  bri¬ 
gades  from  Brannan  to  support  Reyn¬ 
olds,  79;  orders  Brannan  to  reenforce 
Reynolds,  82;  Negley  ordered  to  sup¬ 
port;  surmises  by  Negley  as  to  attacks 
upon,  91 ;  shows  Baird  and  Johnson 
positions  to  be  occupied,  93;  commands 
left  wing;  looks  over  ground  around 
Kelley’s  farm;  posts  his  divisions,  99; 
arranges  his  wing  in  line  of  battle,  100; 
urges  Negley  to  move;  Rosecrans  orders 
Beatty’s  brigade  to;  orders  Beatty  tow¬ 
ard  McDannell’s;  sends  for  balance  of 
Negley ’s  div’n;  orders  Negley  to  mass 
artillery,  102;  report  of,  cited,  102,  151, 
209;  sends  for  Negley’s  troops,  107; 
sends  to  Rosecrans  for  reenforcements, 
107,  no,  1 12;  sends  alarming  reports 
to  Rosecrans,  1 1 1 ;  reenforcements  sent 
to  by  Rosecrans’  orders,  III,  1 1 3 ;  or¬ 
ders  Wood  to  support  Baird,  1 2 1 ;  issues 
orders  to  Negley  as  to  artillery,  124; 
Negley  unable  to  communicate  with, 
126;  Negley  would  have  remained  on 
ridge  if  ordered  by,  127;  Rosecrans  un¬ 
able  to  reach;  Garfield  to  communicate 
with,  128;  Negley  suggests  to  Sheridan 
expediency  of  going  to  support  of,  128, 
129;  Sheridan  to  move  to  support  of, 
via  Lafayette  road,  129;  asks  Davis  and 
Sheridan  to  support  Brannan’s  right, 
130;  Granger  and  Steedman  report  to; 
orders  Steedman  to  support  Brannan, 
137;  perceives  weak  spot  in  Union  line; 
unable  to  send  Steedman  there,  141; 
ordered  by  Rosecrans  to  assume  com¬ 
mand,  144,  165;  his  ammunition-train 
brought  to  the  front;  Garfield  succeeds 
in  reaching;  ordered  to  assume  com¬ 
mand  and  withdraw  to  Rossville,  144, 
199;  Capt.  Barker  attached  to  staff  of; 
in  rear  of  Wood;  personally  instructs 
Reynolds,  147,  190;  orders  Reynolds  to 
initiate  retreat  to  Rossville,  147,  193, 
209;  learns  of  the  presence  of  rebels  in 
woods  west  of  Chattanooga  road;  gives 
instructions  to  Reynolds ;  points  out 
enemy’s  location  to  Turchin,  148;  des¬ 
cribes  rout  of  rebels  by  Turchin,  149, 
150;  his  praise  of  Turchin’s  brigade  in¬ 
adequate,  150;  Gen.  Reynolds  mentions 
orders  by,  152;  other  allusions  to  made 
by  Reynolds,  153;  advises  Rosecrans 
that  Union  position  may  be  turned,  157; 
disperses  rebel  army  at  Nashville,  160; 
analysis  of  his  character,  164;  his  dis¬ 
tinguished  services  at  Chickamauga, 
164,  165;  right  hand  of  Buell  and  Rose- 


INDEX. 


crans;  refuses  to  supersede  either;  per¬ 
suaded  by  Rosecrans  to  accept  com¬ 
mand;  soldiers’  feelings  toward;  Rose¬ 
crans’  confidence  in;  appropriately  nick¬ 
named  “Rock  of  Chickamauga,  ”  165; 
Hindman  not  the  man  to  attack;  why 
Bragg  failed  to  strike  at  Stevens’  Gap, 
168;  commands  left  wing  of  six  divis¬ 
ions,  173;  orders  Reynolds  to  McDan- 
nell’s  house,  186;  orders  Turchin  to  hold 
position,  187;  reports  losses  in  Turchin’s 
brigade,  189,  190;  Reynolds  reports  in 
person  to,  190;  his  orders  to  Reynolds, 
190,  194;  Palmer  to  keep  close  to,  196; 
report  of,  198-200;  orders  division  com¬ 
manders  to  withdraw,  200,  209;  orders 
Reynolds  to  move  his  position,  201; 
Steedman  reports  in  person  to,  202;  see 
also  Fourteenth  Corps. 

Thompson,  Maj.  T.  W.,  4th  Ky.,  225. 

Thurman,  Tenn.,  Wood’s  division  moves 
toward,  24. 

Thruston,  Lt.-Col.  Gates  P.,  ass’t  adj.-gen. 
to  McCook;  carries  orders  from  Thomas 
to  Davis  and  Sheridan,  130;  attached 
to  McCook’s  staff;  meets  Thomas,  199. 

Tillman,  Lt.-Col.  J.  E.,  41st  Tennessee, 
135,  23I>  severely  wounded,  135. 

Tilson,  Col.  John,  10th  Illinois,  222. 

Timmons,  Sergt.  L.  E.,  of  Co.  I,  7th  Fla.; 
captures  colors  of  21st  Ohio,  154. 

Toomer,  Capt.  B.  F.,  24th  Miss.,  227. 

Topography  of  the  country  around  Chat¬ 
tanooga,  58. 

Topographical  maps,  indispensable  to  the 
army;  collected  by  ambassadors  at  the 
European  courts;  U.  S.  destitute  of;  its 
value  to  farmers,  miners,  etc. ;  the  U.  S. 
should  publish,  167. 

Topping,  Lieut.-Col.  Ebenezer  H.,  110th 
Illinois,  220. 

Toulmin,  Capt.  H.  T. ,  22d  Alabama,  229. 

Towers,  Lieut.  Joel,  4th  Georgia,  229. 

Townsend,  Capt.  J.  M.,  3d  S.  Car.,  227. 

Tracy  City,  Tenn.,  railroad  branch  runs 
to;  desirable  to  collect  supplies  at,  24; 
situation  of;  89th  Ohio  detached  at,  76. 

Transportation,  Bragg  complains  of  want 
of,  159. 

Trenton,  Ga.,  Brannan’s  and  Reynolds’ 
divisions  remain  in  camp  near,  25;  in 
Lookout  Valley;  Thomas’  and  Mc¬ 
Cook’s  corps  in  neighborhood  of,  27; 
Garfield  writes  to  Thomas  from,  29. 

Trigg,  Col.  R.  C. ,  promises  Kelly  coop¬ 
eration,  153,  154;  extract  from  report 
of,  154;  reports  to  B.  R.  Johnson,  210; 
report  of,  cited,  212;  com.  Irigg’s  bri¬ 
gade,  230. 

Trigg’s  (Col.  R.  C.)  brigade,  ordered  to 
relief  of  Hood;  joins  Robertson;  attacks 
Carlin,  87;  sent  to  reenforce  Hood;  sup- 


389 

ported  by  Robertson;  attacks  Carlin 
and  Barnes,  89;  attached  to  Preston’s 
division,  89,  118,  116,  210,  212,  230; 
held  in  reserve,  116;  reenforces  Mani- 
gault,  1 18;  left  with  Buckner  by  Pres¬ 
ton,  142;  moves  to  Kelly’s  right;  cap¬ 
tures  three  Union  regiments  with  colors 
and  arms,  154;  supports  Kelly  and 
Grade,  153;  forms  on  Kelly’s  left,  154; 
relieves  Gregg’s  brigade,  210. 

Tripp,  Lt.-Col.  Hagerman,  6th  Ind.,  218. 

Trusler,  Maj.  Gilbert,  36th  Indiana,  220. 

Trusler,  Col.  Nelson,  84th  Indiana,  221. 

Tucker,  Capt.  C.  G.,  32d  Tennessee,  229. 

Tucker,  Col.  W.  F.,  41st  Mississippi,  228. 

Tullahooma,  Tenn.,  evacuated  by  Bragg, 
10;  rebels  defeated  at,  12;  Rosecrans’ 
influence  strengthened  by  campaign  of, 
164. 

Tunnel  Hill,  Ga.,  Wilder  pursues  rebel 
cavalry  toward,  41 ;  Wilder  engages 
Scott’s  cavalry  on  march  toward,  42. 

Turchin,  Brig. -Gen.  John  Basil,  reconnoi¬ 
tres  and  skirmishes  around  Catlett’s 
Gap,  52,  53;  retires  to  camp,  53;  Reyn¬ 
olds  sends  message  to;  cydered  to  join 
his  regiments,  75;  consolidates  his  bri¬ 
gade  on  Palmer’s  left,  76;  orders  bayo¬ 
net  charge;  suggests  halt;  complimented 
by  Palmer  on  his  courage,  77;  describes 
events  in  which  he  participated,  148  n; 
has  horse  killed  under  him,  151,  194; 
directs  advance  on  foot,  15 1;  secures 
artillery  horse  and  rejoins  his  brigade, 
1 5 1,  152;  com.  brigade  in  Reynolds’ 
division,  185;  report  of,  185-90;  forms 
his  brigade  on  Cruft’s  left;  sudden  re¬ 
versal  of  orders  to,  186;  orders  charge; 
consults  with  Cruft;  ordered  to  take 
Hazen’s  place;  directed  to  hold  posi¬ 
tion,  187;  ordered  to  change  front,  188; 
reforms  his  brigade;  complimented  by 
Gen.  Reynolds,  194;  complimented  by 
Palmer,  197;  com.  3d  brigade,  4th  div¬ 
ision,  14th  corps,  217. 

Turchin’s  (Brig. -Gen.  John  B.)  brigade, 
attached  to  Reynolds’  division,  52,  106, 
140,  185,  217;  remains  at  Catlett’s  Gap, 
53;  Gen.  Reynolds’ orders  to;  reenforces 
Palmer;  where  posted;  portion  of  sup¬ 
ports  Hazen,  75;  forms  in  the  place  of 
Hazen’s,  76,  80;  on  Cruft’s  left,  76; 
makes  bayonet  charge  on  rebel  right 
flank;  joined  by  Cruft;  separated  from 
King’s;  possible  fate  of;  Palmer  des¬ 
cribes  attack  upon;  bravery  of  officers 
of;  not  borne  back,  77;  bravery  of,  78; 
forms  Reynolds’  left;  closes  on  Palmer’s 
right,  100;  posted  in  echelon  by  Poe’s 
field,  106;  joined  by  part  of  King’s,  122; 
89th  Ohio  attached  to,  138;  to  seize 
Cooper’s  Gap,  50;  supported  by  Reyn- 


290 


CHICICAMAUGA. 


olds  with  remnants  of  second  brigade, 
140;  moves  by  right  flank  along  Chat¬ 
tanooga  road,  147;  in  what  position 
ordered  to  form;  impetuously  charges 
rebels  in  the  woods;  drives  Govan  and 
Walthall  across  the  Chattanooga  road; 
clears  Union  rear  from  rebels;  captures 
prisoners  and  artillery,  148;  Thomas 
describes  rout  of  rebels  by,  149,  150, 
200;  Thomas’ praise  of  inadequate,  150; 
advances  in  two  lines;  closely  followed 
by  King’s;  attacks  Liddell  without  sup¬ 
port  ;  Reynolds  rides  behind  extreme 
right  of,  1 5 1 ;  Reynolds’  ignorant  of  the 
movements  of,  1 5 1,  152,  192;  forms  on 
left  of  Dan  McCook’s,  152;  regiments 
composing,  85,  217;  how  designated; 
89th  Ohio  becomes  detached  from;  holds 
Catlett’s  Gap;  placed  in  reserve,  185; 
gallant  charges  by,  187,  188,  200;  to 
support  McCook’s,  188;  ordered  south¬ 
east  of  Kelley’s  Cross-roads,  190;  in 
Reynolds’  front  line;  on  Palmer’s  right, 
192;  Reynolds  fails  to  mention  regi¬ 
mental  commanders  in,  195  n;  tempo¬ 
rarily  commanded  by  Palmer,  ig6n; 
forms  on  Cruft’s  left;  relieves  Hazen; 
borne  down  by  heavy  rebel  force,  197; 
not  mentioned  by  Gen.  Palmer;  saves 
Palmer’s  division  from  rout,  198;  closely 
followed  by  King’s;  takes  position  with 
Robinson  and  Willich,  200;  roster  of, 
217;  casualties  in,  235. 

Turner,  Lieut.  George  B.,  adjutant  of  92d 
Ohio;  gallant  conduct  of,  189. 

Turner,  Capt.  B.  M.,  4th  Georgia,  229. 

Turner,  Lieut.  George  D.,  com.  Water’s 
(Ala.)  battery,  229. 

Turner,  Maj.  Joseph  D.,  5th  Tenn.,  222. 

Turner,  Lieut.  William  B.,  com.  Smith’s 
(Miss.)  battery,  225. 

Twentieth  Corps,  Gen.  Alexander  Mc¬ 
Dowell  McCook,  com’d’g;  a  part  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland;  composed  of 
three  div’ns;  concentrated  around  Win¬ 
chester,  Tenn.,  13;  div’ns  of;  advances 
toward  Chattanooga,  24;  in  neighbor¬ 
hood  of  Trenton  and  Valley  Head,  27; 
marches  toward  Winston,  28;  climbs 
over  Lookout,  30;  ordered  to  move 
toward  Alpine  and  Summerville ;  or¬ 
dered  to  pursue  rebels  by  way  of  Ring- 
gold  and  Dalton,  31;  near  Alpine,  40; 
crosses  Lookout  to  Chattanooga;  subse¬ 
quent  movements  of,  40  et  seq.;  to  join 
Fourteenth,  41 ;  to  take  position  on 
Missionary  Ridge;  to  cover  Chattanooga 
Valley,  46;  Rosecrans  describes  distance 
of  from  opposite  flank;  to  move  toward 
Chickamauga  Creek,  50;  should  have 
been  withdrawn  to  Chattanooga;  or¬ 
dered  to  join  14th;  encamps  in  Lookout 


Valley,  51;  Reynolds’  movements  while 
waiting  for ;  bivouacking  in  Lookout 
Valley ;  movements  possible  by,  52 ; 
descends  into  McLamore’s  Cove;  occu¬ 
pies  positions  vacated  by  Thomas;  con¬ 
nects  with  Reynolds  on  the  left,  53; 
Bragg  anticipates  junction  of  Crittenden 
and,  54;  its  only  road  for  escape,  63;  to 
assume  position  in  support,  64;  posted 
as  reserve  at  Crawfish  Spring,  67;  John¬ 
son’s  division  attached  to,  70,  73,  172; 
character  of  ground  occupied  by,  ioi; 
across  the  valley  of  Chattanooga,  157; 
divisions  of  might  have  occupied  Neg- 
ley’s  place,  172;  brigades  of  mixed  with 
those  of  other  corps,  172,  173;  might 
have  been  placed  between  Thomas  and 
Crittenden,  173;  roster  of,  217;  casual¬ 
ties  in,  236;  strength  and  losses,  239; 
see  also  McCook. 

Twenty-first  Corps,  Maj. -Gen.  Thomas  L. 
Crittenden,  com’d’g;  part  of  Army  of 
the  Cumberland;  composed  of  three 
divisions;  stationed  around  McMinn¬ 
ville,  13;  divisions  of;  a  part  of  the  left 
wing ;  advances  toward  Chattanooga, 
24;  Hindman  wants  to  crush,  36;  at 
Ringgold,  40;  in  front  of  Polk,  43; 
movement  possible  by,  52;  Bragg  an¬ 
ticipates  junction  between  McCook  and, 
54;  Thomas  to  pass  beyond;  VanCleve’s 
division  attached  to;  Palmer’s  division 
attached  to,  64;  how  situated  on  Sept. 
19th,  6 7;  WqocI’s  brigades  attached  to, 
no;  artillery  belonging  to  moved  tow¬ 
ard  Dyer’s  house,  1 1 8;  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  north  of  Rossville  Gap,  157; 
why  not  drawn  upon  for  reserves,  170, 
1 7 1 ;  Palmer’s  division  attached  to,  172; 
brigades  of  mixed  with  those  of  20th, 
172,  173;  McCook  might  have  been 
placed  between  Thomas  and,  173;  ros¬ 
ter  of,  219-21;  return  of  casualties  in; 
strength  and  losses  of,  239;  see  also 
Crittenden. 

Tyler,  Col.  R.  C.,  com.  15th  and  37th 
Tennessee,  229. 

U 

Uniforms,  suggestions  as  to  changes  in, 
183. 

United  States  regiments:  15th,  1st  Batt., 
com.  off.,  215;  casualties,  233;  16th,  1st 
Batt.,  com.  off.,  215;  casualties,  233; 
18th,  1st  Batt.,  com.  off.,  215;  casual¬ 
ties,  233;  18th,  2d  Batt.,  com.  off.,  215; 
casualties,  233;  19th,  1st  Batt.,  com. 
off.,  215;  casualties,  233;  4th  Cavalry, 
reports  for  duty  to  Crittenden;  recon¬ 
noitres  in  McLamore’s  Cove,  42;  com. 
off.,  223;  casualties,  238;  4th  Artillery, 


INDEX. 


291 


complimented  by  Hazen,  82;  Battery 
H  attached  to,  192;  com.  off.,  220;  cas¬ 
ualties,  237;  Battery  I,  com.  off,  216; 
casualties,  234;  Battery  I  attached  to, 
123,  124;  Battery  M,  com.  off,  220; 
casualties,  237;  5th  Artillery,  Battery 
H,  com.  off,  215;  casualties,  233. 

University  Place,  Tenn.,  Reynolds’  divis¬ 
ion  advances  from,  24. 

Urquhart,  Capt.  Moses  A.,  98th  Ohio,  221. 

V 

Vagueness,  sometimes  attaching  to  mili¬ 
tary  dispatches,  19. 

Valley-Head,  Ala.,  Johnson’s  and  Davis’ 
divisions  to  concentrate  near,  26;  in 
Lookout  Valley;  Thomas  and  McCook’s 
corps  in  neighborhood  of,  27. 

Valley  road,  Crittenden  to  take  to  Chat¬ 
tanooga,  27. 

VanCleve,  Brig. -Gen.  Horatio  P.,  leads 
division  toward  Pikeville,  24;  advances 
toward  Rossville,  40;  aids  Wilder  in 
routing  rebel  cavalry;  moves  from  Ring- 
gold  toward  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  41; 
ordered  by  Crittenden  to  reconnoitre 
on  Lafayette  road;  skirmishes  with  rebel 
cavalry,  42;  ignorance  of  as  to  rebel 
location,  42,  45;  leaves  Barnes’  brigade 
with  Wood’s  div’n,  85,  88;  establishes 
headquarters  at  Rossville;  Dick  reports 
to,  13 1 ;  com.  3d  div’n,  21st  corps,  220. 

v'anCleve’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Horatio  P. )  divis¬ 
ion,  advances  toward  Pikeville;  leaves 
brigade  at  McMinnville,  24;  aids  in  rout 
of  rebel  cavalry;  moves  toward  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  41;  bivouacs  at  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  42;  on  the  Gordon’s-mill 
road,  43;  at  Crawfish  Spring,  50;  move¬ 
ments  of  Barnes’  brigade  of,  53;  Barnes’ 
brigade  attached  to,  64,  no,  12 1;  to  be 
sent  to  left  of  Wood’s,  64;  Palmer’s  to 
move  to  left  of,  64,  65;  of  Crittenden’s 
corps,  64,  221;  Davis  ordered  to  sup¬ 
port;  portion  of  forms  to  right  of  Reyn¬ 
olds;  Heg  and  Carlin  to  right  of,  85; 
advances  on  Hood,  86;  Crittenden  or¬ 
ders  Wood  to  support,  88;  driven  be¬ 
yond  Lafayette-and- Chattanooga  road; 
driven  by  Johnson;  supported  by  Stan¬ 
ley  and  Sirwell,  91;  on  Union  right; 
near  Vineyard’s  farm;  by  what  rebel 
divisions  confronted,  96;  in  Union  right 
wing;  bivouacs  on  Missionary  Ridge, 
99;  Dick’s  brigade  attached  to,  108; 
forms  in  Wood’s  rear  as  a  reserve;  Rose- 
crans  promises  to  send  to  Thomas,  no; 
McCook  sends  to  Thomas,  III,  H3j 
Wood  knew  to  be  moving  to  Thomas’ 
support,  1 14;  crowding  on  Wood’s,  116; 
crowded  by  rebels,  118;  part  of  under 


Wood,  123;  roster  of,  220,  22 1;  casual¬ 
ties  in,  237;  strength  and  losses  of,  239. 

Vanderveer,  Col.  Ferdinand,  commands 
Brannan’s  reserve,  107;  Dick  not  men¬ 
tioned  in  report  of,  13 1;  report  of,  cited, 
J54>  2I2J  com.  3d  brigade,  3d  division, 
14th  corps,  216. 

Vanderveer’s  (Col.  Ferdinand)  brigade, 
moves  toward  Union  left,  69;  forming 
Brannan’s  reserve;  17th  Ohio  ordered 
to  join,  71;  attached  to  Brannan’s  div¬ 
ision,  72,  123,  216;  attacks  Liddell’s 
right;  joined  by  9th  Ohio,  72;  hard 
pressed  by  rebels;  drives  same  back,  73; 
regiments  composing,  109,  216;  sup¬ 
ported  by  Willich;  routs  rebels,  109; 
on  Horseshoe  Ridge;  drives  Go  van; 
strength  and  losses  of,  123;  Dick  forms 
in  rear  of;  Stanley’s  brigade  to  left  of, 
130;  part  of  Steedman’s  and  Negley’s 
commands  to  right  of,  153;  roster  of, 
216;  casualties  in,  234. 

VanPelt,  Lieut.  Geo.  W.,  taken  prisoner, 
72;  1st  Mich.  Light  Artillery,  Battery 
A,  215. 

VanTassell,  Lieut. -Col.  Oscar,  34th  Illi¬ 
nois,  218. 

Vantine,  Capt.  Chas.  H.,  21st  Ohio,  216. 

VanVleck,  Lieut. -Col.  Carter,  78th  Illi¬ 
nois,  221. 

VanZandt,  Maj.  K.  M.,  7th  Texas,  231. 

Vaughn,  Col.  A.  J.,  jr. ,  report  of,  cited, 
93  n;  strays  into  Union  line;  fired  at, 
93;  captures  prisoners  and  colors,  93, 
94;  com.  13th  and  154th  Tenn.,  224; 
com.  Smith’s  brigade,  224. 

Vedettes,  Union  cavalry,  observe  rebel 
movements,  69. 

Vicksburg,  Miss.,  ineffectual  attempts  to 
pass,  9;  Pemberton’s  forces  fall  back 
on;  surrender  of;  military  stores  des¬ 
troyed  at,  10;  rebel  losses  at,  12;  Hal- 
leck  telegraphs  Grant  and  Sherman  to 
reenforce  Rosecrans  from,  49. 

Victory,  discussion  of  meaning  of  term; 
difference  between  drawn  battle  and, 
157,  158. 

Vidito’s  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  57;  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge  north  of,  120;  Negley  posts 
artillery  southeast  of,  124;  rebels  push 
forward  to,  133. 

Vidito’s  field,  Ga.,  Dent’s  battery  posted 
in;  B.  R.  Johnson’s  brigade  extends 
across;  Union  forces  occupy  ridge  be¬ 
yond,  134;  Manigault’s  brigade  advances 
through,  136. 

Vidito’s  house,  Ga.,  character  of  ground 
around;  Union  artillery  posted  near, 
1 19;  B.  R.  Johnson’s  advance  passes  to 
north  of,  135* 

Vineyard’s  farm,  Ga.,  location  of,  57; 
rebels  halt  near,  61 ;  rebel  left  east  of. 


292 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


67;  Davis’  line  formed  in  front  of,  85; 
desperate  struggle  on;  Carlin  posts  bat¬ 
tery  in,  87;  enumeration  of  Union  div- 
ions  near,  96. 

Vineyard’s  field,  Ga.,  Robertson  and  Davis 
meet  at,  86. 

Virginia,  reenforcements  sent  to  Bragg 
from,  49,  50. 

Virginia,  Army  of,  see  Army  of 

Virginia  regiments:  54th,  privates  in  cap¬ 
ture  colors  of  22d  Michigan  and  89th 
Ohio,  154;  com.  off.,  230;  63d,  com. 
off.,  230. 

Volunteer  officers,  jealousy  of  regular  army 
officers  toward;  remedy  for,  177,  178. 

Volunteer  soldiers,  tribute  to,  166;  com¬ 
pared  with  regulars;  their  contempt  for 
the  regular  army,  180. 

W 

Waddell,  Col.  J.  D.,  20th  Georgia,  228. 

Wade,  Lt.-Col.  John  J.,  54th  Va.,  230. 

Wade,  Col.  W.  B.,  1st  Confederate,  231. 

Wagner,  Brig. -Gen.  Geo.  D.,  commands 
brigade;  subordinate  to  Hazen,  25;  op¬ 
posite  Chattanooga;  informs  Rosecrans 
of  evacuation  of  Chattanooga,  28;  com. 
2d  brigade,  1st  division,  21st  corps,  219. 

Wagner’s  (Brig. -Gen.  Geo.  D. )  brigade, 
opposite  to  Chattanooga,  28;  left  at 
Chattanooga  as  garrison,  40 ;  might 
have  been  ordered  from  Chattanooga; 
not  ordered  to  front,  98;  roster  of,  219. 

Walden,  Capt.  W.  D.,  2d  Alabama,  230. 

Walden’s  Ridge,  Tenn.,  how  formed;  de¬ 
scription  of,  21. 

Walker,  Col.  C.  H.,  com.  3d  and  50th 
Tennessee,  231. 

Walker,  Capt.  Chas.  H.,  21st  Wis.,  215. 

Walker,  Col.  F.  M.,  19th  Tenn.,  224. 

Walker,  Col.  Ivin  N.,  73d  Indiana,  220. 

Walker,  Col.  Moses  B.,  31st  Ohio;  under 
arrest;  does  good  service  on  Brannan’s 
staff,  132. 

Walker,  Maj.-Gen.  Wm.  H.  T.,  com.  re¬ 
serve  corps,  Army  of  Tennessee,  38, 
226;  follows  Cleburne  to  Dug  Gap;  to 
attack  Union  forces  in  front,  38. 

Walker’s  (Maj.-Gen.  W.  H.  T. )  division, 
moves  toward  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill, 
42;  on  Hindman’s  right,  43,  45;  dispo¬ 
sition  of,  45;  to  attack  at  Pea-Vine 
church,  46;  on  B.  R.  Johnson’s  left; 
opposite  Alexander’s  bridge;  to  coop¬ 
erate  with  Johnson’s  column,  54;  com¬ 
position  of;  bivouacs  at  Rock -Spring 
church,  59;  crosses  the  river  at  Byron’s 
F’d;  bivouacs  near  Alexander’s  bridge; 
reaches  Alexander’s  bridge ;  followed 
by  Buckner’s  corps,  62;  how  Bragg 
should  have  directed  movements  of,  63; 


Buckner  and  Cheatham  should  have 
crossed  behind,  64;  halts  at  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  67;  portion  of  reenforces 
Forrest,  71;  com.  corps;  Gist  should 
have  commanded  his  division,  71  n;  or¬ 
dered  to  attack  immediately,  72;  reserve 
of,  sent  against  Union  left,  73;  Cheat¬ 
ham  advances  to  relief  of,  74;  at  extreme 
rebel  right,  92;  by  what  Union  divisions 
opposed,  95;  Gist’s  brigade  attached  to, 
97;  joined  by  Gist’s  brigade;  part  of 
rebel  right  wing;  Liddell’s  division  at¬ 
tached  to,  103;  at  first  ordered  to  sup¬ 
port  Cheatham;  afterward  to  form  in 
rear  of  Breckinridge,  105;  Wilson’s  and 
Ector’s  brigades  attached  to ;  subse¬ 
quently  commanded  by  Hill;  part  of 
led  by  Gist,  107;  sustains  heavy  losses; 
does  not  participate  in  assault  on  left, 
109;  Breckinridge  to  pass  through;  Lid¬ 
dell’s  division  attached  to,  146;  two  div¬ 
isions  of  with  Gen.  Polk,  173;  roster 
of,  226. 

Wall,  Maj.  Sam.  D. ,  25th  Illinois,  218. 

Walthall,  Brig. -Gen.  E.  C.,  com.  Walt¬ 
hall’s  brigade,  in  Liddell’s  division,  149, 
227;  reticent  as  to  rout  by  Turchin,  149. 

Walthall’s  (Brig. -Gen.  E.  C. )  brigade,  at¬ 
tached  to  Liddell’s  division,  107,  147, 
227;  ordered  to  support  Gist,  107;  can 
not  get  near  Union  lines,  108;  holds 
Liddell’s  right  to  draw  the  Union  fire; 
assumes  position  across  Chattanooga 
road,  147;  driven  by  Turchin  to  right 
of  Chattanooga  road,  148,  149;  30th 
Mississippi  attached  to;  Stovall  to  sup¬ 
port,  149. 

Walworth’s  brigade,  moved  to  Thomas’ 
support,  hi. 

Walworth,  Col.  Nathan  H.,  com.  Brad¬ 
ley’s  brigade,  1 1 7 ;  com.  3d  brigade,  3d 
division,  20th  corps;  42d  Illinois,  219. 

Ward,  Lt.-Col.  Durbin,  leads  17th  Ohio, 
122,  216;  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  122. 

Ward,  Brig. -Gen.  T.  D.,  com.  2d  brigade, 
reserve  corps,  Army  of  Cumberl’d,  222. 

Ward’s  (Brig. -Gen.  T.  D. )  brigade,  ros¬ 
ter  of,  222. 

Wai*d,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  D.,  37th  Ind.,  216. 

Ward,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  M. ,  10th  Ohio,  215. 

Warm  Springs,  Ga.,  Bragg  dates  report 
from,  29. 

Warner,  Lt.-Col.  Darius  B.,  113th  Ohio, 
221. 

Warnock,  Capt.  James,  2d  Ohio,  215. 

Warren  Light  Artillery,  com.  off.,  227. 

Washington,  Tenn.,  Minty  to  reconnoitre 
from,  25. 

Water’s  (Ala.)  battery,  com.  off.,  229. 

Waters,  Col.  Louis  H.,  84th  Illinois,  220. 

Watkins,  Maj.  A.,  com.  8th  Arkansas  and 
1st  Louisiana,  227. 


INDEX. 


293 


Watkins,  Lieut.  Chas.  W.,  com.  Water’s 
(Ala.)  battery,  229. 

Watkins,  Col.  Louis  D.,  com.  3d  brigade, 
1st  div’n,  cavalry  of  reserve  corps,  223. 

Watkins’  (Col.  Louis  D.)  brigade,  roster 
of,  223;  casualties  in,  238. 

Watkins,  Col.- W.  M.,  com.  12th  and  47th 
Tennessee,  224. 

Watson,  Lt.  A.  T.,  com.  Scott’s  (Tenn.) 
battery,  225. 

Wauhatchie,  Tenn.,  Union  brigade  to  take 
post  at,  27. 

Weaver,  Capt.  J.  T.,  60th  N.  Car.,  226. 

Weedon,  Lt.-Col.  John,  22d  Ala.,  229. 

West,  Lieut. -Col.  Theodore  S.,  24th  Wis¬ 
consin,  219. 

West  Chickamauga  River,  described,  56. 

West-Point  Academy,  graduation  of  Gen. 
Llalleck  at,  13;  inadequate  to  national 
wants,  178. 

Wharton,  Maj.  Gabriel  C.,  10th  Ky.,  216. 

Wharton,  Brig. -Gen.  John  A.,  com.  div¬ 
ision,  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  231. 

Wharton’s  (Brig. -Gen.  John  A.)  division, 
roster  of,  23 1 . 

Wheeler,  Col.  J.  T.,  com.  Armstrong’s 
brigade,  232. 

Wheeler,  Maj. -Gen.  Joseph,  com.  cavalry, 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  231. 

Wheeler’s  (Maj. -Gen.  Joseph)  cavalry,  to 
attack  Wilder,  43 ;  on  extreme  rebel 
left,  54;  to  hold  gaps  in  Pigeon  Mts.,  55. 

Whitbeck,  Lieut.-Col.  Horatio  N. ,  65th 
Ohio,  220. 

White’s  (Ga. )  battery,  231. 

Whitehurst,  Capt.  Willis  G.,  38th  Illi¬ 
nois,  218. 

Whiteley,  Maj.  JL  H.,  2d  Georgia,  224. 

Whitemore,  Capt.  Henry  C.,  2d  Illinois, 
Battery  H,  222. 

Whittaker,  Maj.  Richard  T.,  com.  6th 
Kentucky,  220. 

Whittaker,  Brig. -Gen.  Walter  C.,  knocked 
off  his  horse  and  stunned,  138;  wounded; 
succeeded  by  Col.  Champion,  208;  com. 
1st  brigade,  1st  division,  reserve  corps, 
221 . 

Whittaker’s  (Brig. -Gen.  W.  C.)  brigade, 
ordered  to  Ringgold,  or  Red- House 
bridge;  unable  to  reach  latter,  61 ;  part 
of  Union  reserve  corps;  under  Gen. 
Steedman;  at  Red-PIouse  bridge,  137; 
led  by  Gen.  Steedman;  how  supported; 
charges  Deas  and  Manigault,  138;  led 
by  Steedman  to  battlefield,  201;  other 
regiments  attached  to,  204,  208;  led  by 
Col.  Champion,  208;  attached  to  Steed- 
man’s  division;  opposed  by  B.  R.  John¬ 
son,  209;  pressed  by  B.  R.  Johnson, 
210;  withdraws,  210,  211,  212;  roster 
of,  221;  casualties  in,  237. 

Wickliffe,  Lt.-Col.  J.  C.,  9th  Ivy.,  225. 


Wiggins’  (Ark.)  battery,  231. 

Wilber,  Almerick  W.,  1st  Michigan  Light 
Artillery,  Battery  A,  215. 

Wilder,  Col.  John  T.,  subordinate  to  Gen. 
Hazen;  commands  brigade  of  mounted 
infantry;  to  reconnoitre  opposite  Chat¬ 
tanooga,  25;  finds  advance  difficult;  en¬ 
gages  rebel  cavalry  under  Scott  and 
Pegram;  ignorance  of  as  to  rebel  loca¬ 
tion;  reconnoitres  through  Pea-Vine 
Valley,  42;  Wheeler  to  attack,  43;  re¬ 
ports  to  Gen.  McCook,  101;  com.  1st 
brigade,  4th  division,  14th  corps.  217. 

Wilder’s  (Col.  J.  T. )  brigade  (mounted), 
runs  rebel  cavalry  out  of  Ringgold;  pur¬ 
sues  same  toward  Tunnel  Hill;  ordered 
to  protect  Crittenden’s  left,  41;  difficul¬ 
ties  attending  march  of;  ordered  to  re¬ 
connoitre  through  Pea- Vine  Valley,  42; 
in  front  of  Polk,  43;  joins  Reynolds’ 
division  at  Pond  Spring,  51,  52;  recon¬ 
noitres  Bluebird  Gap,  53;  stationed  at 
Alexander’s  bridge,  59;  defends  Alex¬ 
ander’s  bridge,  62 ;  its  position  after 
being  driven  from  Alexander’s  bridge, 
66;  Thomas’  right  to  connect  with;  par¬ 
tially  fills  gap,  67;  joins  Carlin  on  the 
right,  85;  checks  rebel  pursuit,  89;  in 
Union  right  wing;  put  under  McCook, 
99;  portion  of  in  woods  to  Negley’s 
right;  the  remainder  strongly  posted  to 
Sheridan’s  right;  barricades  thrown  up 
by,  101;  remains  in  same  position,  no; 
takes  Manigault  in  flank,  118;  part  of 
detached  f/ora  Reynolds’  division,  194; 
roster  of,  217:  casualties  in,  234. 

Wileman,  Maj.  Abram  G.,  18th  Kentucky; 
wounded,  189. 

Wiley,  Col.  Aquila,  report  of,  cited,  84; 
com.  41st  Ohio,  220. 

Wilkinson,  Col.  J.  C.,  8th  Miss.,  224. 

Wilkes,  Col.  F.  C.,  com.  17th,  18th,  24th, 
and  25th  Texas,  225. 

Willard,  Capt.  John  P.,  of  Thomas’  staff; 
sent  with  orders  to  Negley,  102;  notifies 
com’ders  to  prepare  to  withdraw,  199. 

Williams,  Lt.-Col.  A.  J.,  25th  Ga.,  226. 

Williams,  Maj.  S.  C.,  com.  artillery  of 
Preston’s  division,  230. 

Williams,  Maj.  Wm.  D.,  89th  Ill.,  218. 

Williamsburg, Tenn.,  Gen.  Burnside  passes 
through,  16. 

Williamson,  Col.  James  A.,  2d  Arkansas 
Mounted  Rifles,  230. 

Willich,  Brig. -Gen.  August,  com.  brigade 
in  Johnson’s  div’n;  reports  to  Thomas; 
ordered  to  report  to  Reynolds,  200; 
com.  1st  brig.,  2d  div’n,  20th  corps,  218. 

Willich’s  (Brig. -Gen.  August)  brigade,  ad¬ 
vances  in  Johnson’s  right,  735  regiments 
connected  with ;  Goodspeed  s  battery 
attached  to;  supports  Vanderveer’s; 


2  94 


CHICKAMAUGA. 


pursues  rebels,  109;  of  Johnson’s  div¬ 
ision,  147,  186,  200;  opens  artillery  fire 
on  Liddell’s  front,  147 ;  acts  as  rear 
guard  for  retreating  left  wing,  153;  on 
Turchin’s  left;  advances  to  front,  186; 
aids  in  covering  retreat;  joined  by  Tur- 
chin  and  Robinson,  200;  roster  of,  218; 
casualties  in,  235. 

Willits,  Lieut.  Henry  J.,  com.  4th  Indiana 
Light  Battery,  215. 

Wilson,  Col,  C.  C.,  report  of,  cited,  73; 
com.  Wilson’s  brigade,  226. 

Wilson’s  (Col.  C.  C. )  brigade,  ordered  to 
reenforce  Forrest;  attacks  Croxton,  71; 
of  Walker’s  division,  71,  226;  Ector’s 
ordered  to  right  and  rear  of,  71;  suffers 
severe  losses,  73;  led  by  Gist;  to  sup¬ 
port  Colquitt,  107,  108;  ordered  to  at¬ 
tack  Union  left;  unable  to  support  Col¬ 
quitt,  108;  roster  of,  226. 

Wilson,  Col.  J.  A.,  24th  Tennessee,  224. 

Winchester,  Tenn.,  14th  and  20th  corps 
concentrated  about,  13. 

Winston,  Ala.,  Sheridan  within  twelve 
miles  of,  28. 

Winston’s  Gap,  Ala.,  location  of;  to  be 
occupied  by  McCook’s  advance;  seized 
and  occupied  by  Davis’  division,  27; 
other  divisions  marching  toward,  28. 

Winters,  Lieut. -Col.  Joshua  C.,  59th  Illi¬ 
nois,  217.  4 

Wisconsin  regiments:  1st,  com.  off.,  215 
223;  casualties  in,  233;  10th,  com.  off, 
215;  casualties  in,  233;  13th,  com.  off., 
222;  15th,  com.  off.,  218;  casualties  in, 
235;  21st,  com.  off.,  215;  casualties  in, 
233;  22d,  com.  off.,  221;  24th,  com.  off., 
219;  casualties  in,  236;  Artillery:  3d 
Light  Battery,  com.  off.,  221;  casualties 
in,  237;  5th  Light  Battery,  com.  off., 
218;  8th  Light  Battery,  com.  off.,  218; 
10th  Light  Battery,  com.  off.,  222. 

Wofford,  Brig. -Gen.  W.  T.,  com.  Wof¬ 
ford’s  brigade,  227. 

Wofford’s  (Brig. -Gen.  W.  T.)  brigade,  of 
McLaw’s  division,  Army  of  Tenn.,  227. 

Wolihin’s  (Ga. )  battery,  230. 

Wood,  Lt.-Col.  Chas.  H.,  51st  Ohio,  221. 

Wood,  Col.  Gustavus  A.,  15th  Ind. ,  219. 

Wood,  Lieut.  R.  L.,  com.  Bledsoe’s  (Mo.) 
battery,  231. 

Wood,  Brig.-Gen.  S.  A.  M.,  of  Hill’s 
corps;  Hindman  receives  copy  of  com¬ 
munication  from,  35;  com.  Wood’s  bri¬ 
gade,  225. 

Wood’s  (Brig.-Gen.  S.  A.  M. )  brigade, 
forms  Cleburne’s  centre,  92 ;  makes 
night  attack  on  Johnson,  93;  of  Cle¬ 
burne’s  division,  93,  225;  under  heavy 
artillery  fire;  forms  Cleburne’s  centre, 
105;  advance  of  checked;  part  of  passes 
over  Bate’s  brigade;  attempts  to  advance 


near  Poe’s  field;  driven  back;  heavy 
loss  by;  withdrawn  to  rear;  left  of  op¬ 
posite  Reynolds’;  exposed  to  oblique 
cross-fire,  106. 

Wood,  Brig.-Gen.  Thos.  J.,  leads  division 
toward  Thurman,  24;  passes  Rossville; 
reports  to  corps -commander;  advises 
Rosecrans  of  Bragg’s  location;  remains 
at  Chattanooga;  subsequently  advances; 
ordered  by  Rosecrans  to  dispatch  bri¬ 
gade  to  Lee -and -Gordon’s  mill,  40; 
ordered  to  support  Harker  at  Lee-and- 
Gordon’s  mill,  41;  left  alone  at  Gor¬ 
don’s  mill;  to  hold  position  stubbornly; 
to  retreat  toward  Chattanooga,  if  com¬ 
pelled;  to  be  supported,  46;  reenforced 
by  Barnes,  53;  suggestions  to  McCook 
by,  88,  89;  holds  conference  with  Davis, 
89;  copy  of  order  to,  by  Rosecrans,  to 
support  Reynolds;  how  he  understood 
the  same,  112,  114;  report  of,  cited, 
1 12,  1 13;  warns  Crittenden  against 
sending  artillery  into  woods;  advises 
same  of  his  own  movement  to  support 
Reynolds,  113;  should  have  ascertained 
meaning  of  Rosecrans’  order,  113,  114; 
knew  rebels  were  strong  in  his  front; 
knew  of  Sheridan’s  and  VanCleve’s 
movement  to  support  Thomas ;  criti¬ 
cised  for  unreasoning  obedience  to  or¬ 
ders,  1 14;  leads  Barnes’  brigade  to  sup¬ 
port  Reynolds;  directed  to  Baird;  re¬ 
turns  to  his  other  brigades;  finds  Buell 
gone;  mistakes  rebel  for  Union  forces; 
leads  Harker’s  brigade  to  Horseshoe 
Ridge,  12 1 ;  report  of,  cited,  121  n;  or¬ 
ders  Barnes  to  reenforce  Baird;  compo¬ 
sition  of  force  commanded  by  on  Horse¬ 
shoe  Ridge,  123;  accuses  and  complains 
of  Negley,  127;  especially  mentions 
Lt.-Col.  Aldrich’s  services,  13 1;  with 
Harker’s  brigade ;  attacked  by  Ker¬ 
shaw,  133;  attacked  by  Humphrey,  134; 
his  force  on  eastern  hill  of  Horseshoe 
Ridge,  140;  ordered  by  Gen.  Thomas  to 
withdraw,  200;  report  of,  cited,  212  n; 
com.  1st  division,  21st  corps,  219;  men¬ 
tion,  198. 

Wood’s  (Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  J.)  division, 
advances  toward  Thurman,  24;  action 
of  sharpshooters  belonging  to,  38;  re¬ 
mains  in  Chattanooga;  portion  of  sub¬ 
sequently  advances,  40;  supports  Har¬ 
ker,  41;  at  Lee-and-Gordon’s  mill,  50; 
Palmer  and  VanCleve  to  shift  to  left  of, 
64;  VanCleve  leaves  Barnes’  brigade 
with,  85,  88;  remains  at  Lee-and-Gor¬ 
don’s  mill ;  ordered  to  support  Van 
Cleve,  88;  Harker’s  and  Buell’s  bri¬ 
gades  attached  to,  89;  in  right  wing,  99; 
ordered  to  relieve  Negley’s,  102;  of 
Crittenden’s  corps;  takes  place  of  Sir- 


INDEX. 


295 


well’s;  between  Brannan  artd  Davis; 
VanCleve’s  brigade  forms  in  rear  of, 
no;  in  line  with  Reynolds’;  difficulties 
in  way  of  junction  between  them;  under 
what  circumstances  possible;  has  sharp 
skirmish  with  rebels,  1 1 3 ;  moves  to 
support  Reynolds,  114;  Hood’s  column 
stands  opposite,  1 1 5 ;  moves  out  ot  line; 
crowded  by  VanCleve;  Buell’s  brigade 
attached  to;  routed  by  Hood,  116;  its 
withdrawal  leaves  gap  in  Union  centre; 
crowded  by  rebels,  118;  Buell’s  brigade 
attached  to,  123;  part  of  Dick’s  brigade 
goes  to  support  of,  131;  Brannan  joined 
by  stragglers  from,  133;  Thomas  orders 
Steedman  to  support,  137;  Thomas  in 
rear  of,  147,  199;  furious  conflict  in 
front  of,  201;  Steedman  to  move  to  left 
of,  202;  withdraws  at  what  hour;  Steed- 
man’s  withdrawal  disastrous  to,  212; 
roster  of,  219,  220;  casualties  in,  236; 
strength  and  losses  of,  239. 

Woodbury,  Lieut.  Albert,  com.  2d  Minn. 
Light  Battery,  218. 

Woodruff,  Col.  L.  T.,  36th  Ala.,  229. 


Woolfolk’s  (Va.)  battery,  of  Longstreet’s 
corps,  228. 

Wright,  Col.  Geo.  B.,  106th  Ohio,  222. 

Wright,  Brig.-Gen.  Marcus  J..  commands 
Wright’s  brigade,  224. 

Wright’s  (Brig.-Gen.  Marcus  J. )  brigade, 
in  Cheatham’s  first  line;  supported  by 
Clayton;  engages  Hazen’s  and  Dodge’s 
brigades;  suffers  severely;  loses  Carnes’ 
battery,  74;  entirely  broken;  Clayton’s 
sent  to  support,  75;  of  Cheatham’s  div¬ 
ision,  224. 

Y 

York’s  battery,  230. 

York,  Capt.  Harrison  B.,  com.  9th  Ohio 
Light  Battery,  221. 

Young,  Lt.-Col.  Wm.  H.,  26th  Ohio,  219. 

Z 

Zinken,  Col.  Leon  von,  com.  13th  and 
20th  Louisiana,  225. 


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ADVERTISEMENT. 


Noted  Battles  for  the  Union 

DURING  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

In  the  United  States  of  America,  1861-5. 

BY 

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And  later  will  follow 

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Early  Society  in  Southern  Illinois.  By  Rev.  Robert  W.  Patterson,  D.D. 

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21, 1881.  Third  Paper.  By  Hon.  John  Wentworth,  LL.D.  With  an  Appendix,  etc. 
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IO. — Reminiscences  of  Early  Chicago  (1833).  By  Charles  Cleaver. 

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Recollections  of  the  Bench  and  Bar  of  Central  Illinois.  By  Hon.  James 

C.  Conklin G  of  Springfield.  Read  January  12,  1881. 

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Cent.  R.  R.  Notes  by  Hon.  John  Wentworth.  Also  an  Appendix  with  the  Breese- 
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Chiefs  of  the  Miami  Indians,  in  answer  to  General  Harrison,  Governor  of  Indiana 
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1  • 

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(GOV.  REYNOLDS’)  PIONEER  HISTORY  OF  ILLINOIS. 

Containing  the  Discovery  in  1673  and  the  History  of  the  Country  to  the 
Year  1818,  when  the  State  Government  was  organized.  By  John  Reynolds,  late 
Governor  of  Illinois,  Member  of  Congress,  State  Senator,  and  Representative,  etc., 
Belleville,  Ill.,  1852.  Reprinted  from  Mi*  m-i  inal  edition,  to  which  have  been  added 
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THE  MARTYRDOM  OF  LOVEJOY. 

An  Account  of  the  Life,  Trials,  and  Perils  of  Rev.  Elijah  P.  Lovejoy,  who 
was  killed  by  a  Pro-Slavery  Mob,  at  Alton,  Ill.,  on  the  night  of  November  7,  1837. 
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(Vol.  I.)  HISTORY  OF  THE  ENGLISH  SETTLEMENT 

In  Edwards  County,  Illinois;  Founded  by  Morris  Birkbeck  (portrait)  and  George 
Flower  (portrait),  in  1817  and  1818.  By  George  Flower.  With  Preface  and  Foot- 
Notes  by  Hon.  E.  B.  Washburne.  Complete  Subject  and  Personal  Indexes.  Cloth 
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(Vol.  III.)  THE  EDWARDS  PAPERS. 

Steel  portraits  of  Gov.  Edwards  and  D.  P.  Cook;  20  fac-simile  (lithographed)  letters. 
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(Vol.  IV.)  EARLY  CHICAGO  AND  ILLINOIS. 

Sketches  of  Gurdon  S.  Hubbard,  Isaac  N.  Arnold,  E.  B.  Washburne,  Mark  Skin¬ 
ner,  Samuel  Stone,  Pierre  Menard,  Philo  Carpenter,  etc,,  etc.,  with  Portraits.  Cloth 
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CHICAGO  ANTIQUITIES. 

Comprising  original  Items  and  Relations,  Letters,  Extracts,  and  Notes, 

pertaining  to  Early  Chicago;  embellished  with  Views,  Portraits,  Autographs,  etc. 
By  Henry  H.  Hurlbut.  Pp.  673;  8vo.  Cloth  Boards;  Gilt-top.  1881.  Price,  $7.50 


THE  DEARBORNS  (portraits). 

A  Discourse  commemorative  of  the  Eightieth  Anniversary  of  the  Occupation  of 
Fort  Dearborn,  and  the  First  Settlement  at  Chicago.  Read  before  the  Chicago  His¬ 
torical  Society,  Tuesday,  Dec.  18, 1883.  By  Daniel  Goodwin,  Jr.  With  Remarks  df 
Hons.  John  Wentworth,  J.  Young  Scammon,  E.  B.  Washburne,  and  I.  N.  Arnold. 
Pp.  56 ;  8vo.  1884.  Paper,  5(3  oents. 


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Geo.  C.  Miln’s  Famous  Sermons  on  I.  The  Church — Its  Past;  II.  The 
Church— Its  Present;  III.  The  Church— Its  Future;  IV.  A  Sermon  on  The 
Mastery  of  Loye;  and  V.  His  Farewell  to  the  Pulpit.  Also,  a  fine  Carbon 
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which  Mr.  Miln  belongs;  and  as  these  Sermons  resulted  in  his  exclusion  from  the 
Pulpit  of  a  Unitarian  church  (Unity  Church,  Chicago),  they  may  be  regarded  as  a 
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